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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1996

An Independent Evaluation of the FMEA/CIL Hazard Analysis Alternative Study

The present instruments of safety and reliability risk control for a majority of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs/projects consist of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Critical Items List (CIL), and Hazard Report (HR). This extensive analytical approach was introduced in the early 1970's and was implemented for the Space Shuttle Program by NHB 5300.4 (1D-2. Since the Challenger accident in 1986, the process has been expanded considerably and resulted in introduction of similar and/or duplicated activities in the safety/reliability risk analysis. A study initiated in 1995, to search for an alternative to the current FMEA/CIL Hazard Analysis methodology generated a proposed method on April 30, 1996. The objective of this Summer Faculty Study was to participate in and conduct an independent evaluation of the proposed alternative to simplify the present safety and reliability risk control procedure.

Ray, Paul S.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Application of Risk Assessment Tools in the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Process

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently implementing the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Program developed by the Carnegie Mellon University and recommended by NASA as the Risk Management (RM) implementation approach. The four most frequently used risk assessment tools in the center are: (a) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). There are some guidelines for selecting the type of risk assessment tools during the project formulation phase of a project, but there is not enough guidance as to how to apply these tools in the Continuous Risk Management process (CRM). But the ways the safety and risk assessment tools are used make a significant difference in the effectiveness in the risk management function. Decisions regarding, what events are to be included in the analysis, to what level of details should the analysis be continued, make significant difference in the effectiveness of risk management program. Tools of risk analysis also depends on the phase of a project e.g. at the initial phase of a project, when not much data are available on hardware, standard FMEA cannot be applied; instead a functional FMEA may be appropriate. This study attempted to provide some directives to alleviate the difficulty in applying FTA, PRA, and FMEA in the CRM process. Hazard Analysis was not included in the scope of the study due to the short duration of the summer research project.

Paul S. Ray↗
NASA NTRS2011

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗
NASA NTRS2012

Managing Space System Faults: Coalescing NASA's Views

Managing faults and their resultant failures is a fundamental and critical part of developing and operating aerospace systems. Yet, recent studies have shown that the engineering "discipline" required to manage faults is not widely recognized nor evenly practiced within the NASA community. Attempts to simply name this discipline in recent years has been fraught with controversy among members of the Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM), Fault Management (FM), Fault Protection (FP), Hazard Analysis (HA), and Aborts communities. Approaches to managing space system faults typically are unique to each organization, with little commonality in the architectures, processes and practices across the industry.

Muirhead, Brian↗
DOE OSTI2024

Air-coupled tsunamis generated from impacts and airbursts: Our understanding before Hunga-Tonga Hunga-Ha'apai

The effort to prevent or mitigate the effects of an impact on Earth is known as planetary defense. A significant component of planetary defense research involves risk assessment. Much of our understanding of the risk from near-Earth objects comes from the geologic record in the form of impact craters, but not all asteroid impacts are crater-forming events. Small asteroids explode before reaching the surface, generating an airburst, and most impacts into the ocean do not penetrate the water to form a crater in the sea floor. The risk from these non-crater-forming ocean impacts and airbursts is difficult to quantify and represents a significant uncertainty in our assessment of the overall threat. We are currently working to better understand impact scenarios that can generate dangerous tsunamis. One of the suggested mechanisms for the production of asteroid–generated tsunamis is by direct coupling of the pressure wave to the water, analogous to the means by which a moving weather front can generate a meteotsunami. To test this hypothesis, we ran a series of airburst simulations and provided time-resolved pressure and wind profiles to use as source functions for tsunami models. We used the CTH hydrocode to model the various airburst scenarios to compare to the results of other simulations and provide time dependent boundary conditions as input to shallow-water wave propagation codes. The strongest and most destructive meteotsunamis are generated by atmospheric pressure oscillations with amplitudes of only a few hPa1 (mbar), corresponding to changes in sea level of a few cm. The resulting wave is strongest when there is a resonance between the ocean and the atmospheric forcing. A Proudman resonance takes place when the atmospheric disturbance’s translational speed (U) equals the longwave phase speed $\sqrt{gh}$ of shallow water wave. Coupling is strongest when the Froude number (Fr=U/c) is unity. A weather front propagates much slower than the speed of sound, so meteotsunamis are most common and dangerous in shallow bodies of water such as the Mediterranean Sea or Lake Michigan. By contrast, the blast wave from an airburst or crater-forming impact propagates at a speed faster than a tsunami in the deepest ocean, and a Proudman resonance cannot be achieved even though the overpressures are orders of magnitude greater. However, blast wave profiles are N-waves in which a sharp shock wave leading to overpressure is followed by a more gradual rarefaction to a much longer-duration underpressure phase. Even though the blast outruns the water wave it is forcing, the tsunami should continue to be driven by the out-of-resonance gradient associated with the suction phase, which may depend strongly on the details of the airburst or impact scenario. The open question is whether there are any conditions under which such an airburst-driven tsunami can be dangerous enough to contribute to the overall impact risk. We have also identified other potential mechanisms for airburst-generated tsunamis: 1) reaction force at the surface from the plume ejected into space, which carries significant momentum, 2) expanding toroidal vortices at the surface, which travel more slowly than the shock wave and can generate a Proudman resonance in relatively shallow ocean (such as continental shelf), and 3) steam explosion from seawater ablation by a “Type II” (Libyan Desert Glass-type) airburst in which the hot vapor jet descends to the surface. On January 15, 2022, the Hunga-Tonga Hunga-Ha’apai volcano, located approximately 60 km north of Tongatapu, the main island of Tonga, violently erupted with a powerful explosion, culminating the period of volcanic activity that started in December of 2021. This event and resulting tsunamis provided an existence proof for the air pressure wave coupling mechanism we proposed. It also suggests that it can be stronger and more significant over much greater distances than we contemplated, leading to global tsunamis associated with impact events on land as well as in the water. Large atmospheric explosions generate global Lamb waves with larger amplitudes, longer periods, and slower speeds than the local and regional blast waves we modeled prior to that event. This paper reviews our analysis and modeling of airburst-driven tsunamis prior to the 2022 Hunga-Tonga Hunga-Ha’apai tsunami, which was the subject of two presentations at the 2023 Planetary Defense Conference and is the subject of another paper currently in preparation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Long-term patterns of post-fire harvest diverge among ownerships in the Pacific West, U.S.A.

Abstract Post-fire harvest (PFH) is a forest management practice designed to salvage value from burned timber, mitigate safety hazards from dead trees, reduce long-term fuels, and prepare sites for replanting. Despite public controversy and extensive ecological research, little is known about how much PFH occurs on private and public lands in the U.S. Pacific West, or how practices changed with shifting forest policy and increasing area burned over the last three decades. We mapped PFH across 2.2M burned hectares in California, Oregon, and Washington between 1986-2017 and used time series intervention analysis to compare trends in area, rate (% of burned area harvested), and mean patch size between private (0.5M ha) and federal (1.6M ha) forest land and across a gradient of burn severity. Harvest rates varied by ownership (4.9% federal, 18.6% private, 8.0% overall), and practices evolved and diverged over the study period. PFH area and rate declined across all ownerships in the mid-1990s during a period of reduced fire activity. As area burned increased between the early 2000s and late 2010s, PFH area rebounded and surpassed late-1980s levels, while rates remained relatively low. On federal lands, PFH practices shifted in the early-to-mid 1990s towards lower rates (10.3% to 3.8%) and smaller patches (6.0 to 3.3 ha), following policy changes and increased litigation. PFH rates on federal lands decreased at all levels of burn severity, with the largest decreases (6.2% to 1.2%) in forests with low tree mortality (i.e. fire refugia). Conversely, private PFH rates and mean patch sizes more than doubled in forests burned at very low-to-moderate severity. Our results highlight how PFH practices have shifted with policy, socio-economic pressure, and increasing area burned over 31 years in the Pacific West. A similar area of post-fire harvest is now dispersed over larger fires, with practices diverging substantially between ownerships.

Zuspan, Aaron (ORCID:0000000315833710)↗
NASA NTRS2019

Defining Navigation Requirements for Future Precision Lander Missions

Human mission concepts for both the Moon and Mars require landing precision capabilities beyond the current state of art. The Safe and Precise Landing Integrated Capabilities Evolution (SPLICE) project leverages previous work at NASA to develop multimission precision landing and hazard avoidance (PL&HA) technologies to meet the advanced landing requirements. SPLICE aims to develop guidance, navigation and control (GN&C) capabilities for both Moon and Mars lander missions. The approach the project is using to identify a standard suite begins with developing a PL&HA requirements matrix to inform technology investments. The approach to develop a multi-mission navigation requirements matrix includes identifying representative concepts of operations for both robotic and human missions. It also identifies navigation sensor options with estimated performance parameters. This paper summarizes the concepts of operations and sensors considered to develop the SPLICE PL&HA requirements matrix. A description of the analysis used to determine candidate optimal sensor suites and initial results are provided.

Dwyer Cianciolo, Alicia↗
DOE OSTI2020

Distribution Development for Residual Inventory at the New York West Valley Site - 20400

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351 ha site located approximately 48 km south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into Agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States. NFS, a private company, built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations ended in 1972 and never reopened, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. Operations led to contamination in a number of facilities and locations. Some of that contamination has migrated from waste disposal zones to other layers, formations, and features on and off the WNYNSC. Phase I decommissioning activities are ongoing and involve the removal of a number of areas and structures that have been associated with contamination. The purpose of this work is to outline the approach for characterizing contamination not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. In this work, the term, residual radiological activity, is used to describe environmental contamination that exists subsequent to the completion of Phase I decommissioning activities, that is not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. Contamination from the Site was quantified relative to data that characterize the concentrations of radionuclides that exist in background. Background concentrations are those present in the area but having no influence from Site related activities. The existence of residual radiological activity that is elevated relative to background has the potential to contribute to future risks to human health and the environment. As a consequence, the residual inventory information is used to inform the West Valley Probabilistic Performance Assessment (PPA) model to characterize potential future risks to human health and the environment. The centralized West Valley Data Management System (DMS) was the source of information for the data assembled in this analysis. The DMS is a fairly large compilation consisting of thousands of records from investigation studies, with sample dates ranging from 1990 to present. Samples from monitoring wells, boreholes, geoprobe studies, surface water, surface soils, storm water outfalls, ventilation stack filters, plant and animal tissues, and more are included in the DMS. Results are typically reported in units of activity per unit volume. For the purpose of the analyses presented here, all results were converted into consistent units of pCi per unit volume. Since 1990, data have been collected from various locations across the WNYNSC at different times with varying frequency over the course of several decades. As a consequence, a number of potential issues can arise with respect to the assembly of a dataset that is deemed adequate for the characterization of residual radiological activity. These issues were assessed and resolved to the extent possible through careful consideration of the properties of the distributions. The intent was to use data which characterize the current state of the Site. Radionuclides can be designated to one of several groups depending on their origin. In this work the groups considered were 1) Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM), 2) fallout, and 3) Other (including power plant, medical research, etc). This grouping is a useful construct with respect to the interpretation of fixed laboratory results. For example, NORM radionuclides that exist within a decay chain should have approximately equivalent distributions of concentrations if they are representative of background conditions. Insights such as these can be used as a check to identify sample results that need to be further investigated or omitted due to issues associated with reported results from fixed laboratory analyses. This type of analysis provided a foundation for the assessment of the adequacy of sample results for use in subsequent components of an assessment. The general process for the assessment of residual radiological contamination at the Site consists of a sequence of several steps. First, for each analyte, several statistical tests were performed to assess the weight of evidence against the null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of concentrations was equal to zero. If the mean of the distribution of concentrations for a given radionuclide was not found to be greater than zero, then it was removed from consideration as a component of the residual radiological contamination. If there was significant evidence to reject the hypothesis of the mean being equal to zero, the second step was to compare the distribution of the data from the Site to that of the corresponding background. A suite of tests was used to compare the distributions of the site and background data. The results of these tests were collectively used to determine if site data are elevated relative to background. The third step was to develop distributions using a Bayesian framework to characterize the distribution of mean of the increment present above background for each of the radionuclides. The Bayesian model implemented allowed for the comparison of site-specific records to background concentrations to better approximate contamination attributed to the Site. A final screening step was employed for radionuclides that exceed background. This screening step compared 95% upper confidence limits (UCLs) from the increment distribution developed in the previous step to the risk screening levels. This approach yields a list of analytes that were determined to be elevated relative to background.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗