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NASA NTRS2008

Analysis of Proposed 2007-2008 Revisions to the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria for United States Space Launches

Ascending space vehicles are vulnerable to both natural and triggered lightning. Launches under the jurisdiction of the United States are generally subject to a set of rules called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC). The LLCC protect both the vehicle and the public by assuring that the launch does not take place in conditions posing a significant risk of a lightning strike to the ascending vehicle. Such a strike could destroy the vehicle and its payload, thus causing failure of the mission while releasing both toxic materials and debris. To assure safety, the LLCC are conservative and sometimes they may seriously limit the ability of the launch operator to fly as scheduled even when conditions are benign. In order to safely reduce the number of launch scrubs and delays attributable to the LLCC, the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM) program was undertaken in 2000 - 2001. The effort was directed to collecting detailed high-quality data on the electrical, microphysical, radar and meteorological properties of thunderstorm-associated clouds. The expectation was that this additional knowledge would provide a better physical basis for the LLCC and allow them to be revised to be both safer and less restrictive. That expectation was fulfilled, leading to significant revisions to the LLCC in 2003 and 2005. The 2005 revisions included the application of a new radar-derived quantity called the Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) in the rules governing flight through anvil clouds. Analysis of the ABFM data has continued, and two additional revisions to the LLCC were proposed in late 2006 for adoption in 2007 or 2008. One proposal was to apply the VAHIRR concept to debris clouds, and the other was to reduce the "stand-off distances" in the rules for anvil and/or debris clouds. The stand-off distance is the clearance (out side of the cloud) required between the flight path of the vehicle and the edge of a cloud that it is not permissible to fly through. This paper will discuss these proposed changes in the LLCC and the scientific rationale for adopting or rejecting them based on ABFM data.

Dye, J. E.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Analysis of Proposed 2007-2008 Revisions to the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria for United States Space Launches

Ascending space vehicles are vulnerable to both natural and triggered lightning. Launches under the jurisdiction of the United States are generally subject to a set of rules called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) (Krider etal., 1999; Krider etal., 2006). The LLCC protect both the vehicle and the public by assuring that the launch does not take place in conditions posing a significant risk of a lightning strike to the ascending vehicle. Such a strike could destroy the vehicle and its payload, thus causing failure of the mission while releasing both toxic materials and debris. To assure safety, the LLCC are conservative and sometimes they may seriously limit the ability of the launch operator to fly as scheduled even when conditions are benign. In order to safely reduce the number of launch scrubs and delays attributable to the LLCC, the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM II) program was undertaken in 2000 - 2001. The effort was directed to collecting detailed high-quality data on the electrical, microphysical, radar and meteorological properties of thunderstorm-associated clouds. Details may be found in Dye et al., 2007. The expectation was that this additional knowledge would provide a better physical basis for the LLCC and allow them to be revised to be less restrictive while remaining at least as safe. That expectation was fulfilled, leading to significant revisions to the LLCC in 2003 and 2005. The 2005 revisions included the application of a new radar-derived quantity called the Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) in the rules governing flight through anvil clouds. VAHIRR is the product of the volume averaged radar reflectivity times the radardetermined cloud thickness. The reflectivity average extends horizontally 5 km west, east, south and north of a point along the flight track and vertically from the 0 C isotherm to the top of the radar cloud. This region is defined as the "Specified Volume". See Dye et al., 2006 and Merceret et al., 2006 for a more thorough description of VAHIRR. The units are dBZ km (not dBZ per kilometer) and the threshold is 10 dBZ km. It is safe to fly through an anvil cloud for which VAHIRR is below this threshold everywhere along the flight track as long as (1) the entire cloud within 5 nmi. (9.26 km) of the flight track is colder than 0 C, (2) the points at which VAHIRR must be evaluated are at least 20 km from any active convective cores and recent lightning, and (3) the radar return is not being attenuated within the Specified Volume around those points.

Dye, James E.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Rationales for the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria

Since natural and triggered lightning are demonstrated hazards to launch vehicles, payloads, and spacecraft, NASA and the Department of Defense (DoD) follow the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) for launches from Federal Ranges. The LLCC were developed to prevent future instances of a rocket intercepting natural lightning or triggering a lightning flash during launch from a Federal Range. NASA and DoD utilize the Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP) to establish and develop robust rationale from which the criteria originate. The rationale document also contains appendices that provide additional scientific background, including detailed descriptions of the theory and observations behind the rationales. The LLCC in whole or part are used across the globe due to the rigor of the documented criteria and associated rationale. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) adopted the LLCC in 2006 for commercial space transportation and the criteria were codified in the FAA's Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for Safety of an Expendable Launch Vehicle (Appendix G to 14 CFR Part 417, (G417)) and renamed Lightning Flight Commit Criteria in G417.

Lightning Advisory Panel↗
NASA NTRS2005

Launch Commit Criteria Monitoring Agent

The Spaceport Processing Systems Branch at NASA Kennedy Space Center has developed and deployed a software agent to monitor the Space Shuttle's ground processing telemetry stream. The application, the Launch Commit Criteria Monitoring Agent, increases situational awareness for system and hardware engineers during Shuttle launch countdown. The agent provides autonomous monitoring of the telemetry stream, automatically alerts system engineers when predefined criteria have been met, identifies limit warnings and violations of launch commit criteria, aids Shuttle engineers through troubleshooting procedures, and provides additional insight to verify appropriate troubleshooting of problems by contractors. The agent has successfully detected launch commit criteria warnings and violations on a simulated playback data stream. Efficiency and safety are improved through increased automation.

Semmel, Glenn S.↗
NASA NTRS2021

Development and Analysis of a Thick Cloud Layers Database for Lightning Launch Commit Criteria Improvement

Lightning can pose a potential threat to space launch vehicles. In response to this, rules were created called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) that help weather personnel evaluate the potential for natural and rocket-triggered lightning. One of the ten LLCC with the least research is called the Thick Cloud Layers rule. To further understand electrification of thick cloud layers and potentially improve the Thick Cloud Layers rule, a database of thick cloud layers that occurred over the Eastern Range was created. This database is then used to create an algorithm for identifying and differentiating thick cloud layers from other cloud types based on radar characteristics, temperature levels in reference to cloud height, and the surface electric field. By analyzing and identifying thick cloud events, this project could help narrow down when thick clouds are occurring and potentially minimize unnecessary launch delays. Events that caused LLCC violations involving the Thick Cloud Layers rule were analyzed by hand using Level-2 NEXRAD radar data from the National Weather Service WSR-88D radar in Melbourne with the program GR2Analyst. Cases that were found to be isolated and not involved with convection were recorded (date, start/end time, location) in a database. Radar data associated with these cases was collected and gridded using Python radar packages. Once gridded, I calculated and recorded for each radar scan the following radar reflectivity driven parameters within an 11x11 km bin centered on each 1 square km grid point: the mean reflectivity colder than 0 degrees Celsius, Maximum Radar Reflectivity (MRR) colder than 0 degrees Celsius, Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR), Hydrometeor Identification (HID), the difference between the maximum and mean reflectivity, the cloud depth colder than 0 degrees Celsius, the overall cloud depth, the cloud top, and the cloud bottom. Soundings for each event were used to determine cloud temperature levels, and where the cloud is in relation to the freezing level. Electric field mill data collected over the Eastern Range was used to determine surface electric fields below each cloud. All parameters were analyzed in depth for several thick cloud cases to gain an understanding of typical thick cloud characteristics. Cases of thick clouds and other isolated cloud types were also recorded for training purposes to see if enough differences exist between cloud types to differentiate them with an algorithm. Each case along with its corresponding characteristics was recorded in a database, and this database was used to compare differing cloud types, as well as train the algorithm to detect thick clouds.

Lightning↗
NASA NTRS2014

Three Dimensional Lightning Launch Commit Criteria Visualization Tool

Lightning occurrence too close to a NASA LSP or future SLS program launch vehicle in flight would have disastrous results. The sensitive electronics on the vehicle could be damaged to the point of causing an anomalous flight path and ultimate destruction of the vehicle and payload.According to 45th Weather Squadron (45 WS) Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC), a vehicle cannot launch if lightning is within 10 NM of its pre-determined flight path. The 45 WS Launch Weather Officers (LWOs) evaluate this LLCC for their launch customers to ensure the safety of the vehicle in flight. Currently, the LWOs conduct a subjective analysis of the distance between lightning and the flight path using data from different display systems. A 3-D display in which the lightning data and flight path are together would greatly reduce the ambiguity in evaluating this LLCC. It would give the LWOs and launch directors more confidence in whether a GO or NO GO for launch should be issued. When lightning appears close to the path, the LWOs likely err on the side of conservatism and deem the lightning to be within 10 NM. This would cause a costly delay or scrub. If the LWOs can determine with a strong level of certainty that the lightning is beyond 10 NM, launch availability would increase without compromising safety of the vehicle, payload or, in the future, astronauts.The AMU was tasked to conduct a market research of commercial, government, and open source software that might be able to ingest and display the 3-D lightning data from the KSC Lightning Mapping Array (LMA), the 45th Space Wing Weather Surveillance Radar (WSR), the National Weather Service in Melbourne Weather Surveillance Radar 1988 Doppler (WSR-88D), and the vehicle flight path data so that all can be visualized together. To accomplish this, the AMU conducted Internet searches for potential software candidates and interviewed software developers.None of the available off-the-shelf software had a 3-D capability that could display all of the data in a single visualization. The AMU determined there are two viable software packages that could satisfy the 45 WS requirement with further development and recommends the KSC Weather Office follow-up with both organizations to request development costs.

weather↗
NASA NTRS2010

A History of the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria and the Lightning Advisory Panel for America's Space Program

The history of the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) used at all spaceports under the jurisdiction of the United States is provided. The formation and history of the Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP) that now advises NASA, the Air Force and the Federal Aviation Administration on LLCC development and improvement is emphasized. The period covered extends from the early days of space flight through 2010. Extensive appendices provide significant detail about important aspects that are only summarized in the main text.

Merceret, Francis J.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Lightning Launch Commit Criteria for America's Space Program

The danger of natural and triggered lightning significantly impacts space launch operations supported by the USAF. The lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) are used by the USAF to avoid these lightning threats to space launches. This paper presents a brief overview of the LCC.

Roeder, W. P.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Launch commit criteria performance trending analysis, phase 1, revision A. SRM and QA mission services

An assessment of quantitative methods and measures for measuring launch commit criteria (LCC) performance measurement trends is made. A statistical performance trending analysis pilot study was processed and compared to STS-26 mission data. This study used four selected shuttle measurement types (solid rocket booster, external tank, space shuttle main engine, and range safety switch safe and arm device) from the five missions prior to mission 51-L. After obtaining raw data coordinates, each set of measurements was processed to obtain statistical confidence bounds and mean data profiles for each of the selected measurement types. STS-26 measurements were compared to the statistical data base profiles to verify the statistical capability of assessing occurrences of data trend anomalies and abnormal time-varying operational conditions associated with data amplitude and phase shifts.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2000

Establishing Hazardous Gas Launch Commit Criteria for the Space Shuttle External Tank Intertank Compartment

Until recently, the simultaneous detection and evaluation of multiple Space Transportation System (STS) element compartments for propellant leakage was not possible during the External Tank (ET) pre-pressurization (pre-press) phase of propellant loading; late in the loading sequence (T-3 min to T-0). There exist launch commit criteria (LCCS) designed to protect against leaks resulting in flammable mixtures in the intertank during the functional life of the ET; start of propellant loading through ET-Orbiter separation. However thus far, leak protection had relied on the premise that if a propellant supply system leak were to exist, it would be a leak of fixed area present at the start of propellant loading (dumb leak mode) and such a leak could be detected earlier in the loading sequence than the pre-press phase. No measures had ever been implemented which would protect against leaks potentially developing late in the loading sequence (smart leak mode), The STS community had baselined this situation as an accepted risk their decision supported by exhaustive hardware acceptance criteria and a history of many successful launches. With the recent development of improvements to the hazardous gas detection system (HGDS), an opportunity arose to monitor the intertank compartment for hazardous gas concentrations beyond the T-3 minute mark. In this timeframe the propellant supply system is pressurized for flight and protection was sought against potential leaks generated by this pressurization process. The challenge at hand was to develop LCCs in this timeframe that were not too conservative to unnecessarily prohibit a launch, yet not too liberal to endanger crew safety and mission success. Since essentially no measurement history existed in this timeframe, the LCCs would have to rely on analysis alone. At NASA's direction, Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) developed requirements that would protect against a smart leak during pre-press. A smart leak protection strategy is noteworthy from an STS main propulsion system (NWS) community perspective. This paper presents the resultant requirements as well as the technical and program issues involved with establishing hazardous gas LCCs for the ET intertank compartment.

Baran, Adam J.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Launch commit criteria performance trending analysis

Summarized results and recommendations are presented for a prototype performance-trending study sponsored by the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) with NASA Headquarters support. The acquirement of this recognition capability is statistically addressed through the expansion of an arbitrary probability density function (PDF) of the Gram-Charlier series type. This PDF is utilized to assess the relative deviation of any future measurement confidence bounds for launch commit criteria. As a result, the probabilistic assessment of time-varying measurement fluctuation stability can be identified in terms of these historical measurement profiles.

Hart, G. F.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Joint NASA/USAF Airborne Field Mill Program - Operation and safety considerations during flights of a Lear 28 airplane in adverse weather

A NASA Langley Research Center Learjet 28 research airplane was flown in various adverse weather conditions in the vicinity of the NASA Kennedy Space Center from 1990-1992 to measure airborne electric fields during the Joint NASA/USAF Airborne Field Mill Program. The objective of this program was to characterize the electrical activity in various weather phenomena common to the NASA-Kennedy area in order to refine Launch Commit Criteria for natural and triggered lightning. The purpose of the program was to safely relax the existing launch commit criteria, thereby increasing launch availability and reducing the chance for weather holds and delays. This paper discusses the operational conduct of the flight test, including environmental/safety considerations, aircraft instrumentation and modification, test limitations, flight procedures, and the procedures and responsibilities of the personnel in the ground station. Airborne field mill data were collected for all the Launch Commit Criteria during two summer and two winter deployments. These data are now being analyzed.

Fisher, Bruce D.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Developing Dual Polarization Applications For 45th Weather Squadron's (45 WS) New Weather Radar: A Cooperative Project With The National Space Science and Technology Center (NSSTC)

A new weather radar is being acquired for use in support of America s space program at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, NASA Kennedy Space Center, and Patrick AFB on the east coast of central Florida. This new radar includes dual polarization capability, which has not been available to 45 WS previously. The 45 WS has teamed with NSSTC with funding from NASA Marshall Spaceflight Flight Center to improve their use of this new dual polarization capability when it is implemented operationally. The project goals include developing a temperature profile adaptive scan strategy, developing training materials, and developing forecast techniques and tools using dual polarization products. The temperature profile adaptive scan strategy will provide the scan angles that provide the optimal compromise between volume scan rate, vertical resolution, phenomena detection, data quality, and reduced cone-of-silence for the 45 WS mission. The mission requirements include outstanding detection of low level boundaries for thunderstorm prediction, excellent vertical resolution in the atmosphere electrification layer between 0 C and -20 C for lightning forecasting and Lightning Launch Commit Criteria evaluation, good detection of anvil clouds for Lightning Launch Commit Criteria evaluation, reduced cone-of-silence, fast volume scans, and many samples per pulse for good data quality. The training materials will emphasize the appropriate applications most important to the 45 WS mission. These include forecasting the onset and cessation of lightning, forecasting convective winds, and hopefully the inference of electrical fields in clouds. The training materials will focus on annotated radar imagery based on products available to the 45 WS. Other examples will include time sequenced radar products without annotation to simulate radar operations. This will reinforce the forecast concepts and also allow testing of the forecasters. The new dual polarization techniques and tools will focus on the appropriate applications for the 45 WS mission. These include forecasting the onset of lightning, the cessation of lightning, convective winds, and hopefully the inference of electrical fields in clouds. This presentation will report on the results achieved so far in the project.

Roeder, W.P.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Igniter adapter-to-igniter chamber deflection test

Testing was performed to determine the maximum RSRM igniter adapter-to-igniter chamber joint deflection at the crown of the inner joint primary seal. The deflection data was gathered to support igniter inner joint gasket resiliency predictions which led to launch commit criteria temperature determinations. The proximity (deflection) gage holes for the first test (Test No. 1) were incorrectly located; therefore, the test was declared a non-test. Prior to Test No. 2, test article configuration was modified with the correct proximity gage locations. Deflection data were successfully acquired during Test No. 2. However, the proximity gage deflection measurements were adversely affected by temperature increases. Deflections measured after the temperature rise at the proximity gages were considered unreliable. An analysis was performed to predict the maximum deflections based on the reliable data measured before the detectable temperature rise. Deflections to the primary seal crown location were adjusted to correspond to the time of maximum expected operating pressure (2,159 psi) to account for proximity gage bias, and to account for maximum attach and special bolt relaxation. The maximum joint deflection for the igniter inner joint at the crown of the primary seal, accounting for all significant correction factors, was 0.0031 in. (3.1 mil). Since the predicted (0.003 in.) and tested maximum deflection values were sufficiently close, the launch commit criteria was not changed as a result of this test. Data from this test should be used to determine if the igniter inner joint gasket seals are capable of maintaining sealing capability at a joint displacement of (1.4) x (0.0031 in.) = 0.00434 inches. Additional testing should be performed to increase the database on igniter deflections and address launch commit criteria temperatures.

Cook, M.↗
NASA NTRS1993

STS-55 pad abort: Engine 2011 oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter check valve leak

The STS-55 initial launch attempt of Columbia (OV102) was terminated on KSC launch pad A March 22, 1993 at 9:51 AM E.S.T. due to violation of an ME-3 (Engine 2011) Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) limit exceedance. The event description and timeline are summarized. Propellant loading was initiated on 22 March, 1993 at 1:15 AM EST. All SSME chill parameters and launch commit criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.44 seconds, a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2011 for exceeding the 50 psia Oxidizer Preburner (OPB) purge pressure redline. The engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2034 and 2030. All shut down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. The OPB purge pressure redline violation and the abort profile/overlay for all three engines are depicted. SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure indications other than the single FID 013-414, OPB purge pressure redline exceeded. Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous controller software operation. Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was assembled. The team successfully isolated the failure cause to the oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter purge check valve not being fully closed due to contamination. The source of the contaminant was traced to a cut segment from a rubber O-ring which was used in a fine clean tool during valve production prior to 1992. The valve was apparently contaminated during its fabrication in 1985. The valve had performed acceptably on four previous flights of the engine, and SSME flight history shows 780 combined check valve flights without failure. The failure of an Engine 3 (SSME No. 2011) check valve to close was sensed by onboard engine instruments even though all other engine operations were normal. This resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2004

Nowcasting Thunderstorm Anvil Clouds Over KSC/CCAFS

Electrified thunderstorm anvil clouds extend the threat of natural and triggered lightning to space launch and landing operations far beyond the immediate vicinity of thunderstorm cells. The deep convective updrafts of thunderstorms transport large amounts of water vapor, super-cooled water droplets and ice crystals into the upper troposphere, forming anvil clouds, which are then carried downstream by the prevailing winds in the anvil formation layer. Electrified anvil clouds have been observed over the space launch and landing facilities of Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), emanating from thunderstorm activity more than 200 km distant. Space launch commit criteria and flight rules require launch and landing vehicles to avoid penetration of the non-transparent portion of anvil clouds. The life cycles of 167 anvil clouds over the Florida peninsula and its coastal waters were documented using GOES-8 visible imagery on 50 anvil case days during the months of May through July 2001. Anvil clouds were found to propagate at the speed and direction of upper-tropospheric winds in the layer from 300-to-l50 mb, approximately 9.4 km to 14 km, with an effective average transport lifetime of 2 hours and a standard deviation of approximately 30 minutes. The effective lifetime refers to the time required for the nontransparent leading edge of an anvil cloud to reach its maximum extent before beginning to dissipate. The propagation and lifetime information was incorporated into the design, construction and implementation of an objective short-range anvil forecast tool based on upper-air observations, for use on the Meteorological Interactive Data Display System within the Range Weather Operations facility of the 45th Weather Squadron at CCAFS and the Spaceflight Meteorology Group at Johnson Space Center.

Short, David A.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Issues in Shuttle System Instrumentation

The purose: a) Customer's perspective on Space Shuttle Return to Flight instrumentation; b) Focus on the difficult instrumentation issues; and c) Enable a discussion of new technologies (i.e.- NANO/MEMS/Small Tech) that could enhance Shuttle instrumentation posture. The T-10 Umbilical allows the vehicle instruments to be monitored and recorded prior to each launch and retract during launch.Launch Complex Instrumentation are instruments needed for assessment of Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) Salt-air and launch environments are issues. Instrumentation (Drag-On Instrumentation) can be added as needed to the vehicle for non-flight use. The current Roll-out Fatigue Testing is a primary example.

James, George↗
NASA NTRS2008

Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) Cost-Benefit Analysis

Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) are designed to prevent space launch vehicles from flight through environments conducive to natural or triggered lightning and are used for all U.S. government and commercial launches at government and civilian ranges. They are maintained by a committee known as the NASA/USAF Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP). The previous LLCC for anvil cloud, meant to avoid triggered lightning, have been shown to be overly restrictive. Some of these rules have had such high safety margins that they prohibited flight under conditions that are now thought to be safe 90% of the time, leading to costly launch delays and scrubs. The LLCC for anvil clouds was upgraded in the summer of 2005 to incorporate results from the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM) experiment at the Eastern Range (ER). Numerous combinations of parameters were considered to develop the best correlation of operational weather observations to in-cloud electric fields capable of rocket triggered lightning in anvil clouds. The Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) was the best metric found. Dr. Harry Koons of Aerospace Corporation conducted a risk analysis of the VAHIRR product. The results indicated that the LLCC based on the VAHIRR product would pose a negligible risk of flying through hazardous electric fields. Based on these findings, the Kennedy Space Center Weather Office is considering seeking funding for development of an automated VAHIRR algorithm for the new ER 45th Weather Squadron (45 WS) RadTec 431250 weather radar and Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) radars. Before developing an automated algorithm, the Applied Meteorology Unit (AMU) was tasked to determine the frequency with which VAHIRR would have allowed a launch to safely proceed during weather conditions otherwise deemed "red" by the Launch Weather Officer. To do this, the AMU manually calculated VAHIRR values based on candidate cases from past launches with known anvil cloud LLCC violations. An automated algorithm may be developed if the analyses from past launches show VAHIRR would have provided a significant cost benefit by allowing a launch to proceed. The 45 WS at the ER and 30th Weather Squadron (30 WS) at the Western Range provided the AMU with launch weather summaries from past launches that were impacted by LLCC. The 45 WS provided summaries from 14 launch attempts and the 30 WS fkom 5. The launch attempts occurred between December 2001 and June 2007. These summaries helped the AMU determine when the LLCC were "red" due to anvil cloud. The AMU collected WSR-88D radar reflectivity, cloud-to-ground lightning strikes, soundings and satellite imagery. The AMU used step-by-step instructions for calculating VAHIRR manually as provided by the 45 WS. These instructions were used for all of the candidate cases when anvil cloud caused an LLCC violation identified in the launch weather summaries. The AMU evaluated several software programs capable of visualizing radar data so that VAHIRR could be calculated and chose GR2Analyst from Gibson Ridge Software, LLC. Data availability and lack of detail from some launch weather summaries permitted analysis of six launch attempts from the ER and none from the WR. The AMU did not take into account whether or not other weather LCC violations were occurring at the same time as the anvil cloud LLCC since the goal of this task was to determine how often VAHIRR provided relief to the anvil cloud LLCC at any time during several previous launch attempts. Therefore, in the statistics presented in this report, it is possible that even though VAHIRR provided relief to the anvil cloud LLCC, other weather LCC could have been violated not permitting the launch to proceed. The results of this cost-benefit analysis indicated VAHIRR provided relief from the anvil cloud LLCC between about 15% and 18% of the time for varying 5-minute time periods based on summaries fkom six launch attempts and would have allowed launch to proceed that were otherwise "NO GO" due to the anvil cloud LLCC if the T-0 time occurred during the anvil cloud LLCC violations.

Bauman, William H., III↗