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At least 19 records
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DOE OSTI2024

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗
DOE OSTI2019

Analysis of System and Interoperability Impact from Securing Communications for Distributed Energy Resources

As the power grid incorporates increasing amounts of distributed energy resources (DER) that provide new generation sources, new opportunities are created for improving operation of the grid while large challenges also arise for preserving grid reliability and security. To improve grid performance, DERs can be utilized to provide important support functionality, such as supporting frequency and voltage levels, especially if they are assisted by communication schemes as part of an advanced distribution management system (ADMS). Unfortunately, such connectivity and grid support functionality also creates additional cyber security risk with the potential for degradation of grid services, especially under conditions with high amounts of distributed generation. This paper will first discuss the communications needed by DERs to support system and interoperability objectives, as well as the security requirements and impact of securing these communications. Some common security mechanisms are discussed in relation to DERs, and a simulated 15-bus model of a distribution feeder is used to demonstrate aspects of the DER communications and impact to grid performance. These results help to advance understanding of the benefits, requirements, and mechanisms for securely implementing DER communications while ensuring that grid reliability is maintained.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2018

Energy security role of biofuels in evolving liquid fuel markets

In this work, we explore the role of biofuels in mitigating the negative impacts of oil supply shocks on fuel markets under a range of oil price trajectories and biofuel blending mandate levels. Using a partial equilibrium model of US biofuels production and petroleum fuels trade, we discuss the adjustments in light-duty vehicle fuel mix, fuel prices, and renewable identification number (RIN) prices following each shock as well as the distribution of shock costs across market participants. Ethanol is used as both a complement (blend component in E10) and a substitute (in E15 and E85 blends) to gasoline. Results show that, during oil supply shocks, the role of ethanol as a substitute dominates and allows some mitigation of the shock. As US petroleum imports decrease with growing US oil production, the net economic welfare effect of sudden oil price changes and the energy security role of biofuels becomes less clear than it has been in the past. Although fuel consumers lose when oil price increases due to an external shock, domestic fuel producers gain. In some cases, depending on import share and supply and demand elasticities, we show that the gain to producers could more than offset consumer losses. However, in most cases evaluated here, sudden oil-price increases remain costly.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Multilayered Network Models for Security: Enhancing System Security Engineering with Orchestration

Security engineering approaches can often focus on a particular domain—physical security, cyber security, or personnel security, for example. Yet, security systems engineering consistently faces challenges requiring socio-technical solutions to address evolving and dynamic complexity. While some drivers of this complexity stem from complex risk environments, innovative adversaries, and disruptive technologies, other drivers are endogenous and emerge from the interactions across security engineering approaches. In response, INCOSE's Systems Security Working Group identified the need to better coordinate “disparate security solutions [that] operate independently” as one of eleven key concepts in their IS21 FuSE Security Roadmap. From this perspective, this need for “security orchestration” aligns with the perspective that security is a property that emerges from interactions within complex systems. Current efforts at Sandia National Laboratories are developing a systems security engineering approach that describes high consequence facility (HCF) security as a multidomain set of interacting layers. The result is a multilayered network (MLN)-based approach that captures the interactions between infrastructure, physical components, digital components, and humans in nuclear security systems. This article will summarize the MLN-based approach to HCF security and describe two preliminary results demonstrating potential benefits from incorporating interactions across disparate security solutions. Here, leveraging the logical structure of networks, this MLN model-based approach provides an example of how security orchestration provides enhanced systems security engineering solutions.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Connecting Nuclear Security to International Frameworks on Gender and Security

The international community is slowly beginning to recognize the intersections between the law and policy on international security – particularly arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament – and the body of human rights law that addresses gender equality. Notably absent from this discussion is the field of nuclear security. Despite its historical underpinnings as an inherently domestic activity, nuclear security is thoroughly grounded in international treaty law. Yet, nuclear security is often overlooked in the international security context and has not been well situated with international instruments that address gender equality. We argue that gender equality in nuclear security should be understood as an important component of broader efforts to achieve equal opportunities for women in work and critical to ensuring women are included in conflict prevention efforts. Linking nuclear security to broader international efforts to increase gender equality in security and conflict prevention will provide a clearer structure and framework for gender equality initiatives in the nuclear security field. This is critically important given that estimates indicate that women comprise only twenty percent of the nuclear security workforce. Moreover, situating nuclear security in a broader international legal framework will simultaneously help states meet their gender equality commitments emanating from other instruments. This paper will first analyze the relationship between nuclear security and broader international security efforts, in particular arms control treaties and non-proliferation regimes. It will then survey the relevant international and regional frameworks for gender equality, particularly those that have applicability in the security context. This paper will next explore the relationship between nuclear security and these frameworks on gender. We find that some instruments provide support for gender equality initiatives in nuclear security because of their mandate to states to provide structural gender equality, and others are particularly relevant where they call for women's participation in conflict prevention. This paper concludes with recommendations to states that are concerned about the underrepresentation of women in nuclear security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Towards Fully Secure 5G Ultra-Low Latency Communications: A Cost-Security Functions Analysis

Future components to enhance the basic, native security of 5G networks are either complex mechanisms whose impact in the requiring 5G communications are not considered, or lightweight solutions adapted to ultra-reliable low-latency communications (URLLC) but whose security properties remain under discussion. Although different 5G network slices may have different requirements, in general, both visions seem to fall short at provisioning secure URLLC in the future. In this work we address this challenge, by introducing cost-security functions as a method to evaluate the performance and adequacy of most developed and employed non-native enhanced security mechanisms in 5G networks. We categorize those new security components into different groups according to their purpose and deployment scope. We propose to analyze them in the context of existing 5G architectures using two different approaches. First, using model checking techniques, we will evaluate the probability of an attacker to be successful against each security solution. Second, using analytical models, we will analyze the impact of these security mechanisms in terms of delay, throughput consumption, and reliability. Finally, we will combine both approaches using stochastic cost-security functions and the PRISM model checker to create a global picture. Our results are first evidence of how a 5G network that covers and strengthened all security areas through enhanced, dedicated non-native mechanisms could only guarantee secure URLLC with a probability of ~55%.

5G networks↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cross-national analysis of food security drivers: comparing results based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale and Global Food Security Index

Abstract The second UN Sustainable Development Goal establishes food security as a priority for governments, multilateral organizations, and NGOs. These institutions track national-level food security performance with an array of metrics and weigh intervention options considering the leverage of many possible drivers. We studied the relationships between several candidate drivers and two response variables based on prominent measures of national food security: the 2019 Global Food Security Index (GFSI) and the Food Insecurity Experience Scale’s (FIES) estimate of the percentage of a nation’s population experiencing food security or mild food insecurity (FI ). We compared the contributions of explanatory variables in regressions predicting both response variables, and we further tested the stability of our results to changes in explanatory variable selection and in the countries included in regression model training and testing. At the cross-national level, the quantity and quality of a nation’s agricultural land were not predictive of either food security metric. We found mixed evidence that per-capita cereal production, per-hectare cereal yield, an aggregate governance metric, logistics performance, and extent of paid employment work were predictive of national food security. Household spending as measured by per-capita final consumption expenditure (HFCE) was consistently the strongest driver among those studied, alone explaining a median of 92% and 70% of variation (based on out-of-sample R 2 ) in GFSI and FI , respectively. The relative strength of HFCE as a predictor was observed for both response variables and was independent of the countries used for model training, the transformations applied to the explanatory variables prior to model training, and the variable selection technique used to specify multivariate regressions. The results of this cross-national analysis reinforce previous research supportive of a causal mechanism where, in the absence of exceptional local factors, an increase in income drives increase in food security. However, the strength of this effect varies depending on the countries included in regression model fitting. We demonstrate that using multiple response metrics, repeated random sampling of input data, and iterative variable selection facilitates a convergence of evidence approach to analyzing food security drivers.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 2 of 2 – Insights into Developing a Cloud-hosted Security Technology

A Sentry Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS) is a stand-alone security system that provides detection, assessment, and communication of priority alarms as an additional means of thwarting internal and external threats to sites that maintain radiological material. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform is an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS that relays priority alarm information to the identified response stakeholders. Sentry-SECURE is hosted in a cloud environment that abstracts the data owner’s and data consumer’s platforms to allow for greater information sharing. This promotes situational awareness amongst authorized users and enables future innovation among modern response platforms. When securely architecting a cloud solution such as this, the use of design paradigms can be an effective tool to increase the accuracy and reliability of cyber- and information-security-related decisions made throughout the development process. This approach also supports the categorization of design considerations into three levels: industry concepts, project approaches, and data protections for digital processes. Industry concepts consist of the notional underpinnings that guide or motivate a security process, system, or design but often lack any tangible attributes. Project approaches represent decisions made during the design and development process to prioritize a solution, method, or practice above another that may provide a comparable functional output but lacks a desired security benefit. Data protections for digital processes represent the selection, integration, and implementation of specific controls for a given asset. This paper will explore specific examples of how Sentry-SECURE has been designed to account for considerations at each of these three levels, while balancing the operational intent of the platform with the security enhancements necessary to maintain data integrity, availability, and confidentiality.

assessment, RMS, security, physical, cloud, Cyber ↗
DOE OSTI2019

First Road / River Barge Security Transport of SNF under the New German Transport Security Guidelines - 19102

A transfer of 342 spent fuel assemblies from NPP Obrigheim to NPP Neckarwestheim, both located alongside the river Neckar in the south of Germany, is required to promote the decommissioning process of NPP Obrigheim, which started in 2008 after the NPP had been shut down three years before. The spent fuel storage facility in Neckarwestheim offers sufficient storage space to accept the 342 SNF assemblies, stored in fifteen dry casks type CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK. After several transport feasibility studies had been conducted, Daher Nuclear Technologies GmbH was awarded the commission to plan, prepare and conduct the SNF transport. Since the combined road / river barge transport promised to be the most suitable mode of transportation Daher Nuclear Technologies started to prepare its security concept, a prerequisite to apply for and attain the transport license mandatory for transporting spent nuclear fuel in Germany. In March 2014 the company applied for the transport license, which, after more than three years and numerous amendments to the security concept, was finally granted to Daher Nuclear Technologies on May 16, 2017 by the German Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (successor organization of the BfS). Simultaneously to the license application phase the transport equipment - amongst others the heavy-duty trucks and trailers, the pusher tugs, the river barge and transport frames - had to be provided and modified to meet the intensified requirements of the New German Transport Security Guidelines Road / Rail as well as several other legal regulations referring to the transport of dangerous goods by road and inland waterways (e.g. ADR - European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road and ADN - European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways). The planning process involved various meetings with representatives of different authorities and administrative bodies incl. accredited experts as well as subcontractors. Tremendous training efforts had to be undertaken to train more than 100 transport participants regarding security measures, health, safety and environmental measures, as well as the proper handling of radioactive material. This also included the training of the security staff, that had to be qualified in compliance with the new Transport Security Guidelines Road and Rail. Finally, in June 2017, when all preparations where complete, all requirements met, and all permits obtained, the first ever security SNF transport on a German river was performed. Three laden CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK transport and storage casks were transported in one batch via heavy-duty truck-trailer from the NPP Obrigheim to the NPP's own harbor, to be rolled on to the river barge, that would carry the three casks upstream the river Neckar to the approx. fifty kilometer distant NPP Neckarwestheim. The journey on the river took about eleven hours, in which several bridges and locks had to be passed. The entire transport was escorted by qualified security staff and auxiliary police forces on waterways and alongside on roads. It attracted nationwide public attention, due to its pioneer status and the fact, that there hadn't been any SNF or HLW shipments in Germany since 2011. After the convoy safely arrived at NPP Neckarwestheim's pier the three laden CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK casks were rolled off the river barge via heavy-duty truck-trailers to be stored in the on-site interim storage facility. This first transport was a success and was followed by four additionally successful security transports in September, October, November and December 2017. The public attention receded significantly during the transport campaign, which ended on December 19, 2017 with the transfer of the last three of fifteen casks to the on-site interim storage facility in Neckarwestheim. With the last cask safely transferred to the interim storage facility Daher Nuclear Technologies successfully completed the transport campaign on schedule, meeting one of EnBW's fundamental objectives to finish the transfer of the 342 SNF assemblies by the end of 2017. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP) model: Extending the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework Across Organizational Security

Problem Statement: There is a pervasive talent deficit in the cybersecurity industry that prevents employers from being able to fill their open positions efficiently. A holistic approach to security is required to ensure organizations have adequate prevention and response capabilities in case of a cyberattack. Specifically, industrial control systems (ICS’s) and their operational technology (OT) components have become a constant target for cyberattacks. Research Questions: It is proposed that the NICE Framework should be extended in the following areas: 1) Include guidance regarding the job roles and competencies for both IT and OT professionals. 2) Offer step-by-step solutions, based on the work role mappings from the NICE Framework, to increase cybersecurity through employee training and education. 3) Provide a streamlined, lifecycle approach to building a cybersecurity program. Contribution: The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP©) model provides a customized solution for businesses to understand their education gaps in organizational security and target areas for improvement. Rationale: The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 addresses ICS but does not offer a measurement of cybersecurity maturity or clear methods to ascertain an organization’s current risk profile. In Phases 1 and 5 of the model, measurements are provided to help an organization build their current and target risk profiles. The NICE framework provides a structure for planning an IT cybersecurity workforce, but the OT aspects of cybersecurity are only briefly discussed. The model uses Phases 2-3 to examine the competencies of an organization’s workforce, which includes both IT and OT roles. Current frameworks do not offer next steps to increase an organization’s cybersecurity. During Phase 4, employees’ roles are mapped to training, education, and/or certifications from common vendors. Investigative Approach: The model provides measurements and metrics for both an organization’s status and continual improvement. This improvement methodology includes guidance for creating an overall strategic plan for security improvement via products designed to increase an organization’s operational readiness through workforce competency health. Lessons Learned: Depending on who was participating, there were contradicting answers given in Phase 1 due to different security cultures in the organization. This revelation has influenced the steps listed in the User’s Guide, where Phase 1’s first recommended step is to assemble a team that champions the facilitation and implementation of the model in the organization. During Phase 2, the discovery was made that organizations may be missing roles that are necessary to perform critical cybersecurity functions. By understanding the functional roles and competencies needed, they can contract or hire cybersecurity help to fill these gaps. Implications: Using the model, organizations can discuss quantitative measures for improvement as a business case for advancing their security program. Future research can validate and extend the present theory and model to a variety of environments. It is of interest to investigate additional security roles and knowledge domains that are used to build standardized cybersecurity curriculum.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Blockchain-Enabled Cyber-Secure Microgrid Control Using Consensus Algorithm

This paper proposes a distributed control method based on a consensus algorithm for distributed energy resources (DERs) using blockchain as a secure communication medium for cyber resilience. Each DER communicates with a local blockchain server that is maintained by the distributed ledger technology to allow for securely sharing local measurements among neighbouring assets to achieve the global control objectives, i.e., voltage and frequency regulation as well as accurate power sharing among the DERs, including collective grid-forming capability. To prove that the distributed control can retain system stability under a blockchain-induced variable communication delay, Lyapunov function-based stability analysis is carried out. This paper demonstrates the concept on an 11-bus test case developed in MATLAB Simulink, which has been modified from the IEEE 9-bus test case, to study dynamic operations of the five inverter-based DERs working with a blockchain-induced variable delay. The results validate the superior performance of the proposed control method, compared to heavily compromised operations of the other test cases without the security measure, affected by heavy communication delays and communication interruptions.

blockchains↗
DOE OSTI2023

Workshop on Establishing and Operating a National Nuclear Security Support Centre Hypothetical Scenario: “Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre Strategy Implementation Plan”

[This is part of a hypothetical scenario-based exercise for workshop participants, based on the fictitious country "Centralia."] In prior years, as a part of efforts to strengthen and better sustain nuclear security within the State, Centralia requested through the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) framework that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conduct an expert mission on establishing and operating a national nuclear security support centre (NSSC). After the IAEA conducted the NSSC expert mission, members of the Centralia Committee on Nuclear Security (CNS) agreed to initiate the feasibility determination phase of establishing an NSSC, in line with the systematic process recommended by the IAEA. Centralia Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CNRA), as the designated lead organization for coordinating the feasibility determination process, prepared a Feasibility Report in collaboration with members of the CNS and based on input gathered among relevant national stakeholders. The report was presented to the National Security Advisor (NSA), who reviewed and approved the proposal for Centralia to proceed with establishing an NSSC. After Centralia moved into the planning phase for the Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre (CNSSC), per REF, the primary stakeholders of the centre jointly developed this strategy implementation plan, which provides an outline of the organizational structure, needs analysis, programme objectives, financial and project management, risk management, and other key aspects of the centre. This document will be reviewed and updated as necessary on a semi-annual basis during the project implementation period of establishing CNSSC.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Artificial Intelligence for (AI) Nuclear Security: Expert Perspectives on AI Priorities for the Office of International Nuclear Security

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform nuclear security operations, offering opportunities to enhance effectiveness while simultaneously introducing new challenges. As AI technologies rapidly evolve, agencies across the United States Government (USG) are researching, implementing, and evaluating various AI models and systems. Given the broad capabilities and applications of these technologies, it is essential for each agency to identify and articulate those areas where it can make meaningful contributions aligned with its mission and expertise. To address this need for strategic focus, in late Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025), the Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) established an AI Task Force (AITF) to gather input from subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding the most appropriate role INS could serve in researching, evaluating, or implementing AI for nuclear security. The AITF engaged 15 experts from national laboratories with backgrounds in cyber security, physical security, transport security, insider threat mitigation, nuclear engineering, human-systems engineering, and AI/ML development. This white paper summarizes the insights gathered from these SMEs and presents a potential roadmap for INS engagement with AI technologies. The recommendations outlined here are intended to inform INS leadership as they make strategic decisions about resource allocation and program direction in this rapidly evolving technological domain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Vision Strengthening our Nation through Nuclear Security

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s enduring mission is to protect our nation by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global nuclear threats, and providing our submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear propulsion. Although we have numerous strategic partners that enable, contribute to, and benefit from our efforts, no other organization, government or civilian, can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of the American people. In this area, we stand alone. This strategic vision pursues urgent change at a significant scale to develop creative approaches, make sustained investments, and be disciplined in our approach to develop a nuclear capability for our time and for the foreseeable future. It is incumbent on us to anticipate our future security challenges and ensure our country is ready to meet them. Not doing so would have far-reaching consequences. Failure to meet our vital mission objectives will erode confidence in the security that the United States strategic deterrent umbrella provides. In assessing the current mission environment in NNSA, we can count on one thing—change: The geopolitical environment for our deterrent is ever-changing Threats from rogue states and terrorists are evolving Our nuclear weapons and the infrastructure that supports them are aging Science and technology continue to move forward at an ever-increasing pace In this dynamic environment, it is not sufficient to remedy today’s situation and meet our current mission requirements. We must lean forward in the development, planning, and execution of programs that address our current challenges while developing the workforce, infrastructure, tools, and governance systems that will enable us to meet our deterrence, non-proliferation, and naval propulsion mission requirements for the next 50 years. We must embrace a next-generation enterprise that is flexible enough to respond to future challenges. With decades of stagnation following the end of the Cold War, we find ourselves in the unenviable position of implementing near-term fixes while using those lessons learned to better prepare for the future. Without sustained and predictable investments to restore and modernize our infrastructure, we will rapidly lose our ability to deliver on our promise of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, which will degrade our deterrent capability and render legacy weapon systems irrelevant to the defense of our nation. We must not and will not allow the next generation of our nuclear security enterprise to simply maintain the status quo. We have a storied past that guides us. For 75 years our enterprise has overcome every challenge, led the country in incredible scientific and engineering endeavors and discoveries, and successfully ensured constant vigilance in maintaining an effective deterrent, reducing global nuclear threats, and powering our nuclear navy. Now is the time for us to take decisive action in forging the enterprise of the future. As I have traveled to all of our labs, plants, and sites and met with people across our complex, I have been left with one overwhelming impression: the incredible workforce that makes up our nuclear security enterprise is up to all of the challenges we have before us. Together we can and will ensure that those in the future workforce have the resources and the responsive, agile infrastructure they need to maintain the systems of today and to design and field the systems of tomorrow.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2025

Fusing Edge Computing with Transport Security by Leveraging the Controller Area Network Transport Security Tracking and Reporting (C-STAR) Unit

Rapid advances in embedded system complexity and capability provides exciting opportunities for transportation security deployment. Manufacturers and developers of these embedded systems continue to provide lower cost and more powerful solutions that can be leveraged by researchers and engineers. Furthermore, deploying these devices at the “edge” of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) infrastructure provides opportunities for highly capable applications in transport security. In an edge computation architecture, the device is co-located at the source of the data in the larger IoT structure – this provides computational capability at the location directly where the data is collected. For shipment transport security, this provides a direct compute node for digestion of data and mitigation actions in real-time. In our application, the vehicle provides a significant amount of this data that can be processed in real-time via the Controller Area Network Transport Security Tracking and Reporting (C-STAR) edge device. Utilization of a computational node located on the vehicle, such as the C-STAR, capitalizes on previously discussed opportunities of edge architectures. In this paper, we will discuss this security solution’s usability, current deployments, and scalability to further applications in transport security. First, we will cover the supported vehicle platforms that can leverage the C-STAR technology. This will be particularly relevant to medium- and heavy-duty vehicles transporting high-risk shipments. Second, we will speak to current deployments of the C-STAR that are ongoing. Finally, we will discuss additional areas for expansion such as maturing the onboard algorithms through continuing collaborations.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗
DOE OSTI2019

Secure Software Defined Radio Project: Secure Wireless Systems for the Energy Sector (Briefing 6)

Strong industry interest in the SEL-FLT/FLR products has led to a large number of customers conducting various lab and field trial evaluations of the system. These trials are on-going but have allowed SEL to collect enough information about operation and deployment and security capabilities of the system to conclude the field demo phase of the project. The field-testing topical report has been completed and submitted. SEL has also prepared a SEL-FLT/FLR best practices guide based on learnings from the field demo phase of the project. This best practice guide has also been submitted. The final deliverable from this phase of the project is an economic and operational benefits white paper, which has also been written and submitted. The overall objective of the project, extending the cyber security capabilities of utility wired networks into last mile wireless networks has been successfully achieved. SEL chose to target a sensor network for implementation of this capability because it was one area of last mile networking where there was substantial need and opportunity. Based on customer interest in the product these efforts have been a success. Interest in, and support for many of the security features of the product has been expressed by customers trialing the product system. Key security features customers value are strong data encryption, sensor white listing, and use of secure account based log on for access to the system. These and other features of the product have gained strong acceptance from customers interested in purchasing these products. All project deliverables and tasks are now complete, and the project can be closed out.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2018

System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance & Security: 3S Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors (Volume I)—Technical Evaluation of Safety Safeguards & Security

Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors—increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aim of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗