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NASA NTRS2025

A Minority Report Submitted as an Addendum to the Report of the Mars 2020 Organic Contamination Panel

This Minority Report (MR) presents seven findings in addition to or contrary to the main OCP report: 1. Contamination control for the Mars 2020 cache must be strict. Mars’ surface is known to be organics-poor from laboratory studies, Mars meteorite analyses, and from four previous NASA missions. It is imperative that contamination control measures are enacted that enable reliable and robust detection of potential biomarker compounds at the ppb level. 2. Since Mars 2020 is a sample return mission and analyses of samples in the returnable cache are expected to occur after return to Earth, positive controls are not recommended for flight on Mars 2020 unless a compelling case can be made for their use. 3. The findings of previous panels dedicated to organic compound analysis in Martian samples (OCSSG, ND-SAG, SDT) recommend TOC limits between 10-40 ppb. The MR finds that the lower limit of 10 ppb is recommended and that insufficient justification is given by the OCP Panel Report (PR) to raise the TOC limit to 40 ppb. 4. Analytical capability is sufficiently advanced that analytical capability is an irrelevant consideration with respect to differentiating between 10 and 40 ppb TOC. 5. Perceived contamination control challenges are an irrelevant consideration for raising the TOC contamination limit from 10 to 40 ppb since those challenges, and the procedures to ameliorate them, will exist regardless of whether the limit is 10 or 40 ppb. 6. The “dilution cleaning” method has not been adequately proven for utilization on the Mars 2020 mission. Shortcomings have been identified in terms of peer review, method verification, analytical and testing approach, application to space flight hardware, and performance under Martian conditions. The method should be revisited and independently tested using statistically and analytically robust methods, and scrutinized in a rigorous peer review process. 7. The Mars 2020 mission claims considerable heritage from the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission, but MSL contamination control efforts contain significant errors and implementation discrepancies that would imperil the Mars 2020 caching mission were they repeated. A standing contamination control panel should be formed to provide independent oversight for the Mars 2020 mission.

Mars Sample Return↗

NASA NTRS1996

Review of Issues Associated with Safe Operation and Management of the Space Shuttle Program

At the request of the President of the United States through the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the NASA Administrator tasked the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel with the responsibility to identify and review issues associated with the safe operation and management of the Space Shuttle program arising from ongoing efforts to improve and streamline operations. These efforts include the consolidation of operations under a single Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC), downsizing the Space Shuttle workforce and reducing costs of operations and management. The Panel formed five teams to address the potentially significant safety impacts of the seven specific topic areas listed in the study Terms of Reference. These areas were (in the order in which they are presented in this report): Maintenance of independent safety oversight; implementation plan for the transition of Shuttle program management to the Lead Center; communications among NASA Centers and Headquarters; transition plan for downsizing to anticipated workforce levels; implementation of a phased transition to a prime contractor for operations; Shuttle flight rate for Space Station assembly; and planned safety and performance upgrades for Space Station assembly. The study teams collected information through briefings, interviews, telephone conversations and from reviewing applicable documentation. These inputs were distilled by each team into observations and recommendations which were then reviewed by the entire Panel.

Johnstone, Paul M.↗

NASA NTRS2003

The Joint Agency Commercial Imagery Evaluation Team and Product Characterization Approach

The Joint Agency Commercial Imagery Evaluation (JACIE) team is a collaborative interagency group focused on the characterization of commercial remote sensing data products. The team members - the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) - each have a vested interest in the purchase and use of commercial imagery to support government research and operational applications. For both research and applications, commercial products must be well characterized for precision, accuracy, and repeatability. Since commercial systems are built and operated with no government insight or oversight, the JACIE team provides an independent product characterization of delivered image and image-derived end products. End product characterization differs from the systems calibration approach that is typically used with government systems, where detailed system design information is available. The product characterization approach addresses three primary areas of product performance: geopositional accuracy, image quality, and radiometric accuracy. The JACIE team utilizes well-characterized test sites to support characterization activities. To characterize geopositional accuracy, the team utilizes sites containing several "photo-identifiable" targets and compares their precisely known locations with those defined by the commercial image product. In the area of image quality, spatial response is characterized using edge targets and pulse targets to measure edge response and to estimate image modulation transfer function. Additionally, imagery is also characterized using the National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale, a means of quantifying the ability to identify certain targets (e.g., rail-cars, airplanes) within an image product. Radiometric accuracy is characterized using reflectance-based vicarious calibration methods at several uniform sites. Each JACIE agency performs an aspect of product characterization based on its area of expertise, thus minimizing duplication of effort. The JACIE team collaborated to perform comprehensive characterization of products from Space Imaging Inc.'s IKONOS satellite and from DigitalGlobe's QuickBird satellite and is currently characterizing products from OrbImage s OrbView-3. JACIE assessments have resulted in several improvements to commercial image product quality and have enhanced working relationships between government and industry. Assessment results are presented at an annual JACIE High Spatial Resolution Commercial Imagery Workshop.

Zanoni, Vicki↗

NASA NTRS2004

ASAP Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This is the First Quarterly Report for the newly reconstituted Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP). The NASA Administrator rechartered the Panel on November 18,2003, to provide an independent, vigilant, and long-term oversight of NASA's safety policies and programs well beyond Return to Flight of the Space Shuttle. The charter was revised to be consistent with the original intent of Congress in enacting the statute establishing ASAP in 1967 to focus on NASA's safety and quality systems, including industrial and systems safety, risk-management and trend analysis, and the management of these activities.The charter also was revised to provide more timely feedback to NASA by requiring quarterly rather than annual reports, and by requiring ASAP to perform special assessments with immediate feedback to NASA. ASAP was positioned to help institutionalize the safety culture of NASA in the post- Stafford-Covey Return to Flight environment.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1992

Independent verification and validation for Space Shuttle flight software

The Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Software was asked by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Office of Space Flight to determine the need to continue independent verification and validation (IV&V) for Space Shuttle flight software. The Committee found that the current IV&V process is necessary to maintain NASA's stringent safety and quality requirements for man-rated vehicles. Therefore, the Committee does not support NASA's plan to eliminate funding for the IV&V effort in fiscal year 1993. The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle software development process is not adequate without IV&V and that elimination of IV&V as currently practiced will adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software, both now and in the future. Furthermore, the Committee was told that no organization within NASA has the expertise or the manpower to replace the current IV&V function in a timely fashion, nor will building this expertise elsewhere necessarily reduce cost. Thus, the Committee does not recommend moving IV&V functions to other organizations within NASA unless the current IV&V is maintained for as long as it takes to build comparable expertise in the replacing organization.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2004

Managing Risk to Ensure a Successful Cassini/Huygens Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI)

I. Design: a) S/C designed to be largely single fault tolerant; b) Operate in flight demonstrated envelope, with margin; and c) Strict compliance with requirements & flight rules. II. Test: a) Baseline, fault & stress testing using flight system testbeds (H/W & S/W); b) In-flight checkout & demos to remove first time events. III. Failure Analysis: a) Critical event driven fault tree analysis; b) Risk mitigation & development of contingencies. IV) Residual Risks: a) Accepted pre-launch waivers to Single Point Failures; b) Unavoidable risks (e.g. natural disaster). V) Mission Assurance: a) Strict process for characterization of variances (ISAs, PFRs & Waivers; b) Full time Mission Assurance Manager reports to Program Manager: 1) Independent assessment of compliance with institutional standards; 2) Oversight & risk assessment of ISAs, PFRs & Waivers etc.; and 3) Risk Management Process facilitator.

risk managment↗

NASA NTRS1987

A preliminary study of Mars rover/sample return missions

The Solar System Exploration Committee (SSEC) of the NASA Advisory Council recommends that a Mars Sample Return mission be undertaken before the year 2000. Comprehensive studies of a Mars Sample Return mission have been ongoing since 1984. The initial focus of these studies was an integrated mission concept with the surface rover and sample return vehicle elements delivered to Mars on a single launch and landed together. This approach, to be carried out as a unilateral U.S. initiative, is still a high priority goal in an Augmented Program of exploration, as the SSEC recommendation clearly states. With this background of a well-understood mission concept, NASA decided to focus its 1986 study effort on a potential opportunity not previously examined; namely, a Mars Rover/Sample Return (MRSR) mission which would involve a significant aspect of international cooperation. As envisioned, responsibility for the various mission operations and hardware elements would be divided in a logical manner with clearly defined and acceptable interfaces. The U.S. and its international partner would carry out separately launched but coordinated missions with the overall goal of accomplishing in situ science and returning several kilograms of surface samples from Mars. Important considerations for implementation of such a plan are minimum technology transfer, maximum sharing of scientific results, and independent credibility of each mission role. Under the guidance and oversight of a Mars Exploration Strategy Advisory Group organized by NASA, a study team was formed in the fall of 1986 to develop a preliminary definition of a flight-separable, cooperative mission. The selected concept assumes that the U.S. would undertake the rover mission with its sample collection operations and our international partner would return the samples to Earth. Although the inverse of these roles is also possible, this study report focuses on the rover functions of MRSR because rover operations have not been studied in as much detail as the sample return functions of the mission.

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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Uncrewed Lunar Surface Operations and Support Activities

Sustained human presence on the surface of the Moon and future missions to Mars require increased independence from surface crews and Earth-based mission control to operate efficiently, safely, and reliably. The time for surface crews to perform tasks will be limited. Extravehicular activities by surface personnel are burdensome and time-consuming, even when a continuous human presence on the surface occurs. Identifying and balancing human/automation roles and tasks and infusing automation and autonomy practices early in a system’s lifecycle will be essential to achieve mission objectives. Among these objectives are attaining a sustained human presence, improving performance and mission effectiveness, reducing operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, and ensuring operations that are robust to communication delays. To achieve these objectives, an operational shift toward increased automation and autonomy with less reliance on humans is needed. Uncrewed lunar surface operations and support activities occur when surface crews are not present or are independent of surface crew timeline activities requiring no surface crew oversight or intervention. These uncrewed surface opportunities can also be planned to minimize crew workload that avoids routine maintenance and support tasks, thus maximizing crew exploration time. Uncrewed preparations such as staging and prepositioning equipment and materials before the crew arrives could improve crew task efficiency. Additional opportunities exist to conduct uncrewed science, exploration, and utilization. Uncrewed surface architecture functions can include science and exploration; habitation; launch and landing support; surface communication and navigation; surface power generation and distribution; human surface mobility; lifting, handling, manipulating; excavation, construction, and site preparation; logistics management; maintenance and repair; surface resource utilization; integrated site operations and shared support services (e.g., site scheduling/prioritization, dust mitigation/contamination control, and surface safety). Early robotic lunar surface campaigns will provide information on the availability of resources, such as oxygen and water, and demonstrate surface-based technologies. After the Artemis III human lunar return mission, a series of landers will deliver surface systems, cargo, supplies, science packages, spare parts, and commodities. A balance of crewed and uncrewed surface operations will enable a sustained lunar surface presence at the South Pole of the Moon at a site that will be known as the Artemis Base Camp (ABC). It is envisioned that base camp operations on and around the Moon will then help prepare for the mission durations and activities needed to support the first human mission to Mars. Before long-duration crew missions to the base camp can occur, the necessary surface infrastructure will be pre-deployed and verified operational. Surface assets will be teleoperated and remotely managed from Earth. Additionally, robotic and short-duration crewed missions to the ABC will ensure the site’s merit to achieve long-term science objectives, availability of usable resources, and that terrain, seasonal variations, and illumination conditions are acceptable. ABC will consist of different areas where specific functions and services are rendered, including: • Launch and Landing Area • Habitation Area • Power Production Area • Resource Areas Launch and Landing Area—The launch and landing area will support associated functions for the arrival and departure of vehicles, such as crewed landing and ascent and uncrewed cargo deliveries and offloading. It will evolve from an unimproved site at the beginning of the exploration campaign to a more sustainable landing and launch area that can support repeated arrivals and departures. Initial uncrewed Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) surface operations may include emplacement of navigation beacons and communication equipment, real-time video and photography of landing/liftoff events, and element repositioning, such as portable utility power (PUP) (applicable for other landed assets at other areas). Site preparations, such as surface leveling, soil compaction, and berm/path construction, may be needed for a more sustainable launch and landing area capable of accommodating vehicles that are increasingly more reusable and reduce the effects of plume surface interactions and ejecta impacts on nearby surface assets. During the ABC missions, cargo and logistics will be delivered to the lunar surface via robotic cargo landers before the crew arrives. These shipments, which can arrive in pressurized logistics carriers, will deliver the logistics necessary to support a crewed mission and include items such as food, water, equipment spares, etc. Providing the capability to retrieve, offload, and transport the logistics closer to the ABC site before the arrival of the crew will increase the overall efficiency of crew operations once they arrive. In the sustained phase of exploration, other supporting services may be needed, such as lander propellant servicing, surface power services, commodity refreshes, and additional inspection, maintenance, and repair capabilities, to sustain a cadence of extended personnel stays and cargo arrivals and departures. Habitation Area—Uncrewed support to surface habitation could involve supporting activation and pre-entry operations of the habitat while the crew is in orbit at the Gateway outpost preparing for a surface landing. Surface Habitat (SH) uncrewed operations may include bringing the cabin environment to a habitable temperature and air mix and activating other critical crew support systems. Potential crop production uncrewed tasks in the SH could also include autonomous watering and tending. Additionally, when the crew departs, the SH enters dormancy for the long period of uncrewed operation. A logistical staging area could also be collocated near the SH. If so, staging operations for crew supplies, waste re-location, and recycling operations may be opportunities for uncrewed operations. Power Production Area—The Fission Surface Power (FSP) element and its supporting distribution equipment provide power to surface elements as needed across the ABC to supplement day-to-day operations and survive lunar nights. Uncrewed support of this power system includes any initial LTV-assisted deployments of cables and other distributed equipment, associated electrical connections, and system testing and activation operations. Robotically performing some inspections, maintenance, or repair tasks on the power distribution equipment could reduce the surface crew workload. Resource Area— Uncrewed resource prospecting, mapping, and characterizing possible resource sites is likely to be time-consuming and represents an opportunity for uncrewed operations between crewed missions. Uncrewed mobile equipment operations will be needed in the extreme environments of permanently shadowed locations where resource extractions occur. As In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) pilot plant operations begin, uncrewed surface support activities with available mobile and portable assets (LTV, PUP, etc.) will better support these operations. Any produced commodities can be stored at a centralized storage location for future use. Also associated with these operations is the use of mobile robotic excavators for resource acquisition and robotic/autonomous regolith processing. The waste tailings generated during excavation and regolith processing would also need to be transported and deposited at a dedicated location. Surface assets will continue operating between crew visits to maintain surface capabilities, conduct lunar surface science, technology demonstrations, and public outreach opportunities. Additionally, certain sustaining tasks that would consume valuable crew time could be performed before crew arrival, or after their departure. This capability may offer more affordable options to construct, activate, test, and maintain a broad set of surface assets. Telerobotically operated human surface mobility systems, such as the LTV and Pressurized Rover (PR), can be utilized for various tasks. Surface environmental conditions pose a distinct challenge for all these activities. Surface illumination and localized shadows are one such factor. Night-survival operations could consist of thermal management, battery pre-charging, and load shedding. Some surface systems may hibernate through the night and then awake and continue nominal operations. Uncrewed mobile assets may use a more adaptive approach to optimize their power and operations; one method is to follow the sunlight. Night-survival operations may be initiated remotely by teleoperation, automated, or accomplished by supervised autonomous operation. The ability to pre-deploy and control remote assets in orbit or on Mars before the arrival of the mission crew is a key capability that can be simulated on the moon. The base camp provides a venue where these advanced operational concepts, technologies, and autonomous methods and techniques, including the incorporation of time delays to simulate Earth-Mars latency can be replicated to help buy down future Mars mission risks. This paper will examine the evolution of uncrewed lunar surface operations and support activities. It will also discuss the lunar surface environmental conditions (thermal, lighting, terrain, topography, communications) along with the challenges they pose on uncrewed surface operations, and the performance of these activities with limited to minimal human interaction and/or teleoperation. Since lunar missions include Mars mission analogs, such investigation provides the framework for future uncrewed Mars mission support.

Mark E Lewis↗

NASA NTRS2005

The Space Laser Business Model

Creating long-duration, high-powered lasers, for satellites, that can withstand the type of optical misalignment and damage dished out by the unforgiving environment of space, is work that is unique to NASA. It is complicated, specific work, where each step forward is into uncharted territory. In the 1990s, as this technology was first being created, NASA gave free reign to a group of "laser jocks" to develop their own business model and supply the Space Agency with the technology it needed. It was still to be a part of NASA as a division of Goddard Space Flight Center, but would operate independently out of a remote office. The idea for this satellite laboratory was based on the Skunk Works concept at Lockheed Martin Corporation. Formerly known as the Lockheed Corporation, in 1943, the aerospace firm, realizing that the type of advanced research it needed done could not be performed within the confines of a larger company, allowed a group of researchers and engineers to essentially run their own microbusiness without the corporate oversight. The Skunk Works project, in Burbank, California, produced America s first jet fighter, the world s most successful spy plane (U-2), the first 3-times-the-speed-of-sound surveillance aircraft, and the F-117A Nighthawk Stealth Fighter. Boeing followed suit with its Phantom Works, an advanced research and development branch of the company that operates independent of the larger unit and is responsible for a great deal of its most cutting-edge research. NASA s version of this advanced business model was the Space Lidar Technology Center (SLTC), just south of Goddard, in College Park, Maryland. Established in 1998 under a Cooperative Agreement between Goddard and the University of Maryland s A. James Clark School of Engineering, it was a high-tech laser shop where a small group of specialists, never more than 20 employees, worked all hours of the day and night to create the cutting- edge technology the Agency required of them. Drs. Robert Afzal and Joseph Dallas were directors of the SLTC, and led the development and production of active spaceborne, remote-sensing, optical instruments. As a pioneer in the area of photonics, Dr. Dallas led basic research, development, and production of semiconductor laser diode products, improving coupling efficiency through novel physical optics modeling and intracavity phase-correction techniques. He worked for NASA for 15 years, 11 of which were as a civil servant, and 4 of which were as a contractor.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2010

Risk Mitigation Approach to Commercial Resupply to the International Space Station

In August 2006, NASA awarded Space Act Agreements (SAAs) for Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) under the Commercial Crew and Cargo Project Office at Johnson Space Center. One of the goals of the SAAs is to facilitate U.S. private industry demonstration of cargo transportation capabilities, ultimately achieving reliable, cost effective access to low-Earth orbit (LEO). Each COTS provider is required to complete International Space Stations (ISS) Integration activities, which includes meeting the physical and functional interfaces and interface requirements between the ISS and COTS vehicles. These requirements focus on the areas of risk to the ISS during rendezvous and proximity operations, as well as the integration operations while the COTS vehicle is berthed to the ISS. On December 23, 2008, NASA awarded Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) contracts to provide resupply services to the ISS, following the Shuttle retirement. In addition to performing any ISS Integration activities, NASA will be performing independent assessments of the launch vehicle and orbital vehicle to evaluate the readiness of the contractor to deliver NASA cargo safely to the ISS. This paper will address the activities NASA Centers, both JSC and KSC, in the oversight and insight function over commercial visiting vehicles to the ISS.

Koons, Diane S.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Ares I-X Range Safety Analyses Overview

Ares I-X was the first test flight of NASA's Constellation Program's Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle designed to provide manned access to low Earth orbit. As a one-time test flight, the Air Force's 45th Space Wing required a series of Range Safety analysis data products to be developed for the specified launch date and mission trajectory prior to granting flight approval on the Eastern Range. The range safety data package is required to ensure that the public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and resources are provided with an acceptable level of safety and that all aspects of prelaunch and launch operations adhere to applicable public laws. The analysis data products, defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, consisted of a nominal trajectory, three sigma trajectory envelopes, stage impact footprints, acoustic intensity contours, trajectory turn angles resulting from potential vehicle malfunctions (including flight software failures), characterization of potential debris, and debris impact footprints. These data products were developed under the auspices of the Constellation's Program Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group with the intent of beginning the framework for the operational vehicle data products and providing programmatic review and oversight. A multi-center NASA team in conjunction with the 45th Space Wing, collaborated within the Trajectory Working Group forum to define the data product development processes, performed the analyses necessary to generate the data products, and performed independent verification and validation of the data products. This paper outlines the Range Safety data requirements and provides an overview of the processes established to develop both the data products and the individual analyses used to develop the data products, and it summarizes the results of the analyses required for the Ares I-X launch.

Starr, Brett R.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Ares I-X Range Safety Flight Envelope Analysis

Starr, Brett R.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

human-systems integration↗

NASA NTRS1993

An assessment of space shuttle flight software development processes

In early 1991, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Office of Space Flight commissioned the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to investigate the adequacy of the current process by which NASA develops and verifies changes and updates to the Space Shuttle flight software. The Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Flight Software Processes was convened in Jan. 1992 to accomplish the following tasks: (1) review the entire flight software development process from the initial requirements definition phase to final implementation, including object code build and final machine loading; (2) review and critique NASA's independent verification and validation process and mechanisms, including NASA's established software development and testing standards; (3) determine the acceptability and adequacy of the complete flight software development process, including the embedded validation and verification processes through comparison with (1) generally accepted industry practices, and (2) generally accepted Department of Defense and/or other government practices (comparing NASA's program with organizations and projects having similar volumes of software development, software maturity, complexity, criticality, lines of code, and national standards); (4) consider whether independent verification and validation should continue. An overview of the study, independent verification and validation of critical software, and the Space Shuttle flight software development process are addressed. Findings and recommendations are presented.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2008

ePORT, NASA's Computer Database Program for System Safety Risk Management Oversight (Electronic Project Online Risk Tool)

ePORT (electronic Project Online Risk Tool) provides a systematic approach to using an electronic database program to manage a program/project risk management processes. This presentation will briefly cover the standard risk management procedures, then thoroughly cover NASA's Risk Management tool called ePORT. This electronic Project Online Risk Tool (ePORT) is a web-based risk management program that provides a common framework to capture and manage risks, independent of a programs/projects size and budget. It is used to thoroughly cover the risk management paradigm providing standardized evaluation criterion for common management reporting, ePORT improves Product Line, Center and Corporate Management insight, simplifies program/project manager reporting, and maintains an archive of data for historical reference.

Johnson, Paul W.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) provided oversight on the safety aspects of many NASA programs. In addition, ASAP undertook three special studies. At the request of the Administrator, the panel assessed the requirements for an assured crew return vehicle (ACRV) for the space station and reviewed the organization of the safety and mission quality function within NASA. At the behest of Congress, the panel formed an independent, ad hoc working group to examine the safety and reliability of the space shuttle main engine. Section 2 presents findings and recommendations. Section 3 consists of information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendices A, B, C, and D, respectively, cover the panel membership, the NASA response to the findings and recommendations in the March 1992 report, a chronology of the panel's activities during the reporting period, and the entire ACRV study report.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2005

Backstop: Shuttle Will Fly with Outstanding Waivers; New Oversight Eases Conflicts on Safety

he space shuttle Discovery is carrying some 300 waivers to technical specifications as it enters the home stretch of its planned return to flight next month. There were about 6,000 waivers in place when Columbia crashed. Shuttle managers say they are working to reduce the number of waivers remaining by fixing the problems they highlight, a change prompted by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. In the wake of the accident, NASA has heeded the CAWS recommendation that waivers be the responsibility of an "independent technical authority" (ITA), rather than the shuttle program itself. To carry out the recommendation of the CAIB-which found an inherent conflict of interest in having the same managers make decisions about cost, schedule and safety-then-Administrator Sean O'Keefe designated the agency's chief engineer as the formal ITA. He is responsible for setting, maintaining and granting waivers across the agency. In mid-January, Fred Gregory, then O'Keefe's deputy and now his acting replacement, launched the ITA within NASA under Chief Engineer Rex Geveden, the former program manager on the Gravity Probe B experiment.

Morring, Frank, Jr.↗