Results for “Intruder screening”

DOE OSTI2021

E- Area Low-Level Waste Facility Multitiered Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E- Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit (DU) options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA)issued back in 2008, along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SA).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility Multitiered Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit (DU) options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA) issued back in 2008 (WSRC 2008), along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SAs). The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed the prior PAs and SAs and was tasked to update the facility’s upcoming PA, most likely to be issued during FY2023. For operating the E-Area facility, a Consolidated Waste Tracking System (CWTS) is actively employed by waste generators where every radionuclide entering the facility, to be buried in one of its many DUs1, must be either directly or indirectly tracked. Since there are many radionuclides in existence (>3,000), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), specially ICRP Publication 107, has provided guidance on the subset of radionuclides requiring further assessment in landfills such as the ELLWF. The ICRP 107 publication provides critical radiological information on 1,252 radionuclides consisting of 97 elements. This database, along with the current dose coefficients that have been developed for these radionuclides in DOE-STD-1196-2011 (DOE 2011), is the critical starting point for developing a consistent inventory limit system.

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DOE OSTI2020

Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA) issued back in 2008, along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SA). The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed the prior PAs and SAs and has been tasked to update the facility’s PA. For operating the E-Area facility, a Waste Inventory Tracking System (e.g., WITS) is actively employed by waste generators where every radionuclide entering the facility (to be buried in one of its many disposal units) must be either directly or indirectly accounted for. Since there is a large number of radionuclides in existence (>3,000), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP-107) has provided guidance on the subset of radionuclides requiring further assessment in landfills such as the E-Area LLWF. The ICRP-107 publication provides critical radiological information on 1,252 radionuclides of 97 elements. This database is the critical starting point for developing a consistent inventory limit system. The explicit measurement and tracking of all radionuclides are not necessary when process knowledge, burial history, and radiological aspects are factored into conservative groundwater and intruder screening processes. Across the DOE complex these screening processes have been historically performed using the methodology suggested by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) as presented in their original report (NCRP 1984) and then refined in a later report (NCRP 1996). In the recommended screening models employed within this report the traditional NCRP models are updated to better handle progeny and better reflect the known characteristics of E-Area. This improved screening process is referred to as the “NCRP-like” method. Various upgrades to the traditional NCRP methodology have been used by others (e.g., NRC funded effort by Kennedy and Strenge 1992). The more detailed models by Kennedy and Strenge (1992) were considered in this effort and are compared to the results from the more traditional NCRP-like models. The groundwater and inadvertent intruder screening analyses presented in this report start with this 1,252 radionuclide list and reduces it down to more manageable lists that are applicable to the various disposal unit types contained within E-Area. In order to reduce this starting list, some level of exposure risk must be considered acceptable. Historically, a dose (or concentration level) has been compared with a screening criterion set to 1% of a performance measure (e.g., a beta-gamma dose not to exceed the 4 mrem/yr beta-gamma performance measure x 0.01 = 0.04 mrem/yr). Thus, if a radionuclide produced a bounding or screening-level dose (or concentrations) less than the screening criterion, it could be safely removed from further consideration. Several tiers of screening and bounding level analyses have been considered in this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA) issued back in 2008, along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SA). The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed the prior PAs and SAs and has been tasked to update the facility’s PA. For operating the E-Area facility, a Waste Inventory Tracking System (e.g., WITS) is actively employed by waste generators where every radionuclide entering the facility (to be buried in one of its many disposal units1) must be either directly or indirectly accounted for. Since there is a large number of radionuclides in existence (>3,000), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP-107) has provided guidance on the subset of radionuclides requiring further assessment in landfills such as the E-Area LLWF. The ICRP-107 publication provides critical radiological information on 1,252 radionuclides of 97 elements. This database is the critical starting point for developing a consistent inventory limit system. The explicit measurement and tracking of all 1,252 ICRP-107 radionuclides can be reduced when process knowledge, burial history, and radiological aspects are factored into conservative groundwater and intruder screening processes. Across the DOE complex these screening processes have been historically performed using the methodology suggested by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) as presented in their original report (NCRP 1984) and then refined in a later report (NCRP 1996). In the recommended screening models employed within this report the traditional NCRP models are updated to better handle progeny and better reflect the known characteristics of E-Area. This improved screening process is referred to as the “NCRP-like” method. Various upgrades to the traditional NCRP methodology have been used by others (e.g., NRC funded effort by Kennedy and Strenge 1992). The more detailed models by Kennedy and Strenge (1992) were considered in this effort and are compared to the results from the more traditional NCRP-like models. The groundwater and inadvertent intruder screening analyses presented in this report start with this 1,252 radionuclide list and reduces it down to more manageable lists that are applicable to the various disposal unit types contained within E-Area. In order to reduce this starting list, some level of exposure risk must be considered acceptable. Historically, a dose (or concentration level) has been compared with a screening criterion set to 1% of a performance measure (e.g., a betagamma dose not to exceed the 4 mrem/yr beta-gamma performance measure x 0.01 = 0.04 mrem/yr). Thus, if a radionuclide produced a bounding or screening-level dose (or concentrations) less than the screening criterion, it could be safely removed from further consideration. Several tiers of screening and bounding level analyses have been considered in this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

Reassessment of Dose Contributions from the Paducah Cask Special Waste Form Buried in the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

During a recent revision to the groundwater and inadvertent human intruder screening analysis report (Aleman and Hamm, 2023), weaknesses within the screening logic were observed resulting in the addition of U-235 being brought back into the list of radionuclides requiring inventory limits within the Paducah Cask special waste form (SWF). In addition, while reviewing the earlier vadose zone transport analysis efforts, an inconsistency was observed in the initial U-235P inventory that was supplied to the Consolidated Waste Tracking System (CWTS) back in 2009.

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DOE OSTI2025

Reassessment of Dose Contributions from the M-Area Glass Special Waste Form Buried in the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

During a recent revision to the groundwater (GW) and inadvertent human intruder (IHI) screening analysis report (Aleman and Hamm, 2023), weaknesses within the screening logic were observed resulting in U-235 being brought back into the list of radionuclides requiring inventory limits within the M-Area Glass SWF. In addition, while reviewing the earlier vadose zone (VZ) transport analysis efforts, an input deck error was observed in the U-234G VZ transport simulation.

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NASA NTRS2017

Developmental Research in Space: Predicting Adult Neurobehavioral Phenotypes via Metabolomic Imaging

As human habitation and eventual colonization of space becomes an inevitable reality, there is a necessity to understand how organisms develop over the life span in the space environment. Microgravity, altered CO2, radiation and psychological stress are some of the key factors that could affect mammalian reproduction and development in space, however there is a paucity of information on this topic. Here we combine early (neonatal) in vivo spectroscopic imaging with an adult emotionality assay following a common obstetric complication (prenatal asphyxia) likely to occur during gestation in space. The neural metabolome is sensitive to alteration by degenerative changes and developmental disorders, thus we hypothesized that that early neonatal neurometabolite profiles can predict adult response to novelty. Late gestation fetal rats were exposed to moderate asphyxia by occluding the blood supply feeding one of the rats pair uterine horns for 15min. Blood supply to the opposite horn was not occluded (within-litter cesarean control). Further comparisons were made with vaginal (natural) birth controls. In one-week old neonates, we measured neurometabolites in three brain areas (i.e., striatum, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus). Adult perinatally-asphyxiated offspring exhibited greater anxiety-like behavioral phenotypes (as measured the composite neurobehavioral assay involving open field activity, responses to novel object, quantification of fecal droppings, and resident-intruder tests of social behavior). Further, early neurometabolite profiles predicted adult responses. Non-invasive MRS screening of mammalian offspring is likely to advance ground-based space analogue studies informing mammalian reproduction in space, and achieving high-priority multigenerational research that will enable studies of the first truly space-developed mammals.

Schorn, Julia M.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Developmental Research in Space: Predicting Adult Neurobehavioral Phenotypes via Metabolomic Imaging

As human habitation and eventual colonization of space becomes an inevitable reality, there is a necessity to understand how organisms develop over the life span in the space environment. Microgravity, altered CO2, radiation and psychological stress are some of the key factors that could affect mammalian reproduction and development in space, however there is a paucity of information on this topic. Here we combine early (neonatal) in vivo spectroscopic imaging with an adult emotionality assay following a common obstetric complication (prenatal asphyxia) likely to occur during gestation in space. The neural metabolome is sensitive to alteration by degenerative changes and developmental disorders, thus we hypothesized that that early neonatal neurometabolite profiles can predict adult response to novelty. Late gestation fetal rats were exposed to moderate asphyxia by occluding the blood supply feeding one of the rats pair uterine horns for 15min. Blood supply to the opposite horn was not occluded (within-litter cesarean control). Further comparisons were made with vaginal (natural) birth controls. In one-week old neonates, we measured neurometabolites in three brain areas (i.e., striatum, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus). Adult perinatally-asphyxiated offspring exhibited greater anxiety-like behavioral phenotypes (as measured the composite neurobehavioral assay involving open field activity, responses to novel object, quantification of fecal droppings, and resident-intruder tests of social behavior). Further, early neurometabolite profiles predicted adult responses. Non-invasive MRS screening of mammalian offspring is likely to advance ground-based space analogue studies informing mammalian reproduction in space, and achieving high-priority.

rodent development spacefligh↗

NASA NTRS2004

Toward Synthesis, Analysis, and Certification of Security Protocols

Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.

Schumann, Johann↗