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At least 19 records

R&D100: IC ID

Supply chain security to detect, deter, and prevent the counterfeiting of networked and stand-alone integrated circuits (ICs) is critical to cyber security. Sandia National Laboratory researchers have developed IC ID to leverage Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and strong cryptographic authentication to create a unique fingerprint for each integrated circuit. IC ID assures the authenticity of ICs to prevent tampering or malicious substitution.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Inter-Domain Fusion for Enhanced Intrusion Detection in Power Systems: An Evidence Theoretic and Meta-Heuristic Approach

False alerts due to misconfigured or compromised intrusion detection systems (IDS) in industrial control system (ICS) networks can lead to severe economic and operational damage. However, research using deep learning to reduce false alerts often requires the physical and cyber sensor data to be trustworthy. Implicit trust is a major problem for artificial intelligence or machine learning (AI/ML) in cyber-physical system (CPS) security, because when these solutions are most urgently needed is also when they are most at risk (e.g., during an attack). To address this, the Inter-Domain Evidence theoretic Approach for Inference (IDEA-I) is proposed that reframes the detection problem as how to make good decisions given uncertainty. Specifically, an evidence theoretic approach leveraging Dempster–Shafer (DS) combination rules and their variants is proposed for reducing false alerts. A multi-hypothesis mass function model is designed that leverages probability scores obtained from supervised-learning classifiers. Using this model, a location-cum-domain-based fusion framework is proposed to evaluate the detector’s performance using disjunctive, conjunctive, and cautious conjunctive rules. The approach is demonstrated in a cyber-physical power system testbed, and the classifiers are trained with datasets from Man-In-The-Middle attack emulation in a large-scale synthetic electric grid. For evaluating the performance, we consider plausibility, belief, pignistic, and general Bayesian theorem-based metrics as decision functions. To improve the performance, a multi-objective-based genetic algorithm is proposed for feature selection considering the decision metrics as the fitness function. Finally, we present a software application to evaluate the DS fusion approaches with different parameters and architectures.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Assessing Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection Configurations for Industrial Control Systems

To reduce cost and ease maintenance, industrial control systems (ICS) have adopted Ethernetbased interconnections that integrate operational technology (OT) systems with information technology (IT) networks. This integration has made these critical systems vulnerable to attack. Security solutions tailored to ICS environments are an active area of research. Anomalybased network intrusion detection systems are well-suited for these environments. Often these systems must be optimized for their specific environment. In prior work, we introduced a method for assessing the impact of various anomaly-based network IDS settings on security. This paper reviews the experimental outcomes when we applied our method to a full-scale ICS test bed using actual attacks. Our method provides new and valuable data to operators enabling more informed decisions about IDS configurations.

Gillen, Rob↗

The Impact of Time-Aware Design Choices in ICS Anomaly Detection

Industrial control systems (ICS) remain vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks, yet evaluating anomaly detection models in these environments is challenging due to temporal dependencies, missing-not-at-random patterns, and extremely imbalanced datasets. These factors make common practices—especially random data splits and na¨ıve imputation— prone to severe temporal leakage, which can inflate reported performance and obscure real-world limitations. In this work, we systematically examine classical machine learning models, temporal deep learning architecture, and tensordecomposition– based methods on a gas-pipeline dataset using a fully temporally separated evaluation pipeline designed to mimic realistic deployment conditions. Our findings show that proper temporal handling and MNAR-aware preprocessing significantly alter the relative performance of popular anomaly-detection methods, providing practical guidance for designing reliable, leakage-resistant ICS intrusion-detection systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Design Choices in Anomaly Detection for Industrial Control Systems: Insights from Gas Pipeline Data

Industrial control systems (ICS) remain vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks, yet evaluating anomaly detection models in these environments is challenging due to temporal dependencies, missing-not-at-random patterns, and extremely imbalanced datasets. These factors make common practices—especially random data splits and naïve imputation—prone to severe temporal leakage, which can inflate reported performance and obscure real-world limitations. In this work, we systematically examine classical machine learning models, temporal deep learning architecture, and tensor-decomposition–based methods on a gas-pipeline dataset using a fully temporally separated evaluation pipeline designed to mimic realistic deployment conditions. Our findings show that proper temporal handling and MNAR-aware preprocessing significantly alter the relative performance of popular anomaly-detection methods, providing practical guidance for designing reliable, leakage-resistant ICS intrusion-detection systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Total metal, carbon, anion, iron speciation, and sulfide concentrations; Slate River, East River, and Trail Creek surface water and floodplains, Crested Butte, CO; May 2023–August 2023

This data package comprises analytical results and metadata from stream and groundwater samples collected from the Slate River, East River, Trail Creek, and their respective floodplains. This dataset contains five files: (1) a samples file (2023_SFA_Field_samples.csv) that contains site information; (2) a chemical analysis data file (2023_FieldWaterSampleData_IC__ICPOES__ICPMS__TOC__Fe__S_chem_data.csv) that contains sample analysis values; (3) a file-level metadata file (flmd.csv) that lists each file contained in the dataset with associated metadata; (4) a data dictionary file (dd.csv) that contains column/row headers used throughout the files along with definitions, units, and data types; and (5) a methods file (methods.csv) that contains ID, type, description, instrument, and lab information for each method.The samples’ anion concentrations were measured using ion chromatography (IC), total metal concentrations using inductively coupled plasma emission spectrometry (ICP-OES) and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS), non-purgeable organic carbon using total organic carbon (TOC) analysis, dissolved sulfide concentration using methylene blue spectrophotometry, and iron speciation using the ferrozine assay. To support bulk chemical analyses and colloid characterization, samples were collected from multiple depths ranging from the surface to 3.5 meters below ground.Update on 2024-10-18: Updates were made to the 2023_FieldWaterSampleData_IC__ICPOES__ICPMS__TOC__Fe__S_chem_data.csv and dd.csv files to correct units (ppb instead of ppm).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

ANALYZING THE LARGEST SPECTROSCOPIC DATA SET OF STRIPPED SUPERNOVAE TO IMPROVE THEIR IDENTIFICATIONS AND CONSTRAIN THEIR PROGENITORS

Using the largest spectroscopic data set of stripped-envelope core-collapse supernovae (stripped SNe), we present a systematic investigation of spectral properties of Type IIb SNe (SNe IIb), Type Ib SNe (SNe Ib), and Type Ic SNe (SNe Ic). Prior studies have been based on individual objects or small samples. Here, we analyze 242 spectra of 14 SNe IIb, 262 spectra of 21 SNe Ib, and 207 spectra of 17 SNe Ic based on the stripped SN data set of Modjaz et al. and other published spectra of individual SNe. Each SN in our sample has a secure spectroscopic ID, a date of V -band maximum light, and most have multiple spectra at different phases. We analyze these spectra as a function of subtype and phase in order to improve the SN identification scheme and constrain the progenitors of different kinds of stripped SNe. By comparing spectra of SNe IIb with those of SNe Ib, we find that the strength of H α can be used to quantitatively differentiate between these two subtypes at all epochs. Moreover, we find a continuum in observational properties between SNe IIb and Ib. We address the question of hidden He in SNe Ic by comparing our observations with predictions from various models that either include hidden He or in which He has been burnt. Our results favor the He-free progenitor models for SNe Ic. Finally, we construct continuum-divided average spectra as a function of subtype and phase to quantify the spectral diversity of the different types of stripped SNe.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Feature Engineering and Ensemble Methods for Imbalanced ICS Intrusion Detection: Pipeline Audit and Constrained Evaluation

Industries are becoming increasingly connected and are more vulnerable to cyberattacks due to the widened attack surface. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are among the most critical sectors that malicious actors can target, as such attacks can cause significant operational disruption and physical damage. It is imperative to detect such attacks as early as possible. This paper evaluates constraint-conditioned optimistic performance estimates for traditional ML models in ICS intrusion detection (i.e., estimates obtained under contiguous, non-shuffled temporal evaluation without test-set alteration, but with pre-split feature engineering that may introduce temporal leakage, due to dataset constraints). Our findings are threefold. First, we quantify how iterative feature engineering affects tree-based ensemble performance and examine how pipeline decisions (split strategy, sampling scope, and cleaning policy) can inflate or reduce reported IDS results under constraint-bound evaluation. Second, we compare intrinsic class-imbalance handling across ensemble models. Third, under our current pipeline constraints (including pre-split feature engineering), CatBoost achieves the best performance on Water Storage Tank (accuracy: 0.9831, class-1 F1: 0.9682), while Light- GBM achieves the best performance on Gas Pipeline (accuracy: 0.9618, class-1 F1: 0.9086).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Removal of Institutional Controls at CERCLA Site ANL-01 Ditches A, B and C at the Materials and Fuels Complex

ANL-01 is a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) site within Operable Unit (OU) 9-04 at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC). The ANL-01 site includes the Industrial Waste Pond and its associated ditches. Ditches A, B and C within ANL-01 were remediated in accordance with the Final Record of Decision for Argonne National Laboratory - West (DOE-CH 1998a). Due to the success of the selected and contingent remedies for the ditches and the determination that they are protective of human health and the environment, institutional controls (ICs) are no longer required and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) recommends termination of the ICs. In addition, the documentation requirements of the INL Site-wide Institutional Controls, and Operations and Maintenance Plan for CERCLA Response Actions (DOE-ID 2017) have been met to allow termination to occur.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Triazolopyrimidine and triazolopyridine scaffolds as TDP2 inhibitors

Tyrosyl-DNA phosphodiesterase 2 (TDP2) repairs topoisomerase II (TOP2) mediated DNA damages and causes cellular resistance to clinically used TOP2 poisons. Inhibiting TDP2 can potentially sensitize cancer cells toward TOP2 poisons. Commercial compound P10A10, to which the structure was assigned as 7-phenyl triazolopyrimidine analogue 6a, was previously identified as a TDP2 inhibitor hit in our virtual and fluorescence-based biochemical screening campaign. In this artilce, we report that the hit validation through resynthesis and structure elucidation revealed the correct structure of P10A10 (Chembridge ID 7236827) to be the 5-phenyl triazolopyrimidine regioisomer 7a. Subsequent structure–activity relationship (SAR) via the synthesis of a total of 47 analogues of both the 5-phenyl triazolopyrimidine scaffold (7) and its bioisosteric triazolopyridine scaffold (17) identified four derivatives (7a, 17a, 17e, and 17z) with significant TDP2 inhibition (IC 50 < 50 μM), with 17z showing excellent cell permeability and no cytotoxicity.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Cyote-attack Chain Estimator

Attack Chain Estimator (ACE) Application Overview The Attack Chain Estimator (ACE) Application is a sophisticated tool designed for the ingestion, classification, sequencing, and enrichment of cybersecurity threat reports. This application leverages advanced machine learning models and extensive historical data to provide comprehensive insights into cyber threats, specifically targeting Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Purpose The primary functions of the ACE Application include: Ingestion of Cybersecurity Threat Reporting: Capable of ingesting text-based threat reports in markdown or text file format. Supports ingestion of structured data from other sources in STIX/JSON format. Classification of Report’s Text-Based Events: Utilizes a DeBERTa classifier, specifically trained on cybersecurity data, to map the events to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Tactics and Techniques. Classification is performed using multiple Jupyter notebooks and machine learning workflows hosted as FastAPI microservices: regex_data deberta_base_35_train_hft_classifier_mlflow.ipynb hft_regex_classifier_mlflow.ipynb param_train_hft_classifier_mlflow.ipynb regex_tactic_tech.ipynb Ordering of Tactics, Techniques, and Observable Events: Sequences the identified tactics, techniques, and events to form a coherent attack chain. Enrichment with Historical Attack Chain Details: Enhances the attack chain with details from historical attacks using a Markov model developed from CyOTE Precursor Analysis Report data. The Markov model is available as a FastAPI endpoint for seamless integration. Enrichment with Adversary Emulation Capabilities Data: Integrates adversary emulation capabilities data using MITRE Caldera for OT adversary abilities UUIDs. Export of Output Files: Provides options to export the enriched attack chain in JSON or CSV formats. Routing of Output to Other Applications: Facilitates routing of output to various platforms and applications, including: Threat Intelligence Platforms COREII Scout for Threat Intelligence Analysis COREII Modeling and Simulation for Adversary Emulation Technical Description The ACE Application is an advanced cybersecurity tool designed to provide detailed threat analysis and sequence generation. It is built on a robust architecture that integrates natural language processing, machine learning, and historical data modeling. Key Components: Data Ingestion Module: Handles the input of threat reports and data from various formats, ensuring flexibility in data sources. Classification Engine: Employs DeBERTa-based classifiers hosted as FastAPI microservices to analyze and classify threat report events in accordance with the MITRE ATT&CK framework for ICS. Sequence Generator: Orders the classified events into a logical attack chain, providing clear insight into the sequence of tactics and techniques used in the threat. Enrichment Engine: Integrates historical data and adversary emulation capabilities to enhance the attack chain with valuable context and additional details. The historical data enrichment is powered by a Markov model, which is available as a FastAPI endpoint. Export and Routing Module: Facilitates the export of the enriched attack chain in multiple formats and routes the output to designated applications for further analysis or emulation.

Paul, Tony [Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Idaho↗

Total metals & anion concentration data; Slate River floodplain, Crested Butte, CO; May 2020-September 2020

This data package includes processed and undiluted measurements for metal and anion concentrations from pore water (groundwater) samples from the Slate River floodplain of Crested Butte, CO, a focus field site for the SLAC Floodplain Hydro-Biogeochemistry SFA. The data was generated as part of the work targeting the overarching research question for the SLAC SFA: How do ubiquitous subsurface interfaces mediate molecular-scale biogeochemical processes and groundwater quality in floodplains and watersheds? Samples were collected between May and September of 2020. These measurements were all recorded at the Arizona Laboratory for Emerging Contaminants (ALEC) at the University of Arizona located in Tucson, AZ. Groundwater samples were extracted from a network of installed rhizon (Rhizosphere Research Products, part no. 19.60.21F, 0.6 micrometer mesh size) and piezometer wells within the river floodplain. All water samples were shaded from sun exposure during extraction from the subsurface and preserved at 4C until measured at ALEC.Analysis by ICP-MS:Measurements for total metals were made on the Agilent 7700x ICP-MS (for total metals) – Agilent Technologies, Santa Clara, CA.The analytical QA/QC protocol was adapted from US EPA Method 200.8 for analysis by ICP-MS. Calibration standards were prepared from multi-element stock solution (Sigma-Aldrich Multielement standard solution for ICP, St. Louis, MO) using matrix matched to sample solutions (either 2% HCl or HNO3 from AriStar Plus,grade acids from VWR Scientific). Calibration curves include at least 7 points with correlation coefficients > 0.995. The QC protocol includes a continuing calibration blank (CCB), a continuing calibration verification (CCV) solution and at least one quality control sample (QCS) to be analyzed just after calibration and again after every 12 samples and at the completion of the run. The QCS solutions are from an independent source, such as NIST SRM 1643e - Trace Elements in Water, or QCS solutions from High Purity Standards (Charleston, SC). Acceptable QC responses must be between 90 and 110% of the certified value. An internal standard (Rh) is added via on-line addition into the sample line using a mixing tee.Analysis by Ion Chromatography (Anions):The protocol follows Method 4110 in Standard Methods for Examination of Water and Wastewater.The instrument used is the Thermo Scientific Dionex ICS-6000 using AS+AG22 column set for anion analysis with isocratic method using sodium carbonate eluent. Detection is by chemical suppression of eluent conductivity. Quality control solutions and mixed analyte standards purchased from Inorganic Ventures, Christiansburg, VA.All files are in csv format.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Experimental Investigation of the Effect of Air-Handling and DME-Propane Blends on the Performance and Emissions of a 4-Cylinder CI Engine

Dimethyl ether (DME) is considered an excellent alternative to diesel because of its higher cetane number and lower carbon content. Additionally, DME can be blended with abundantly available propane with minimal modifications to the propane infrastructure. This paper focuses on an experimental investigation of the effect of air-handling i.e., boost pressure and exhaust gas recirculation (EGR), and DME-propane blends on the combustion and emissions performance of a light-duty, four-cylinder, compression ignition (CI) engine. Here, the boost pressure and EGR sweeps were carried out and showed that higher boost pressures resulted in increased brake thermal efficiencies (BTE) at the expense of higher NOx emissions which could be reduced by an increase in EGR. The fuel sweeps were carried out at 0, 15 and 25% propane (neat, 85% and 75% DME) with 0% and 25% EGR. The fuel sweeps indicated that the ignition delay (ID) increased and burn duration (BD) decreased monotonically when the blend increased to 25% propane/75% DME. The results suggest optimum engine performance with neat DME at 105 kPa boost pressure and 25% EGR with propane addition improving the BTE with negligible increase in emissions. Higher contents of Propane, up to 25%, did not affect the variability of combustion, with standard deviations of burn duration and peak cylinder pressures below 1% for all test cases.

air-handling↗

Identifying Adversarial Cyber-Activity in Operational Technology Environments Using Bayesian Networks

Critical infrastructure and other operational technology (OT) environments face increasing cybersecurity risks from adversarial behavior. This paper describes the development of a risk model using a Bayesian network to enhance the comprehension of observable cyber events caused by malicious activity in OT environments. The core of the Bayesian network is a process model that describes the stages of adversary behavior. The remainder of the model is based on the MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) taxonomy, which includes tactics and techniques that may be used by the adversary. The observables provide evidence for adversary behavior through the intermediary technique and tactic nodes. One challenge in constructing this model is a lack of open-source data from cyber-attacks on OT systems. This paper discusses learning from limited data, the elicitation of expert opinion to construct the conditional probability tables when data is scarce, and the refinement of the most difficult conditional probabilities tables using several forms of sensitivity analyses. Finally, the Bayesian network is demonstrated using two historical case studies: the DarkSide ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline and the destructive cyberattack targeting the ThyssenKrupp blast furnace. Index Terms—Cybersecurity, industrial control systems, operational technology

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Wind Supply Chain Security: Hardware Enumeration and Analysis

This project, undertaken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Department of Energy (DOE) Wind Energy Technologies Office (WETO), focused on the enumeration and analysis of six key devices important to wind technologies. The devices analyzed included Beckhoff Bus Terminal Controllers (BK1120 and BC9000), a Beckhoff Economy Built-in Panel PC (CP6231), an N-Tron Managed Industrial Ethernet Switch (711FX3), a Bachmann M1 Gateway, and a Bachmann Smart Power Plant Controller. Device selection was driven by availability and budget constraints, with several components sourced from existing wind farms and others procured through a co-agreement with another WETO-funded project. The project's primary objective was to create a hardware bill of materials (HBOM) for each device, identifying and documenting all components to assess potential security and supply chain risks. A detailed analysis revealed over 750 unique components across the six devices, with 80% successfully identified and accompanied by datasheets. Notably, Texas Instruments emerged as the leading supplier, providing over 16% of the components, followed by ON Semiconductor at 11.3%, Analog Devices at 5.3%, and Renesas Electronics Corp at 4.1%. Other notable vendors included Toshiba Corporation, iC-Haus Corporation, Atmel, Vishay, and STMicroelectronics. The enumeration process involved thorough documentation of each component, including its designation, quantity, identifiers, pin package, description, vendor, model, and country of origin. This process provided valuable insights into the complexity and diversity of the electronic systems within these wind devices. It also highlighted the distinct separation of components between vendors, suggesting a trend of vendor-specific component usage. Key findings from the project emphasized the importance of broadening the scope of vendor analysis in future research to gain a comprehensive understanding of component distribution and commonality. The identification of vendor-specific component usage patterns offers new avenues for research and underscores the significance of continued investigation in this field. Overall, this project provides critical insights into the component composition of wind devices, aiding in the development of improved supply chain management and component sourcing strategies. The results contribute valuable knowledge to the wind technology sector, laying the groundwork for enhanced security and resilience in wind energy systems.

17 - WIND ENERGY↗