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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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Lightning Threat Analysis for the Space Shuttle Launch Pad and the Payload Changeout Room Using Finite Difference Methods

This report describes finite difference computer calculations for the Space Shuttle Launch Pad which predict lightning induced electric currents and electric and magnetic fields caused by a lightning strike to the Lightning Protection System caternary wire. Description of possible lightning threats to Shuttle Payload components together with specifications for protection of these components, result from the calculation of lightning induced electric and magnetic fields inside and outside the during a lightning event. These fields also induce currents and voltages on cables and circuits which may be connected to, or a part of, shuttle payload components. These currents and voltages are also calculated. These threat levels are intended as a guide for designers of payload equipment to specify any shielding and/or lightning protection mitigation which may be required for payload components which are in the process of preparation or being transferred into the Shuttle Orbiter.

Collier, Richard S.↗

Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of NASA's Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs

Over the past 50 years, various NASA communities have contributed significantly to maturing NASA s meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD)1 programs to their current state. As a result of these community efforts, and to NASA s credit, NASA s MMOD programs and models are now widely used and respected by the providers and users of both government and commercial satellites, nationally as well as internationally. Satellites have been redesigned to protect critical components from MMOD damage by moving critical components from exterior surfaces to deep inside a satellite s structure. Orbits are monitored and altered to minimize the risk of collision with tracked orbital debris. MMOD shielding added to the International Space Station (ISS) protects critical components and astronauts from potentially catastrophic damage that might result from smaller, untracked debris and meteoroid impacts. The space shuttle, as it orbited Earth, and whether docked to the ISS or not, was optimally oriented to protect its fragile thermal protection and thermal radiation systems from MMOD damage. In addition, astronauts inspected its thermal protection system for MMOD damage before the shuttle reentered Earth s atmosphere; Orion, NASA s capsule to carry astronauts to low Earth orbit, includes designs to mitigate the threat of MMOD damage and provide increased safety to the crew. When a handful of reasonable assumptions are used in NASA s MMOD models, scenarios are uncovered that conclude that the current orbital debris environment has already reached a "tipping point." That is, the amount of debris - in terms of the population of large debris objects, as well as overall mass of debris in orbit - currently in orbit has reached a threshold where it will continually collide with itself, further increasing the population of orbital debris. This increase will lead to corresponding increases in spacecraft failures, which will only create more feedback into the system, increasing the debris population growth rate. The increase thus far has been most rapid in low Earth orbit (LEO), with geosynchronous Earth orbits (GEOs) potentially suffering the same fate, but over a much longer time period. The exact timing and pace of this exponential growth are uncertain, but the serious implications of such a scenario require careful attention because of the strategic importance of U.S. space operations. The Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management and Budget contracted with the National Research Council for a study to perform three tasks: review NASA s MMOD programs and efforts, recommend in which of those NASA should increase or decrease its effort or change focus, and determine whether NASA should pursue work in any new MMOD areas. The official letter requesting the study and the full statement of task for the Committee for the Assessment of NASA s Orbital Debris Programs are in Appendixes A and B, respectively.

Source record↗

Mesh-Based Entry Vehicle and Explosive Debris Re-Contact Probability Modeling

The risk to a crewed vehicle arising from potential re-contact with fragments from an explosive breakup of any jettisoned spacecraft segments during entry has long sought to be quantified. However, great difficulty lies in efficiently capturing the potential locations of each fragment and their collective threat to the vehicle. The method presented in this paper addresses this problem by using a stochastic approach that discretizes simulated debris pieces into volumetric cells, and then assesses strike probabilities accordingly. Combining spatial debris density and relative velocity between the debris and the entry vehicle, the strike probability can be calculated from the integral of the debris flux inside each cell over time. Using this technique it is possible to assess the risk to an entry vehicle along an entire trajectory as it separates from the jettisoned segment. By decoupling the fragment trajectories from that of the entry vehicle, multiple potential separation maneuvers can then be evaluated rapidly to provide an assessment of the best strategy to mitigate the re-contact risk.

McPherson, Mark A.↗

Comparing the Earth Impact Flux from Comets and Near-Earth Asteroids

Long-period comets (LPC), defined here as those active comets with orbital periods greater than 200 years, are the most difficult objects to mitigate should one be found on an Earth threatening trajectory. The arrival of these objects from the distant Oort cloud cannot be predicted and the impact warning time would be measured in a few months - not years. At the distance of Jupiter, an inactive cometary nucleus with a diameter of one kilometer and a geometric albedo equal to 0.04 would have an apparent magnitude fainter than 25 near opposition and, hence would be well outside the detection capability of current NEO search telescopes. In general LPCs do not become active, and hence discoverable, until inside the orbit of Jupiter and it takes but nine months for a LPC to travel the distance from Jupiter's orbit to that of the Earth.Estimating the impact energy for long-period comets is particularly difficult because the sizes and masses of these objects are not well known. Their solid nuclei are hidden from ground-based telescopes by their gas and dust atmospheres and even when nearby spacecraft observations can determine a size and shape for a cometary nucleus, there are no direct determinations of any cometary mass or bulk density to date. However, a variety of indirect bulk density determinations consistently provide values below one gram per cubic centimeter, the value for water. From measurements made by the Deep Impact spacecraft during its encounter with comet Tempel 1 in July 2005, the bulk density was estimated to be 0.6 grams per cubic centimeter. The mean impact velocity of a LPC is about 51 km/s, three times the 17 km/s value for a typical near-Earth asteroid (NEA) so the impact energy for an LPC would be 9 times that of a NEA of similar mass. However, the bulk density of a comet (approx. 0.6 g/cu cm) is several times less than the density of a stony NEA (approx. 2.6 g/ cu cm) so for a LPC and a stony NEA of the same size, the LPC's impact energy would be about twice that of the NEA.To properly allocate the limited resources available for NEO surveys and physical characterization, it is important to understand the relative threat from long-period comets versus the threat posed by near-Earth asteroids.

near Earth objects↗