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At least 19 records

Moving from Information Assurance to Functional Assurance with Engineered Controls

Cyber threats to operational technology demand more than traditional IT defenses—they require full-spectrum mission assurance. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that embeds engineered controls into system design to ensure critical functions remain safe and reliable, even under attack. Unlike conventional cybersecurity tools, engineered controls act directly on physical processes to prevent unacceptable outcomes such as equipment damage or mission failure. This session will outline the CIE framework and share examples of consequence-based design that deliver true resilience, not just fail-safe behaviors. Attendees will learn how to integrate these principles into the engineering lifecycle to support resilient-by-design architectures and inform emerging standards. This talk sets the stage for the panel discussion on advancing CIE across sectors as digital and physical systems converge.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Templates for Risk Informed Assurance with Curvature Embeddings (TRACE)

We investigate recovery of geometric structure from networks embedded in manifolds with spatially varying curvature, extending the constant-curvature framework of Lubold et al. (2023). Our work supports cascade risk assessment in critical infrastructure through the Templates for Risk-informed Assurance with Curvature Embeddings (TRACE) framework. Simulations on a bi-modal Gaussian surface show that constant-curvature methods yield weighted averages shaped by clique patterns, while hierarchical clustering identifies distinct regimes. Localized estimation, however, reveals boundary contamination in transitional regions. To address heterogeneity, we develop distance metrics for graphs with edge and node features, proving their metric validity, and validate them via deterministic graph generation from canonical tilings. We further propose a diffusion-based anomaly detection approach that treats networks as glued manifolds, using curvature discontinuities to detect structural anomalies. Employing the carré-du-champ operator and scalar curvature, we achieve robust anomaly discrimination, demonstrated on the Singapore Water Treatment (SWaT) dataset with joint network-traffic and sensor features. Integration with TRACE reveals how curvature shapes cascade dynamics: positive curvature impedes, while negative curvature accelerates propagation. This geometric perspective provides interpretable risk metrics and visualization tools for critical infrastructure managers. While full validation remains ongoing, our contributions establish a rigorous foundation for geometric analysis of network resilience and cascade vulnerability.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Monthly Quality-filtered Aggregation of NOAA Climate Data Record (CDR) of AVHRR Leaf Area Index (LAI) and Fraction of Absorbed Photosynthetically Active Radiation (FAPAR), Version 5

This dataset contains gridded monthly Leaf Area Index (LAI) derived from the daily NOAA Climate Data Record (CDR) of AVHRR Leaf Area Index (LAI) and Fraction of Absorbed Photosynthetically Active Radiation (FAPAR), Version 5. This data record spans from 1981 to 2018 using data from eight NOAA polar orbiting satellites: NOAA-7, -9, -11, -14, -16, -17, -18 and -19. The data are projected on a 0.05 degree x 0.05 degree global grid, as in the original CDR. The original CDR is one of the Land Surface CDR Version 5 products produced by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and the University of Maryland (UMD), which is accompanied by algorithm documentation, data flow diagram and source code for the NOAA CDR Program. This dataset is in the netCDF-4 file format following ACDD and CF Conventions. This dataset has applied quality assurance information to only include "OK" data from the original CDR in the monthly aggregation.

Vermote, Eric [NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (G↗

Monthly Quality-filtered Aggregation of NOAA Climate Data Record (CDR) of AVHRR (Version 5) and VIIRS (Version 1) Leaf Area Index (LAI) and Fraction of Absorbed Photosynthetically Active Radiation (FAPAR)

This dataset contains gridded monthly Leaf Area Index (LAI) derived from the daily NOAA Climate Data Record (CDR) of AVHRR (Version 5) and VIIRS (Version 1) Leaf Area Index (LAI) and Fraction of Absorbed Photosynthetically Active Radiation (FAPAR). This data record spans from 1981 to 2024 using data from NOAA polar orbiting satellites: NOAA-7, -9, -11, -14, -16, -17, -18, -19 and S-NPP. The data are projected on a 0.05 degree x 0.05 degree global grid, as in the original CDR. The original CDR is one of the Land Surface CDR products produced by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and the University of Maryland (UMD), which is accompanied by algorithm documentation, data flow diagram and source code for the NOAA CDR Program. This dataset is in the netCDF-4 file format following ACDD and CF Conventions. This dataset has applied quality assurance information to only include "OK" data from the original CDR in the monthly aggregation.

Vermote, Eric [NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (G↗

Cyber-Enabled Sabotage, Critical Function Assurance, and Cyber-Informed Engineering

Cyber-enabled Sabotage, Critical Function Assurance, and Cyber-Informed Engineering: This discussion will introduce the idea of cyber-enabled sabotage, and the role engineering plays in the cyber defense of critical functions with a focus on electric power systems. It will outline how and why engineering practice must be used to apply cybersecurity principles to establish safe and reliable operations even in the face of determined and skilled adversaries, and give an overview of INL’s Consequence-Driven Cyber-Informed Engineering methodology to apply these principles. There will be an opportunity for audience questions and answers at the end of the session.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Digital Assurance for High Consequence Systems: 2024 Mission Campaign White Paper

This Sandia National Laboratories Mission Campaign (MC) seeks to create the technical basis that allows national leaders to efficiently assess and manage the digital assurance of high consequence systems. We will call for transformative research that enables efficient (1) development of provably secure systems and secure integration of untrusted products, (2) intelligent threat mitigation, and (3) digital risk-informed engineering trade-offs. Ultimately, this MC will impact multiple national security missions; it will develop an informed Digital Assurance for High Consequence Systems (DAHCS) community and expand Sandia partnerships to build this national capability.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Progress Report on SFR Metallic Fuel Data Qualification

This report summarizes the progress of SFR metallic fuel qualification related activities, which are focused on providing quality assurance relevant information applicable to experiments irradiated during the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program. An overview of the metallic fuel performance data and the associated databases, including the EBR-II Fuels Irradiation & Physics Database (FIPD), Out-of-Pile Transient Database (OPTD), and TREAT Experimental Relational Database (TREXR) is included. The legacy data in the databases, including as-built, post-irradiation examination (PIE), operating parameters, and out-of-pile experiment post-test data are introduced. The SFR metallic fuel Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP) and its implementation to qualify these legacy data is described in detail. Important PIE data QA documents and the specifications of seven types of PIE measurements (contact profilometry, laser profilometry, neutron radiography, gamma scan, fission gas release fission gas chemistry, and metallography) are provided. Examples of the implementation of the QAPP to qualify each of those types of PIE data are provided.

Mo, Kun [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Argonn↗

Over three decades, and counting, of near-surface turbulent flux measurements from the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) user facility

Processes mediating the coupling of terrestrial, aquatic, biospheric, and atmospheric systems influence weather, climate, and ecosystem dynamics via transfer of energy, momentum, water, and carbon (or other species). These exchange processes are quantified by measurements of near-surface turbulent fluxes. Understanding processes at these interfaces provides insight toward understanding and predicting current and future states within the Earth system. The Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) user facility has been conducting measurements of near-surface turbulent fluxes since the early 1990s at long-term fixed locations and shorter-term mobile deployments across the Earth. ARM has utilized two established methods for conducting these measurements: energy balance Bowen ratio (EBBR) and eddy covariance (EC). Primary measurements from the former include sensible and latent heat flux, while the latter also measures fluxes of momentum and carbon (primarily carbon dioxide, with methane fluxes measured at two locations to date). The EBBR systems have been deployed at 22 locations, and, to date, the EC systems have been deployed at over 50 sites, with plans for additional novel site locations in the future. Herein, the history, evolution, and key aspects of these instrument systems are documented, along with information on data quality assurance and post-processing, as well as best use practices. Additionally, three data validation experiments were recently conducted, and their key findings are summarized. Finally, ancillary datasets acquired by ARM, which can contextualize and aid interpretation of the near-surface turbulent flux measurements, are discussed. The datasets described herein include the eddy correlation flux measurement system: 30ECOR (https://doi.org/10.5439/1879993, Sullivan et al., 1997), 30QCECOR (https://doi.org/10.5439/1097546, Gaustad, 2003), ECORSF (https://doi.org/10.5439/1494128, Sullivan et al., 2019a), and associated AmeriFlux and Methane Value-Added Product, AMCMETHANE (https://doi.org/10.5439/1508268, Billesbach, 2011); the energy balance Bowen ratio system: 30EBBR (https://doi.org/10.5439/1023895, Sullivan et al., 1993) and 30BAEBBR (https://doi.org/10.5439/1027268, Gaustad and Xie, 1993); and the carbon dioxide flux measurement system: CO2FLX (https://doi.org/10.5439/1287574, https://doi.org/10.5439/1287575, https://doi.org/10.5439/1287576, Koontz et al., 2015a, b, c; https://doi.org/10.5439/1989774, https://doi.org/10.5439/1989776, https://doi.org/10.5439/1992202, Biraud and Chan, 2002a, b, c). These data can be found by searching the above data stream names at https://adc.arm.gov/discovery/#/results/ (last access: 8 September 2025).

Sullivan, Ryan C. [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Annual Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 2023

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), one of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science’s 10 national laboratories, provides innovative science and technology development in the areas of energy and the environment, fundamental and computational science, and national security. There are three DOE offices within the Richland area. Two are responsible for the Hanford Site, whereas the Pacific Northwest Site Office oversees PNNL. PNNL prepares an Annual Site Environmental Report to meet the requirements of DOE Order 231.1B, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting, and DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, thus assuring that the public is informed of any PNNL-Richland campus or PNNL-Sequim campus event that could adversely affect the health and safety of the public, site staff, or the environment. The report provides a synopsis of ongoing environmental management performance and compliance activities for operations that occur at the PNNL-Richland campus in Richland, Washington, and at the PNNL-Sequim campus near Sequim, Washington. It describes the location of and background for each facility; addresses compliance with applicable DOE, federal, state, and local regulations, and site-specific permits; documents environmental monitoring efforts and their status; presents potential radiation doses to staff and the public in the surrounding areas; and describes DOE-required data quality assurance methods used for data verification. The ASER report describes Compliance with Federal, State, and Local Laws and Regulations in 2023, Environmental Sustainability, Environmental monitoring and dose assessment, Natural and Cultural Resource Management, and Quality Assurance activities that took place during Calendar Year 2023.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

ORNL Package Testing Program Software Quality Assurance Plan

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Package Testing Program (PTP) uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software in performing data collection of thermal test results for package designs that contain radioactive materials. Specifically, this software is used to collect temperature data from the furnace, packages, and ambient air to prepare and execute the thermal test specified in 10 CFR 71.73, “Thermal Test.” This software quality assurance (SQA) plan sets forth the guidelines, standards, and procedures that shall be used to provide SQA for PTP software applications. This is a living document that will be maintained for the lifecycle of the PTP program. The SQA plan follows the requirements set forth in ORNL Standards Based Management System (SBMS): Information Technology; Subject Area: Software Quality Assurance. When applicable to the requirements as described in ORNL SBMS, Software Quality Assurance, the software shall be listed in the ORNL Software Registration System (SRS). Exemptions to this SBMS are COTS and firmware that are not modified; spreadsheet applications and personal productivity tools that do not have a utility or safety application, research applications, legacy software, system software, vendor-supplied software used to interface with the vendor’s services, software used within the organization to facilitate processing or management of information, and software developed for applications not specific to the US Department of Energy (DOE).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

COnfirmation using Gamma-ray Non-Imaging Zero-knowledge ANti-mask Time-encoding (COGNIZANT) Final Summary Report

In potential future arms reduction treaties in which the numbers of nuclear warheads may approach small numbers, using delivery systems as a proxy for the warheads themselves may be insufficient. Therefore, a technical means of verifying the presence of a nuclear warhead may become necessary. Verifying that a declared item actually is a warhead is technically challenging within a verification regime: providing assurance to the monitoring party that a presented item is a warhead while protecting sensitive information about that warhead may be required. It is generally believed that strong assurance will require the confirmation of key attributes that may reveal closely-guarded critical design information. This provides high confidence to the monitoring party, but presents a risk of information loss to the host. A verification system must overcome this hurdle. Over the last several decades, systems have been developed that balance host and monitoring partner needs by using sensitive information to confirm treaty accountable items (TAI) as warheads while sequestering that information behind an information barrier (1). These are designed to meet the needs of the host but places the onus on the monitor to authenticate the hardware, firmware, and software. Authentication requires that the monitor confirm that all components of the system have not been modified and work as intended. In 2014, Glaser et al. proposed applying the concept of “zero knowledge protocols” (ZKP) from the field of cryptography to the problem of warhead verification (2). In mathematical cryptography, ZKP is accomplished by challenging one party to solve a problem that is only possible if that party possesses the information being authenticated. After repeated challenges, the party provides confidence that it possesses this information without revealing any details about the information itself. Systems have been in development based on this idea at both Princeton and MIT (2) (3) (4). The final measurement results produced by these systems can be viewed by both the host and the monitoring party without the worry of revealing sensitive information. However, in both of these physical implementations, there remains an information barrier within the system. The need for a digital information barrier to protect a measurement result is eliminated, but it has been replaced with the need to sequester physical components of the system, potentially obfuscating the measurement process itself. Both implementations physically insert information into the system that requires protection to prevent undesired disclosure of sensitive information: in the Princeton method, one must physically load the complement of the expected image of a true warhead into the system, and in the MIT technique, one loads a collection of spectator foils whose thicknesses physically encrypt a measured spectrum. This complicates authentication of the hardware and measurement process. The CONFIDANTE/COGNIZANT concept developed in this project do not load sensitive information into the system at any time, and could therefore open the possibility of allowing the inspector to not only view the final data but also the measurement as it is being performed and all associated equipment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

System-Level Integration of Modular Language Models for Real-Time Risk Assessment in Third-Party Risk Management Systems

Large enterprises typically rely on dedicated teams to govern and implement security measures throughout their supply chains, ensuring compliance with enterprise security procedures. There is a significant reliance on Third-Party Risk Management (TPRM) platforms, which often require complete, highly structured information from potential vendors. The review and compliance assurance processes are time- and labor intensive, often requiring several rounds of review between the supply chain security risk management teams, business users, and potential vendors, leading to delays in the supply chain processing and consumer experience. Significant challenges in the risk management paradigm include handling unstructured data in various formats and providing real-time feedback to users to reduce the required review time. This paper presents a novel solution to these challenges. A modular multi-step system architecture is proposed using advances in language processing, specifically for unstructured responses and provides real-time feedback (i.e., 3 seconds) so that users can improve their responses before the TPSRM team review. This novel system architecture will increase information accuracy and significantly reduce time and labor during the review process.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

3D-Reconstruction of Tau Neutrinos in LArTPC Detectors

The Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) is a next-generation neutrino experiment currently under construction. DUNE will consist of two high-resolution neutrino interaction imaging detectors exposed to the world’s most intense neutrino beam, with the Near Detector at Fermilab and the Far Detector 1,300 km away in the Sanford Underground Research Facility in South Dakota, US. The high statistics and excellent resolution capabilities of DUNE's $^{40}$Ar detector will allow us to make precision studies of oscillation parameters capable of searching for CP violation in the lepton sector, testing interaction models, and studying phenomena that have until now, seemed too complex to measure, like $\nu_\tau$ detection and therefore, providing the completion of the 3-flavor neutrino paradigm. Knowledge of the $\nu_\tau$ detection can impact a broad spectrum of open questions. These include searching for non-standard neutrino interactions, constraining the unitarity of the PMNS matrix, searching for sterile neutrinos, and studying neutrino interactions. In the case of LArTPC data, the detector hits can be considered nodes in a graph, and the edges represent the spatial and temporal relationships between them. By using graph neural networks, it is possible to exploit these relationships and improve the accuracy of particle identification and reconstruction. During my presentation and specifically for tau neutrino reconstruction, I will show the effectiveness and reliability of our in-house developed graph neural network (GNN), NuGraph. This GNN classifies detector hits based on the particle type responsible for their production, assuring that the system accurately identifies and categorizes information based on its unique characteristics.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2023

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2023. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2023 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

Record of Decision↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2024

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2024. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2024 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗