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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Algorithms for Scrutiny of Mandatory State Reports Declarations to the IAEA (Final Project Report)

In compliance with their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, based on INFCIRC/153 (corrected) (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972), States Party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are obligated to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all changes in their nuclear material inventory as well as movement of the material across boundaries of IAEA recognized material balance areas (MBA), inventories and nuclear material balances. This project addresses capabilities to detect irregularities in State reports, thus ensuring their accuracy and completeness, and in the broader context, States’ compliance with safeguards obligations of the NPT. A recent study (Henzl et al., 2022) (lead by this project’s PI) demonstrated how analysis of dynamic correlations in nuclear material movement within the entire fuel cycle of a State (viewed as a single system) can reveal variances consistent with and indicative of “irregular” activities. Expanding on this concept, novel ways to analyze State declarations themselves—again, for the State as a whole entity—will help the IAEA draw accurate safeguards conclusions and trust the validity and authenticity of Stategenerated declaration reports. Introducing new declaration analyses capabilities explored in this project will help to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State in general.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Summary Report of the Technical Meeting on International Network of Nuclear Reaction Data Centres IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria

This report summarizes the IAEA Technical Meeting on the International Network of Nuclear Reaction Data Centres held at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria from 14 to 17 May 2024. The meeting was attended by 26 participants representing 13 cooperative Centres from eight Member States (China, Hungary, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine and USA) and two International Organisations (NEA, IAEA). A summary of the meeting is given in this report along with the conclusions and actions.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Gender Mainstreaming in Nuclear Security: Strategies for Incorporating Gender Equality by Design in the IAEA Milestones Approach

Gender mainstreaming has emerged as a critical mechanism towards achieving gender equality in the development and implementation of laws, policies, and programs, including those related to national security. Gender mainstreaming is generally defined as the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies, and programs, in all areas and at all levels, with the ultimate goal to achieve gender equality. Gender mainstreaming, which in essence can be thought of as “gender equality by design,” is an important element for building a robust nuclear security infrastructure. To date, however, gender mainstreaming has not been fully operationalized in the nuclear sector. For instance, the IAEA Milestones Approach, which provides important guidance to states seeking to develop nuclear power programs, has not yet incorporated or addressed gender considerations in its various phases or nuclear infrastructure issues, including those related to nuclear security. Therefore, this paper will argue that specifically for nuclear newcomer states, gender mainstreaming could serve as a powerful tool to integrate gender considerations into the design of laws, policies, programs, and entities necessary to successfully implement a nuclear power program. The objective of this study is twofold: first, to explore the concept of gender mainstreaming and its relevance to nuclear security, and second, to identify how gender can be incorporated into the IAEA Milestones Approach. The paper will emphasize the importance of developing guidance for the IAEA and nuclear newcomer states on how gender considerations could be incorporated throughout the development of a nuclear security program.

Siserman-Gray, Ioana-Cristina↗
DOE OSTI2024

Contribution of IAEA coordinated research projects to light water reactors advanced technology fuel testing and simulation

The Fukushima-Daiichi accident in 2011 highlighted the pressing need for enhanced design and safety analysis of nuclear fuels, especially under accident conditions in nuclear power plants (NPPs). To address this need, the international nuclear fuel community has developed several concepts of Accident Tolerant and Advanced Technology Fuels (ATFs) for light water reactors. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), at the request of its Member States, has initiated a series of three Coordinated Research Projects (CRPs) to aid in the development and testing of these ATFs. Further, these projects, known as FUMAC, ACTOF, and ATF-TS, focus on the experimentation and simulation of ATFs under various accident conditions, including design basis accidents and design extension conditions. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the main activities, as well as the achieved or anticipated results of these three CRPs. The insights and advancements gained from these projects will enable IAEA Member States to further refine nuclear fission technology, thereby contributing to efforts aimed at mitigating climate change.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Algorithms for Scrutiny of Mandatory State Reports Declarations to the IAEA (Final Project Report)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) has an interest in applying machine learning to safeguards problems. However, the lack of machine training data for outside researchers is a significant impediment for progress in including advanced algorithms in safeguards practices. Information about a State’s inventory and movements of nuclear material is highly sensitive, both from a commercial perspective and from a security perspective. States (and commercial entities) do not freely divulge this information, and the IAEA–which receives detailed information from States as accounting reports–considers all information concerning nuclear materials location and composition to be Safeguards Confidential. Even within the Agency, information marked as safeguards confidential can be accessed only on a direct need-to-know basis by those who analyze and summarize the information for that particular State.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Summary of the 5th IAEA technical meeting on fusion data processing, validation and analysis (FDPVA)

The purpose of the 5th International Atomic Energy Agency technical meeting on fusion data processing, validation and analysis (FDPVA) (Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium, 12–15 June 2023) was to provide a platform during which a set of topics relevant to FDPVA were discussed with the view of meeting the needs of next step fusion devices such as ITER. The validation and analysis of experimental data obtained from diagnostics used to characterize fusion plasmas are crucial for a knowledge-based understanding of the physical processes governing the dynamics of these plasmas. This paper presents the recent progress and achievements in the domain of plasma diagnostics data analysis and synthetic diagnostics reported at the meeting, including concept description of new devices; fusion databases; integrated data analysis; inverse problems; uncertainty propagation, verification and validation; probabilistic methods and machine learning. The relevant results underline trends observed in the current major fusion confinement devices.

fusion databases↗
DOE OSTI2023

IAEA PT sample results and analysis [Slides]

Data shows that we need to keep the requirement for matching samples and standards as the set of data from matching standards and samples is qualitatively better with fewer questionable or actionable measurements. Both before and after estimated buoyance corrections.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

IAEA ACTI Presentation

Demonstrate Technologies to Significantly Reduce the Cost and Schedule for Construction of Advanced Reactors. Make these technologies available to reactor developers by the 2030s, to improve the economics of deploying Advanced Reactors. Selected technologies will not require major R& D efforts. Technologies are ready for demonstration for use in the nuclear environment. Cost-shared public-private partnership 70% DOE-NE / 30% GEH & TVA Phase 1: Duration 14 months; Vertical Shaft Excavation Steel Bricks™ - Modular Walling Systems Holdings Limited Advanced Monitoring and Digital Twins Learn By Doing!

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Experiences of Member States in Building a Nuclear Security Infrastructure for New Nuclear Power Programmes

A nuclear power programme has many benefits, but it is a major undertaking that requires careful planning and preparation as well as a substantial investment in time. It also necessitates the establishment of a sustainable national infrastructure with committed and sustained financial and human resources. While nuclear power is not unique in this respect, it is different from other sources of energy because of the risks associated with the use of nuclear material, as well as the need for compliance with international legal instruments, internationally accepted nuclear safety standards, nuclear security guidance, and safeguards requirements. The IAEA’s Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1 (Rev. 1), defines a phased approach that identifies 19 infrastructure issues that should be addressed in each of the three phases of the development of a nuclear infrastructure for a nuclear power programme. The publication Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development IAEA Nuclear Energy Series NG-T-3.2 (Rev. 2) provides a methodology to determine the status of the infrastructure conditions covering all 19 issues identified in the Milestones Approach. A companion IAEA Implementing Guide, Establishing the Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 19, provides guidance on the recommended actions to be taken by a State to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme using the Milestones Approach. This publication is intended to provide guidance based on the experiences and good practices of Member States with embarking nuclear power programmes as well as Member States that are expanding their nuclear power programmes. The guidance is in the form of case studies, which highlight challenges, issues, and solutions identified by Member States as lessons learned for new nuclear power programmes. This TECDOC is designed to present the experiences of Member States to assist other Member States in developing a nuclear security programme. It addresses the key actions necessary to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme consistent with the three phases of the IAEA Milestones Approach. The Member States that provided case studies in this document are at different stages in the development of a nuclear power programme.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

FY26 Mid-Year Report Self-Diagnostic Capabilities for Neutron Instruments

This year we will transfer the latest version of INCC6 with last year’s self-diagnostic features to the IAEA. In FY25 we completed the development of three automated self diagnostic features into INNC6. The completion of these features marked the final stable version of INCC 6.0 ready for release to the IAEA and other users. In the first half of the Fiscal Year 2026 we have worked with LANL’s Feynman Center and Export Control office to attain a license for exporting INCC6 to the IAEA. We have successfully attained the export license for INCC6, and contacts at the IAEA have been granted permission to receive INCC6. We are in the final stage of writing the version 6 user manual. Once this is complete, we will deliver INCC6 to the IAEA for testing.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗