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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Analysis of Phoenix Anomalies and IV & V Findings Applied to the GRAIL Mission

NASA IV&V was established in 1993 to improve safety and cost-effectiveness of mission critical software. Since its inception the tools and strategies employed by IV&V have evolved. This paper examines how lessons learned from the Phoenix project were developed and applied to the GRAIL project. Shortly after selection, the GRAIL project initiated a review of the issues documented by IV&V for Phoenix. The motivation was twofold: the learn as much as possible about the types of issues that arose from the flight software product line slated for use on GRAIL, and to identify opportunities for improving the effectiveness of IV&V on GRAIL. The IV&V Facility provided a database dump containing 893 issues. These were categorized into 16 bins, and then analyzed according to whether the project responded by changing the affected artifacts or using as-is. The results of this analysis were compared to a similar assessment of post-launch anomalies documented by the project. Results of the analysis were discussed with the IV&V team assigned to GRAIL. These discussions led to changes in the way both the project and IV&V approached the IV&V task, and improved the efficiency of the activity.

Larson, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2018

IV&V Planning & Execution Initiative

Independent verification and validation (IV&V) is a systems engineering discipline which seeks to provide confidence that mission-critical software-dependent systems will operate safely and achieve all mission objectives. In order to optimize application of IV&V resources, it is necessary to identify specific assurance objectives that are most likely to reveal difficulty and therefore to increase confidence. Software assurance literature deals predominantly with the code itself. However, our experience is that the most significant software-related issues are discovered via analysis of other system artifacts such as operations concepts, requirements and design. Consequently, it is desirable to, when assessing risk and defining assurance objectives, consider all facets of the software system architecture. We describe in this presentation progress and lessons learned from an IV&V capability development initiative to enhance the IV&V project planning process using all available architecture information.

Risk↗
NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA’s Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V’s desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V’s assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Gerek Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA's Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA's Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V's desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V's assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Whitman, Gerek↗
NASA NTRS2022

Adaptive IV&V for Increasingly Complex Software Systems

As NASA software systems continue to innovate, becoming more complex and nondeterministic, the need for the NASA IV&V Program to become systemically adaptive to ensure mission success is paramount. To ensure adaptability within resource constraints, IV&V has developed an agile, risk-based approach to identify, characterize, scope, focus, and prioritize mission assurance activities. This risk based adaptive framework has been applied to trends such as increased reliance on data driven algorithms for safety and mission critical software behavior, use of MBSE in system design, and application of agile principles to embedded software development. The framework is enabled by continuous innovation of new approaches such as software only test beds, assurance design tools, and initiatives that augment IV&V assurance methods with artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques. This presentation will highlight the trends the NASA IV&V Program is seeing, the innovative steps it is taking to address those challenges, and how it is postured to address evolving risk and constantly changing and new technologies.

Wesley W Deadrick↗
NASA NTRS2012

IV&V Project Assessment Process Validation

The Space Launch System (SLS) will launch NASA's Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). This launch vehicle will provide American launch capability for human exploration and travelling beyond Earth orbit. SLS is designed to be flexible for crew or cargo missions. The first test flight is scheduled for December 2017. The SLS SRR/SDR provided insight into the project development life cycle. NASA IV&V ran the standard Risk Based Assessment and Portfolio Based Risk Assessment to identify analysis tasking for the SLS program. This presentation examines the SLS System Requirements Review/System Definition Review (SRR/SDR), IV&V findings for IV&V process validation correlation to/from the selected IV&V tasking and capabilities. It also provides a reusable IEEE 1012 scorecard for programmatic completeness across the software development life cycle.

Driskell, Stephen↗
NASA NTRS1975

Semiempirical upper photosphere models - The sun /G2 V/ and Procyon /F5 IV-V/

A description is presented of an approach for developing a model of the average upper photosphere temperature structure of a late-type star. The approach makes use of the frequency dependence of the damping wing opacity of a strong resonance line. Difficulties related to a dependence on uncertain constant and parameter values are to be overcome with the aid of a 'calibration' relative to a solar photosphere model obtained by an independent method.

Ayres, T. R.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Chromospheric models for Altair (A7 IV-V)

The star, Altair (A7 IV-V), is clearly shown to have Lyman-alpha emission of chromospheric origin, while no evidence is found for the Mg II emission reported in previous investigations. We present non-Local Thermodymanic Equilibrium (non-LTE) semiempirical models incorporating partial redistribution of the chromosphere of Altair that reproduce the observed Lyman-alpha emission and the Mg II resonance absorption at 2800 A. We unambiguously establihed that chromospheres exist at spectral types as early as A7 on the main sequence, and we also demonstrate that it very unlikely that the observed emission originates in a corotating expanding wind. This result represents a new challenge for chromospheric heating theories. It may indicate that both differential rotation and convection layers, at least near the equator, exist in this fast rotating (v sin i = 220 km/s) star.

Ferrero, R. Freire↗
NASA NTRS2017

VIII. New Zr IV-VII, Xe IV-V, and Xe VII Oscillator Strengths and the Al, Zr, and Xe Abundances in the Hot White Dwarfs G191-B2B and RE0503-289

Context: For the spectral analysis of high-resolution and high-signal-to-noise spectra of hot stars, state-of-the-art non-local thermodynamic equilibrium (NLTE) model atmospheres are mandatory. These are strongly dependent on the reliability of the atomic data that is used for their calculation. Aims: To search for zirconium and xenon lines in the ultraviolet (UV) spectra of G191−B2B and RE 0503−289, new Zr iv-vii, Xe iv-v, and Xe vii oscillator strengths were calculated. This allows, for the first time, determination of the Zr abundance in white dwarf (WD) stars and improvement of the Xe abundance determinations.Methods: We calculated Zr iv-vii, Xe iv-v, and Xe vii oscillator strengths to consider radiative and collisional bound-bound transitions of Zr and Xe in our NLTE stellar-atmosphere models for the analysis of their lines exhibited in UV observations of the hot WDs G191−B2B and RE 0503−289. Results: We identified one new Zr iv, 14 new Zr v, and ten new Zr vi lines in the spectrum of RE 0503−289. Zr was detected for the first time in a WD. We measured a Zr abundance of −3.5 +/- 0.2 (logarithmic mass fraction, approx. 11 500 times solar). We identified five new Xe vi lines and determined a Xe abundance of −3.9 +/- 0.2 (approx. 7500 times solar). We determined a preliminary photospheric Al abundance of −4.3 +/- 0.2 (solar) in RE 0503−289. In the spectra of G191−B2B, no Zr line was identified. The strongest Zr iv line (1598.948 Å) in our model gave an upper limit of −5.6 +/- 0.3 (approx. 100 times solar). No Xe line was identified in the UV spectrum of G191−B2B and we confirmed the previously determined upper limit of −6.8 +/- 0.3 (ten times solar). Conclusions: Precise measurements and calculations of atomic data are a prerequisite for advanced NLTE stellar-atmosphere modeling. Observed Zr iv-vi and Xe vi-vii line profiles in the UV spectrum of RE 0503−289 were simultaneously well reproduced with our newly calculated oscillator strengths.

Rauch, T.↗
NASA NTRS2018

IV&V of Autonomy

This presentation gives a brief overview of how NASA's IV&V Facility approaches assurance for autonomous space systems, and the perceived challenges for the future.

Costello, Ken↗
NASA NTRS1974

Stellar model chromospheres. II - Procyon /F5 IV-V/

Derivation of a model for the chromosphere and upper photosphere of Procyon (F5 IV-V) based on calibrated observations of the K and 8542-A lines of Ca II, the k(2796-A) line of Mg II, and the K-line wings. The feasibility of this model synthesis approach to derive a preliminary model chromosphere is demonstrated despite the lack of spatial and spectral resolution associated with solar chromospheric studies. The proposed upper photosphere model is very similar to the radiative equilibrium Procyon model of Strom and Kurucz (1966), while the proposed chromospheric model is similar to the quiet solar chromosphere temperature distribution of Shine (1973) in the 6000 to 8000 K range.

Ayres, T. R.↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA IV&V's Cyber Range for Space Systems

A cyber range is a virtual environment that is used for cyberwarfare training and cyber technology development. It provides tools that help strengthen the stability, security and performance of cyber infrastructures and IT systems. NASA IV&V has created an adaptable virtual environment that is representative of a typical NASA mission system of systems environment that serves multiple purposes: Training of network defenders. Ability to perform simulated red vs blue training events. Ability to deploy mission specific technologies in a cyber contested environment. Ability to demonstrate vulnerabilities and their impact to ground and space systemsThe overall system is comprised of more than 70 virtual machines and physical infrastructure to demonstrate real-world cyber attacks against: email users, wireless networks, and physically implanted devices with command and control call-back. The cyber range was built to emulate a NASA precipitation satellite infrastructure.This presentation will give an overview of the virtual cyber range and how it was used to conduct a simulate red vs blue exercise with the goal of compromising the simulated spacecraft that utilizes real NASA flight software.

test and evaluation DT&E↗