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Constructive recommendations are suggested for pollution problems from offshore energy resources industries on outer continental shelf. Technical management techniques for pollution identification and control offer possible applications to space engineering and management.
Kennedy Space Center is not only home to one of the largest buildings in the world - the massive Vehicle Assembly Building - it also hosts a number of one-of-a-kind facilities. The more than 30-mile-long campus has witnessed every launch from the Space Shuttle Launch Pad, as well as many homecomings at the Shuttle Landing Facility. Just as important, the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) has seen each element of the International Space Station (ISS) that passes through Kennedy before it goes into orbit. The SSPF is where ISS components are checked, tested, and adjusted before being packed into the Space Shuttle for transport. In an environment like the SSPF - spanning 457,000 square feet of processing areas, operational control rooms, laboratories, logistics areas, and office space - large workstands and equipment used to support the processing of ISS components need to be moved around the facility. One of the devices employed for this task is an air pallet. An air pallet moves on cushions of air instead of wheels. Compressed air inflates the cushions underneath the pallet and is then expelled through exhaust holes. This forms a thin film of air between the cushions and the floor, lifting the platform off the floor and making it easy to move the heavy workstands, equipment, and ISS components. Concerned with the safety of the connections on the pressurized air hoses used for the air pallets, engineers at Kennedy modified an existing commercial cam and groove fitting to control the air supply hose in the event of an accidental release of a pressurized hose. This modification prevented the hose from detaching and, propelled by compressed air, striking workers or equipment. "At the time, these were not available on commercial coupling halves, so NASA made a modification and then put them into use. If a worker were to accidentally try to remove a pressurized hose from the pallet, it no longer rapidly separated, and it safely relieved the pressure," says Paul Schwindt, an engineer at Kennedy who together with Alan Littlefield, also an engineer at Kennedy, designed the modification.
The role of NASA in the national attempt to minimize the occurrence and severity of accidents is described. Equipment and structure safety, industrial safety, and accident prevention are discussed.
For safety-critical industries, human error (HE) presents continual risks to system productivity, reliability and safety. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) methods have emerged as promising approaches to understand, categorize and mitigate the risk of HE in safety-critical industries. Furthermore, this review offers an examination of the current landscape regarding the utilization of AI/ML with regards to HE in safety-critical industries, categorizing literature into descriptive modeling, predictive modeling, prescriptive modeling, and generative modeling techniques. Additionally, the review aims to provide insights regarding themes in literature, challenges, and future research directions. Findings of the review suggest that AI/ML methods can prove useful in addressing the HE problem across safety-critical industries.
Papers presented at conference on system safety in government and industry
Ensuring accurate detection and attribution of abnormal releases of radioactive material is critical for protecting human health and safety. Most commonly, such detection is accomplished via active monitoring approaches involving the collection of physical samples. Further, this is labor intensive and limits the temporal and spatial resolution of any detected events to a relatively coarse level. As an alternative first step towards passive monitoring, we developed an approach using eddy flux tower data records to identify signals from a known abnormal release and quantify the extent to which that signal also occurs at other times in the data record. Through two case studies, one of which targeted the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the other targeting an abnormal release event at a radioisotope production facility in Fleurus, Belgium, we tested our approach and identified several potential heretofore unidentified abnormal events that were consistent with atmospheric circulation patterns and/or wind direction from known release sites. Because our approach is relatively simple and is resistant to systematic errors in the observational record, it has broad applicability beyond specific constituents and ecosystem types to identify a wide variety of limited-duration anomalies in flux tower data to ensure human health and industrial safety.
Thin layer of polysulfone on polycarbonate safety helmets and visors protects them from attack by chemicals. Useful in industrial safety helmets. Highly resistant to creep under tension load. Retains dimensional stability when exposed to moisture. Does not adversely affect optical properties of polycarbonate visors. Configuration varied to accommodate such special requirements as high impact strength or protection against moving particles and debris.
Topics include: Bioreactors Drive Advances in Tissue Engineering; Tooling Techniques Enhance Medical Imaging; Ventilator Technologies Sustain Critically Injured Patients; Protein Innovations Advance Drug Treatments, Skin Care; Mass Analyzers Facilitate Research on Addiction; Frameworks Coordinate Scientific Data Management; Cameras Improve Navigation for Pilots, Drivers; Integrated Design Tools Reduce Risk, Cost; Advisory Systems Save Time, Fuel for Airlines; Modeling Programs Increase Aircraft Design Safety; Fly-by-Wire Systems Enable Safer, More Efficient Flight; Modified Fittings Enhance Industrial Safety; Simulation Tools Model Icing for Aircraft Design; Information Systems Coordinate Emergency Management; Imaging Systems Provide Maps for U.S. Soldiers; High-Pressure Systems Suppress Fires in Seconds; Alloy-Enhanced Fans Maintain Fresh Air in Tunnels; Control Algorithms Charge Batteries Faster; Software Programs Derive Measurements from Photographs; Retrofits Convert Gas Vehicles into Hybrids; NASA Missions Inspire Online Video Games; Monitors Track Vital Signs for Fitness and Safety; Thermal Components Boost Performance of HVAC Systems; World Wind Tools Reveal Environmental Change; Analyzers Measure Greenhouse Gasses, Airborne Pollutants; Remediation Technologies Eliminate Contaminants; Receivers Gather Data for Climate, Weather Prediction; Coating Processes Boost Performance of Solar Cells; Analyzers Provide Water Security in Space and on Earth; Catalyst Substrates Remove Contaminants, Produce Fuel; Rocket Engine Innovations Advance Clean Energy; Technologies Render Views of Earth for Virtual Navigation; Content Platforms Meet Data Storage, Retrieval Needs; Tools Ensure Reliability of Critical Software; Electronic Handbooks Simplify Process Management; Software Innovations Speed Scientific Computing; Controller Chips Preserve Microprocessor Function; Nanotube Production Devices Expand Research Capabilities; Custom Machines Advance Composite Manufacturing; Polyimide Foams Offer Superior Insulation; Beam Steering Devices Reduce Payload Weight; Models Support Energy-Saving Microwave Technologies; Materials Advance Chemical Propulsion Technology; and High-Temperature Coatings Offer Energy Savings.
Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)
This paper explores the application of established roadmapping approaches in standards planning and roadmap development to support mission assurance objectives. Mission assurance requires proactive planning across multiple domains including technical, schedule, cost, organizational, and policy. The intersection of these domains happens at the enterprise level, and enterprise systems engineering processes can systematically guide mission assurance activities, including development of standards roadmaps. Standards planning and development is a critical contributor to an effective mission assurance strategy, although standards are often developed and adopted reactively. Technology and standards planning is a key Enterprise Process Management activity, as identified by the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge, and technology and standards roadmaps are strategic tools used to enable that process. Technology roadmapping has proven effective in guiding enterprise architecture and concept design, and standards planning supports enterprise requirements definition and management. However, there are limited methodologies to guide such standards planning activities. The application of technology roadmapping principles to standards planning formalizes the process and establishes a repeatable framework for standards development and integration. The framework development described in this paper fills a methodological gap by adapting proven roadmapping techniques to standards planning. Through a comparison of roadmapping methodologies and a case study analysis, this approach outlines a systematic process for anticipating and planning standards needs. In the case of developing a standards integration roadmap for NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), technology roadmapping principles were adapted to develop a roadmap framework to allow NASA and OSMA to define an agency-wide standards integration plan for commercial and industry safety and mission assurance standards. The outcome highlights key adaptations required for roadmapping in a standards context and describes the process steps to formalize a standards planning activity. The roadmapping framework adapted for standards development and integration enables more strategic, forward-looking standards planning and allows for better alignment between evolving capabilities and mission assurance requirements. Beyond its application to mission assurance, this methodology can be transferred to other domains requiring standards development, providing a systematic approach that integrates systems engineering principles into policy strategy and decision-making processes.
The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) were developed as the lessons-learned from process criticality accidents. These consensus standards were developed to reduce the rate of process criticality accidents in facilities that process, store, handle or transport fissionable materials by hand. After a significant increase in criticality accidents through the mid-1960’s, the rate of criticality accidents decreased due to these standards and the criticality accident rate is extremely low from an industrial safety perspective.
The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) were developed based on the lessons-learned from process criticality accidents. These consensus standards were developed to reduce the rate of process criticality accidents in facilities that process, store, handle, or transport fissionable materials by hand. After a significant increase in criticality accidents through the mid-1960s, the rate of criticality accidents decreased as a result of these standards, and the criticality accident rate is extremely low from an industrial safety perspective. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 47 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (almost 26 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American National Standards (ANS) that are prepared and published by the American Nuclear Society and approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently 18 standards in the ANS-8 series. Nine ANS-8 standards are either in revision mode or planned for revision. A new standard for the use of nondestructive assay measurements (ANSI/ANS-8.28-2024) for NCS was approved in March of 2024. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 “Nuclear Energy,” Subcommittee 5, “Nuclear Fuel Technology,” and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eleven standards are currently available, four standards are proposed for revision, and four standards are at various stages of development. This paper provides the NCS community with a high-level overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.
Under contract to NASA during preparations for the space station, Memry Technologies Inc. investigated shape memory effect (SME). SME is a characteristic of certain metal alloys that can change shape in response to temperature variations. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Memry used its NASA-acquired expertise to produce a line of home and industrial safety products, and refined the technology in the mid-1990s. Among the new products they developed are three MemrySafe units which prevent scalding from faucets. Each system contains a small valve that reacts to temperature, not pressure. When the water reaches dangerous temperatures, the unit reduces the flow to a trickle; when the scalding temperature subsides, the unit restores normal flow. Other products are the FIRECHEK 2 and 4, heat-activated shutoff valves for industrial process lines, which sense excessive heat and cut off pneumatic pressure. The newest of these products is Memry's Demand Management Water Heater which shifts the electricity requirement from peak to off-peak demands, conserving energy and money.
Now that the NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is beginning its full certification contract for crew transportation to the International Space Station (ISS), is it time for industry to embrace a minimum set of core safety attributes? Those attributes can then be evolved into an industry-led set of basic safety standards and requirements. After 50 years of human space travel sponsored by governments, there are two basic conditions that now exist within the international space industry. The first, there is enough of a space-faring history to encourage the space industry to design, develop and operate human spaceflight systems without government contracts for anything other than services. Second, industry is capable of defining and enforcing a set of industry-based safety attributes and standards for human spaceflight to low-Earth orbit (LEO). This paper will explore both of these basic conditions with a focus on the safety attributes and standards. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is now starting to dialogue with industry about the basic safety principles and attributes needed for potential future regulatory oversight. This process is not yet formalized and will take a number of years once approval is given to move forward. Therefore, throughout the next few years, it is an excellent time and opportunity for industry to collaborate together and develop the core set of attributes and standards. As industry engages and embraces a common set of safety attributes, then government agencies, like the FAA and NASA can use that industry-based product to strengthen their efforts on a safe commercial spaceflight foundation for the future. As the commercial space industry takes the lead role in establishing core safety attributes, and then enforcing those attributes, the entire planet can move away from governmental control of design and development and let industry expand safe and successful space operations in LEO. At that point the governmental agencies can focus on oversight of the industries' defined standards and enforcement for common welfare of the space-faring populous and overall public safety.
A compact, chip-scale mid-infrared gas sensor is demonstrated, leveraging a two-dimensional photonic crystal waveguide (PCW) fabricated on a silicon-on-insulator (SOI) platform. The PCW comprises a hexagonal lattice with lattice constant a = 860 nm and hole radius r = 0.22a, incorporating a central line defect of reduced-radius holes (r s = 0.7r) to induce slow-light propagation near the photonic band edge with a group index of approximately 73, thereby enhancing light-matter interaction. The sensor operates at fundamental absorption wavelengths of 3.42 μm for nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ) and 3.40 μm for methane (CH 4 ), utilizing the strongest molecular vibrational transitions for maximum sensitivity. Experimental validation was conducted using dynamically diluted gas mixtures generated by mass flow controllers, with signal acquisition performed by a liquid nitrogen-cooled InSb detector. For NO 2 , the sensor exhibited excellent linear response over 5–25 ppm (part per million) with coefficient of determination R 2 = 0.9934, achieving a detection limit of 210 ppb (part per billion)─representing the first reported silicon photonic-based NO 2 detection. For CH 4 , exposure to 25 ppm resulted in a 6.4% decrease in transmitted intensity, demonstrating multigas sensing capability. The CMOS-compatible fabrication process and compact 3 mm device footprint establish this SOI-PCW platform as a scalable, low-power solution for integrated mid-infrared gas sensing, with significant potential for environmental monitoring and industrial safety applications.
This report reviews the history of the radium dial workers in the United States, summarizes the scientific progress made since the last evaluation in the early 1990s, and discusses current progress in updating the epidemiologic cohort and applying new dosimetric models for radiation risk assessment. The discoveries of radiation and radioactivity led quickly to medical and commercial applications at the turn of the 20th century, including the development of radioluminescent paint, made by combining radium with phosphorescent material and adhesive. Workers involved with the painting of dials and instruments included painters, handlers, ancillary workers, and chemists who fabricated the paint. Dial painters were primarily women and, prior to the mid to late 1920s, would use their lips to give the brush a fine point, resulting in high intakes of radium. The tragic experience of the dial painters had a significant impact on industrial safety standards, including protection measures taken during the Manhattan Project. The dial workers study has formed the basis for radiation protection standards for intakes of radionuclides by workers and the public. The mortality experience of 3,276 radium dial painters and handlers employed between 1913-1949 is being determined through 2019. The last epidemiologic follow-up was 30 years ago when most of these workers were still alive. Nearly 65% were born before 1920, 37.5% were teenagers when first hired, and nearly 50% were hired before 1930 when the habit of placing brushes in mouths essentially stopped. Comprehensive dose reconstruction techniques are being applied to estimate organ doses for each worker related to the intake of 226Ra, 228Ra, and associated photon exposures. Time dependent dose-response analyses will estimate lifetime risks for specific causes of death. The study of radium dial workers is part of the Million Person Study of low-dose health effects that is designed to evaluate radiation risks among healthy American workers and veterans. Despite being one of the most important and influential radiation effects studies ever conducted, shifting programmatic responsibilities and declining funding led to the termination of the radium program of studies in the early 1990s. Renewed interest and opportunity have arisen. With scientific progress made in dosimetric methodology and models, the ability to perform a study over the entire life span, and the potential applicability to other scenarios such as medicine, environmental contamination and space exploration, the radium dial workers have once again come to the forefront.
Almost all work performed within the nuclear industry requires some form of training, regardless of an individual’s education. While many of the hazards that exist in nuclear operations are present in other industries (e.g., industrial safety), nuclear operations have the unique hazards of radiation and inadvertent criticality. Therefore, these topics require additional training for individuals performing hands-on work or accessing those work areas. Many methods are available to train people including lectures (either with an instructor or automated video), reading procedures/policies, hands-on demonstrations, and on-the-job training.
Annotated bibliography on human reliability in connection with industrial safety