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At least 19 records

NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health

This slide presentation reviews the history, and development of NASA-STD-3001, NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health, and the related Human Integration Design Handbook. Currently being developed from NASA-STD-3000, this project standard currently in review will be available in two volumes, (i.e., Volume 1 -- VCrew Health and Volume 2 -- Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health) and the handbook will be both available as a pdf file and as a interactive website.

Holubec, Keith↗

NASA’s Identified Risks of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture in Human Spaceflight

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. One of the identified risks is due to inadequate human systems integration architecture (HSIA) and a driving factor of this risk is that given decreasing real-time ground support for execution of complex operations during future exploration missions, there is a possibility of adverse performance outcomes including that crew are unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety critical procedural errors. The HSRB uses Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) as a communication tool for describing how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes and as the basis for understanding intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes. The HSIA risk DAG will be presented and described. Historically, critical malfunctions requiring Crew/MCC management occurred at a rate of 1.7 times per year for ISS averaged over the lifetime and 3-4 times per year in the burn in phase for the vehicle. These averages do not include EVA data, which greatly increases the incident rate. Prior experience from the Apollo program showed 10/11 crewed missions experienced significant anomalies where crew relied heavily on MCC expertise in real-time. These failure patterns are in line with those observed in other complex engineered systems (e.g., oil rigs, launch systems, commercial aviation, etc.) It is likely that general malfunction and error rates are > 10% for short duration missions (<30 days), based on past and current spaceflight operations data. Likelihood of adverse outcomes has the potential to increase as crew conduct work with new, complex systems and with less ground support. For Low Earth Orbit missions and Lunar missions less than 30 days, assuming minimal comm delays, disruptions and bandwidth limitations, malfunctions and errors can affect mission objectives and crew health but may be mitigated by ground support. For Lunar missions greater than 30 days and any potential Mars mission malfunctions and errors can have Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences due to reduced ground support (communication delays, constraints and blackouts) for more complex operations, as well as reduced resupply and evacuation options.

Daniel M Buckland↗

NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human-System Standard and the Human Integration Design Handbook

NASA-STD-3001 Space Flight Human-System Standard Volume 1, Crew Health, Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health, and the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH) have replaced the Man-Systems Integration Standards (MSIS), NASA-STD-3000. For decades, NASA-STD-3000 was a significant contribution to human spaceflight programs and to human-systems integration. However, with research program and project results being realized, advances in technology, and the availability of new information in a variety of topic areas, the time had arrived to update this extensive suite of standards and design information. NASA-STD-3001, Volume 2 contains the Agency level standards from the human and environmental factors disciplines that ensure human spaceflight operations are performed safely, efficiently, and effectively. The HIDH is organized in the same sequence and serves as the companion document to NASA-STD-3001, Volume 2, providing a compendium of human spaceflight history and knowledge. The HIDH is intended to aid interpretation of NASA-STD-3001, Volume 2 standards and to provide guidance for requirement writers and vehicle and habitat designers. Keywords Human Factors, Standards, Environmental Factors, NASA

Whitmore, Mihriban↗

High Value Risk Targets in Human System Risk

The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. The Board is also charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Each Risk Custodian Team (RCT) identifies High Value Risk Mitigation Targets (HVRMT) that have the highest likelihood or greatest impact in reducing their risk. These typically include areas where there are major gaps in knowledge or capability; or other targets that promise to yield returns worthy of investments in time, money and other resources by stakeholders interested in reducing Human System Risk. As part of the review of each risk the Board members consider and discuss the HVRMT statements, which are then approved by the Board Chair. High Value Risk Mitigation Targets can include research activities funded by the Human Research Program, but often involve recommending standards, monitoring, or other operational goals to reduce risk. This presentation will discuss common themes and highlights of the approved HVRTs to inform IWS attendees and the wider research community.

D M Buckland↗

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Tool for Understanding the NASA Human Spaceflight System Risks - Human System Risk Board

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.

Erik L. Antonsen↗

Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS): Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Factors" and Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH) - Volume 2

This viewgraph presentation reviews the standards for space flight hardware based on human capabilities and limitations. The contents include: 1) Scope; 2) Applicable documents; 3) General; 4) Human Physical Characteristics and Capabilities; 5) Human Performance and Cognition; 6) Natural and Induced Environments; 7) Habitability Functions; 8) Architecture; 9) Hardware and Equipment; 10) Crew Interfaces; 11) Spacesuits; 12) Operatons: Reserved; 13) Ground Maintenance and Assembly: Reserved; 14) Appendix A-Reference Documents; 15) Appendix N-Acronyms and 16) Appendix C-Definition. Volume 2 is supported by the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH)s.

Davis, Jeffrey R.↗

NASA's Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.

human-systems integration architecture↗

Human System Risk Changes in 2021

The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are re-evaluated in a Continuous Risk Management (CRM) process. This session will summarize the risk posture changes that have occurred in the last year and what high level research, performance, and epidemiologic data have informed those changes. Human System Risks updated in 2021 include: Dynamic Loads, Sensorimotor, EVA, Crew Egress, Behavioral Medicine, Electrical Shock, Human System Integration Architecture (HSIA), Toxic Exposure, Bone Fracture, Cardiovascular, Medical Conditions, Renal Stone, CO2 Exposure, and Pharmacology.

Mary Van Baalen↗

Implementation of Human System Integration Workshop at NASA for Human Spaceflight

The human is a key element in the complex system of systems underlying space exploration missions. As a critical system, its operating bands and requirements need to be characterized and integrated with other systems. Optimal integration of the human system with hardware and software elements has an impact on multiple aspects of mission execution, including human health and performance, risk mitigation, effective design and functionality, enhanced safety, and reduced lifecycle costs. The field of Human Systems Integration (HSI) represents an interdisciplinary and comprehensive cross-cutting approach encompassing technical and management processes for integrating human as a system consideration and objective within and across all other system components and multiple domains. In addition to human activities, HSI covers training, operations and support dimensions. Moreover, HSI is an essential enabler to systems engineering practice, emphasizing human system aspects toward optimizing fully integrated system of systems performance while systematically infusing the needs of all users during the earliest stages of development. Consistent with the National Space Exploration Campaign, NASA is developing the Gateway, a lunar orbiting platform that will serve as astronaut habitat, support transit to deep space, validate new technologies and systems, and function as a science laboratory and communications hub, among other uses. It is an essential element of a phase that will extend human exploration into deep space through evolvable infrastructure and advanced technology, supporting assembly and logistics of other exploration architecture elements. In an effort to explore the current status and forward plan of HSI implementation in the mission (system of systems) lifecycle, the HSI Employee Resource Group conducted an HSI workshop using the Gateway Program as a case study. It revealed how different organizations at the Johnson Space Center incorporate HSI in their processes in preparation for the development and operation of the Gateway. The workshop focused on HSI methodology for implementation of the six NASA HSI domains: Human Factors Engineering, Operations Resources, Habitability and Environment, Maintainability and Supportability, Safety, and Training. Results from the workshop are reported on this paper, as well as some historical background of HSI at NASA, and the success in using an Employee Resource Group to promote technical knowledge. The authors hope that this information can be used to disseminate best practices for translational applications to other space exploration systems.

Silva-Martinez, Jackelynne↗

Implementation of Human System Integration Workshop at NASA for Human Spaceflight

The human is a key element in the complex system of systems underlying space exploration missions. As a critical system, its operating bands and requirements need to be characterized and integrated with other systems. Optimal integration of the human system with hardware and software elements has an impact on multiple aspects of mission execution, including human health and performance, risk mitigation, effective design and functionality, enhanced safety, and reduced lifecycle costs. The field of Human Systems Integration (HSI) represents an interdisciplinary and comprehensive cross-cutting approach encompassing technical and management processes for integrating human as a system consideration and objective within and across all other system components and multiple domains. In addition to human activities, HSI covers training, operations and support dimensions. Moreover, HSI is an essential enabler to systems engineering practice, emphasizing human system aspects toward optimizing fully integrated system of systems performance while systematically infusing the needs of all users during the earliest stages of development. Consistent with the National Space Exploration Campaign, NASA is developing the Gateway, a lunar orbiting platform that will serve as astronaut habitat, support transit to deep space, validate new technologies and systems, and function as a science laboratory and communications hub, among other uses. It is an essential element of a phase that will extend human exploration into deep space through evolvable infrastructure and advanced technology, supporting assembly and logistics of other exploration architecture elements. In an effort to explore the current status and forward plan of HSI implementation in the mission (system of systems) lifecycle, the HSI Employee Resource Group conducted an HSI workshop using the Gateway Program as a case study. It revealed how different organizations at the Johnson Space Center incorporate HSI in their processes in preparation for the development and operation of the Gateway. The workshop focused on HSI methodology for implementation of the six NASA HSI domains: Human Factors Engineering, Operations Resources, Habitability and Environment, Maintainability and Supportability, Safety, and Training. Results from the workshop are reported on this paper, as well as some historical background of HSI at NASA, and the success in using an Employee Resource Group to promote technical knowledge. The authors hope that this information can be used to disseminate best practices for translational applications to other space exploration systems.

Silva-Martinez, Jackelynne↗

Human Factors in Human-Systems Integration

Any large organization whose mission is to design and develop systems for humans, and train humans needs a well-developed integration and process plan to deal with the challenges that arise from managing multiple subsystems. Human capabilities, skills, and needs must be considered early in the design and development process, and must be continuously considered throughout the development lifecycle. This integration of human needs within system design is typically formalized through a Human-Systems Integration (HSI) program. By having an HSI program, an institution or organization can reduce lifecycle costs and increase the efficiency, usability, and quality of its products because human needs have been considered from the beginning.

Fitts, David J.↗

Development of Human System Integration at NASA

Human Systems Integration seeks to design systems around the capabilities and limitations of the humans which use and interact with the system, ensuring greater efficiency of use, reduced error rates, and less rework in the design, manufacturing and operational deployment of hardware and software. One of the primary goals of HSI is to get the human factors practitioner involved early in the design process. In doing so, the aim is to reduce future budget costs and resources in redesign and training. By the preliminary design phase of a project nearly 80% of the total cost of the project is locked in. Potential design changes recommended by evaluations past this point will have little effect due to lack of funding or a huge cost in terms of resources to make changes. Three key concepts define an effective HSI program. First, systems are comprised of hardware, software, and the human, all of which operate within an environment. Too often, engineers and developers fail to consider the human capacity or requirements as part of the system. This leads to poor task allocation within the system. To promote ideal task allocation, it is critical that the human element be considered early in system development. Poor design, or designs that do not adequately consider the human component, could negatively affect physical or mental performance, as well as, social behavior. Second, successful HSI depends upon integration and collaboration of all the domains that represent acquisition efforts. Too often, these domains exist as independent disciplines due to the location of expertise within the service structure. Proper implementation of HSI through participation would help to integrate these domains and disciplines to leverage and apply their interdependencies to attain an optimal design. Via this process domain interests can be integrated to perform effective HSI through trade-offs and collaboration. This provides a common basis upon which to make knowledgeable decisions. Finally, HSI must be considered early in the requirements development phase of system design and acquisition. This will provide the best opportunity to maximize return on investment (ROI) and system performance. HSI requirements must be developed in conjunction with capability ]based requirements generation through functional. HSI requirements will drive HSI metrics and embed HSI issues within the system design. After a system is designed, implementation of HSI oversights can be very expensive. An HSI program should be included as an integral part of a total system approach to vehicle and habitat development. This would include, but not limited to, workstation design, D&C development, volumetric analysis, training, operations, and human -robotic interaction. HSI is a necessary process for Human Space Flight programs to meet the Agency Human ]System standards and thus mitigate human risks to acceptable levels. NASA has been involved in HSI planning, procedures development, process, and implementation for many years, and has been building several internal and publicly accessible products to facilitate HSI fs inclusion in the NASA Systems Engineering Lifecycle. Some of these products include: NASA STD 3001 Volumes 1 and 2, Human Integration Design Handbook, NASA HSI Implementation Plan, NASA HSI Implementation Plan Templates, NASA HSI Implementation Handbook, and a 2 ]hour short course on HSI delivered as part of the NASA Space and Life Sciences Directorate Academy. These products have been created leveraging industry best practices and lessons learned from other Federal Government agencies.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗