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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

NASA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering (REV B)

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses, GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System Safety Engineering for NASA if adequate modeling processes and environment are established.

NASA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

Model Based Engineering↗
NASA NTRS1992

Making the Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission safe

This paper will detail how the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) system safety program is conducted. Numerous safety analyses are conducted through the various phases of design, test, and fabrication, and results are presented to NASA management for discussion during dedicated safety reviews. This paper will then address the system safety assessment and risk analysis methodologies used (i.e. hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis), and how they are coupled with enginering and test analyses for a 'synergistic picture' of the system. Some preliminary safety analysis results, showing the relationship between hazard identification, control or abatement, and finally control verification, will be presented as examples of this safety process.

Bahr, N. J.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Making the Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission safe

The implementation of the HST system safety program is detailed. Numerous safety analyses are conducted through various phases of design, test, and fabrication, and results are presented to NASA management for discussion during dedicated safety reviews. Attention is given to the system safety assessment and risk analysis methodologies used, i.e., hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis, and to how they are coupled with engineering and test analysis for a 'synergistic picture' of the system. Some preliminary safety analysis results, showing the relationship between hazard identification, control or abatement, and finally control verification, are presented as examples of this safety process.

Bahr, N. J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

NASA Taxonomies for Searching Problem Reports and FMEAs

Many types of hazard and risk analyses are used during the life cycle of complex systems, including Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis, Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Reliability Analysis and analysis of Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) databases. The success of these methods depends on the availability of input data and the analysts knowledge. Standard nomenclature can increase the reusability of hazard, risk and problem data. When nomenclature in the source texts is not standard, taxonomies with mapping words (sets of rough synonyms) can be combined with semantic search to identify items and tag them with metadata based on a rich standard nomenclature. Semantic search uses word meanings in the context of parsed phrases to find matches. The NASA taxonomies provide the word meanings. Spacecraft taxonomies and ontologies (generalization hierarchies with attributes and relationships, based on terms meanings) are being developed for types of subsystems, functions, entities, hazards and failures. The ontologies are broad and general, covering hardware, software and human systems. Semantic search of Space Station texts was used to validate and extend the taxonomies. The taxonomies have also been used to extract system connectivity (interaction) models and functions from requirements text. Now the Reconciler semantic search tool and the taxonomies are being applied to improve search in the Space Shuttle PRACA database, to discover recurring patterns of failure. Usual methods of string search and keyword search fall short because the entries are terse and have numerous shortcuts (irregular abbreviations, nonstandard acronyms, cryptic codes) and modifier words cannot be used in sentence context to refine the search. The limited and fixed FMEA categories associated with the entries do not make the fine distinctions needed in the search. The approach assigns PRACA report titles to problem classes in the taxonomy. Each ontology class includes mapping words - near-synonyms naming different manifestations of that problem class. The mapping words for Problems, Entities and Functions are converted to a canonical form plus any of a small set of modifier words (e.g. non-uniformity NOT + UNIFORM.) The report titles are parsed as sentences if possible, or treated as a flat sequence of word tokens if parsing fails. When canonical forms in the title match mapping words, the PRACA entry is associated with the corresponding Problem, Entity or Function in the ontology. The user can search for types of failures associated with types of equipment, clustering by type of problem (e.g., all bearings found with problems of being uneven: rough, irregular, gritty ). The results could also be used for tagging PRACA report entries with rich metadata. This approach could also be applied to searching and tagging failure modes, failure effects and mitigations in FMEAs. In the pilot work, parsing 52K+ truncated titles (the test cases that were available), has resulted in identification of both a type of equipment and type of problem in about 75% of the cases. The results are displayed in a manner analogous to Google search results. The effort has also led to the enrichment of the taxonomy, adding some new categories and many new mapping words. Further work would make enhancements that have been identified for improving the clustering and further reducing the false alarm rate. (In searching for recurring problems, good clustering is more important than reducing false alarms). Searching complete PRACA reports should lead to immediate improvement.

Malin, Jane T.↗
NASA NTRS1981

System safety in Stirling engine development

The DOE/NASA Stirling Engine Project Office has required that contractors make safety considerations an integral part of all phases of the Stirling engine development program. As an integral part of each engine design subtask, analyses are evolved to determine possible modes of failure. The accepted system safety analysis techniques (Fault Tree, FMEA, Hazards Analysis, etc.) are applied in various degrees of extent at the system, subsystem and component levels. The primary objectives are to identify critical failure areas, to enable removal of susceptibility to such failures or their effects from the system and to minimize risk.

Bankaitis, H.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Addressing Uniqueness and Unison of Reliability and Safety for a Better Integration

Over time, it has been observed that Safety and Reliability have not been clearly differentiated, which leads to confusion, inefficiency, and, sometimes, counter-productive practices in executing each of these two disciplines. It is imperative to address this situation to help Reliability and Safety disciplines improve their effectiveness and efficiency. The paper poses an important question to address, "Safety and Reliability - Are they unique or unisonous?" To answer the question, the paper reviewed several most commonly used analyses from each of the disciplines, namely, FMEA, reliability allocation and prediction, reliability design involvement, system safety hazard analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment. The paper pointed out uniqueness and unison of Safety and Reliability in their respective roles, requirements, approaches, and tools, and presented some suggestions for enhancing and improving the individual disciplines, as well as promoting the integration of the two. The paper concludes that Safety and Reliability are unique, but compensating each other in many aspects, and need to be integrated. Particularly, the individual roles of Safety and Reliability need to be differentiated, that is, Safety is to ensure and assure the product meets safety requirements, goals, or desires, and Reliability is to ensure and assure maximum achievability of intended design functions. With the integration of Safety and Reliability, personnel can be shared, tools and analyses have to be integrated, and skill sets can be possessed by the same person with the purpose of providing the best value to a product development.

Huang, Zhaofeng↗
NASA NTRS2002

Application of Risk Assessment Tools in the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Process

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently implementing the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Program developed by the Carnegie Mellon University and recommended by NASA as the Risk Management (RM) implementation approach. The four most frequently used risk assessment tools in the center are: (a) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). There are some guidelines for selecting the type of risk assessment tools during the project formulation phase of a project, but there is not enough guidance as to how to apply these tools in the Continuous Risk Management process (CRM). But the ways the safety and risk assessment tools are used make a significant difference in the effectiveness in the risk management function. Decisions regarding, what events are to be included in the analysis, to what level of details should the analysis be continued, make significant difference in the effectiveness of risk management program. Tools of risk analysis also depends on the phase of a project e.g. at the initial phase of a project, when not much data are available on hardware, standard FMEA cannot be applied; instead a functional FMEA may be appropriate. This study attempted to provide some directives to alleviate the difficulty in applying FTA, PRA, and FMEA in the CRM process. Hazard Analysis was not included in the scope of the study due to the short duration of the summer research project.

Paul S. Ray↗
NASA NTRS2009

A Reference Model for Software and System Inspections. White Paper

Software Quality Assurance (SQA) is an important component of the software development process. SQA processes provide assurance that the software products and processes in the project life cycle conform to their specified requirements by planning, enacting, and performing a set of activities to provide adequate confidence that quality is being built into the software. Typical techniques include: (1) Testing (2) Simulation (3) Model checking (4) Symbolic execution (5) Management reviews (6) Technical reviews (7) Inspections (8) Walk-throughs (9) Audits (10) Analysis (complexity analysis, control flow analysis, algorithmic analysis) (11) Formal method Our work over the last few years has resulted in substantial knowledge about SQA techniques, especially the areas of technical reviews and inspections. But can we apply the same QA techniques to the system development process? If yes, what kind of tailoring do we need before applying them in the system engineering context? If not, what types of QA techniques are actually used at system level? And, is there any room for improvement.) After a brief examination of the system engineering literature (especially focused on NASA and DoD guidance) we found that: (1) System and software development process interact with each other at different phases through development life cycle (2) Reviews are emphasized in both system and software development. (Figl.3). For some reviews (e.g. SRR, PDR, CDR), there are both system versions and software versions. (3) Analysis techniques are emphasized (e.g. Fault Tree Analysis, Preliminary Hazard Analysis) and some details are given about how to apply them. (4) Reviews are expected to use the outputs of the analysis techniques. In other words, these particular analyses are usually conducted in preparation for (before) reviews. The goal of our work is to explore the interaction between the Quality Assurance (QA) techniques at the system level and the software level.

He, Lulu↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Redundancy-Guided Approach for the Hazard Analysis of Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Advanced Nuclear Power Plants

We report digital instrumentation and control (I&C) upgrades are a vital research area for the nuclear industry. Despite their performance benefits, deployment of digital I&C in nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been limited. Digital I&C systems exhibit complex failure modes including common cause failures (CCFs), which can be difficult to identify. This paper describes the development of a redundancy-guided application of the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis and fault tree analysis for the hazard analysis of digital I&C in advanced NPPs. The resulting Redundancy-Guided Systems-Theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) is applied for the case study of a representative state-of-the-art digital reactor trip system. The analysis qualitatively and systematically identifies the most critical CCFs and other hazards of digital I&C systems. Ultimately, the RESHA can help researchers make informed decisions for how, and to what degree, defensive measures such as redundancy, diversity, and defense in depth can be used to mitigate or eliminate the potential hazards of digital I&C systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS1993

Reliability studies of integrated modular engine system designs

A study was performed to evaluate the reliability of Integrated Modular Engine (IME) concepts. Comparisons were made between networked IME systems and non-networked discrete systems using expander cycle configurations. Both redundant and non-redundant systems were analyzed. Binomial approximation and Markov analysis techniques were employed to evaluate total system reliability. In addition, Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA), Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) were performed to allow detailed evaluation of the IME concept. A discussion of these system reliability concepts is also presented.

Hardy, Terry L.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Reliability studies of Integrated Modular Engine system designs

A study was performed to evaluate the reliability of Integrated Modular Engine (IME) concepts. Comparisons were made between networked IME systems and non-networked discrete systems using expander cycle configurations. Both redundant and non-redundant systems were analyzed. Binomial approximation and Markov analysis techniques were employed to evaluate total system reliability. In addition, Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA), Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) were performed to allow detailed evaluation of the IME concept. A discussion of these system reliability concepts is also presented.

Hardy, Terry L.↗
NASA NTRS2004

GRC Payload Hazard Assessment: Supporting the STS-107 Accident Investigation

A hazard assessment was conducted on the GRC managed payloads in support of a NASA Headquarters Code Q request to examine STS-107 payloads and determine if they were credible contributors to the Columbia accident. This assessment utilized each payload's Final Flight Safety Data Package for hazard identification. An applicability assessment was performed and most of the hazards were eliminated because they dealt with payload operations or crew interactions. A Fault Tree was developed for all the hazards deemed applicable and the safety verification documentation was reviewed for these applicable hazards. At the completion of this hazard assessment, it was concluded that none of the GRC managed payloads were credible contributors to the Columbia accident.

Schoren, William R.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Testing for Software Safety

This research focuses on testing whether or not the hazardous conditions identified by design-level fault tree analysis will occur in the target implementation. Part 1: Integrate fault tree models into functional specifications so as to identify testable interactions between intended behaviors and hazardous conditions. Part 2: Develop a test generator that produces not only functional tests but also safety tests for a target implementation in a cost-effective way. Part 3: Develop a testing environment for executing generated functional and safety tests and evaluating test results against expected behaviors or hazardous conditions. It includes a test harness as well as an environment simulation of external events and conditions.

Chen, Ken↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advancing Multi-Hazard Risk and Safety Considerations for Aging Nuclear Facilities

While probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear facilities is expected to include internal and external hazards for a risk-informed and performance-based design, the current state of practice treats each hazard independently. However, such an independent treatment of hazards may not account for the correlations between different hazards and their response of and damage to the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in a plant resulting in underestimating the overall risk. This project proposes to advance the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities to more adequately evaluate concurrent hazards and contribute to an increased safety of nuclear plants. A framework for multi-hazard PRA will be developed by identifying concurrent hazard events (both internal and external) and event sequences that include interdependencies through the response of SSCs. An example application of the multi-hazard PRA framework will be demonstrated by considering a generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) subjected to seismic and internal flooding hazards. Computational models for the response of components will be developed to generated multi-hazard fragility surfaces under seismic and flooding loads. A PRA model consisting of event and fault trees will also be developed to quantify the multi-hazard risk profile and compare it with the independent hazard risk profile. Overall, by advancing the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities, this project enhances nuclear safety and reduces costs by mitigating unforeseen consequences caused by correlations between concurrent hazards.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Faulty State Occurrence in Wildfire UAS Missions Using Markov Chains

As autonomous technology advances, unmanned aircraft systems are increasingly integrated into emergency response missions, such as wildfire response. These systems must be be safe with less risk than non-autonomous counter parts, yet quantifying the risk associated with present-day and future systems conventionally relies solely on expert opinion and little data. Instead, combining narrative mishap reports with probabilistic analysis can provide a method for evolutionary and timely risk analysis. In this paper, we present a framework for a data-driven probabilistic risk assessment style analysis, where hazard events and rates originate from documented UAS mishaps. The framework is applied to a UAS mapping mission in wildfire response, including a fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and probabilistic analysis using Markov Chains. The analysis provides an enumeration of hazards in the system, hazard events that can lead to faults, the probability of a mission experiencing any fault, the probability of experiencing a specific fault, and the expected time spent until faulty states occur in present-day operations.

risk analysis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Faulty State Occurrence in Wildfire UAS Missions Using Markov Chains

As autonomous technology advances, unmanned aircraft systems are increasingly integrated into emergency response missions, such as wildfire response. These systems must be be safe with less risk than non-autonomous counter parts, yet quantifying the risk associated with present-day and future systems conventionally relies solely on expert opinion and little data. Instead, combining narrative mishap reports with probabilistic analysis can provide a method for evolutionary and timely risk analysis. In this paper, we present a framework for a data-driven probabilistic risk assessment style analysis, where hazard events and rates originate from documented UAS mishaps. The framework is applied to a UAS mapping mission in wildfire response, including a fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and probabilistic analysis using Markov Chains. The analysis provides an enumeration of hazards in the system, hazard events that can lead to faults, the probability of a mission experiencing any fault, the probability of experiencing a specific fault, and the expected time spent until faulty states occur in present-day operations.

risk analysis↗