Launch Safety Analysis for Radioisotope Power Systems.
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The purpose of this document is to define the data inputs required for a full safety analysis to support launch approval.
The Galileo spacecraft, which will release probes to explore the Jupiter system, was launched in October, 1989 as the payload on STS-34, and the Ulysses spacecraft, which will fly by Jupiter en route to a polar orbit of the sun, is presently entering system-test activity in preparation for an October, 1990 launch. This paper reviews the Galileo and Ulysses mission objectives and design approaches and presents details of the missions' safety analysis. The processes used to develop the safety analysis are described and the results of safety tests are presented.
There is a long literature studying the criticality of space reactors immersed in water/sand after a launch accident; however, most of these studies evaluate nominal or uniformly compacted system configurations. There is less research on the reactivity consequences of impact, which can cause large structural deformation of reactor components that can result in changes in the reactivity of the system. Predicting these changes is an important component of launch safety analysis. This paper describes new features added to the DAG-MCNP5 neutronics code that allow the criticality analysis of deformed geometries. A CAD-based solid model of the reactor geometry is used to generate an initial mesh for a structural mechanics impact calculation using the PRONTO3D/PRESTO continuum mechanics codes. Boundary conditions and material specifications for the reactivity analysis are attached to the solid model that is then associated with the initial mesh representation. This geometry is then updated with the deformed finite element mesh to perturb node coordinates. DAG-MCNP5 was extended to accommodate two consequences of the large structural deformations: dead elements representing fracture, and small overlaps between adjacent volumes. The dead elements are removed during geometry initialization and adjustments are made to conserve mass. More challenging, small overlaps where adjacent mesh elements contact cause the geometric queries to become unreliable. A new point membership test was developed that is tolerant of self-intersecting volumes, and the particle tracking algorithm was adjusted to enable transport through small overlaps. These new features enable DAG-MCNP5 to perform particle transport and criticality eigenvalue calculations on both deformed mesh geometry and CAD geometry with small geometric defects. Detailed impact simulations were performed on an 85-pin space reactor model. In the most realistic model that included NaK coolant and water in the impact simulation, the eigenvalue was determined to increase 2.7% due to impact.
Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.
Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account system integration risks such as those attributable to manufacturing and assembly. These sources often dominate component level risk. While consequence of failure is often understood, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence may underestimate the actual risk. Managers and decision makers use the probability of occurrence to influence the determination whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. The actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be fully understood due to the absence of system level test data or operational data. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.
This NASA KSC video release presents a press conference that discusses the major system changes implemented on the shuttle in preparation for the launch of Discovery STS-26. Richard A. Colonna (Mgr. Orbiter and GFE Projects office) and an unidentified colleague present discussions involving hazard analysis, landing safety, launch abort/crew escape and major modidfications made to the Space Shuttle Boosters. Their presentations are followed by a question and answer period for journalists from scientific journals.
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A safety risk was identified for the International Space Station (ISS) by The Aerospace Corporation following the launch of GPS IIR-20 (March 24, 2009), when the spent upper stage of the launch vehicle unexpectedly crossed inside the ISS notification box shortly after launch. This event highlighted a 56-hour vulnerability period following the end of the launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) process where the ISS would be unable to react to a conjunction with a newly launched object. Current launch COLA processes screen each launched object across the launch window to determine if an object's nominal trajectory is predicted to pass within 200 km of the ISS (or any other manned/mannable object), resulting in a launch time closure. These launch COLA screens are performed from launch through separation plus I 00 minutes. Once the objects are in orbit, they are cataloged and evaluated as part of routine on-orbit conjunction assessment processes. However, as the GPS IIR-20 scenario illustrated, there is a vulnerability period in the time line between the end of launch COLA coverage and the beginning of standard on-orbit COLA assessment activities. The gap between existing launch and on-orbit COLA processes is driven by the time it takes to track and catalog a launched object, identify a conjunction, and plan and execute a collision avoidance maneuver. For the ISS, the total time required to accomplish an of these steps is 56 hours. To protect human lives, NASA/JSC has requested that an US launches take additional steps to protect the ISS during this "COLA gap" period. The uncertainty in the state of a spent upper stage can be quite large after all bums are complete and all remaining propellants are expelled to safe the stage. Simply extending the launch COLA process an additional 56 hours is not a viable option as the 3-sigma position uncertainty will far exceed the 200 km miss-distance criterion. Additionally, performing a probability of collision (Pc) analysis over this period is also not practical due to the limiting effects of these large orbit state uncertainties. An estimated upper bound for Pc for a typical spent upper stage if nominally aligned for a direct broadside collision with the ISS is only on the order of 10-6. For a smaller manned object such as a Soyuz capsule, the risk level decreases to an order of 10'8 . In comparison, the Air Force Range policy (AFI 91-217) for launch COLAs would only eliminate launch opportunities when conjunctions with objects exceed a Pc of 10'5 This paper demonstrates a conservative geometry-based methodology that may be used to determine if launch opportunities pose a threat to the ISS during the COLA gap period. The NASA Launch Services Program at Kennedy Space Center has developed this COLA gap analysis method and employed it fQr three NASA missions to identify potential ISS conjunctions and corresponding launch window closures during the 56-hour at-risk period. In the analysis, for each launch opportunity, the nominal trajectory of the spent upper stage and the orbit state of the ISS are propagated over the 56 hour period. Each time the upper stage crosses the orbit plane of the ISS, the relative radial and argument of latitude separations are calculated. A window cutout is identified if these separation differences fall within a mission-specific violation box, which is determined from the evaluation of a Monte Carlo dispersions analysis that quantifies the potential variation in the upper stage radial and argument of latitude differences. This paper details the results of these analyses and their impacts to each mission.
A safety risk was identified for the International Space Station (ISS) by The Aerospace Corporation, where the ISS would be unable to react to a conjunction with a newly launched object following the end of the launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) process. Once an object is launched, there is a finite period of time required to track, catalog, and evaluate that new object as part of standard onorbit COLA screening processes. Additionally, should a conjunction be identified, there is an additional period of time required to plan and execute a collision avoidance maneuver. While the computed prelaunch probability of collision with any object is extremely low, NASA/JSC has requested that all US launches take additional steps to protect the ISS during this "COLA gap" period. This paper details a geometric-based COLA gap analysis method developed by the NASA Launch Services Program to determine if launch window cutouts are required to mitigate this risk. Additionally, this paper presents the results of several missions where this process has been used operationally.
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Ares I-X was the first test flight of NASA's Constellation Program's Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle designed to provide manned access to low Earth orbit. As a one-time test flight, the Air Force's 45th Space Wing required a series of Range Safety analysis data products to be developed for the specified launch date and mission trajectory prior to granting flight approval on the Eastern Range. The range safety data package is required to ensure that the public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and resources are provided with an acceptable level of safety and that all aspects of prelaunch and launch operations adhere to applicable public laws. The analysis data products, defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, consisted of a nominal trajectory, three sigma trajectory envelopes, stage impact footprints, acoustic intensity contours, trajectory turn angles resulting from potential vehicle malfunctions (including flight software failures), characterization of potential debris, and debris impact footprints. These data products were developed under the auspices of the Constellation's Program Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group with the intent of beginning the framework for the operational vehicle data products and providing programmatic review and oversight. A multi-center NASA team in conjunction with the 45th Space Wing, collaborated within the Trajectory Working Group forum to define the data product development processes, performed the analyses necessary to generate the data products, and performed independent verification and validation of the data products. This paper outlines the Range Safety data requirements and provides an overview of the processes established to develop both the data products and the individual analyses used to develop the data products, and it summarizes the results of the analyses required for the Ares I-X launch.
Ares I-X was the first test flight of NASA's Constellation Program's Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle designed to provide manned access to low Earth orbit. As a one-time test flight, the Air Force's 45th Space Wing required a series of Range Safety analysis data products to be developed for the specified launch date and mission trajectory prior to granting flight approval on the Eastern Range. The range safety data package is required to ensure that the public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and resources are provided with an acceptable level of safety and that all aspects of prelaunch and launch operations adhere to applicable public laws. The analysis data products, defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, consisted of a nominal trajectory, three sigma trajectory envelopes, stage impact footprints, acoustic intensity contours, trajectory turn angles resulting from potential vehicle malfunctions (including flight software failures), characterization of potential debris, and debris impact footprints. These data products were developed under the auspices of the Constellation's Program Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group with the intent of beginning the framework for the operational vehicle data products and providing programmatic review and oversight. A multi-center NASA team in conjunction with the 45th Space Wing, collaborated within the Trajectory Working Group forum to define the data product development processes, performed the analyses necessary to generate the data products, and performed independent verification and validation of the data products. This paper outlines the Range Safety data requirements and provides an overview of the processes established to develop both the data products and the individual analyses used to develop the data products, and it summarizes the results of the analyses required for the Ares I-X launch.
NASA s Ares I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. To obtain approval for launch, a range safety final flight data package was generated to meet the data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710 Volume 2. The delivery included products such as a nominal trajectory, trajectory envelopes, stage disposal data and footprints, and a malfunction turn analysis. The Air Force s 45th Space Wing uses these products to ensure public and launch area safety. Due to the criticality of these data, an independent validation and verification effort was undertaken to ensure data quality and adherence to requirements. As a result, the product package was delivered with the confidence that independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded consistent results. This document captures Ares I-X final flight data package verification and validation analysis, including the methodology used to validate and verify simulation inputs, execution, and results and presents lessons learned during the process
SAND2022-13231 O Sandia Fireball Model is used in the assessment of liquid propellant fireballs in the source term analysis for space nuclear systems launch safety. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.