Design and fabrication of a composite door outer panel including intrusion protection
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A method for providing security to a network having a data stream with a plurality of portions of data, each having differing levels of sensitivity. The data stream is interrogated to determine the presence of predetermined characteristics associated with at least one of the portions of data within the data stream. At least one of the portions of data is then characterized, based upon the portion of data exhibiting a predetermined combination of characteristics, wherein the predetermined combination of characteristics is related to the sensitivity of the portion of data. The portions of the data stream are then distributed into a plurality of different channels, each of the channels associated with different level of sensitivity.
This project developed a new scalable network firewall and Intrusion Protection System (IPS) that can manage increasing traffic loads, higher network speeds, and strict Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. This new approach provides a strong foundation for next-generation network security technologies and products that address growing and unmet needs in the government and corporate sectors by delivering Optimal Network Security. Controlling access is an essential task for securing networks that are vital to private industry, government agencies, and the military. This access can be granted or denied based on the packet header or payload contents. For example, a simple network firewall enforces a security policy by inspecting and filtering the packet headers. As a complement to the firewall, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) inspects the packet payload for known threat signatures; for example, virus or worm. Similar to a firewall policy, IDS policies consist of multiple rules that specify an action for matching packets. Each rule can specify different items, such as the signature contents and the signature location within the payload. When the firewall and IDS are merged into one device, the resulting system is referred to as an Intrusion Protection System (IPS), which provides both packet header and payload inspections. Having both types of inspections is very desirable and more manageable in a single device.
This paper presents an integrated technical framework to protect pipelines against both malicious intrusions and piping degradation using a distributed fiber sensing technology and artificial intelligence. A distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) system based on phase-sensitive optical time-domain reflectometry (φ-OTDR) was used to detect acoustic wave propagation and scattering along pipeline structures consisting of straight piping and sharp bend elbow. Signal to noise ratio of the DAS system was enhanced by femtosecond induced artificial Rayleigh scattering centers. Data harnessed by the DAS system were analyzed by neural network-based machine learning algorithms. The system identified with over 85% accuracy in various external impact events, and over 94% accuracy for defect identification through supervised learning and 71% accuracy through unsupervised learning.
As part of monitoring required under Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA), the NRC staff reviewed an updated DOE performance assessment (PA) for salt waste disposal at the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). The NRC staff concluded that it has reasonable assurance that waste disposal at the SDF meets the 10 CFR 61 performance objectives for protection of individuals against intrusion (chap.61.42), protection of individuals during operations (chap.61.43), and site stability (chap.61.44). However, based on its evaluation of DOE's results and independent sensitivity analyses conducted with DOE's models, the NRC staff concluded that it did not have reasonable assurance that DOE's disposal activities at the SDF meet the performance objective for protection of the general population from releases of radioactivity (chap.61.41) evaluated at a dose limit of 0.25 mSv/yr (25 mrem/yr) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE). NRC staff also concluded that the potential dose to a member of the public is expected to be limited (i.e., is expected to be similar to or less than the public dose limit in chap.20.1301 of 1 mSv/yr [100 mrem/yr] TEDE) and is expected to occur many years after site closure. The NRC staff used risk insights gained from review of the SDF PA, its experience monitoring DOE disposal actions at the SDF over the last 5 years, as well as independent analysis and modeling to identify factors that are important to assessing whether DOE's disposal actions meet the performance objectives. Many of these factors are similar to factors identified in the NRC staff's 2005 review of salt waste disposal at the SDF. Key areas of interest continue to be waste form and disposal unit degradation, the effectiveness of infiltration and erosion controls, and estimation of the radiological inventory. Based on these factors, NRC is revising its plan for monitoring salt waste disposal at the SDF in coordination with South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). DOE has completed or begun additional work related to salt waste disposal to address these factors. NRC staff continues to evaluate information related to the performance of the SDF and has been working with DOE and SCDHEC to resolve NRC staff's technical concerns. (authors)
This document was developed to provide guidance for the implementation of secure data transfer in a complex computational infrastructure representative of the electric power and oil and natural gas enterprises and the control systems they implement. For the past 20 years the cyber security community has focused on preventative measures intended to keep systems secure by providing a hard outer shell that is difficult to penetrate. Over time, the hard exterior, soft interior focus changed to focus on defense-in-depth adding multiple layers of protection, introducing intrusion detection systems, more effective incident response and cleanup, and many other security measures. Despite much larger expenditures and more layers of defense, successful attacks have only increased in number and severity. Consequently, it is time to re-focus the conventional approach to cyber security. While it is still important to implement measures to keep intruders out, a new protection paradigm is warranted that is aimed at discovering attempted or real compromises as early as possible. Put simply, organizations should take as fact that they have been, are now, or will be compromised. These compromises may be intended to steal information for financial gain as in the theft of intellectual property or credentials that lead to the theft of financial resources, or to lie silent until instructed to cause physical or electronic damage and/or denial of services. This change in outlook has been recently confirmed by the National Security Agency [19]. The discovery of attempted and actual compromises requires an increased focus on monitoring events by manual and/or automated log monitoring, detecting unauthorized changes to a system's hardware and/or software, detecting intrusions, and/or discovering the exfiltration of sensitive information and/or attempts to send inappropriate commands to ICS/SCADA (Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems.
Critical infrastructure Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems were designed to operate on closed, proprietary networks where a malicious insider posed the greatest threat potential. The centralization of control and the movement towards open systems and standards has improved the efficiency of industrial control, but has also exposed legacy SCADA systems to security threats that they were not designed to mitigate. This work explores the viability of machine learning methods in detecting the new threat scenarios of command and data injection. Similar to network intrusion detection systems in the cyber security domain, the command and control communications in a critical infrastructure setting are monitored, and vetted against examples of benign and malicious command traffic, in order to identify potential attack events. Multiple learning methods are evaluated using a dataset of Remote Terminal Unit communications, which included both normal operations and instances of command and data injection attack scenarios.
This document discusses various issues in implementing a robust access control schema to secure the Reactor Embrittlement Archive Project (REAP) web application. REAP application has been designed to allow different types of users. Consequently, it is vital to ensure that REAP website has a robust security framework in order to prevent intrusion, to protect data and resources from misuse, and protect data from malicious or unintentional modification by users. Various possible alternatives for authentication frameworks in ASP.NET - Windows, Forms, Passport and custom (JOSSO) authentication frameworks are evaluated. It is concluded that Windows Authentication is apt for REAP. Various elements of implementation are discussed with examples.
Motivation. Critical infrastructures are large, complex engineered systems that must be operated robustly under abnormal conditions resulting from natural hazards or intentional acts. For example, electric power systems must be robust to line faults, water utilities must rapidly mitigate contamination incidents, and computing networks must adapt to adversarial intrusions to protect critical information. Problem. It is difficult for decision-makers within resiliency analysis in critical infrastructure to optimize designs and develop effective response strategies that can account for uncertainties. Facing incomplete information and the sheer scope that a natural hazard or attack vector may incorporate, response can be ineffective without reliable, scalable decision support tools. These problems are intrinsically nonlinear and involve discrete decisions, and unfortunately, existing off-the-shelf mathematical programming methods cannot support optimization-based decision-making of these nonlinear at scale. Method/Approach and Results. This project emphasized development of fundamental optimization strategies that supported real- time mitigation and response for critical infrastructures. In particular, the project developed multi- tree approaches based on piecewise outer-approximations for solution of mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problems. These techniques alternate between an MILP or MISOCP relaxation to obtain a lower bound and candidate discrete solutions and an NLP subproblem to obtain upper bounds. Using tailored relaxations based on problem structure, these methods were used to solve several key applications in resilience and response of critical infrastructure. This work resulted in two open-source, copyrighted software packages: CORAMIN (https://github.com/Coramin/Coramin) -- an object-oriented mathematical programming framework that supports tailored multi-tree algorithms for solution of large- scale mixed-integer nonlinear programming; and EGRET (Electrical Grid Research and Engineering Toolkit) (https://github.com/grid- parity-exchange/Egret) -- a declarative mathematical programming framework built upon CORAMIN and Pyomo for formulation and solution of resilience and operations problems in power grid systems. Furthermore, these tools resulted in several important published results, including the following: The first known global optimization approach that could solve the unit-commitment problem with nonlinear power flow constraints on medium-sized test problems; Improved parallel optimization-based bounds tightening and strengthening of relaxations of AC power flow constraints; and, Optimization-based approaches for improved grid resilience and use of demand response to improve grid resilience with reduction in capital requirements. Result Implications. This project developed first-of-a-kind algorithms for decision-making in critical infrastructure resilience operations and planning, as well as a next-generation toolkit for MINLP researchers. These approaches leveraged high-performance computing architectures to solve some of the largest, most challenging nonlinear discrete optimization problems to global optimality, and these successes were captured in open-source software to enable optimization-based decision-making, and efficient solution of MINLP formulations for electric power transmission grids.
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Concepts for the use of markers in the post-closure phase of deep geological repositories (DGRs), are often designed to prevent 'inadvertent' human intrusion (HI), while it is common practice not to protect against deliberate intrusion (i.e. 'advertent' HI). In the literature, inadvertent HI prevention studies usually combine future human activity scenarios with the assumption that all memory of the DGR has been lost, and analyze what can be done now to make the possible future intruder 'aware' of the associated risks. In this paper, we show that the classical 'advertent'/'inadvertent' duality classification of HI, as used in the performance assessment context, is not ideal to characterize potential HI situations in the RK and M preservation context. We suggest that the relevant HI categories are expanded and refined to 'un/necessary HI', 'un/intentional HI' and 'un/friendly HI'. Along with refining the taxonomy of HI that way, we refine the assumption relating to the loss of memory of the DGR. Different HI situations are likely to arise in different 'loss-of-memory situations'. We analyze the resulting 5 classes of the proposed HI classification and find that 2 hold the classic 'advertent' and 'inadvertent' HI scenarios while 3 are 'new'. We apply the proposed categories to sub-surface marking concepts from the literature and suggest that, in particular, sub-surface marking concepts would benefit from this new approach to HI and loss-of-memory categorization. (authors)
We report the initial results of ongoing development of minimally intrusive, single-chip integrated capacitive recession/temperature sensors that would provide real-time monitoring of ablation recession of heatshield thermal protection systems (TPS) during spacecraft atmospheric entry. This work, which was performed using Phenolic Impregnated Carbon Ablator (PICA), is also to demonstrate the ease of sensor insertion during TPS manufacturing, thereby resulting in faster, low-cost, uniform sensor assembly, and spatial distribution, without compromising TPS structural integrity. Using oxy-acetylene flame at 500 W-cm-2 heat flux for 16 seconds, the average recession depth of 3.25 mm was obtained. Some measurement problems were encountered in this first attempt. However, the initial results obtained are in relatively good agreement with published data, and offer promise of future improvement based on lessons learned.
A core concern of the Department of Energy is protecting sensitive information in the face of verification agreements that may make use of increasingly sophisticated and intrusive sensors. The conflict between intrusiveness and information protection is evident in existing treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Additional Protocol (AP), where Congress has seen a need to step in and enact implementing legislation to protect, for example, sensitive information such as certain unique chemical signatures, but in so doing has introduced complexities into U.S. treaty compliance policy. Information barriers or filters (IFs) – broadly defined as physical and/or encryption mechanisms that preclude acquisition of sensitive, quantitative information while allowing the acquisition of treaty-relevant qualitative information by an inspectorate – could play a useful role in avoiding this type of conflict. In order to stimulate new thinking on ways to meet existing and future safeguard challenges, this scoping study investigates how IFs – a technique borrowed from the realm of arms control verification - might contribute to international safeguards activities. Information filters (IFs) have long been recognized as an important tool for the protection of sensitive signals and other data in the verification of bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties. The implementation of NPT safeguards, while differing somewhat in context from arms control verification, involves similar sensitivity concerns. This report examines whether or not IFs can be useful in the world of international safeguards, and provides a survey of methods of barring or filtering information that could be applied. The study finds that while many safeguards activities involve non sensitive data, there are also a number of areas where IFs are already in use and others where IFs could make a useful contribution. Examples include verification of enrichment plants, complementary access inspections, and the Additional Protocol (AP) to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The rapid growth in the number of devices and their connectivity has enlarged the attack surface and made cyber systems more vulnerable. As attackers become increasingly sophisticated and resourceful, mere reliance on traditional cyber protection, such as intrusion detection, firewalls, and encryption, is insufficient to secure the cyber systems. Cyber resilience provides a new security paradigm that complements inadequate protection with resilience mechanisms. A Cyber-Resilient Mechanism (CRM) adapts to the known or zero-day threats and uncertainties in real-time and strategically responds to them to maintain the critical functions of the cyber systems in the event of successful attacks. Feedback architectures play a pivotal role in enabling the online sensing, reasoning, and actuation process of the CRM. Reinforcement Learning (RL) is an important gathering of algorithms that epitomize the feedback architectures for cyber resilience. It allows the CRM to provide dynamic and sequential responses to attacks with limited or without prior knowledge of the environment and the attacker. In this work, we review the literature on RL for cyber resilience and discuss the cyber-resilient defenses against three major types of vulnerabilities, i.e., posture-related, information-related, and human-related vulnerabilities. Here we introduce moving target defense, defensive cyber deception, and assistive human security technologies as three application domains of CRMs to elaborate on their designs. The RL algorithms also have vulnerabilities themselves. We explain the major vulnerabilities of RL and present develop several attack models where the attacker target the information exchanged between the environment and the agent: the rewards, the state observations, and the action commands. We show that the attacker can trick the RL agent into learning a nefarious policy with minimum attacking effort. The paper introduces several defense methods to secure the RL-enabled systems from these attacks. However, there is still a lack of works that focuses on the defensive mechanisms for RL-enabled systems. Last but not least, we discuss the future challenges of RL for cyber security and resilience and emerging applications of RL-based CRMs.
To protect process control networks from cyber intrusions, preventive security measures such as perimeter defenses (for example, network firewalls and demilitarized zones) and secure versions of process control network protocols have been increasingly adopted or proposed. Although system hardening and fixing known vulnerabilities of existing systems are crucial to secure process control systems, intrusion monitoring is essential to ensure that the preventive measures are not compromised or bypassed. Our approach involves a multilayer security architecture for monitoring process control systems to achieve accurate and effective situational awareness. Also, we leverage some of the characteristics of process control systems such as the regularity of network traffic patterns to perform intrusion detection, with the potential to detect unknown attacks. To facilitate human analysts to gain a better understanding of anomalous network traffic patterns, we present a visualization tool that supports multiple usercustomizable views and animation for analyzing network packet traces.
SAVI models physical protection systems for fixed sites using Adversary Sequence Diagrams (ASDs) and then uses the ASD to find most-vulnerable adversary paths through the ASD. The identified paths have the lowest Probability of Interruption among all the paths through the ASD.
A new feature-based forecasting framework of abnormalities is presented for early warning for cyber-physical control systems. The abnormalities may refer to intelligent cyber-attacks or naturally occurring faults and failures. Techniques presented here are aimed at protecting against unauthorized intrusions as well as fault prevention. Time series signals from system monitoring nodes are converted to features using feature discovery techniques. The feature behavior for each monitoring node is characterized in the form of decision boundaries, separating normal and abnormal space with operating data collected from the plant or by running virtual models of the plant. A set of ensemble state-space models are constructed for representing feature evolution in time-domain, where the ensembles are selected using Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) clustering. The forecasted outputs are anticipated time-evolution of features, computed by applying an adaptive Kalman predictor to each ensemble model. The overall features forecast is then obtained through dynamic ensemble averaging. This is done by projecting evolution of feature vector to future times in a receding horizon fashion. The features forecast are compared to the decision boundary to estimate if/when the feature vectors will cross the boundary. Simulation results in a high fidelity GE gas turbine platform, show the effectiveness of our approach for forecasting abnormalities.
Control system networks are increasingly being connected to enterprise level networks. These connections leave critical industrial controls systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Most of the effort in protecting these cyber-physical systems (CPS) has been in securing the networks using information security techniques and protection and reliability concerns at the control system level against random hardware and software failures. However, besides these failures the inability of information security techniques to protect against all intrusions means that the control system must be resilient to various signal attacks for which new analysis and detection methods need to be developed. In this paper, sensor signal attacks are analyzed for observer-based controlled systems. The threat surface for sensor signal attacks is subdivided into denial of service, finite energy, and bounded attacks. In particular, the error signals between states of attack free systems and systems subject to these attacks are quantified. Optimal sensor and actuator signal attacks for the finite and infinite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the corresponding cost functions are computed. The closed-loop system under optimal signal attacks are provided. Illustrative numerical examples are provided together with an application to a power network with distributed LQ controllers.