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Criticality Alarm Systems at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant

The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) has a number of criticality alarm systems (CAS) in the various facilities. The complexity of the plant creates some unique CAS problems. A detailed review of the CAS has been made to determine the level of compliance with ANSI 8.3-1986. A major CAS upgrade project is currently in the design stage which will expand coverage and bring all CAS monitoring unshielded areas into full compliance with ANSI 8.3-1986. Because DOE Orders do not contain an exclusion that exempts the need for CAS coverage in shielded areas as provided in ANSI 8.3-1986, a future CAS upgrade project is in the planning stage which will also upgrade the CAS coverage in shielded portions of the plant.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Idaho Chemical Processing Plant Low-Level Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) Low-Level waste stream is suitable for disposal by shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The INL ICPP Low-Level waste stream consists of debris and solidified liquids. The INL ICPP Low-Level waste stream requires an SA to resolve two unreviewed disposal questions (UDQs). The first UDQ addresses whether it is acceptable to dispose of radium-226 (226Ra) at an activity concentration that exceeds the NNSS Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) Action Level. The second UDQ evaluates the acceptability of disposing of five long-lived radionuclides without WAC action levels. Long-lived radionuclides without action levels are radionuclides not evaluated in the performance assessment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

OVERVIEW AND STATUS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY

For many years, the United States (US) and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for those with hands-on operations involving fissionable materials. These consensus standards have been crucial to reducing the number of criticality accidents in process facilities. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 41 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (20 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. Currently there are 18 standards in the ANS-8 series: 6 are in revision mode and 12 are in maintenance mode. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eight standards are currently available, three standards are in revision mode, and four proposed standards are at various stages of development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report on domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

Bowen, Douglas G.↗

Developing a competent criticality safety program: A retrospective - 14383

This paper considers the role of a nuclear criticality safety (NCS) program in protection of the nuclear facilities personnel as well as its mission and finances. It will discuss the author's experiences in assessing and strengthening the NCS program at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant following the 1978 criticality accident. The weaknesses in the program illuminated by the event and the structural changes that resulted will be discussed. The upgrades to the development of the Criticality Safety Evaluation process, the strengthening of the implementation of limits and controls and the defense of the enhanced program in later years will be presented. The author's experiences with various problems in the NCS program at the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado will also be detailed. The core problem of the disconnect between the NCS staff and the operators was addressed by a careful and cooperative rebuilding of the program by safety and operation staff. A key element in the new program was a clear assignment of responsibility for each program element and the role of a Criticality Safety Officer in each facility, reporting to and representing operations, in managing the communication flow and assuring the program field implementation so that the criticality risk reduction was as intended. From these practical experiences in focusing on identifying NCS program weaknesses and subsequent problem resolution, recommendation will be provided for elements of a robust NCS program. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radionuclide Inventory Calculations for the Calcined Solid Storage Facility Performance Assessment - 19292

Originally named the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant when it was constructed in the early 1950's, the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center reprocessed SNF to recover highly enriched uranium and other nuclear-related products for the U.S. DOE. Reprocessing SNF generated millions of gallons of aqueous radioactive waste. Calcination was a process developed at the INL Site to convert liquid waste into a solid, granular form from 1963 to 2000. The calcination process produced a safer product for storage while reducing the volume of stored liquid waste by an average factor of seven. Calcine is currently stored in the Calcined Solids Storage Facility (CSSF). The CSSFs are often called 'bin sets' because each CSSF (CSSFs 1 through 6) contains several stainless-steel storage bins housed in a concrete vault. The CSSF is an interim waste storage facility. In the future, calcine will be retrieved, treated (if necessary), and sent to an off-Site facility for storage or disposal. To close the CSSF, the bulk of the calcine will be removed and stored or disposed of elsewhere. The bins and vaults will then be placed in a configuration that is protective of human health and the environment. For purposes of the performance assessment, the depth of the residual calcine at closure was assumed to be 5-cm in each bin. The 5-cm of residual calcine in each bin is assumed to be mixed in grout during closure. The activities of the residual radionuclides are the inventory used for the dose assessment calculations for the CSSF performance assessment. The objective of this analysis was to calculate the radionuclide activity in the residual calcine remaining in the CSSF after closure. The purpose of this paper is to present the approach used to calculate the radionuclide inventory of the calcine currently stored in CSSF and the residual calcine in the CSSF after closure using data from the calcined waste Historical Processing Model (HPM). Limited sampling and analysis of the calcine in the CSSF bins was conducted in the past. Future similar calcine sampling and analysis efforts would be costly, generate additional mixed waste, and may not provide the desired detailed calcine composition data. However, during the later years of calcining, an alternative to calcine sampling and analysis was developed and the information was captured in the HPM. The HPM uses multiple sources to provide definitive calcine volume, mass, and composition, including: compositions and volumes of the liquid wastes that were calcined, ORIGEN2 - and ORIGEN-ARP-based radioactivity calculations, calciner and CSSF operating data, and process knowledge of INTEC fuel and waste-processing systems. HPM calcine composition was used to develop an inventory of radionuclides for use in the performance assessment evaluation for closure of CSSF. There are 43 bins that contain calcine, with six to twelve segments in each bin for a total of 337 bin segments for which the HPM calculates the average calcine composition. The HPM calculates the composition of each of the nearly 7,000 batches of material (startup bed, nonradioactive material, and radioactive waste) charged to the calciners. The calculations use the CSSF dimensions, including the CSSF number of bins, heights, outside diameters, annular air space diameter (if necessary), and volume of calcine currently in the bins. For each of the CSSFs, for a 5-cm residual, the percent of total calcine was calculated along with the residual activity for the radionuclides. Residual activity was estimated for 148 different radionuclides. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Overview and status of domestic and international standards for nuclear criticality safety

For many years, the domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for those performing hands-on operations involving fissionable materials. These consensus standards have been crucial to reducing the number of criticality accidents in process facilities. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (39 years ago at this writing) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-Mura, Japan, in 1999 (18 years ago at this writing). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently eighteen standards in revision (seven) or maintenance (eleven) cycles, and one standard is currently in development. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, Nuclear Criticality Safety. Seven standards are currently available, one standard is in revision, and four standards are at various stages of development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Analysis of Legacy {sup 85}Kr Waste Form Samples - 16319

In the late 1970's, the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant conducted an R and D program on krypton encapsulation. Legacy samples composed of {sup 85}Kr incorporated in solid zeolite 5A material, and five small metal tubes containing a mixture of the zeolite combined with a glass matrix resulting from hot isostatic pressing, have been preserved. These samples were shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in mid-FY 2014. After receipt and repackaging, the samples were examined by x-ray imaging and x-ray tomography. Two of the capsules appear to contain an amorphous mass within the capsules. An image of one capsule clearly shows the saw marks on the capsule and a quantity of loose pellet or bead-like material remaining in the capsule. An image of another capsule shows similar bead-like material within the intact capsule. One of the capsules was previously opened. The end of this capsule appears to have been cut off, and there are additional saw marks on the side of the capsule. X-ray tomography allowed the capsules to be viewed along the three axes. Of most interest was determining whether there was any residual material in the closed end of this capsule. The images confirmed the presence of residual material within this capsule. The material appears to be compacted but still retains some of the bead-like morphology. Based on the initial nondestructive assay (NDA) and the fact that there are two obviously breached samples, a plan was developed for exploratory tests that would be conducted with the breached specimens before opening the three intact capsules. Preparations are being made to determine the fraction of krypton/xenon remaining in the waste form matrix and the amount of rubidium remaining in the waste form matrix. The inner surface of the breached capsules will be examined for corrosion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analysis of Selected Legacy 85 Kr Samples

Legacy samples composed of 85 Kr encapsulated in solid zeolite 5A material and five small metal tubes containing a mixture of the zeolite combined with a glass matrix resulting from hot isostatic pressing have been preserved. The samples were a result of krypton R&D encapsulation efforts in the late 1970s performed at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. These samples were shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in mid-FY 2014. Upon receipt the outer shipping package was opened, and the inner package, removed and placed in a radiological hood. The individual capsules were double bagged as they were removed from the inner shipping pig and placed into individual glass sample bottles for further analysis. The five capsules were then x-ray imaged. Capsules 1 and 4 appear intact and to contain an amorphous mass within the capsules. Capsule 2 clearly shows the saw marks on the capsule and a quantity of loose pellet or bead-like material remaining in the capsule. Capsule 3 shows similar bead-like material within the intact capsule. Capsule 5 had been opened at an undetermined time in the past. The end of this capsule appears to have been cut off, and there are additional saw marks on the side of the capsule. X-ray tomography allowed the capsules to be viewed along the three axes. Of most interest was determining whether there was any residual material in the closed end of Capsule 5. The images confirmed the presence of residual material within this capsule. The material appears to be compacted but still retains some of the bead-like morphology. Based on the nondestructive analysis (NDA) results, a proposed path forward was formulated to advance this effort toward the original goals of understanding the effects of extended storage on the waste form and package. Based on the initial NDA and the fact that there are at least two breached samples, it was proposed that exploratory tests be conducted with the breached specimens before opening the three intact capsules. Portions of these would be analyzed to determine the fraction of krypton/xenon remaining in the matrix and the amount of rubidium remaining in the matrix. The inner surface of the breached capsules would be examined for corrosion. The materials contained in Capsules 2 and 5 have been examined. There appears to be a relatively uniform distribution of Kr and Rb throughout the pellets examined. The chemical composition of the pellets appears to be consistent with 5A molecular sieves. The material contained within Capsule 5 showed ~1 at. % lead. The origin of the Pb is currently indeterminate. X-ray diffraction analysis shows a significant shift from the 5A structure, most likely due to the Kr encapsulation / sintering process that occurred when the samples were made. The capsule walls were also examined and showed extensive corrosion throughout. Elemental mapping of the capsule material appeared consistent with carbon steel, while the weld material appeared consistent with a stainless steel. The interior surface of the capsule appeared to have a layer of material containing Al, Si, and Ca similar to the 5A molecular sieve. Analysis for Rb within the corrosion sites was inconclusive.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Milestone report - M4FT-15OR03120210 - Multi-lab Analytical Plan for Analysis of Legacy 85 Kr Samples

Legacy samples composed of 85 Kr encapsulated in solid zeolite 5A material and five small metal tubes containing a mixture of the zeolite combined with a glass matrix resulting from hot isostatic pressing have been preserved. The samples were a result of krypton R&D encapsulation efforts in the late 1970s performed at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. These samples were shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in mid-FY 2014. Upon receipt the outer shipping package was opened and the inner package removed and placed in a radiation hood. The individual capsules were double bagged as they were removed from the inner shipping pig and placed into individual glass sample bottles for further analysis. The five capsules were then x-ray imaged. Capsules 1 and 4 appear to contain an amorphous mass within the capsules. Capsule 2 clearly shows the saw marks on the capsule and a quantity of loose pellet or bead-like material remaining in the capsule. Capsule 3 shows similar bead-like material within the intact capsule. Capsule 5 was previously opened. The end of this capsule appears to have been cut off and there are additional saw marks on the side of the capsule. X-ray tomography allowed the capsules to be viewed along the three axes. Of most interest was determining whether there was any residual material in the closed end of Capsule 5. The images confirmed the presence of residual material within this capsule. The material appears to be compacted but still retains some of the bead-like morphology. A conference call was held on February 19, 2015, with participation from ORNL, Idaho National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Sigma Team members. The nondestructive analysis (NDA) results were discussed, and a proposed path forward was formulated to advance this effort toward the original goals of understanding the effects of extended storage on the waste form and package. Based on the initial NDA and the fact that there are at least two breached samples it was proposed that exploratory tests be conducted with the breached specimens before opening the three intact capsules. Portions of these would be analyzed to determine the fraction of krypton/xenon remaining in the matrix and the amount of rubidium remaining in the matrix. The inner surface of the breached capsules would be examined for corrosion.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Potential Research and Development Opportunities for Light Water Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel at INL

This report documents the commercial spent nuclear fuel currently in storage at Idaho National Laboratory with a specific focus on the potential research and development (R&D) opportunities for this material. Commercial spent nuclear fuel is stored in dry casks on the INL site at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC, formerly the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant or ICPP). This spent fuel was part of the DOE-industry cooperative dry cask demonstration project that began in 1983 and from historical fuel testing and treatment activities that had been performed at the Test Area North (TAN)-607 facility. Most of the fuel is “low burnup,” but given that it was removed from the respective reactors between 1970 and 1985, it was representative for its time. The majority of the fuel is of the 15×15 Westinghouse PWR variety, though additional fuel types (e.g., TN-BRP) and configurations are also stored. Potential R&D opportunities identified are (1) the REA-2023 cask, (2) the TN-BRP cask, and (3) the Castor V/21 cask. Fuel from the TN-24P may be an alternative to the intact assemblies in the Castor V/21. Specifically, the REA-2023 cask contains 9 rods that have been exposed to air since 2005. These rods have a detailed pre-loading characterization and thus any changes in corrosion or geometry can most likely be attributed to the storage environment. In addition, similar rods to the nine in REA-2023 reside in the Castor V/21 cask whose environment has been maintained with inert nitrogen. The Castor V/21 cask also contains intact PWR assemblies that could be used to perform limited confirmation of the pyroprocessing approach. An alternative to the use of the Castor assemblies for pyroprocessing is the consolidated fuel that is stored in the TN-24P, which would not require removal from the assembly grid since it has already been packaged in accessible two-piece shell strongback containers. The TN-BRP cask contains a number of Gd-doped, low burnup assemblies that could be of use to validate code packages used to justify burnup-up credit for boiling water reactors (BWRs). The INL dry casks are stored on the CPP-2707 pad at INTEC, adjacent to the CPP-603 Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility, which incorporates a dry hot cell that has the potential to receive a full scale commercial cask of the types identified. Several evaluations have been made regarding this task, including full scale mockup testing of the physical clearances required to remove and handle fuel assemblies and components. A proposed schedule of 14 months and cost of $5.3 million was the outcome of analysis performed by Fluor Idaho and is included as Appendix A & B. In addition to the spent fuel at INL, there is also a full-scale mockup assembly that was fabricated for the Protypical Consolidation Demonstration Project to validate fuel rod consolidation approaches. The assembly was fabricated by Westinghouse as a 15 x 15 PWR, using Zircaloy-4 tubing and steel end fittings in accordance with product specifications. The only departure from specification is the use of copper metal in lieu of uranium oxide pellets to achieve a weight that is within 10% of the standard.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Domestic and International Standards for Nuclear Criticality Safety – Overview and Status

The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for staff performing hands-on work in operations with fissionable materials. These consensus standards have contributed directly to the significant reduction in the rate of criticality accidents in process facilities since the 1940s. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 43 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (23 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently eighteen standards in the ANS-8 series. Currently, there are six ANS-8 standards in revision mode and eleven in a maintenance mode with one new standard under development. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eleven standards are currently available, three standards are in revision mode, and two standards are development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Domestic and International Standards for Nuclear Criticality Safety - Overview & Status [Abstract]

The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for staff performing hands-on work in operations with fissionable materials. These consensus standards have contributed directly to the significant reduction in the rate of criticality accidents in process facilities since the 1940s. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 43 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (22 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently eighteen standards in the ANS-8 series. Currently, there are six ANS-8 standards in re- vision mode and eleven in a maintenance mode with one new standard under development. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eleven standards are currently available, three standards are in revision mode, and two standards are development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Domestic and International Consensus Standards for Nuclear Criticality Safety - Overview & Status

The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) were developed based on the lessons-learned from process criticality accidents. These consensus standards were developed to reduce the rate of process criticality accidents in facilities that process, store, handle, or transport fissionable materials by hand. After a significant increase in criticality accidents through the mid-1960s, the rate of criticality accidents decreased as a result of these standards, and the criticality accident rate is extremely low from an industrial safety perspective. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 47 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (almost 26 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American National Standards (ANS) that are prepared and published by the American Nuclear Society and approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently 18 standards in the ANS-8 series. Nine ANS-8 standards are either in revision mode or planned for revision. A new standard for the use of nondestructive assay measurements (ANSI/ANS-8.28-2024) for NCS was approved in March of 2024. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 “Nuclear Energy,” Subcommittee 5, “Nuclear Fuel Technology,” and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eleven standards are currently available, four standards are proposed for revision, and four standards are at various stages of development. This paper provides the NCS community with a high-level overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

Bowen, Douglas G [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000212460026)↗

The Evolution of Chemical Waste Treatment in the Nuclear Industry Simple Solutions for Complex Problems - 16694

The U.S. nuclear waste treatment industry was born in the 1980s and early 1990s with the end of the Cold War, the peak of commercial nuclear power, and after implementation of federal regulations that drove new disposal requirements for radioactive waste generators. New regulations resulted in soaring costs for radioactive waste disposal, and thus an industry was born that focused on recycling, volume reduction, and waste form improvement. New treatment facilities and technologies were started that primarily dealt with low-level radioactive wastes; however, there was little to no treatment capacity for wastes commingled with hazardous chemicals. Large volumes of 'mixed wastes', of which many became known as 'orphan wastes', were being stored on U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites with no path for disposal and thus posed a risk to workers, the public, and the environment. Perma-fix Environmental Services, Inc. (Perma-Fix), which started in the hazardous waste industry in 1990 and had developed facilities and technologies to treat hazardous wastes, evolved in the late 90's to meet this mixed waste market opportunity. By adapting our technologies and collaborating with waste generators to understand their needs, we successfully developed treatment and disposition solutions for some of the most challenging mixed wastes in the U.S. By establishing a pathway for treatment and disposal of orphan wastes, Perma-Fix played an important role in the safe treatment and disposition of orphan wastes, which facilitated closure of DOE sites such as Rocky Flats, Mound, and Fernald. We found that understanding chemistry and having experience in managing the hazardous constituents of mixed wastes allowed us to apply solutions that were not overly complex and expensive. Further, by adapting proven hazardous waste treatment solutions to wastes commingled with contaminants such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), mercury, and organics we were able to safely manage even more problematic mixed wastes. During the 1980's, commercial low-level radioactive waste treatment and disposal solutions were being developed. At the same time, the federal government began dealing with increasing stakeholder demands for permanent solutions of more complex radioactive wastes such as high-level waste (HLW) and transuranic (TRU) wastes. HLW and TRU waste disposal became a contentious political issue between the federal government, regulatory agencies, and the public. As a result, DOE was mandated to develop treatment and disposal methodologies to address these wastes. DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility solved most issues with disposition of TRU wastes; however, for HLW (for example tank wastes at Hanford, Savannah River, and Idaho) the complexity of the wastes and the fact that government entities were developing political solutions for waste treatment resulted in a variety of complex and expensive solutions. Decades later we still do not have a permanent solution for HLW. Whether some simple commercial approaches are possible, what regulatory changes should occur, and what the implications may be if we do not change our current path, will be discussed. After two decades, we see the low-level nuclear waste industry maturing and replicating the path of the hazardous waste industry. When new hazardous waste federal regulations were enacted in the 1970's and 1980's, the hazardous waste industry began to boom with new company start-ups and construction of numerous treatment and disposal facilities. Initially, this was a good business to be in, managing dangerous wastes in an environmentally safe and responsible manner, and it was profitable. However, over-capacity and fierce competition drove down pricing, and companies failed. This ultimately led to a major consolidation within the hazardous waste industry. Similarly and more recently in the nuclear industry, over-capacity and competition has driven down profitability, companies have failed, and there is a major consolidation occurring within sectors of the industry. For consolidation to be successful and healthy for either industry, a leader must emerge to set the direction for the others and establish a sustainable path that is acceptable for waste generators, stakeholders, and investors. This was the case for the hazardous waste industry. This paper will examine the parallels between the hazardous and nuclear waste industries as they have matured and evolved, and what discuss the long term implications of consolidation within the nuclear industry. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Improving the Safety Culture by Strengthening Leadership Skills - 16563

As a primary contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is managing a team of approximately 1,400 employees at the Hanford Site in Southeast Washington. The work on this 10-year, $5.7 billion contract ranges from design and construction to decommissioning and cleanup. In 2013, CH2M began the second half of its contract and expanded its leadership development program to focus on succession planning and strengthening the leadership skills of its employees. The goal is to create and sustain qualified leaders to lead the Hanford cleanup mission today and into the future. CH2M launched the Leadership Impact Initiative, a training program modeled from best practices used at other CH2M projects, including the Idaho Cleanup Project. Based on the results of a CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company site-wide safety culture survey, the company developed an improvement strategy focused on leadership development with emphasis on the front-line leadership. The strategy stresses core leadership principles and skill development to help managers more effectively engage the workforce. The two-day workshop gives employees the opportunity to build leadership on the job in an audience of their peers. CH2M expanded the workshops to include employees from all levels of the organization, including bargaining unit employees. The workshops are reinforced at quarterly all-manager meetings, communications among team members and regular sharing of lessons learned and experiences in the field. The Leadership Impact Initiative advances CH2M's vision of quality leadership and project delivery anchored by health and safety performance excellence. Since 2013, CH2M hosted more than 25 Leadership Impact Initiative workshops, reaching approximately 500 participants. Meanwhile, the company achieved the best safety record since the start of its contract, and results from its 2015 safety culture survey show improvements in the safety climate. A DOE assessment of the CH2M worker health and safety culture for the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) found the workshop was a contributing factor to the contractor achieving VPP Star and VPP Star of Excellence Status. This paper summarizes the strategy behind the leadership development program, the outcomes and its relevance for other companies, particularly those on DOE Environmental Management decommissioning projects. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Vitrification Process for Idaho HLW Calcine - 18433

The majority of the liquid wastes produced from reprocessing of several types of spent nuclear fuel at the Department of energy's (DOE) Idaho site have been volume reduced by calcination. The resulting ∼155,600 ft{sup 3} of calcined waste is stored in 43 shielded stainless steel bins, which have a 500-year design life. The calcined material is both a high-level waste and a RCRA hazardous waste, which complicates treatment and disposal options. In addition to a potential direct disposal option, treatment options that have been considered include steam reforming, hot isostatic pressing (HIP), and vitrification. This paper describes testing and evaluation of a vitrification option for the calcine. Vitrification to produce a borosilicate glass has the advantage that it is the only treatment that provides a waste form that meets the current HLW repository waste acceptance criteria. It is therefore the lowest risk option in terms of regulatory and legislative concerns. The present work addressed several key questions: (i) Calcine waste loadings in glass, which determine the number of HLW canisters produced and the required glass production rate (throughput) for the system design; (ii) Melt rate per unit glass pool surface area of the melter, which determines the sizing of the vitrification system; and (iii) The ability to meet waste form acceptance requirements (PCT and TCLP) while achieving reasonable waste loadings. These are issues of fundamental importance to the sizing estimates for the unit operations and overall flow-sheet and they, therefore, directly impact the cost and schedule estimates. Fully compliant, high-waste-loading glasses were developed for two of the four Idaho calcine wastes. The results demonstrate that waste loadings of 35 wt% waste oxides are achievable for the two alumina calcines and about 30 wt% is achievable for the two zirconia calcines. Testing of these formulations in a joule-heated ceramic melter showed glass production rates of over 5000 kg/(m2/d) for the Alumina calcine and over 8500 kg/(m{sup 2}/d) for the Zirconium-Na Blend calcine. These extremely high production rates translate directly into smaller system size and shorter mission duration and, therefore, reduced costs. Based on these results, a preliminary design for the full-scale vitrification system was developed. The system consists of waste receipt, vitrification, off-gas treatment, and canister sealing and decontamination equipment. The calcine is blended with the appropriate glass forming chemicals (or glass frit) and fed to the melter as a solid stream. The melter has a glass pool surface area of about 2.5 m{sup 2} and is equipped with a bubbling system to increase processing rates. Glass production rates of about 6 metric tons per day are projected. The vitrification system would be installed into the existing Idaho Waste Treatment Unit Facility (IWTU) so that no new facilities are required to house the treatment system, thus greatly reducing overall cost, duration, and risk. The system would be designed to treat all of the calcine waste within a period of 12 years at an operating efficiency of 80%, producing a total of about 8500 canisters each weighing two metric tons. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Technology Applicable to Remote Hazardous Constituents and Waste Stream Grouping

Originally, Rocky Flats transuranic (TRU) waste was managed from waste streams that were composed of similar chemical constituents and were generated from identical processes. Early waste processing at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) maintained the Rocky Flats record until INL began generating their own item description codes (IDCs). Ultimately TRU waste management at INL was driven to combine wastes from all IDCs that were assigned by Rocky Flats to a summary category group regardless of whether the chemical constituents in the waste were known or not. At this point, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) certified program requirements to process the TRU waste according to waste streams was nearly eliminated. In April 2018, operations in the Sludge Repackage Project (SRP) area were halted by a radiological materials release accident in which drums containing waste experienced a loss of containment after over-pressurization occurred. Four SRP drums, repackaged in the Accelerated Retrieval Project (ARP) V area, had an adverse, delayed chemical reaction event occur when prohibited materials from one container were mixed with chemically-incompatible materials from other containers in the repackaging process. This incident was the direct result of processing unknowns under a protocol where the components of the waste were added to incompatible materials resulting in a run-away reaction. After a Difficult Waste Team (DWT) and Los Alamos National Laboratory – Carlsbad Operations (LANL-CO) subject matter expert (SME) visit in September 2019, it was determined by the team that all of the work observed on the September visit was performed upstream of the certified program and that the Visual Examination (VE) and other methods typically used by the certified program were being used for Acceptable Knowledge (AK) augmentation. This augmentation was needed in order to determine what the constituents in the waste might be, and is based primarily on collections of VE results. The waste at INL that is being processed in what is considered to be the Priority 2 (yellow) and Priority 3 (red) lists either needs AK to be completed before certified characterization can occur or is waiting to be processed because the waste has been mixed with unknown wastes resulting in a lack of information that could have impact of the ability to certify and ship the waste to the WIPP.

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