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At least 19 records

Galileo and Ulysses missions safety analysis and launch readiness status

The Galileo spacecraft, which will release probes to explore the Jupiter system, was launched in October, 1989 as the payload on STS-34, and the Ulysses spacecraft, which will fly by Jupiter en route to a polar orbit of the sun, is presently entering system-test activity in preparation for an October, 1990 launch. This paper reviews the Galileo and Ulysses mission objectives and design approaches and presents details of the missions' safety analysis. The processes used to develop the safety analysis are described and the results of safety tests are presented.

Cork, M. Joseph↗

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account system integration risks such as those attributable to manufacturing and assembly. These sources often dominate component level risk. While consequence of failure is often understood, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence may underestimate the actual risk. Managers and decision makers use the probability of occurrence to influence the determination whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. The actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be fully understood due to the absence of system level test data or operational data. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗

STS-26 Preflight Press Briefing: Shuttle System Changes

This NASA KSC video release presents a press conference that discusses the major system changes implemented on the shuttle in preparation for the launch of Discovery STS-26. Richard A. Colonna (Mgr. Orbiter and GFE Projects office) and an unidentified colleague present discussions involving hazard analysis, landing safety, launch abort/crew escape and major modidfications made to the Space Shuttle Boosters. Their presentations are followed by a question and answer period for journalists from scientific journals.

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A Geometric Analysis to Protect Manned Assets from Newly Launched Objects - COLA Gap Analysis

A safety risk was identified for the International Space Station (ISS) by The Aerospace Corporation following the launch of GPS IIR-20 (March 24, 2009), when the spent upper stage of the launch vehicle unexpectedly crossed inside the ISS notification box shortly after launch. This event highlighted a 56-hour vulnerability period following the end of the launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) process where the ISS would be unable to react to a conjunction with a newly launched object. Current launch COLA processes screen each launched object across the launch window to determine if an object's nominal trajectory is predicted to pass within 200 km of the ISS (or any other manned/mannable object), resulting in a launch time closure. These launch COLA screens are performed from launch through separation plus I 00 minutes. Once the objects are in orbit, they are cataloged and evaluated as part of routine on-orbit conjunction assessment processes. However, as the GPS IIR-20 scenario illustrated, there is a vulnerability period in the time line between the end of launch COLA coverage and the beginning of standard on-orbit COLA assessment activities. The gap between existing launch and on-orbit COLA processes is driven by the time it takes to track and catalog a launched object, identify a conjunction, and plan and execute a collision avoidance maneuver. For the ISS, the total time required to accomplish an of these steps is 56 hours. To protect human lives, NASA/JSC has requested that an US launches take additional steps to protect the ISS during this "COLA gap" period. The uncertainty in the state of a spent upper stage can be quite large after all bums are complete and all remaining propellants are expelled to safe the stage. Simply extending the launch COLA process an additional 56 hours is not a viable option as the 3-sigma position uncertainty will far exceed the 200 km miss-distance criterion. Additionally, performing a probability of collision (Pc) analysis over this period is also not practical due to the limiting effects of these large orbit state uncertainties. An estimated upper bound for Pc for a typical spent upper stage if nominally aligned for a direct broadside collision with the ISS is only on the order of 10-6. For a smaller manned object such as a Soyuz capsule, the risk level decreases to an order of 10'8 . In comparison, the Air Force Range policy (AFI 91-217) for launch COLAs would only eliminate launch opportunities when conjunctions with objects exceed a Pc of 10'5 This paper demonstrates a conservative geometry-based methodology that may be used to determine if launch opportunities pose a threat to the ISS during the COLA gap period. The NASA Launch Services Program at Kennedy Space Center has developed this COLA gap analysis method and employed it fQr three NASA missions to identify potential ISS conjunctions and corresponding launch window closures during the 56-hour at-risk period. In the analysis, for each launch opportunity, the nominal trajectory of the spent upper stage and the orbit state of the ISS are propagated over the 56 hour period. Each time the upper stage crosses the orbit plane of the ISS, the relative radial and argument of latitude separations are calculated. A window cutout is identified if these separation differences fall within a mission-specific violation box, which is determined from the evaluation of a Monte Carlo dispersions analysis that quantifies the potential variation in the upper stage radial and argument of latitude differences. This paper details the results of these analyses and their impacts to each mission.

Hametz, Mark E.↗

A Geometric Analysis to Protect Manned Assets from Newly Launched Objects - Cola Gap Analysis

A safety risk was identified for the International Space Station (ISS) by The Aerospace Corporation, where the ISS would be unable to react to a conjunction with a newly launched object following the end of the launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) process. Once an object is launched, there is a finite period of time required to track, catalog, and evaluate that new object as part of standard onorbit COLA screening processes. Additionally, should a conjunction be identified, there is an additional period of time required to plan and execute a collision avoidance maneuver. While the computed prelaunch probability of collision with any object is extremely low, NASA/JSC has requested that all US launches take additional steps to protect the ISS during this "COLA gap" period. This paper details a geometric-based COLA gap analysis method developed by the NASA Launch Services Program to determine if launch window cutouts are required to mitigate this risk. Additionally, this paper presents the results of several missions where this process has been used operationally.

Hametz, Mark E.↗

Ares I-X Range Safety Analyses Overview

Ares I-X was the first test flight of NASA's Constellation Program's Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle designed to provide manned access to low Earth orbit. As a one-time test flight, the Air Force's 45th Space Wing required a series of Range Safety analysis data products to be developed for the specified launch date and mission trajectory prior to granting flight approval on the Eastern Range. The range safety data package is required to ensure that the public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and resources are provided with an acceptable level of safety and that all aspects of prelaunch and launch operations adhere to applicable public laws. The analysis data products, defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, consisted of a nominal trajectory, three sigma trajectory envelopes, stage impact footprints, acoustic intensity contours, trajectory turn angles resulting from potential vehicle malfunctions (including flight software failures), characterization of potential debris, and debris impact footprints. These data products were developed under the auspices of the Constellation's Program Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group with the intent of beginning the framework for the operational vehicle data products and providing programmatic review and oversight. A multi-center NASA team in conjunction with the 45th Space Wing, collaborated within the Trajectory Working Group forum to define the data product development processes, performed the analyses necessary to generate the data products, and performed independent verification and validation of the data products. This paper outlines the Range Safety data requirements and provides an overview of the processes established to develop both the data products and the individual analyses used to develop the data products, and it summarizes the results of the analyses required for the Ares I-X launch.

Starr, Brett R.↗

Ares I-X Range Safety Flight Envelope Analysis

Ares I-X was the first test flight of NASA's Constellation Program's Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle designed to provide manned access to low Earth orbit. As a one-time test flight, the Air Force's 45th Space Wing required a series of Range Safety analysis data products to be developed for the specified launch date and mission trajectory prior to granting flight approval on the Eastern Range. The range safety data package is required to ensure that the public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and resources are provided with an acceptable level of safety and that all aspects of prelaunch and launch operations adhere to applicable public laws. The analysis data products, defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, consisted of a nominal trajectory, three sigma trajectory envelopes, stage impact footprints, acoustic intensity contours, trajectory turn angles resulting from potential vehicle malfunctions (including flight software failures), characterization of potential debris, and debris impact footprints. These data products were developed under the auspices of the Constellation's Program Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group with the intent of beginning the framework for the operational vehicle data products and providing programmatic review and oversight. A multi-center NASA team in conjunction with the 45th Space Wing, collaborated within the Trajectory Working Group forum to define the data product development processes, performed the analyses necessary to generate the data products, and performed independent verification and validation of the data products. This paper outlines the Range Safety data requirements and provides an overview of the processes established to develop both the data products and the individual analyses used to develop the data products, and it summarizes the results of the analyses required for the Ares I-X launch.

Starr, Brett R.↗

Ares I-X Range Safety Simulation Verification and Analysis Independent Validation and Verification

NASA s Ares I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. To obtain approval for launch, a range safety final flight data package was generated to meet the data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710 Volume 2. The delivery included products such as a nominal trajectory, trajectory envelopes, stage disposal data and footprints, and a malfunction turn analysis. The Air Force s 45th Space Wing uses these products to ensure public and launch area safety. Due to the criticality of these data, an independent validation and verification effort was undertaken to ensure data quality and adherence to requirements. As a result, the product package was delivered with the confidence that independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded consistent results. This document captures Ares I-X final flight data package verification and validation analysis, including the methodology used to validate and verify simulation inputs, execution, and results and presents lessons learned during the process

Merry, Carl M.↗

Final (Tier 1) environmental impact statement for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions

Presented here is a Final (Tier 1) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addressing the potential environmental consequences associated with continuing the modifications of the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft for launch using a booster/upper stage combination that is different from the one planned for use prior to the Challenger accident, while conducting the detailed safety and environmental analysis in order to preserve the October 1989 launch opportunity for Galileo and an October 1990 launch opportunity for Ulysses. While detailed safety and environmental analyses associated with the missions are underway, they currently are not complete. Nevertheless, sufficient information is available to enable a choice among the reconfiguration alternatives presented. Relevant assessments of the potential for environmental impacts are presented.

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Integrated Safety Analysis Tiers

Commercial partnerships and organizational constraints, combined with complex systems, may lead to division of hazard analysis across organizations. This division could cause important hazards to be overlooked, causes to be missed, controls for a hazard to be incomplete, or verifications to be inefficient. Each organization s team must understand at least one level beyond the interface sufficiently enough to comprehend integrated hazards. This paper will discuss various ways to properly divide analysis among organizations. The Ares I launch vehicle integrated safety analyses effort will be utilized to illustrate an approach that addresses the key issues and concerns arising from multiple analysis responsibilities.

Shackelford, Carla↗

Ares I-X Range Safety Simulation and Analysis IV and V

NASA s Ares I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. NASA generated a Range Safety (RS) product data package to meet the RS trajectory data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710. Some products included were a nominal ascent trajectory, ascent flight envelopes, and malfunction turn data. These products are used by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) to ensure public safety and to make flight termination decisions on launch day. Due to the criticality of the RS data, an independent validation and verification (IV&V) effort was undertaken to accompany the data generation analyses to ensure utmost data quality and correct adherence to requirements. As a result of the IV&V efforts, the RS product package was delivered with confidence that two independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded similar results. This document captures the Ares I-X RS product IV&V analysis, including the methodology used to verify inputs, simulation, and output data for certain RS products. Additionally a discussion of lessons learned is presented to capture advantages and disadvantages to the IV&V processes used.

Merry, Carl M.↗

Evaluating Mass Analyzers as Candidates for Small, Portable, Rugged Single Point Mass Spectrometers for Analysis of Permanent Gases

For Space Shuttle launch safety, there is a need to monitor the concentration Of H2, He, O2, and Ar around the launch vehicle. Currently a large mass spectrometry system performs this task, using long transport lines to draw in samples. There is great interest in replacing this stationary system with several miniature, portable, rugged mass spectrometers which act as point sensors which can be placed at the sampling point. Five commercial and two non-commercial analyzers are evaluated. The five commercial systems include the Leybold Inficon XPR-2 linear quadrupole, the Stanford Research (SRS-100) linear quadrupole, the Ferran linear quadrupole array, the ThermoQuest Polaris-Q quadrupole ion trap, and the IonWerks Time-of-Flight (TOF). The non-commercial systems include a compact double focusing sector (CDFMS) developed at the University of Minnesota, and a quadrupole ion trap (UF-IT) developed at the University of Florida.

Arkin, C. Richard↗

Evaluating Mass Analyzers as Candidates for Small, Portable, Rugged Single Point Mass Spectrometers for Analysis of Permanent Gases

For Space Shuttle launch safety, there is a need to monitor the concentration of H2, He, O2 and Ar around the launch vehicle. Currently a large mass spectrometry system performs this task, using long transport lines to draw in samples. There is great interest in replacing this stationary system with several miniature, portable, rugged mass spectrometers which act as point sensors which can be placed at the sampling point. Five commercial and two non-commercial analyzers are evaluated. The five commercial systems include the Leybold Inficon XPR-2 linear quadrupole, the Stanford Research (SRS-100) linear quadrupole, the Ferran linear quadrupole array, the ThermoQuest Polaris-Q quadrupole ion trap, and the IonWerks Time-of-Flight (TOF). The non-commercial systems include a compact double focusing sector (CDFMS) developed at the University of Minnesota, and a quadrupole ion trap (UF-IT) developed at the University of Florida. The System Volume is determined by measuring the entire system volume including the mass analyzer, its associated electronics, the associated vacuum system, the high vacuum pump and rough pump. Also measured are any ion gauge controllers or other required equipment. Computers are not included. Scan Time is the time required for one scan to be acquired and the data to be transferred. It is determined by measuring the time required acquiring a known number of scans and dividing by said number of scans. Limit of Detection is determined first by performing a zero-span calibration (using a 10-point data set). Then the limit of detection (LOD) is defined as 3 times the standard deviation of the zero data set. (An LOD of 10 ppm or less is considered acceptable.)

Arkin, C. Richard↗

Ares-I-X Vehicle Preliminary Range Safety Malfunction Turn Analysis

Ares-I-X is the designation given to the flight test version of the Ares-I rocket (also known as the Crew Launch Vehicle - CLV) being developed by NASA. As part of the preliminary flight plan approval process for the test vehicle, a range safety malfunction turn analysis was performed to support the launch area risk assessment and vehicle destruct criteria development processes. Several vehicle failure scenarios were identified which could cause the vehicle trajectory to deviate from its normal flight path, and the effects of these failures were evaluated with an Ares-I-X 6 degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) digital simulation, using the Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories Version 2 (POST2) simulation framework. The Ares-I-X simulation analysis provides output files containing vehicle state information, which are used by other risk assessment and vehicle debris trajectory simulation tools to determine the risk to personnel and facilities in the vicinity of the launch area at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and to develop the vehicle destruct criteria used by the flight test range safety officer. The simulation analysis approach used for this study is described, including descriptions of the failure modes which were considered and the underlying assumptions and ground rules of the study, and preliminary results are presented, determined by analysis of the trajectory deviation of the failure cases, compared with the expected vehicle trajectory.

Beaty, James R.↗

Evolution of Safety Analysis to Support New Exploration Missions

NASA is currently developing the Ares I launch vehicle as a key component of the Constellation program which will provide safe and reliable transportation to the International Space Station, back to the moon, and later to Mars. The risks and costs of the Ares I must be significantly lowered, as compared to other manned launch vehicles, to enable the continuation of space exploration. It is essential that safety be significantly improved, and cost-effectively incorporated into the design process. This paper justifies early and effective safety analysis of complex space systems. Interactions and dependences between design, logistics, modeling, reliability, and safety engineers will be discussed to illustrate methods to lower cost, reduce design cycles and lessen the likelihood of catastrophic events.

Thrasher, Chard W.↗