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This paper is a collaboration between SNL and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) - sponsored by NA211, Office of International Nuclear Security. The paper was accepted for publication by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS 2024).
The IAEA Conference on the Development of Preparedness for National and International Emergency Response 2021. The purpose of the event is to foster the exchange of information and enhance global awareness on various EPR topics through the discussion of both the progress made at national and international levels and the challenges encountered, by sharing experiences, evaluating current trends, technologies and lessons in EPR
The process of developing and deploying safeguards technology should be carried out in such a way that it supports the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) international safeguards verification mission, while also being efficient in terms of both cost and time. This process, however, may be hindered by a general lack of nuclear facility operating experience among the scientists or engineers designing safeguards technology, or the inability to interact with the IAEA inspector end user. As a result, equipment designers may have difficulty understanding inspector needs and the limitations of using safeguards technology in the field, often leading to inefficiencies (in the form of increased cost and time spent) in the safeguards technology design process. Here, to mitigate this knowledge gap, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, has developed design considerations that should be incorporated into safeguards technologies, focusing on non-destructive assay equipment. Timelines for integration of these considerations into the design process are also discussed.
The accurate accounting of nuclear materials is a cornerstone of international nuclear safeguards. One emerging challenge in this domain is the fabrication of TRIstructural ISOtropic (TRISO) particle fuels. Although these innovative fuel forms are critical for advanced reactor applications, their robust refractory ceramics and coating compositions present significant obstacles to destructive analysis (DA) methods. Ensuring full and quantitative recovery from these particles is essential for accurate mass accountancy. The current study was initiated to address these challenges, first by validating a previously established destructive method developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the quantitative recovery of uranium from TRISO particles and then following that process with uranium content determination through isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) and Davies-Gray titration. This study expands on the scope of a digestive method that was developed under the Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification program and is currently implemented in both the Coated Particle Fuel Development Laboratory and Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory at ORNL. The success of the previous Advanced Gas Reactor work relied on developing a DA method to evaluate the fabrication process and reactor experiments. The methodology described in this report was designed to rigorously investigate the efficacy of the crush/burn/leach sample preparation of TRISO particles; it aims to quantify uranium recovery while also assessing the effects of TRISO constituents (e.g., silicon and zirconium) on analytical precision and accuracy. By comparing the results from the titration method and IDMS, we sought to determine whether existing analytical procedures accepted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be effectively translated to TRISO fuel forms. The team employed an approach that involved processing replicate TRISO samples, optimizing the milling (i.e., crushing) step and performing serial leaches. The elemental composition of the analytical samples was examined to prepare for interference studies in the second year of this project. The integration of gamma spectrometry to verify residual uranium activity further strengthened the validation. Statistical methods were applied to the collected data to evaluate the uncertainties arising from sampling, sample preparation and uranium quantification. These uncertainties were then compared to the IAEA’s international target values (ITVs). Additional data collected in upcoming project work will strengthen the uncertainty estimates. Ultimately, it is hoped that this project will contribute materially to the body of work related to characterization of TRISO based fuels for the purpose of material accountancy and its applications to international safeguards.
This report summarizes the IAEA Technical Meeting on the International Network of Nuclear Reaction Data Centres held at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria from 14 to 17 May 2024. The meeting was attended by 26 participants representing 13 cooperative Centres from eight Member States (China, Hungary, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine and USA) and two International Organisations (NEA, IAEA). A summary of the meeting is given in this report along with the conclusions and actions.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) has an interest in applying machine learning to safeguards problems. However, the lack of machine training data for outside researchers is a significant impediment for progress in including advanced algorithms in safeguards practices. Information about a State’s inventory and movements of nuclear material is highly sensitive, both from a commercial perspective and from a security perspective. States (and commercial entities) do not freely divulge this information, and the IAEA–which receives detailed information from States as accounting reports–considers all information concerning nuclear materials location and composition to be Safeguards Confidential. Even within the Agency, information marked as safeguards confidential can be accessed only on a direct need-to-know basis by those who analyze and summarize the information for that particular State.
Predictions of radionuclide dose rates to freshwater organisms can be used to evaluate the radiological environmental impacts of releases from uranium mining and milling projects. These predictions help inform decisions on the implementation of mitigation measures. The objective of this study was to identify how dose rate modelling could be improved to reduce uncertainty in predictions to non-human biota. For this purpose, we modelled the activity concentrations of 210 Pb, 210 Po, 226 Ra, 230 Th, and 238 U downstream of uranium mines and mills in northern Saskatchewan, Canada, together with associated weighted absorbed dose rates for a freshwater food chain using measured activity concentrations in water and sediments. Differences in predictions of radionuclide activity concentrations occurred mainly from the different default partition coefficient and concentration ratio values from one model to another and including all or only some 238 U decay daughters in the dose rate assessments. Consequently, we recommend a standardized best-practice approach to calculate weighted absorbed dose rates to freshwater biota whether a facility is at the planning, operating or decommissioned stage. At the initial planning stage, the best-practice approach recommend using conservative site-specific baseline activity concentrations in water, sediments and organisms and predict conservative incremental activity concentrations in these media by selecting concentration ratios based on species similarity and similar water quality conditions to reduce the uncertainty in dose rate calculations. At the operating and decommissioned stages, the best-practice approach recommends relying on measured activity concentrations in water, sediment, fish tissue and wholebody of small organisms to further reduce uncertainty in dose rate estimates. This approach would allow for more realistic but still conservative dose assessments when evaluating impacts from uranium mining projects and making decision on adequate controls of releases.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established a designation for an International Centre based on Research Reactors (ICERR). The intention of this designation is to provide a vehicle for IAEA member states to access international research-reactor and ancillary nuclear research and development infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has made a commitment to world leadership in the development of advanced nuclear energy, science, and technology. To this end, DOE has established programs and initiatives to enhance this leadership role. ICERR designation constitutes an important step in achieving the DOE vision. DOE, represented by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), is submitting this application for re-designation as an IAEA ICERR. Both INL and ORNL have a decades-long and storied history that supports nuclear research, development, and deployment both nationally and internationally. Both have a history of safe and efficient nuclear operations and have demonstrated a track record of international collaboration and cooperation. INL and ORNL are home to two primary and two secondary research reactors. The primary reactors are Advanced Test Reactor at INL, and High-Flux Isotope Reactor at ORNL. Secondary reactors include: Neutron Radiography Reactor at INL, Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility at INL, and INL Advanced Test Reactor: Critical Facility (ATRC). ICERR designation will also include numerous ancillary facilities at both laboratories, including the following: Multiple post-irradiation examination facilities at both INL and ORNL, Radiochemistry hot-cell facilities at ORNL, INL nuclear-fuel-fabrication and materials-science facilities, and INL and ORNL radiological and nuclear analytical capabilities.
This report summarizes the IAEA Technical Meeting on the International Network of Nuclear Reaction Data Centres held as a video meeting from 4 to 7 May 2021. The meeting was attended by 29 participants representing 13 cooperative Centres from eight Member States (China, Hungary, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine and USA) and two International Organisations (NEA, IAEA) as well as a participant from Kazakhstan. A summary of the meeting is given in this report along with the conclusions and actions.
This report summarizes the IAEA Workshop on Compilation of Experimental Nuclear Reaction Data held at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria from 13 to 16 December 2022. The meeting was attended by 23 participants representing 12 cooperative Centres from seven Member States (China, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine and USA) and two International Organisations (NEA, IAEA) as well as a participant from Mongolia and Spain. A summary of the workshop is given in this report along with the conclusions and actions.
In compliance with their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, based on INFCIRC/153 (corrected) (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972), States Party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are obligated to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all changes in their nuclear material inventory as well as movement of the material across boundaries of IAEA recognized material balance areas (MBA), inventories and nuclear material balances. This project addresses capabilities to detect irregularities in State reports, thus ensuring their accuracy and completeness, and in the broader context, States’ compliance with safeguards obligations of the NPT. A recent study (Henzl et al., 2022) (lead by this project’s PI) demonstrated how analysis of dynamic correlations in nuclear material movement within the entire fuel cycle of a State (viewed as a single system) can reveal variances consistent with and indicative of “irregular” activities. Expanding on this concept, novel ways to analyze State declarations themselves—again, for the State as a whole entity—will help the IAEA draw accurate safeguards conclusions and trust the validity and authenticity of Stategenerated declaration reports. Introducing new declaration analyses capabilities explored in this project will help to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State in general.
Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) has hosted the International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities since 1978. This course is the flagship training course of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On behalf of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Sandia manages, develops, and coordinates all course materials, and works closely with the IAEA to arrange all logistical details for the course ITC-29 incorporated some updates to the facility models, based on feedback received in ITC-28 and the ITC-29 dry run. In addition, all the graphics were refreshed after ITC-28 and implemented in the posters, data handbooks, etc. As in ITC-28, the ITC-29 staff worked closely with the IAEA on course materials, including a peer review process to ensure all course materials were aligned with Nuclear Security Series No. 13 and other relevant international guidance documentation from the IAEA. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ITC-29 was postponed twice and eventually took place in the late summer/early fall of 2022. Due to ongoing COVID-19 restrictions and safety requirements, the number of participants was reduced by about 31 percent from 59 participants in ITC-28 to 41 in ITC-29. As a result, the number of subgroups also decreased from eight in ITC-28 to six for ITC-29. This enabled the Sandia team to implement more opportunities for social distancing, particularly in the large classrooms. Despite the challenges, ITC-29 still passed a significant milestone, with the one-thousandth participant of the international training course attending during this event. Finally, the ITC staff continued the use of its improved method of evaluation to capture participants’ satisfaction with the updated course and to gather feedback concerning future improvements. This document provides a brief description of ITC-29, including a summary of lessons learned and key recommendations for future development efforts.
SAND2024-08428O The IDB Loader is a database designed to hold gamma spectra. IDB is a web-accessible database of reference gamma spectra for measuring uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) isotopic composition. The database, developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), provides access to well-characterized groups of gamma spectra curated by international experts in gamma spectroscopy. It was created to promote sustainability and maintenance of software used to determine the isotopic abundances of U and Pu. The IDB Loader works by uploading one set of spectral data into an existing IDB. The Data Loader package includes documentation describing the IDB's table, the format of the spectral data, and a description of the loader program. The IDB is currently hosted by the IAEA at: https://nds.iaea.org/idb Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.
The immobilization of irradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel is a critical component of nuclear waste management and non-proliferation efforts. In Kazakhstan, at National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan special attention is given to managing legacy HEU fuel from research reactors. One such case involves the IGR research reactor, whose first core containing irradiated HEU uranium-graphite fuel was operated from 1961 to 1966 and removed following reactor modernization. This fuel now requires a reliable and secure immobilization strategy. Here, this paper presents the development of a technological process for immobilizing this fuel to reduce its enrichment to below 20 % in terms of 235U content. The proposed method involves down-blending irradiated HEU fuel with depleted uranium, followed by encapsulation in a Portland cement matrix. Full-scale experiments were conducted to assess the uniformity of uranium distribution within the matrix. The results confirm the effectiveness of this approach, ensuring reliable immobilization of fuel in accordance with international requirements, including IAEA standards and Kazakhstan's regulatory framework. These findings contribute to the broader effort of adapting immobilization strategies for the safe management of spent fuel from research reactors.
We report that small-particle analysis is a highly promising emerging forensic tool for analysis of interdicted special nuclear materials. Integration of microstructural, morphological, compositional, and molecular impurity signatures could provide significant advancements in forensic capabilities. We have applied rapid, high-sensitivity, hard X-ray synchrotron chemical imaging to analyze impurity signatures in two differently fabricated fuel pellets from the 5th Collaborative Materials Exercise (CMX5) of the IAEA Nuclear Forensics International Working Group. The spatial distributions, chemical compositions, and morphological and molecular characteristics of impurities were evaluated using X-ray absorption near-edge structure (XANES) and X-ray fluorescence chemical imaging to discover principal impurities, their granularity, particle sizes, modes of occurrence (distinct grains vs incorporation in the UO 2 lattice), and sources and mechanisms of incorporation. Differences in UO 2+x stoichiometry were detected at the microscale in nominally identical UO 2 ceramics (CMX5-A and CMX5-B), implying the presence of multiple UO 2 host phases with characteristic microstructures and feedstock compositions. Al, Fe, Ni, W, and Zr impurities and integrated impurity signature analysis identified distinctly different pellet synthesis and processing methods. For example, two different Al, W, and Zr populations in the CMX5-B sample indicated a more complex processing history than the CMX5-A sample. K-edge XANES measurements reveal both metallic and oxide forms of Fe and Ni but with different proportions between each sample. Altogether, these observations suggest multiple sources of impurities, including fabrication (e.g., force-sieving) and feedstock (mineral oxides). This study demonstrates the potential of synchrotron techniques to integrate different signatures across length scales (angstrom to micrometer) to detect and differentiate between contrasting UO 2 fuel fabrication techniques.
Despite interesting properties, the use of 67 Cu, 186 Re and 47 Sc theranostic radionuclides inpreclinical studies and clinical trials is curtailed by their limited availability due to a lack of widelyestablished production methods. An IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) was initiated toidentify important technical issues related to the production and quality control of these emergingradionuclides and related radiopharmaceuticals, based on the request from IAEA Member States.The international team worked on targetry, separation, quality control and radiopharmaceutical aspectsof the radionuclides obtained from research reactors and cyclotrons leading to preparation ofa standard recommendations for all Member States. The CRP was initiated in 2016 with fourteenparticipants from thirteen Member States from four continents. Extraordinary results on the production,quality control and preclinical evaluation of selected radionuclides were reported in this projectthat was finalized in 2020. The outcomes, outputs and results of this project achieved by participatingMember States are described in this minireview.
Fluid-fueled molten-salt reactors (MSRs) are actively being developed by several companies, with plans to deploy them internationally. The current IAEA inspection tools are largely incompatible with the unique design features of liquid fuel MSRs (e.g., the complex fuel chemistry, circulating fuel inventory, bulk accountancy, and high radiation environment). For these reasons, safeguards for MSRs are seen as challenging and require the development of new techniques. This paper proposes one such technique through the observation of the reactor’s off-gas. Any reactor design using low-enriched uranium will build up plutonium as the fuel undergoes burnup. Plutonium has different fission product yields than uranium. Therefore, a shift in fission product production is expected with fuel evolution. The passive removal of certain gaseous fission products to the off-gas tank of an MSR provides a valuable opportunity for analysis without significant modifications to the design of the system. Uniquely, due to the gaseous nature of the isotopes, beta particle emissions are available for observation. The ratios of these fission product isotopes can, thus, be traced back to the relative amount and types of fissile isotopes in the core. This proposed technique represents an effective safeguards tool for bulk accountancy which, while avoiding being onerous, could be used in concert with other techniques to meet the IAEA’s timeliness goals for the detection of a diversion.
Pyroprocessing is a promising technology for reprocessing used nuclear fuel (UNF) from light water reactors (LWR) and sodium fast reactors (SFR). With the advancement of fast reactors with projects from companies such as TerraPower, the prospects of pyroprocessing are more promising than ever before, as fast reactors can consume all actinides, not just uranium and plutonium. Before pyroprocessing can be implemented commercially, pre-existing safeguards used for aqueous reprocessing must be adapted for pyroprocessing. Safeguards, as determined by both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are discussed in this review as guidelines for approaches used in both domestic and international reprocessing plants. The implementation of safeguards in aqueous reprocessing was then reviewed based on the experience from existing aqueous facilities. The experimental pyroprocessing facilities were identified as pyroprocessing plants in the design stage with one operating exception of the Fuel Conditioning Facility (FCF). The safeguard methods implemented or designed for each and the accompanying challenges of utilizing existing safeguards in pyroprocessing are considered and a summary of applicable approaches is included.