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The article presents a control and communication architecture for interconnecting multiple microgrids by leveraging IEC 61850 data models with distributed energy resources (DER) extensions, IEC Common Information Model (CIM) and Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB) frameworks. An example use case for planned islanding in the nested microgrid scenario is also provided.
This paper presents a resilient, modular and scalable distributed control architecture for microgrid systems which uses distributed agents controlling individual loads, network switches, generators or storage devices to provide intelligent power management and efficient microgrid operation. The communication between the distributed agents is realized by implementing IEC 61850 data models and GOOSE messages. The data models include state representation, measurements at various points, and dispatch requests for reliable operation of microgrid control system. System resiliency is enhanced through implementing distributed agent architecture with no single point of failure.
Integration of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in modern smart grids (SGs) offers many advantages including the use of renewables and an effective way to protect, control and monitor the energy transmission and distribution. To reach an optimal operation of future energy systems, availability, integrity and confidentiality of data should be guaranteed. Research on the cyber-physical security of electrical substations based on IEC 61850 is still at an early stage. In the present work, we first model the network traffic data in electrical substations, then, we present a statistical Anomaly Detection (AD) method to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) network communication. According to interpretations on the self-similarity and the Long-Range Dependency (LRD) of the data, an Auto-Regressive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA) model was shown to describe well the GOOSE communication in the substation process network. Based on this ARFIMA-model and in view of cyber-physical security, an effective model-based AD method is developed and analyzed. Two variants of the statistical AD considering statistical hypothesis testing based on the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) and the cumulative sum (CUSUM) are presented to detect flooding attacks that might affect the availability of the data. Our work presents a novel AD method, with two different variants, tailored to the specific features of the GOOSE traffic in IEC 61850 substations. The statistical AD is capable of detecting anomalies at unknown change times under the realistic assumption of unknown model parameters. The performance of both variants of the AD method is validated and assessed using data collected from a simulation case study. We perform several Monte-Carlo simulations under different noise variances. The detection delay is provided for each detector and it represents the number of discrete time samples after which an anomaly is detected. In fact, our statistical AD method with both variants (CUSUM and GLRT) has around half the false positive rate and a smaller detection delay when compared with two of the closest works found in the literature. Our AD approach based on the GLRT detector has the smallest false positive rate among all considered approaches. Whereas, our AD approach based on the CUSUM test has the lowest false negative rate thus the best detection rate. Depending on the requirements as well as the costs of false alarms or missed anomalies, both variants of our statistical detection method can be used and are further analyzed using composite detection metrics.
Cybersecurity breaches targeting electrical substations constitute a significant threat to the integrity of the power grid, necessitating comprehensive defense and mitigation strategies. Any anomaly in information and communication technology (ICT) should be detected for secure communications between devices in digital substations. This paper proposes large language models (LLMs), e.g., ChatGPT, for the cybersecurity of IEC 61850-based communications. Multi-cast messages such as generic object oriented system events (GOOSE) and sampled values (SV) are used for case studies. The proposed LLM-based cybersecurity framework includes, for the first time, data pre-processing of communication systems and human-in-the-loop (HITL) training (considering the cybersecurity guidelines recommended by humans). The results show a comparative analysis of detected anomaly data carried out based on the performance evaluation metrics for different LLMs. A hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed is used to generate and extract a dataset of IEC 61850 communications.
Smart grids with interoperability improve grid reliability by collecting system information and transferring it to an energy management system and associated applications through a seamless end-to-end connection. To achieve interoperability, it is required to exchange the semantic information within the different domains. The international electrotechnical commission has established the Common Information Model (CIM) tool, which is a standard application programming interface for the exchange of semantic information in power systems. CIM provides a robust framework for accurate data sharing, merging, and transformation into reusable information. However, as CIM provides a basic framework for information exchange, various practical issues arise in establishing an energy management system capable of exchanging information using CIM. This paper aims to offer a comprehensive understanding by summarizing and categorizing the research on the practical use of CIM for interoperability in smart grids. Many papers are analyzed and the issues are classified into CIM extension, harmonization, and validation to address the issues that arise when establishing an integrated information exchange system.
The main challenge of the microgrid is to design a suitable protection scheme due to the complexity of the architecture of the microgrid. The importance of the proposed protection technique is threefold. First, it presents a co-simulation platform to integrate between a simulated model on power system computer aided design (PSCAD)/real time digital simulator computer aided design (RSCAD) software’s and physical devices schweitzer engineering laboratories (SEL) 421-7 relays to protect the microgrid that includes different resources connected based on inverter interface. Second, it presents a comprehensive hardware/software setup to test the protective relays in a closed loop system and shows how to configure the protective relay’s International Electrotechnical Commission 61850 communications. Third, IEEE 1588 standard is used to provide sub nanoseconds latency between the simulated model that emulated on real time digital simulator (RTDS) and the external devices. Also, the measurement signals are synchronized between RTDS and the external devices using giga-transceiver synchronization card (GTSYNC) interface card and SEL-2488 satellite-synchronized network clock. The results showed that the co-simulation infrastructure introduces a highly dependable design, analysis, and testing environment for cyber and physical data flow in the system. Besides that, the voltages at ac/dc sides and frequency at fault condition were maintained due to the energy storage device contributions at different modes of operation.
Cyber-physical system (CPS) security for the smart grid enables secure communication for the SCADA and wide-area measurement system data. Power utilities world-wide use various SCADA protocols, namely DNP3, Modbus, and IEC 61850, for the data exchanges across substation field devices, remote terminal units (RTUs), and control center applications. Adversaries may exploit compromised SCADA protocols for the reconnaissance, data exfiltration, vulnerability assessment, and injection of stealthy cyberattacks to affect power system operation. In this paper, we propose an efficient algorithm to generate robust rule sets. We integrate the rule sets into an intrusion detection system (IDS), which continuously monitors the DNP3 data traffic at a substation network and detects intrusions and anomalies in real-time. To enable CPS-aware wide-area situational awareness, we integrated the methodology into an open-source distributed-IDS (D-IDS) framework. The D-IDS facilitates central monitoring of the detected anomalies from the geographically distributed substations and to the control center. The proposed algorithm provides an optimal solution to detect network intrusions and abnormal behavior. Different types of IDS rules based on packet payload, packet flow, and time threshold are generated. Further, IDS testing and evaluation is performed with a set of rules in different sequences. The detection time is measured for different IDS rules, and the results are plotted. All the experiments are conducted at Power Cyber Lab, Iowa State University, for multiple power grid models. After successful testing and evaluation, knowledge and implementation are transferred to field deployment.