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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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Submersion criticality safety of tungsten-rhenium urania cermet fuel for space propulsion and power applications

Nuclear thermal rockets are the preferred propulsion technology for a manned mission to Mars, and tungsten–uranium oxide cermet fuels could provide significant performance and cost advantages for nuclear thermal rockets. A nuclear reactor intended for use in space must remain subcritical before and during launch, and must remain subcritical in launch abort scenarios where the reactor falls back to Earth and becomes submerged in terrestrial materials (including seawater, wet sand, or dry sand). Submersion increases reflection of neutrons and also thermalizes the neutron spectrum, which typically increases the reactivity of the core. This effect is typically very significant for compact, fast-spectrum reactors. This paper provides a submersion criticality safety analysis for a representative tungsten/uranium oxide fueled reactor with a range of fuel compositions. Each submersion case considers both the rhenium content in the matrix alloy and the uranium oxide volume fraction in the cermet. The inclusion of rhenium significantly improves the submersion criticality safety of the reactor. While increased uranium oxide content increases the reactivity of the core, it does not significantly affect the submersion behavior of the reactor. There is no significant difference in submersion behavior between reactors with rhenium distributed within the cermet matrix and reactors with a rhenium clad in the coolant channels. The combination of the flooding of the coolant channels in submersion scenarios and the presence of a significant amount of spectral shift absorbers (i.e. high rhenium concentration) further decreases reactivity for short reactor cores compared to longer cores.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Risk Analysis of the Space Shuttle: Pre-Challenger Bayeisan Prediction of Failure

Dalal et al performed a statistical analysis of field and nozzle O-ring data collected prior to the ill-fated launch of the Challenger in January 1986. The purpose of their analysis was to show how statistical analysis could be used to provide information to decisionmakers prior to the launch, information that could have been expected to lead to a decision to abort the launch due to the low temperatures (~30o F.) present at the launch pad on the morning of the scheduled launch. Dalal et al. performed a frequentist analysis of the O-ring data, and found that a logistic regression model provided a relatively good fit to the past data. In the second portion of their paper, Dalal et al. propagated parameter uncertainties through the fitted logistic regression model in order to estimate the probability of shuttle failure due to O-ring failure at the estimated launch temperature of ~30o F. Because their analysis was frequentist in nature, probability distributions representing epistemic uncertainty in the input parameters were not available, and the authors had to resort to an approximate approach based on bootstrap confidence intervals. In this paper, we will re-evaluate the analyses of Dalal et al. from a Bayesian perspective. Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling will be used to sample from the joint posterior distribution of the model parameters, and to sample from the posterior predictive distributions at the estimated launch temperature, a temperature that had not been observed in prior launches of the space shuttle. Uncertainties, which are represented by probability distributions in the Bayesian approach, are propagated through the model to obtain a probability distribution for O-ring failure, and subsequently for shuttle failure as a result of O-ring failure. No approximations are required in the Bayesian approach and the resulting distributions can be input to a decision analysis to obtain expected utility for the decision to launch.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Nuclear risk assessment for the Mars 2020 mission environmental impact statement.

In the summer of 2020, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to launch a spacecraft as part of the Mars 2020 mission. One option for the rover on the proposed spacecraft uses a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) to provide continuous electrical and thermal power for the mission. An alternative option being considered is a set of solar panels for electrical power with up to 80 Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Units (LWRHUs) for local component heating. Both the MMRTG and the LWRHUs use radioactive plutonium dioxide. NASA is preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. The EIS will include information on the risks of mission accidents to the general public and on-site workers at the launch complex. This Nuclear Risk Assessment (NRA) addresses the responses of the MMRTG or LWRHU options to potential accident and abort conditions during the launch opportunity for the Mars 2020 mission and the associated consequences. This information provides the technical basis for the radiological risks of both options for the EIS.

NESDPS Office of Nuclear Energy Space and Defense ↗

Nuclear Risk Assessment 2019 Update for the Mars 2020 Mission Environmental Impact Statement

In the summer of 2020, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to launch a spacecraft as part of the Mars 2020 mission. The rover on the proposed spacecraft will use a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) to provide continuous electrical and thermal power for the mission. The MMRTG uses radioactive plutonium dioxide. NASA is preparing a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for the mission in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. This Nuclear Risk Assessment addresses the responses of the MMRTG option to potential accident and abort conditions during the launch opportunity for the Mars 2020 mission and the associated consequences. This information provides the technical basis for the radiological risks discussed in the SEIS.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗