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At least 19 records

Integrating Mission Timelines and Procedures to Enhance Situational Awareness in Human Spaceflight Operations

Future human spaceflight missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond will have significant transmission delays and reduced communications bandwidth compared to operations in Low Earth Orbit, requiring increased crew autonomy due to the limited availability of real-time support from Mission Control Center (MCC). In this paper, we argue for the development of technology to enhance situational awareness (SA) for a remote MCC and astronauts onboard the vehicle, describe a usability study conducted towards this aim, and identify key usability features for the design of future integrated timeline tools. By tightly integrating timelines and procedures, future crew systems can predict future constraint violations, suggest resolutions to these violations, and ultimately support more successful missions.

User experience↗

Integrating Mission Timelines and Procedures to Enhance Situational Awareness in Human Spaceflight Operations

Future human spaceflight missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond will have significant transmission delays and reduced communications bandwidth compared to operations in Low Earth Orbit, requiring increased crew autonomy due to the limited availability of real-time support from Mission Control Center (MCC). In this paper, we argue for the development of technology to enhance situational awareness (SA) for a remote MCC and astronauts onboard the vehicle, describe a usability study conducted towards this aim, and identify key usability features for the design of future integrated timeline tools. By tightly integrating timelines and procedures, future crew systems can predict future constraint violations, suggest resolutions to these violations, and ultimately support more successful missions.

user experience↗

Fault Management Techniques in Human Spaceflight Operations

This paper discusses human spaceflight fault management operations. Fault detection and response capabilities available in current US human spaceflight programs Space Shuttle and International Space Station are described while emphasizing system design impacts on operational techniques and constraints. Preflight and inflight processes along with products used to anticipate, mitigate and respond to failures are introduced. Examples of operational products used to support failure responses are presented. Possible improvements in the state of the art, as well as prioritization and success criteria for their implementation are proposed. This paper describes how the architecture of a command and control system impacts operations in areas such as the required fault response times, automated vs. manual fault responses, use of workarounds, etc. The architecture includes the use of redundancy at the system and software function level, software capabilities, use of intelligent or autonomous systems, number and severity of software defects, etc. This in turn drives which Caution and Warning (C&W) events should be annunciated, C&W event classification, operator display designs, crew training, flight control team training, and procedure development. Other factors impacting operations are the complexity of a system, skills needed to understand and operate a system, and the use of commonality vs. optimized solutions for software and responses. Fault detection, annunciation, safing responses, and recovery capabilities are explored using real examples to uncover underlying philosophies and constraints. These factors directly impact operations in that the crew and flight control team need to understand what happened, why it happened, what the system is doing, and what, if any, corrective actions they need to perform. If a fault results in multiple C&W events, or if several faults occur simultaneously, the root cause(s) of the fault(s), as well as their vehicle-wide impacts, must be determined in order to maintain situational awareness. This allows both automated and manual recovery operations to focus on the real cause of the fault(s). An appropriate balance must be struck between correcting the root cause failure and addressing the impacts of that fault on other vehicle components. Lastly, this paper presents a strategy for using lessons learned to improve the software, displays, and procedures in addition to determining what is a candidate for automation. Enabling technologies and techniques are identified to promote system evolution from one that requires manual fault responses to one that uses automation and autonomy where they are most effective. These considerations include the value in correcting software defects in a timely manner, automation of repetitive tasks, making time critical responses autonomous, etc. The paper recommends the appropriate use of intelligent systems to determine the root causes of faults and correctly identify separate unrelated faults.

O'Hagan, Brian↗

Utilizing a Common Model Architecture for the Simulation of On-Orbit Human Spaceflight Operations

Advances in computing and simulation technology during the 1980 s promoted the development of multiple simulations for on-orbit human spaceflight operations at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC). By the late 1980 s, it became increasingly clear that redundancy risked leading to inefficiencies in dissemination and incorporation of models across simulations, institutional organizations, and spaceflight programs. Software development tools, such as the Trick Simulation Environment, began to emerge providing a generalized framework for the development, integration, and operation of simulations. Throughout the 1990s, engineering, operations, and training simulations began to migrate to Trick in order to take advantage of a common simulation environment. Due to forecasted reductions in funding to the Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs in the early 2000s, the common framework that arose from this simulation migration was formalized as the Common Model Architecture (CMA). The CMA was established in order to further reduce redundancy, while promoting model sharing and enhancing model integrity. A minimal set of standards for data flows, functional interactions, and model organization based on Trick were defined for those features found to be most important in facilitating model interaction. Model-providing organizations within NASA JSC took ownership of models for their specific areas of expertise, and agreements were reached on common model sharing and usage. This paper describes the evolution of commonality enabled by the Trick Simulation Environment at JSC leading to the CMA, the standards defined by the CMA, a recent CMA simulation example, and potential application of the CMA to NASA s new Exploration program.

Leslie J Quiocho↗

Human Spaceflight Trajectory Operations: A Case Study from STS-132/ULF4

Prior to the launch of the STS-132/ULF4 mission, the International Space Station (ISS) Flight Control Team was alerted to the approach of a space debris with a predicted time of closest approach approximately 1 hr after Space Shuttle docking. As a result, the ISS team considered performing a collision avoidance maneuver prior to the Space Shuttle s approach. The purpose of this presentation will be to use this case study to illustrate best practices of the human spaceflight trajectory operations team. The presentation will begin with an overview of the roles of the real-time ISS and Space Shuttle trajectory flight control teams. Then, the STS-132/ULF4 case study will be used to illustrate the issues and lessons learned involved in performing Space Shuttle rendezvous maneuver planning and execution. Specific elements of the STS-132 Space Shuttle rendezvous maneuver profile that can be used to provide mission assurance in cases of trajectory uncertainty will be described and discussed. Additionally, this case study will be used to provide context for identifying lessons learned in an operational environment that requires technical and decision-making coordination between two control center teams with two potentially maneuvering space vehicles.

Cutri-Kohart, Rebecca↗

Human-Automation Allocations for Current Robotic Space Operations

Within the Human Research Program, one risk delineates the uncertainty surrounding crew working with automation and robotics in spaceflight. The Risk of Inadequate Design of Human and Automation/Robotic Integration (HARI) is concerned with the detrimental effects on crew performance due to ineffective user interfaces, system designs and/or functional task allocation, potentially compromising mission success and safety. Risk arises because we have limited experience with complex automation and robotics. One key gap within HARI, is the gap related to functional allocation. The gap states: We need to evaluate, develop, and validate methods and guidelines for identifying human-automation/robot task information needs, function allocation, and team composition for future long duration, long distance space missions. Allocations determine the human-system performance as it identifies the functions and performance levels required by the automation/robotic system, and in turn, what work the crew is expected to perform and the necessary human performance requirements. Allocations must take into account each of the human, automation, and robotic systems capabilities and limitations. Some functions may be intuitively assigned to the human versus the robot, but to optimize efficiency and effectiveness, purposeful role assignments will be required. The role of automation and robotics will significantly change in future exploration missions, particularly as crew becomes more autonomous from ground controllers. Thus, we must understand the suitability of existing function allocation methods within NASA as well as the existing allocations established by the few robotic systems that are operational in spaceflight. In order to evaluate future methods of robotic allocations, we must first benchmark the allocations and allocation methods that have been used. We will present 1) documentation of human-automation-robotic allocations in existing, operational spaceflight systems; and 2) To gather existing lessons learned and best practices in these role assignments, from spaceflight operational experience of crew and ground teams that may be used to guide development for future systems. NASA and other space agencies have operational spaceflight experience with two key Human-Automation-Robotic (HAR) systems: heavy lift robotic arms and planetary robotic explorers. Additionally, NASA has invested in high-fidelity rover systems that can carry crew, building beyond Apollo's lunar rover. The heavy lift robotic arms reviewed are: Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS), Japanese Remote Manipulator System (JEMRMS), and the European Robotic Arm (ERA, designed but not deployed in space). The robotic rover systems reviewed are: Mars Exploration Rovers, Mars Science Laboratory rover, and the high-fidelity K10 rovers. Much of the design and operational feedback for these systems have been communicated to flight controllers and robotic design teams. As part of the mitigating the HARI risk for future human spaceflight operations, we must document function allocations between robots and humans that have worked well in practice.

robotic allocation↗

Lessons Learned on Mega-Constellation Deployments and Impact to Space Domain Awareness

The breakneck expansion of multi-payload launches in low Earth orbit (LEO) has seen significant escalation over the last three years in the Space Domain Awareness (SDA) enterprise. The uptick in satellite deployment frequency, gradation of mega-constellation deployments utilizing electric propulsion, and surge in metric observation density from the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) have driven major system enhancements to ensure spaceflight safety. Beginning with the launch phase, new tactics, software, and procedures have been developed over the last few years to optimize the tasking of the SSN and ensure custody of all recently launched satellites that are added to the space catalog. Ensuring appropriate tasking levels were pivotal during the satellite separation phase, which necessitated updates to the mission systems for improved delineation between clustered satellites in a short window of time. The improved incorporation of utilizing satellite owner/operator-provided ephemeris coupled with critical code improvements have revolutionized how we maintain custody of Earth orbiting objects. The exponential population growth of Low-Earth orbiting satellites have also increased the quantity of Conjunction Data Messages sent out to partners such as the Trajectory Operations Group (TOPO) in Johnson Space Center. We will discuss the need for continued collaboration between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other mega-constellation satellite operators to safeguard human spaceflight operations. Lastly, we will discuss how mega-constellations are driving best practices for safe operations across the space community.

Christian Ramos↗

Horizontally Integrated Informatics to Support Science Operations in Human Spaceflight

Many systems will be designed and developed for the Artemis program. A subset of these systems will be relevant to scientific activities conducted during the program, but it is important to consider that these scientific activities will be conducted within the context of the larger program. Thinking about the program data holistically, and deliberately structuring its data products in a way that preserves the data’s mission context will enable new opportunities for real-time science support, and long-term analysis of the mission and its data for generations to come (see [1] for an example). Here, we show that horizontally integrated mission data products are valuable by describing the SSERVI RISE2 field program. Temporally contextualized data introduces relationships that do not need to be predefined. One field that greatly benefits from freeform relationship building between disparate datasets is anomaly investigation, where investigators need to follow lines of evidence that may not be a priori apparent. Building relationships between data enables accident investigators to react faster to time-sensitive incidents during EVA operation and other critical human spaceflight activities. Another advantage is the long-term data preservation that enables unplanned or yet-to-be conceived applications or study of this data many years in the future. As Artemis activities become more defined, having a horizontally integrated data management plan will be paramount to ensuring successful mission context is captured for generations to come.

B F Feist↗

Integrated Logistics and Supportability Challenges of Sustained Human Lunar Exploration

NASA’s Artemis program plans to establish a sustained human presence on the lunar surface. The International Space Station other space station programs have demonstrated long-duration human spaceflight operations that reuse infrastructure in Low Earth Orbit, sometimes including long uncrewed “dormant” periods. In contrast, human lunar exploration to date has consisted solely of relatively short sortie missions, rather than a sustained presence. A sustained human outpost on the Moon that can support month-long crewed exploration missions and be reused by multiple crews will be more challenging than past operations, particularly from the perspective of logistics, supportability, and risk. This paper examines the integrated logistics and supportability challenges of sustained human lunar exploration and provides a review of historical spaceflight experience in terms of crewed mission endurance, uncrewed duration, transportation overhead, and access to abort. Planned Artemis Base Camp crewed mission endurance is approximately 2.5 times longer than past lunar surface crewed mission endurance, but similar to average time between resupply for the International Space Station. Sustained human spacecraft have only twice experienced uncrewed durations longer than the planned interval between Artemis Base Camp missions, and Artemis surface assets will face long uncrewed periods more regularly than any past sustained human spacecraft. Transportation of crew and cargo to and from the Moon will be more difficult and time-consuming than transportation to and from Low Earth Orbit, and crew access to abort will be more limited. The implications of Artemis lunar operations for crewed Mars mission planning are also discussed. Historical approaches to risk management—including logistics, supportability, and abort strategies—should be reexamined and re-optimized for this new mission context. Sustained lunar operations will provide a valuable proving ground for testing new approaches to crewed space exploration.

logistics↗

Integrated Logistics and Supportability Challenges of Sustained Human Lunar Exploration

NASA’s Artemis program plans to establish a sustained human presence on the lunar surface. The International Space Station and other space station programs have demonstrated long-duration human spaceflight operations that reuse infrastructure in Low Earth Orbit, sometimes including long uncrewed “dormant” periods. In contrast, all human exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit to date has consisted solely of relatively short sortie missions, rather than a sustained presence. A sustained human outpost on the Moon that can support month-long crewed exploration missions and be reused by multiple crews will be more challenging than past operations, particularly from the perspective of logistics, supportability, and risk. This paper examines the integrated logistics and supportability challenges of sustained human lunar exploration and provides a review of historical spaceflight experience in terms of crewed mission endurance, uncrewed duration, transportation overhead, and access to abort. Planned Artemis Base Camp crewed mission endurance is approximately 2.5 times longer than past lunar surface crewed mission endurance, but similar to the average time between resupply for the International Space Station. Sustained human spacecraft have only twice experienced uncrewed durations longer than the planned interval between Artemis Base Camp missions, and Artemis surface assets will face long uncrewed periods more regularly than any past sustained human spacecraft. Transportation of crew and cargo to and from the Moon will be more difficult and time-consuming than transportation to and from Low Earth Orbit, and crew access to abort will be more limited. The implications of Artemis lunar operations for crewed Mars mission planning are also discussed. Historical approaches to risk management—including logistics, supportability, and abort strategies—should be reexamined and re-optimized for this new mission context. Sustained lunar operations will provide a valuable proving ground for testing new approaches to crewed space exploration.

logistics↗

Operational Considerations for Oxygen Flammability Risks: Concentrated Oxygen Diffusion and Permeation Behaviors

Increased human spaceflight operations utilize oxygen concentrations that are frequently varied with use of concentrations up to 100 percent oxygen. Even after exiting a higher percentage oxygen environment, high oxygen concentrations can still be maintained due to material saturation and oxygen entrapment between barrier materials. This paper examines the material flammability concerns that arise from changing oxygen environments during spaceflight operations. We examine the time required for common spacecraft and spacesuit materials exposed to oxygen to return to reduced ignitability and flammability once removed from the increased concentration. Various common spacecraft materials were considered: spacecraft cabin environment foams, Extra Vehicular Mobility Unit materials and foams, Advanced Crew Escape Suit materials, and other materials of interest such as Cotton, Nomex^ HT90-40, and Tiburon Surgical Drape. This paper presents calculated diffusion coefficients derived from experimentally obtained oxygen transmission rates for the tested materials and the analytically derived times necessary for reduced flammability to be achieved based on NASA flammability criteria. Oxygen material saturation and entrapment scenarios are examined. Experimental verification data on oxygen diffusion in saturation scenarios are also presented and discussed. We examine how to use obtained data to address flammability concerns during operational planning to reduce the likelihood of fires while improving efficiency for procedures.

Harper, Susana↗

Mission Operations Directorate - Success Legacy of the Space Shuttle Program

In support of the Space Shuttle Program, as well as NASA's other human space flight programs, the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at the Johnson Space Center has become the world leader in human spaceflight operations. From the earliest programs - Mercury, Gemini, Apollo - through Skylab, Shuttle, ISS, and our Exploration initiatives, MOD and its predecessors have pioneered ops concepts and emphasized a history of mission leadership which has added value, maximized mission success, and built on continual improvement of the capabilities to become more efficient and effective. MOD's focus on building and contributing value with diverse teams has been key to their successes both with the US space industry and the broader international community. Since their beginning, MOD has consistently demonstrated their ability to evolve and respond to an ever changing environment, effectively prepare for the expected and successfully respond to the unexpected, and develop leaders, expertise, and a culture that has led to mission and Program success.

Azbell, Jim↗

Mission Operations Directorate - Success Legacy of the Space Shuttle Program (Overview of the Evolution and Success Stories from MOD During the Space Shuttle program)

In support of the Space Shuttle Program, as well as NASA's other human space flight programs, the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at the Johnson Space Center has become the world leader in human spaceflight operations. From the earliest programs - Mercury, Gemini, Apollo - through Skylab, Shuttle, ISS, and our Exploration initiatives, MOD and its predecessors have pioneered ops concepts and emphasized a history of mission leadership which has added value, maximized mission success, and built on continual improvement of the capabilities to become more efficient and effective. This paper provides specific examples that illustrate how MOD's focus on building and contributing value with diverse teams has been key to their successes both with the US space industry and the broader international community. This paper will discuss specific examples for the Plan, Train, Fly, and Facilities aspects within MOD. This paper also provides a discussion of the joint civil servant/contractor environment and the relative badge-less society within MOD. Several Shuttle mission related examples have also been included that encompass all of the aforementioned MOD elements and attributes, and are used to show significant MOD successes within the Shuttle Program. These examples include the STS-49 Intelsat recovery and repair, the (post-Columbia accident) TPS inspection process and the associated R-Bar Pitch Maneuver for ISS missions, and the STS-400 rescue mission preparation efforts for the Hubble Space Telescope repair mission. Since their beginning, MOD has consistently demonstrated their ability to evolve and respond to an ever changing environment, effectively prepare for the expected and successfully respond to the unexpected, and develop leaders, expertise, and a culture that has led to mission and Program success.

Azbell, Jim A.↗