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DOE OSTI2011

Nuclear Data Sheets for A = 133

Evaluated nuclear structure and decay data for all nuclei within the A=133 mass chain are presented. The experimental data are evaluated and best values for level and gamma-ray energies, quantum numbers, lifetimes, gamma-ray intensities, and other nuclear properties are recommended. Inconsistencies and discrepancies that exist in the literature are noted. This work supersedes the earlier evaluation by S. Raab (1995Ra12), published in Nuclear Data Sheets75, 491 (1995).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Improved Cumulative Fission Yield Measurements with Fission Spectrum Neutrons on 235 U

Two isotopically-characterized targets of high-purity (99.84±0.03%) 235 U-oxide and a neutron dosimetry package were exposed to a pulsed neutron irradiation using the Godiva critical assembly at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center. Following irradiation, the fissioned targets were counted with a broad-energy germanium detector. Estimates of the total fissions for each target were made using measurements of well-known fission products. The total fission values were then used to measure the fission yields of 21 fission products with half-lives between 636 and 119,700 seconds. Mean values of seventeen of the measured fission products fell within the 95% confidence level of the Evaluated Nuclear Data Files VII.1/b (ENDF/B-VII.1) using the larger of the two uncertainties: 84g Br, 89 Rb, 91 Sr, 93 Y, 97 Zr, 101 Mo, 105 Ru, 128 Sn, 129 Sb, 130g Sb, 131 Sb, 131m Te, 133 I, 135 I, 141 Ba, 142 Ba, and 142 La. Seven isotopes were measured to better precision than is listed in the ENDF/B-VII.1 database: 89 Rb, 93 Y, 128 Sn, 129 Sb, 130g Sb, 131m Te, and 133 I. Four of the measured isotopes were found to be statistically different from the ENDF/B-VII.1 database: 94 Y, 134 Te, 134 I, and 138 Xe. Two of the isotopic analyses conducted in this paper fit the parent and daughter data simultaneously. The parent-daughter pairs measured in this way were the 134 Te/I and 142 Ba/La pairs. The fission yield results obtained in this way are unique, especially for 134 I, because the parent and daughter half-lives are so close. Here, given the limited number of direct measurements of the 134 Te/I pair from fast neutron induced fission and the seemingly high estimate for 134 Te from previous work, it is likely that the value in this paper is more accurate; however, additional measurements of this pair are needed to validate this assertion.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2013

Low background HPGe spectrometer in investigations of 2β decay

The low background high sensitive HPGe spectrometer called OBELIX is briefly described. The calibration measurements using {sup 152}Eu, {sup 133}Ba and La{sub 2}O{sub 3} sources in different geometries, the obtained efficiency curves for OBELIX HPGe detector, the results of measurements of radioactivity of the NEMO-3 sources ({sup 100}Mo, {sup 150}Nd) as well as future plans for OBELIX detector (e.g. 0νEC/EC decay of {sup 106}Cd) are presented.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2016

Validation of gamma-ray detection techniques for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

Recent IAEA circulars and policy papers have sought to implement safeguards when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under the revised policy, IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed to develop and validate concepts of nondestructive assay monitoring systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP), where gamma-ray spectroscopy was selected as the process monitoring tool. The Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was employed to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in an NUCP. Nondestructive assay techniques using gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely way. This work investigated gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate circulating in the UNCLE facility and evaluated various gamma-ray detector sensitivities to uranyl nitrate. These detector validation activities include assessing detector responses to the uranyl nitrate gamma-ray signatures for spectrometers based on sodium iodide, lanthanum bromide, and high-purity germanium detectors. The results of measurements under static and dynamic operating conditions at concentrations ranging from 10–90 g U/L of natural uranyl nitrate are presented. A range of gamma-ray lines is examined, including attenuation for transmission measurement of density and concentration. It was determined that transmission-corrected gamma-ray spectra provide a reliable way to monitor the 235 U concentration of uranyl nitrate solution in transfer pipes in NUCPs. Furthermore, existing predictive and analysis methods are adequate to design and realize practical designs. The 137 Cs transmission source employed in this work is viable but not optimal for 235 U densitometry determination. Validated simulations assessed the viability of 133 Ba and 57Co as alternative densitometry sources. All three gamma-ray detectors are viable for monitoring natural uranium feed; although high-purity germanium is easiest to interpret, it is, however, the least attractive as an installation instrument. Overall, for monitoring throughput in a facility such as UNCLE, emulating the uranium concentration and pump speeds of the Springfields conversion facility in the United Kingdom, an uncertainty of less than 0.17% is required in order to detect the diversion of 1 SQ of uranyl nitrate through changes in uranium concentration over an accountancy period of one year with a detection probability of 50%. As a result, calibrated gamma-ray detection systems are capable of determining the concentration of uranium content in NUCPs, it is only in combination with verifiable operator declarations and supporting data, such as flow rate and enrichment, that safeguards conclusions can be drawn.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗