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NRC Reactor Operating Experience Analysis and Trend Summary: 2020 Update

This report presents a summary of the reliability and frequency trends identified in the 2020 update reports for component performance study, loss of offsite power analysis, initiating events analysis, and system study provided on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Reactor Operating Experience Results and Databases web site (https://nrcoe.inl.gov/).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NRC Reactor Operating Experience Analysis and Trend Summary: 2022 Update

This report presents a summary of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reactor operating experience analyses with data through 2022 as well as the reliability and frequency trends identified in the 2022 update reports for component performance study, loss of offsite power analysis, initiating events analysis, and system study provided on the NRC Reactor Operating Experience Results and Databases website (https://nrcoe.inl.gov/).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NRC Reactor Operating Experience Analysis and Trend Summary: 2024 Update

This report presents a summary of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) reactor operating experience analyses with data through 2024 as well as the reliability and frequency trends identified in the 2024 update reports for the component performance studies, loss-of-offsite power analysis, initiating events analysis, and system studies provided on the NRC Reactor Operating Experience Results and Databases website (https://nrcoe.inl.gov/).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2: Vol. 2—User’s Guide for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code

Version 2.0 of the RESRAD-RDD&IND computer code is designed to support the implementation of protective action guides (PAGs) after a nuclear emergency incident including a radiological dispersal device (RDD) and/or an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident (EPA 2017). Eight different group types, addressing various decisions, are available for selection. The RESRAD-RDD&IND code calculates radiological doses, stay times, etc., for the selected group that the user wishes to focus on. (That is, the results for all the groups are not calculated simultaneously, and the input for those other groups do not matter, although some parameter values are shared between groups.) Version 2.0 has a user-friendly interface so that the RESRAD-RDD&IND code can be used with minimal training. For example, the user can select the major characteristics of the problem-event type, source term, and decision type from the left side of the interface and then calculate the results with the default assumptions for the exposure scenarios. More in-depth analysis would include specifying site-specific exposure scenario characteristics in the right side of the interface. The procedures for data entry and results viewing are self-explanatory. This is because common window maneuvering features and text instructions were incorporated in the interface design. General and context-specific help are available to aid users entering parameter values, as well. The RESRAD-RDD&IND computer code gives the user the option to select either an RDD or IND incident for analysis. For an RDD event analysis, 11 radionuclides (Am-241, Cf-252, Cm-244, Co-60, Cs-137, Ir-192, Po-210, Pu-238, Pu-239, Ra-226, and Sr-90) are included. These 11 radionuclides are the radionuclides most likely used for an RDD. More than 90 radionuclides can be selected for an IND event analysis. Initial default concentrations are provided for 44 radionuclides for a uranium-fueled IND event. These 44 radionuclides are those that would contribute significantly to the radiation dose associated with a uranium-fueled bomb detonation. The radionuclides generated from ingrowth of these 44 initial radionuclides are also automatically included in the analysis. Pu-239, Cs-134m, Ru-105, and Rb-89 and their progeny can be selected for analysis if they are detected and their concentrations are determined. This user’s guide, which is Volume 2 of the User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2, provides instructions to users on how to install the RESRAD-RDD&IND code, navigate the interface, and use the various features, including those discussed above, to set up an analysis and view/print the results in text outputs. Volume 1 of the User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2 (Yu et al. 2026), which contains descriptions of the methodology and theoretical basis for dose modeling and the mathematical equations implemented in the code, can be accessed and viewed through the Help menu in the code or can be downloaded from the RESRAD website (https://resrad.evs.anl.gov).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

SPAR Model Structural Efficiencies

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) are supporting initiatives aimed at improving the quality of probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs). Included in these initiatives are the resolution of key technical issues that are have been judged to have the most significant influence on the baseline core damage frequency of the NRC’s Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models and licensee PRA models. Previous work addressed issues associated with support system initiating event analysis and loss of off-site power/station blackout analysis.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Spatial, Temporal, and Electrical Characteristics of Lightning in Reported Lightning-Initiated Wildfire Events

Analysis was performed to determine whether a lightning flash could be associated with every reported lightning-initiated wildfire that grew to at least 4 km(exp 2). In total, 905 lightning-initiated wildfires within the Continental United States (CONUS) between 2012 and 2015 were analyzed. Fixed and fire radius search methods showed that 81–88% of wildfires had a corresponding lightning flash within a 14 day period prior to the report date. The two methods showed that 52–60% of lightning-initiated wildfires were reported on the same day as the closest lightning flash. The fire radius method indicated the most promising spatial results, where the median distance between the closest lightning and the wildfire start location was 0.83 km, followed by a 75th percentile of 1.6 km and a 95th percentile of 5.86 km. Ninety percent of the closest lightning flashes to wildfires were negative polarity. Maximum flash densities were less than 0.41 flashes km(exp 2) for the 24 h period at the fire start location. The majority of lightning-initiated holdover events were observed in the Western CONUS, with a peak density in north-central Idaho. A twelve day holdover event in New Mexico was also discussed, outlining the opportunities and limitations of using lightning data to characterize wildfires.

Flash density↗

Initiating Event Rates at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants. 1988 - 2013

Analyzing initiating event rates is important because it indicates performance among plants and also provides inputs to several U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) risk-informed regulatory activities. This report presents an analysis of initiating event frequencies at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants since each plant’s low-power license date. The evaluation is based on the operating experience from fiscal year 1988 through 2013 as reported in licensee event reports. Engineers with nuclear power plant experience staff reviewed each event report since the last update to this report for the presence of valid scrams or reactor trips at power. To be included in the study, an event had to meet all of the following criteria: includes an unplanned reactor trip (not a scheduled reactor trip on the daily operations schedule), sequence of events starts when reactor is critical and at or above the point of adding heat, occurs at a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant (excluding Fort St. Vrain and LaCrosse), and is reported by a licensee event report. This report displays occurrence rates (baseline frequencies) for the categories of initiating events that contribute to the NRC’s Industry Trends Program. Sixteen initiating event groupings are trended and displayed. Initiators are plotted separately for initiating events with different occurrence rates for boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors. p-values are given for the possible presence of a trend over the most recent 10 years.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Initiating Event Rates at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: 1988–2016

Analyzing initiating event rates is important because it indicates performance among plants and also provides inputs to several U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) risk-informed regulatory activities. This report presents an analysis of initiating event frequencies at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants from calendar year 1988 through 2016 as reported in licensee event reports. Engineers with nuclear power plant experience reviewed each event report since the last update to this report for the presence of valid scrams or reactor trips at power. To be included in the study, an event had to meet all of the following criteria: (1) the event includes an unplanned reactor trip (not a scheduled reactor trip on the daily operations schedule), (2) the sequence of events started when reactor is critical and at or above the point of adding heat, (3) the event occurred at a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant (excluding Fort St. Vrain and LaCrosse), and (4) the event was reported by a licensee event report. Sixteen initiating event groupings are trended and displayed. For some of the categories as relevant initiators are plotted separately for boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors. P values are given for the possible presence of a trend over the most recent 10 years. Statistically significant decreasing trends were identified for BWR loss of heat sink and general transients.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Initiating Event Rates at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants 1988–2013

Analyzing initiating event rates is important because it indicates performance among plants and also provides inputs to several U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) risk-informed regulatory activities. This report presents an analysis of initiating event frequencies at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants since each plant’s low-power license date. The evaluation is based on the operating experience from fiscal year 1988 through 2013 as reported in licensee event reports. Engineers with nuclear power plant experience staff reviewed each event report since the last update to this report for the presence of valid scrams or reactor trips at power. To be included in the study, an event had to meet all of the following criteria: includes an unplanned reactor trip (not a scheduled reactor trip on the daily operations schedule), sequence of events starts when reactor is critical and at or above the point of adding heat, occurs at a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant (excluding Fort St. Vrain and LaCrosse), and is reported by a licensee event report. This report displays occurrence rates (baseline frequencies) for the categories of initiating events that contribute to the NRC’s Industry Trends Program. Sixteen initiating event groupings are trended and displayed. Initiators are plotted separately for initiating events with different occurrence rates for boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors. p-values are given for the possible presence of a trend over the most recent 10 years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Initiating Event Rates at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, 2021 Update

Analyzing initiating event rates is important because it indicates trends and patterns of plant performance and provides inputs to several U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) risk-informed regulatory activities. This report presents an analysis of initiating event frequencies at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants from calendar year 1988 through 2021, as reported in licensee event reports. Engineers with nuclear power plant experience reviewed each event report since the last update to this report to categorize and characterize reactor trips. To be included in this study, an event had to meet all of the following criteria: (1) the event included an unplanned reactor trip (not a scheduled reactor trip on the daily operations schedule), (2) the sequence of events started when the reactor was critical and at or above the point of adding heat, (3) the event occurred at a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant (excluding Fort St. Vrain and LaCrosse), and (4) the event was reported by a licensee event report. Sixteen initiating event groupings are trended and displayed. For some of the categories, relevant events are plotted separately for boiling-water reactors (BWR) and pressurized-water reactors (PWR). P-values are given for the possible presence of a trend over the most recent 10 years. The following trends were identified for the most recent 10 years (2012–2021): • A highly statistically significant decreasing trend was identified for Loss of Offsite Power (p-value = 0.002) • A statistically significant decreasing trend was identified for BWR general transients (p-value = 0.025) • A statistically significant decreasing trend was identified for PWR general transients for the second year in a row (p-value = 0.038).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Initiating Event Rates at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: 2022 Update

Analyzing initiating event rates is important because it indicates trends and patterns of plant performance and provides inputs to several U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) risk-informed regulatory activities. This report presents an analysis of initiating event frequencies at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants from calendar year 1988 through 2022, as reported in licensee event reports. Engineers with nuclear power plant experience reviewed each event report since the last update to this report to categorize and characterize reactor trips. To be included in this study, an event had to meet all of the following criteria: (1) the event included an unplanned reactor trip (not a scheduled reactor trip on the daily operations schedule), (2) the sequence of events started when the reactor was critical and at or above the point of adding heat, (3) the event occurred at a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant (excluding Fort St. Vrain and LaCrosse), and (4) the event was reported by a licensee event report. Sixteen initiating event groupings are trended and displayed. For some of the categories, relevant events are plotted separately for boiling-water reactors (BWR) and pressurized-water reactors (PWR). P-values are given for the possible presence of a trend over the most recent 10 years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Applying AI/ML Techniques to U.S. Nuclear Operating Experience Program

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has provided technical assistance to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in reliability and risk analysis including the operating experience (OpE) program since the 1980s. The U.S. nuclear OpE program provides input parameters to the NRC Standardized Plant Analysis Risk models and the industry probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. While earlier PRA focuses were on at-power, internal event analysis, the risks from external hazards and during low power shutdown (LPSD) operation could be significant and the needs to develop LPSD PRA and external hazards PRA are on the rise. One issue in developing LPSD PRA is the reasonable estimation of shutdown initiative event (SDIE) frequencies. INL has developed and is maintaining an SDIE database for the NRC. However, this database is based on the reviewing of Licensee Event Reports (LERs), which is believed to be only a subset of “actual” shutdown initiating events occurred in the industry. This paper investigates a new approach to identify and characterize shutdown initiating events from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) industry database using machine learning techniques. The main process in this approach is to find out the relationship between key words in event descriptions and the SDIE categories as in the NRC SDIE database. The relationship can then be applied to the INPO database and search for SDIEs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Backup Power Performance of Solar-plus-Storage Systems during Routine Power Interruptions: A Case Study Application of Berkeley Lab’s PRESTO Model

This technical brief estimates the expected performance of a solar photovoltaic and energy storage system (PVESS) for providing backup power during short-duration power interruption events, accounting for the unpredictable nature of those events. The analysis relies on the Power Reliability Event Simulation TOol (PRESTO), a publicly available model developed by Berkeley Lab to simulate the occurrence of short-duration power interruption events at the county-level. A separate storage dispatch model is then used to simulate PVESS operation and backup performance for each of the large number of interruption events produced by PRESTO. In performing this simulation, the analysis accounts for how the customer operates its battery on a day-to-day basis—in this case, we assume the battery is cycled each day in response to time-of-use rates—and how that, in turn, impacts the battery’s state of charge at the beginning of each interruption event. The analysis presented here is intended to demonstrate an application of the PRESTO model as well as to illustrate some of the key determinants of PVESS backup power performance during short-duration power interruption events. The analysis focuses initially on a typical single-family home in Maricopa County, Arizona, and includes a limited set of scenarios related to system sizing, backup power configuration, and whether the customer charges its battery storage system from the grid during normal operating conditions. The analysis also presents comparative results for two other counties, in Massachusetts (Middlesex) and California (Los Angeles), illustrating how regional differences in climate, interruption patterns, and retail rate structures can affect PVESS performance as a backup power source. In the conclusions, we highlight a number of other important considerations for evaluating PVESS backup power capabilities.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

The Publication and Endorsement of the ASME/ANS Probabilistic Risk Assessment Standard for Advanced Non-Light Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants

Due to growing interest in non-light water reactor (NLWR) concepts, the predecessor to the American Nuclear Society (ANS)/American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) initiated development of a NLWR probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard in 2006. The developed standard, released for trial use in 2013, was the first integral PRA standard created by the JCNRM, containing requirements ranging from the development of initiating events to the analysis of offsite radiological consequence. Based on feedback from pilot applications of the trial standard, a revised version of the standard was developed and balloted in 2020, with unanimous passage by the JCNRM and formal publication as an American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard in 2021. The paper provides an overview of the standard and its development process. In addition, the paper reviews the latest status of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission endorsement efforts through Regulatory Guide 1.247.

Fleming, K.↗

Conditional Tree Reduction in the ADAPT Framework

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) uses fault tree/event tree analysis to evaluate the environmental impacts of nuclear power plants due to internal or external initiating events. In a fault tree, basic failure events are assembled using primarily And/Or logic to determine the combinations of failures that lead to failure of the system as a whole. An event tree is forward-facing, and begins with a single initiating event. From there the analysis considers what event may occur next, and branches out among the possible configurations of occurrence and non-occurrence of that event. This branching continues until end states are reached. End states may include a safe and stable configuration of the plant, or any number of differing failure states. Both fault and event trees require basic event probabilities as inputs to provide insight on the likelihood of different outcomes. PRA has been applied to nuclear power plants as an analysis tool since the 1975 Reactor Safety Study. In a traditional PRA, the order of events is prescribed by the analyst and each event is typically a binary aleatory uncertainty: occurrence or non-occurrence. Discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) analysis eliminates this subjectivity in ordering of events by using the output of a dynamic system model (simulator) to inform the branching. Branching conditions are triggered by the existence of a relevant plant state in the code, and therefore only occur as physically appropriate. The DDET approach also allows consideration of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties on a phenomenologically and stochastically consistent platform. A DDET may be orders of magnitude larger than a traditional event tree for the same initiating event, as more of the uncertainty space is likely to be explored and the tree does not require manual assembly. Because of the size, manual inspection of the entire DDET is often infeasible. This problem may be approached from the front by reducing the number of sampled branching values or by online pruning of the tree, thus reducing the total number of branches. Utilizing post-processing techniques to draw actionable insights via clustering has also been proposed. One post-processing tool to reduce the DDET according to user-defined rules has been recently implemented in the Analysis of Dynamic Accident Progression Trees (ADAPT) DDET driver code. The tool creates a 'slice' of the DDET comprised of the set of branches that meet a set of user-input rules, for immediate visualization or for further calculations conditional on the rules being met. This extension is expected to ease analysis of the results of large and complex DDETs, leading to greater applicability of DDETs in PRA. It should be emphasized that this tool is a visualization aide and does not impact the theoretical basis of the DDET approach. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Extension of the ADAPT Framework for Multiple Simulators

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) uses fault tree/event tree analysis to evaluate the environmental impacts of nuclear power plants due to internal or external initiating events. In a fault tree, basic failure events are assembled using primarily And/Or logic to determine the combinations of failures that lead to failure of the system as a whole. An event tree is forward-facing, and begins with a single initiating event. From there the analysis considers what event may occur next, and branches out among the possible configurations of occurrence and non-occurrence of that event. This branching continues until end states are reached. End states may include a safe and stable configuration of the plant, or any number of differing failure states. Both fault and event trees require basic event probabilities as inputs to provide insight on the likelihood of different outcomes. PRA has been applied to nuclear power plants as an analysis tool since the 1975 Reactor Safety Study. In a traditional PRA, the order of events is prescribed by the analyst and each event is typically a binary aleatory uncertainty: occurrence or non-occurrence. Discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) analysis eliminates this subjectivity in ordering of events by using the output of a dynamic system model (simulator) to inform the branching. Branching conditions are triggered by the existence of a relevant plant state in the code, and therefore only occur as physically appropriate. The DDET approach also allows consideration of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties on a phenomenologically and stochastically consistent platform. One limitation of the DDET driver codes developed to date (namely ADAPT, ADS, and MCDET ) is that the tree is driven by a single simulator. The goal of this work is a general multi-simulator driver. This limits the parameter space that may be explored in a single DDET to that which may be covered by a single simulator. In this work, the Analysis of Dynamic Accident Progression Trees (ADAPT) code is extended to support multiple arbitrary simulators. This capability will increase the depth and breadth of phenomena that may be analyzed in a single DDET. For example, a large-scale system code may pass the analysis to a more detailed code if certain conditions are met, in order to capture relevant phenomena that would be lost if only the system code were to be used. In addition, the time required to cover a given uncertainty space may be reduced by dynamically identifying and running only the situations that are appropriate given the plant conditions in each simulator. The use of multiple simulators is expected to further reduce subjectivity in PRA by enabling high fidelity modeling of reality. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Dynamic Importance Measures in the ADAPT Framework

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) uses fault tree/event tree analysis to evaluate the environmental impacts of nuclear power plants due to internal or external initiating events. In a fault tree, basic failure events are assembled using primarily And/Or logic to determine the combinations of failures that lead to failure of the system as a whole. An event tree is forward-facing, and begins with a single initiating event. From there the analysis considers what event may occur next, and branches out among the possible configurations of occurrence and non-occurrence of that event. This branching continues until user-defined end states are reached. End states may include a safe and stable configuration of the plant, or any number of differing failure states. Both fault and event trees require basic event probabilities as inputs to provide insight on the likelihood of different outcomes. PRA has been applied to nuclear power plants as an analysis tool since the 1975 Reactor Safety Study. In a traditional PRA, the order of events is prescribed by the analyst and each event is typically a binary aleatory uncertainty: occurrence or non-occurrence. Discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) analysis eliminates this subjectivity in ordering of events by using the output of a dynamic system model (simulator) to inform the branching. Branching conditions are triggered by the existence of a relevant plant state in the code, and therefore only occur as physically appropriate. The DDET approach also allows consideration of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties on a phenomenologically and stochastically consistent platform. One current limitation of DDETs is the assessment of results, which is not as well developed as in traditional PRA. A concept that is used in PRA to assess the significance of a basic event is the concept of importance measures (IMs). In traditional PRA, IMs only consider the likelihood of occurrence of non-occurrence of a basic event. The application of importance measures to DDETs must take into consideration not only the occurrence and non-occurrence of an event, but also uncertain timing or severity. This work describes three general dynamic importance measures (DIMs) as implemented in the Analysis of Dynamic Accident Progression Trees (ADAPT) DDET driver code. The measures account for the change in progression of the DDET resulting from the different values of each uncertain variable under investigation. The DIMs are applied to a sample DDET to demonstrate the type of insights that may be gained from each one. These measures will facilitate comparison of the impact of dynamic branching events on a consequence of interest, which also allow DDETs to be used in prioritizing plant investments. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Measurement of e + e - → π + π - ψ ( 2 S ) via initial state radiation at Belle

We report here measurement of the cross section of e + e - → π + π - ψ ( 2 S ) between 4.0 and 5.5 GeV, based on an analysis of initial state radiation events in a 980 fb - 1 data sample recorded with the Belle detector. The properties of the Y ( 4360 ) and Y ( 4660 ) states are determined. Fitting the mass spectrum of π + π - ψ ( 2 S ) with two coherent Breit-Wigner functions, we discover two solutions with identical mass and width but different couplings to electron-positron pairs: M Y ( 4360 ) = ( 4347 ± 6 ± 3 ) MeV / c 2 , Γ Y ( 4360 ) = ( 103 ± 9 ± 5 ) MeV , M Y ( 4660 ) = ( 4652 ± 10 ± 8 ) MeV / c 2 , Γ Y ( 4660 ) = ( 68 ± 11 ± 1 ) MeV ; and B [ Y ( 4360 ) → π + π - ψ ( 2 S ) ] · Γ Y ( 4360 ) e + e - = ( 10.9 ± 0.6 ± 0.7 ) eV and B [ Y ( 4660 ) → π + π - ψ ( 2 S ) ] · Γ Y ( 4660 ) e + e - = ( 8.1 ± 1.1 ± 0.5 ) eV for one solution; or B [ Y ( 4360 ) → π + π - ψ ( 2 S ) ] · Γ Y ( 4360 ) e + e - = ( 9.2 ± 0.6 ± 0.6 ) eV and B [ Y ( 4660 ) → π + π = ψ ( 2 S ) ] · Γ Y ( 4660 ) e + e - = ( 2.0 ± 0.3 ± 0.2 ) eV for the other. Here, the first errors are statistical and the second systematic. Evidence for a charged charmoniumlike structure at 4.05 GeV / c 2 is observed in the π ± ψ ( 2 S ) intermediate state in the Y ( 4360 ) decays. decays.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗