Building a Better Boot Camp
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 8 (1). JAN-FEB 2010. p.81-85, IEEE COMPUTER SOC, LOS ALAMITOS
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 8 (1). JAN-FEB 2010. p.81-85, IEEE COMPUTER SOC, LOS ALAMITOS
The 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy has recommended a transition to secure-by-design methodologies in critical infrastructure. This paper presents the adoption of the National Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Strategy as initiated by the U.S. DOE’s CESER office, advocating for the integration of cybersecurity at the earliest stages of system design. The strategy targets design engineers responsible for energy infrastructure to embed CIE principles within the engineering lifecycle, thus enhancing cyber resilience. This paper discusses the expansion of secure-by-design concepts to cyber-physical systems, moving beyond traditional IT security to include engineering considerations that can mitigate cyber risks through design choices. The paper introduces Digital Risk Management, balancing traditional cybersecurity with CIE to reduce both likelihood and impact of cyber threats. A set of CIE starter questions derived from 12 core principles is detailed, aiding engineers to consider cybersecurity in their designs and highlights the importance of CIE in anticipating and reducing the impacts of cyber attacks, suggesting that such integration is essential for national security and infrastructure resilience.
Both the number and security implications of sophisticated cyber attacks on companies providing critical energy infrastructures are increasing. As power networks and, to a certain extent, oil and gas infrastructure both upstream and downstream, are becoming increasingly integrated with information communication technology systems, they are growing more susceptible to cyber attacks.
The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide offers a comprehensive framework, guidance, and resources for integrating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. The primary goal is to help educators adopt CIE principles into their teaching to produce future engineers and technicians who understand digital risks in modern engineered systems, thereby addressing the nation’s infrastructure resilience needs. This guide outlines practical integration examples, links to resources to accelerate CIE adoption, and shares insights from partner academic institutions on various implementation strategies. CIE is a framework for embedding engineered controls that mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks in any cyber-physical system used in critical energy infrastructure and other sectors. Developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy emphasizes embedding CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing. This guide supports this strategic objective by providing examples of integrating CIE concepts into engineering curricula, from class activities to new courses and certificate programs. The importance of educating cyber-informed engineers is underscored by the evolving cybersecurity threats facing engineered systems. As industrial control systems (ICS) increasingly incorporate digital technologies, the responsibility for security extends to both cyber professionals and engineers. CIE addresses critical gaps in designing and protecting physical systems with digital components against cyber risks, ensuring engineers consider digital risk throughout the engineering design lifecycle. Currently, engineering education does not routinely include cyber-informed principles, highlighting a gap in addressing modern engineering system risks. This guide advocates for updating engineering curricula to include digital risk management as a fundamental element. By doing so, future engineers will be equipped to design resilient systems that mitigate digital risks from the outset. Through this guide, engineering faculty can integrate CIE into their curricula, bridging the gap between digital risk and engineering. This approach prepares a cyber-informed workforce capable of safeguarding the cyber-physical systems crucial to national security and public welfare. By embedding CIE into education and training, institutions can produce engineers and technicians who can effectively mitigate cyber impacts throughout the engineering design lifecycle, resulting in more secure critical infrastructures.
Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This presentation discusses engineered controls of 7 categories and the CIE database of controls that provides clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design.
This document describes the concept and application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE), a methodology that integrates cyber threat awareness into all stages of the systems engineering life cycle. It delineates how CIE enhances the security posture of critical infrastructure systems, which are increasingly targeted by sophisticated cyber threats. The exposition proceeds to methodically walk through the twelve foundational principles of CIE, each serving as a strategic guidepost for embedding cybersecurity into the fabric of system design, development, operation, and maintenance. The principles highlight the importance of proactive and comprehensive security measures that span from risk assessment to continuous improvement, ensuring that systems are not only designed with security in mind but are also resilient in the face of evolving cyber threats.
This document provides guidance on incorporating Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into the research and development (R&D) of operational technology systems and tools, facilitating the creation and adoption of innovative technologies that are secure and resilient by design. As technological innovation and research are becoming pivotal for economic and national security, cybersecurity has emerged as a paramount concern across industries and sectors. The challenge of integrating robust cybersecurity measures is imperative to safeguard critical infrastructure, protect sensitive data, and preserve national security interests.
Critical infrastructures such as cyber-physical energy systems (CPS-E) integrate information flow and physical operations that are vulnerable to natural and targeted failures. Safe, secure, and reliable operation and control of CPS-E is critical to ensure societal well-being and economic prosperity. Automated control is key for real-time operations and may be mathematically cast as a sequential decision-making problem under uncertainty. Emergence of data-driven techniques for decision making under uncertainty, such as reinforcement learning (RL), have led to promising advances for addressing sequential decision-making problems for risk-based robust CPS-E control. However, existing research challenges include understanding the applicability of RL methods across diverse CPS-E applications, addressing the effect of risk preferences across multiple RL methods, and development of open-source domain-aware simulation environments for RL experimentation within a CPS-E context. This article systematically analyzes the applicability of four types of RL methods (model-free, model-based, hybrid model-free and model-based, and hierarchical) for risk-based robust CPS-E control. Problem features and solution stability for the RL methods are also discussed. We demonstrate and compare the performance of multiple RL methods under different risk specifications (risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking) through the development and application of an open-source simulation environment. Motivating numerical simulation examples include representative single-zone and multizone building control use cases. Finally, six key insights for future research and broader adoption of RL methods are identified, with specific emphasis on problem features, algorithmic explainability, and solution stability.
The Hanford site, located in southeastern Washington, produced much of our nation's weapons-grade plutonium for the Defense nuclear weapons program. This production lasted the better part of four decades with production ending in 1987. Since 1987, the focus of the Hanford site has turned to clean-up activities. Mission Support Alliance (MSA) is the integrator of the multi-contractor effort to clean up the Hanford site. MSA collaborates with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and all Hanford site contractors in finding and implementing new, cost-saving, safe and practical solutions to cleanup challenges with a continual focus on innovative processes and technologies that reduce costs, energy use and bring safety improvements to the site. Support Services include environmental integration and land management; fleet and road maintenance; water/electric and utilities; cyber security and information management as well as the preservation of the site's cultural artifacts. This paper describes the process, challenges, and focus on infrastructure upgrade and energy efficiency projects in the context of a multi-contractor nuclear clean-up site. Project development and new technology deployment at Hanford has long been plagued with economic challenges. For example, despite extensive auditing, analysis, and project development, most of the energy-related projects on the Hanford site have gone unfunded due to the low cost of electricity, the relatively high cost of labor, and costs associated with detailed safety and cultural reviews. - The Hanford site is a direct-service customer of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and has a marginal electricity rate of $0.033/kWh. - Labor costs on the Hanford site track high because of the requirements associated with the safety and security necessary to operate a legacy nuclear weapons complex. - In partnership with three federally recognized and other affected Native American tribes (Yakama Nation, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Nez Perce Tribe, and Wanapum People), most activities on the Hanford site are afforded in-depth cultural reviews. To work within these constraints, the MSA Energy Management team has embarked on a three-pronged approach to energy project development: Program Visibility: The MSA Energy Management team has promoted both project opportunities and requirements across the Hanford site. This information comes in the form of site-wide newsletters, group meetings, e-mails, success stories, and recognition of staff. Single-point Analysis: To by-pass the inevitable duplications of effort, learning curve issues, and to improve project consistency/delivery, the MSA Energy Management team serves as the single resource to the site for energy project analysis. This resource includes initial assessment, engineering analysis, efficiency calculation and project recommendations. Contractor/utility Interface: In addition to the infrastructure under its own purview, MSA provides all support services for the contractor/utility interface. These activities include formulation and submission of incentive-based efficiency projects, project tracking, and incentive awards. All incentive awards are forwarded to the relevant contractor and then highlighted in the visibility campaign. Successful energy efficiency projects at Hanford have included high efficiency heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) systems, interior and exterior lighting/lighting control systems, pump and motor systems, and the right-sizing of transformers and area-wide electrical distribution systems. Prior to the initiation of this program and structure (roughly 3 years ago) the average annual energy efficiency incentive applied for and received was under $10,000, with an annual energy savings of approximately 36,000 kilowatt hours (kWh). In fiscal year 2017, the annual incentive received was over $419,000, with identified energy savings of over 1.3 million kWh. Details and case studies of the major project accomplishments are included. The success of this program can be traced to an understanding of the constraints, the development of a program to address these constraints, and good communication/coordination across DOE and the multiple contractors serving the Hanford site. (authors)
The buildings and city streets we walk down are changing. Driven by various data-driven use cases, there is increased interest in networking and integrating lighting and other building systems (e.g., heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), security, scheduling) that were previously not internet-facing, and equipping them with sensors that collect information about their environment and the people that inhabit it. These data-enabled systems can potentially deliver improved occupant and resident experiences and help meet the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national energy and carbon reduction goals. Deploying connected devices new to being networked, however, is not without its challenges. This paper explores tools available to system designers and integrators that facilitate a cybersecurity landscape assessment – or more specifically the identification of threats, vulnerabilities, and adversarial behaviors that could be used against these networked systems. These assessments can help stakeholders shift security prioritization proactively toward the beginning of the development process.
As energy infrastructure becomes more interconnected, understanding cybersecurity risks to production systems requires integrating operational and computer security knowledge. We interviewed 18 experts working in the field of energy critical infrastructure to compare what information they find necessary to assess the impact of computer vulnerabilities on energy operational technology. These experts came from two groups: 1) computer security experts and 2) energy sector operations experts. We find that both groups responded similarly for general categories of information and displayed knowledge about both domains, perhaps due to their interdisciplinary work at the same organization. Yet, we found notable differences in the details of their responses and in their stated perceptions of each group’s approaches to impact assessment. Their suggestions for collaboration across domains highlighted how these two groups can work together to help each other secure the energy grid. Our findings inform the development of interdisciplinary security approaches in critical-infrastructure contexts.
The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law kick-started a surge in clean energy investments in the United States. Securing these systems and their supporting infrastructure from the outset is imperative, starting from the conceptual design and continuing through the entire engineering lifecycle. Cyber-Informed Engineering is an ideal approach to seamlessly integrate the necessary advanced control capabilities and adaptive protection systems, especially considering the trend towards cloud-based infrastructure and process controls. Learn more about CIE at https://www.energy.gov/ceser/articles/cyber-informed-engineering-bridge-between-cyber-and-critical-infrastructure-securing.
The Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) has teamed with Stony Brook University (Stony Brook or SBU) and Farmingdale State College (Farmingdale or FSC), two branches of the State University of New York (SUNY), to create a “Smart Energy Corridor.” The project, located along the Route 110 business corridor on Long Island, New York, demonstrated the integration of a suite of Smart Grid technologies from substations to end-use loads. The Smart Energy Corridor Project included the following key features: -TECHNOLOGY: Demonstrated a full range of smart energy technologies, including substations and distribution feeder automation, fiber and radio communications backbone, advanced metering infrastructure (AM”), meter data management (MDM) system (which LIPA implemented outside of this project), field tools automation, customer-level energy management including automated energy management systems, and integration with distributed generation and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. -MARKETING: A rigorous market test that identified customer response to an alternative time-of-use pricing plan and varying levels of information and analytical support. -CYBER SECURITY: Tested cyber security vulnerabilities in Smart Grid hardware, network, and application layers. Developed recommendations for policies, procedures, and technical controls to prevent or foil cyber-attacks and to harden the Smart Grid infrastructure. -RELIABILITY: Leveraged new Smart Grid-enabled data to increase system efficiency and reliability. Developed enhanced load forecasting, phase balancing, and voltage control techniques designed to work hand-in-hand with the Smart Grid technologies. -OUTREACH: Implemented public outreach and educational initiatives that were linked directly to the demonstration of Smart Grid technologies, tools, techniques, and system configurations. This included creation of full-scale operating models demonstrating application of Smart Grid technologies in business and residential settings. Farmingdale State College held three international conferences on energy and sustainability and Smart Grid related technologies and policies. These conferences, in addition to public seminars increased understanding and acceptance of Smart Grid transformation by the general public, business, industry, and municipalities in the Long Island and greater New York region. - JOB CREATION: Provided training for the Smart Grid and clean energy jobs of the future at both Farmingdale and Stony Brook. Stony Brook focused its “Cradle to Fortune 500” suite of economic development resources on the opportunities emerging from the project, helping to create new technologies, new businesses, and new jobs. To achieve these features, LIPA and its sub-recipients, FSC and SBU, each have separate but complementary objectives. At LIPA, the Smart Energy Corridor (1) meant validating Smart Grid technologies; (2) quantifying Smart Grid costs and benefits; and (3) providing insights into how Smart Grid applications can be better implemented, readily adapted, and replicated in individual homes and businesses. LIPA installed 2,550 AMI meters (exceeding the 500 AMI meters in the original plan), created three “smart” substations serving the Corridor, and installed additional distribution automation elements including two-way communications and digital controls over various feeders and capacitor banks. It gathered and analyzed customer behavior information on how they responded to a new “smart” TOU rate and to various levels of information and analytical tools.
This document describes the process for Consequence Prioritization, the first phase of the Consequence-Driven Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) framework. The primary goal of Consequence Prioritization is to identify potential disruptive events that would significantly inhibit an organization’s ability to provide the critical services and functions deemed fundamental to their business mission. These disruptive events, defined as High Consequence Events (HCE), include both events that have occurred or could be realized through an attack of critical infrastructure owner assets. While other efforts have been initiated to identify and mitigate disruptive events at the national security level, such as Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD-41), this process is intended to be used by individual organizations to evaluate events that fall below the threshold for a national security. Described another way, Consequence Prioritization considers threats greater than those addressable by standard cyber-hygiene and includes the consideration of events that go beyond a traditional continuity of operations (COOP) perspective. Finally, Consequence Prioritization is most successful when organizations adopt a multi-disciplinary approach, engaging both cyber security and engineering expertise, as in-depth engineering perspectives are required to recognize and characterize and mitigate HCEs. Figure 1 provides a high-level overview of the prioritization process.
Cyber physical computing infrastructures typically consist of a number of sites are interconnected. Its operation critically depends both on cyber components and physical components. Both types of components are subject to attacks of different kinds and frequencies, which must be accounted for the initial provisioning and subsequent operation of the infrastructure via information security analysis. Information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. We concentrated our analysis on the electric sector failure scenarios and impact analyses by the NESCOR Working Group Study, From the Section 5 electric sector representative failure scenarios; we extracted the four generic failure scenarios and grouped them into three specific threat categories (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) to the system. These specific failure scenarios serve as a demonstration of our simulation. The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrates how to model the electric sector functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the cyber physical infrastructure network with respect to CIA.
United States critical infrastructure entities are increasingly targeted by motivated and capable threat actors and must be prepared to assess and treat a diverse range of cyber risks. Consequently, this necessitates some form of analytical process to evaluate risks and inform cyber security investment decisions. A potential solution for structuring cyber risk evaluation exists within the field of sovereign credit ratings – where agencies employ mature approaches that integrate quantitative and qualitative data to produce a singular value of assessment. Adapting such approaches, we present a novel criterion and methodology for measuring and communicating the likelihood element of cyber risk. The methodology is composed of three sequential phases: a quantitative baseline organized by distinct capability frames, a bounded qualitative adjustment per frame, and a greater-bounded qualitative adjustment spanning the entire process. The process culminates in publication of a cyber capability rating that communicates a critical infrastructure entity’s ability and willingness to mitigate discontinuous function due to cyberattack.
Project Objectives The AEP Ohio gridSMART® Demonstration Project (Project) achieved the following objectives: • Built a secure, interoperable, and integrated smart grid infrastructure in northeast central Ohio that demonstrated the ability to maximize distribution system efficiency and reliability and consumer use of demand response programs that reduced energy consumption, peak demand, and fossil fuel emissions. • Actively attracted, educated, enlisted, and retained consumers in innovative business models that provided tools and information reducing consumption and peak demand. • Provided the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) information to evaluate technologies and preferred smart grid business models to be extended nationally. Project Description Ohio Power Company (the surviving company of a merger with Columbus Southern Power Company), doing business as AEP Ohio (AEP Ohio), took a community-based approach and incorporated a full suite of advanced smart grid technologies for 110,000 consumers in an area selected for its concentration and diversity of distribution infrastructure and consumers. It was organized and aligned around: • Technology, implementation, and operations • Consumer and stakeholder acceptance • Data management and benefit assessment Combined, these functional areas served as the foundation of the Project to integrate commercially available products, innovative technologies, and new consumer products and services within a secure two-way communication network between the utility and consumers. The Project included Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Distribution Management System (DMS), Distribution Automation Circuit Reconfiguration (DACR), Volt VAR Optimization (VVO), and Consumer Programs (CP). These technologies were combined with two-way consumer communication and information sharing, demand response, dynamic pricing, and consumer products, such as plug-in electric vehicles and smart appliances. In addition, the Project incorporated comprehensive cyber security capabilities, interoperability, and a data assessment that, with grid simulation capabilities, made the demonstration results an adaptable, integrated solution for AEP Ohio and the nation.
Securing high value and critical assets is one of the biggest challenges facing this nation and others around the world. In modern integrated systems, there are four potential modes of attack available to an adversary: • physical only attack, • cyber only attack, • physical-enabled cyber attack, • cyber-enabled physical attack. Blended attacks involve an adversary working in one domain to reduce system effectiveness in another domain. This enables the attacker to penetrate further into the overall layered defenses. Existing vulnerability assessment (VA) processes and software tools which predict facility vulnerabilities typically evaluate the physical and cyber domains separately. Vulnerabilities which result from the integration of cyber-physical control systems are not well characterized and are often overlooked by existing assessment approaches. In this paper, we modified modification of the timely detection methodology, used for decades in physical security VAs, to include cyber components. The Physical and Cyber Risk Analysis Tool (PACRAT) prototype illustrates an integrated vulnerability assessment that includes cyber-physical interdependencies. Information about facility layout, network topology, and emplaced safeguards is used to evaluate how well suited a facility is to detect, delay, and respond to attacks, to identify the pathways most vulnerable to attack, and to evaluate how often safeguards are compromised for a given threat or adversary type. We have tested the PACRAT prototype on critical infrastructure facilities and the results are promising. Future work includes extending the model to prescribe the recommended security improvements via an automated cost-benefit analysis.