Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Low Power Shutdown”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Applying AI/ML Techniques to U.S. Nuclear Operating Experience Program

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has provided technical assistance to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in reliability and risk analysis including the operating experience (OpE) program since the 1980s. The U.S. nuclear OpE program provides input parameters to the NRC Standardized Plant Analysis Risk models and the industry probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. While earlier PRA focuses were on at-power, internal event analysis, the risks from external hazards and during low power shutdown (LPSD) operation could be significant and the needs to develop LPSD PRA and external hazards PRA are on the rise. One issue in developing LPSD PRA is the reasonable estimation of shutdown initiative event (SDIE) frequencies. INL has developed and is maintaining an SDIE database for the NRC. However, this database is based on the reviewing of Licensee Event Reports (LERs), which is believed to be only a subset of “actual” shutdown initiating events occurred in the industry. This paper investigates a new approach to identify and characterize shutdown initiating events from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) industry database using machine learning techniques. The main process in this approach is to find out the relationship between key words in event descriptions and the SDIE categories as in the NRC SDIE database. The relationship can then be applied to the INPO database and search for SDIEs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

PRA BASICS FOR REGULATORY APPLICATIONS P-105

This report includes the following: Course Overview •Separated into two sections –Section I - PRA methodology •First 11 modules of Section I •Overview of basic terms and concepts •Designed to provide information about the development of a probabilistic risk assessment model (all of the pieces) •Provide background information on different types of PRAs (external events, low power/ shutdown, Level 2 & 3) –Section II - PRA applications •Last 6 modules of Section II •Risk Informed Regulation and Risk Informed Decision-Making •NRC uses of PRA –Configuration risk management –Significance Determination –Mitigating System Performance Indicator

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Event Tree Success Branch Modeling Approaches in SAPHIRE/SPAR

Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models are a set of linked fault tree/event tree PRA models that have been used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate the risk of operations at U.S. nuclear power plants since 1990s. The models use the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) code developed by the NRC and Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Currently Version 8, SAPHIRE is a powerful software with advanced features to perform separated or integrated Level 1, Level 2, internal events, external events, at-power, and low power shutdown PRA [1]. One of its features is the availability of three different approaches to model the success branch of a top event in event tree: delete term, complement of system logic, and developed event. However, improper choosing and modeling success branch might yield unexpected and incorrect results. This paper will discuss the two most often used success branch modeling approaches, delete term and developed event, and provide recommendations for using proper approaches in different models. A potential SAPHIRE code enhancement is also proposed to address the adverse impact brought by the developed event approach.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Review of Human Reliability Needs in the U.S. Nuclear Industry

In this survey, 34 subject matter experts from the U.S. nuclear industry were interviewed to determine specific needs for human reliability analysis (HRA). Conclusions from the interviews are detailed in this article. A summary of the findings includes: (1) The need for improved guidance on the use of HRA methods generally and for specific applications. (2) The need for additional training in HRA to provide more hands-on experience in the application of HRA methods. (3) Thedevelopment of HRA approaches suitable for advanced reactors, severe accident situations, and low-power and shutdown applications. (4) The refinement of HRA methods to account forfactors such as crew variability, latent errors, more sophisticated dependency modeling, and errors of commission. (5) The continued need for simplified HRA methods appropriate for field applications. (6) The need for tighter coupling of HRA and human factors. (7) The need for improvements in the quantitative basis of HRA methods. These findings suggest the field of HRA is mature but still benefits from refinements.

human reliability analysis↗

SAPHIRE 8 Volume 1 - Overview and Summary

The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer (PC) running the Microsoft Windows operating system. SAPHIRE Version 8 is funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). INL's primary role in this project is that of software developer and tester. However, INL also plays an important role in technology transfer by interfacing and supporting SAPHIRE users, who constitute a wide range of PRA practitioners from the NRC, national laboratories, the private sector, and foreign countries. SAPHIRE can be used to model a complex system’s response to initiating events and quantify associated consequential outcome frequencies. Specifically, for nuclear power plant applications, SAPHIRE 8 can identify important contributors to core damage (Level 1 PRA) and containment failure during a severe accident which leads to releases (Level 2 PRA). It can be used for a PRA where the reactor is at full power, low power, or at shutdown conditions. Furthermore, it can be used to analyze both internal and external initiating events and has special features for managing models such as flooding and fire. It can also be used in a limited manner to quantify risk in terms of release consequences to the public and environment (Level 3 PRA). In SAPHIRE 8, the act of creating a model has been separated from the analysis of that model in order to improve the quality of both the model (e.g., by avoiding inadvertent changes) and the analysis. Consequently, in SAPHIRE 8, the analysis of models is performed by using what are called Workspaces. Currently, there are Workspaces for three types of analyses: (1) the NRC’s Accident Sequence Precursor program, where the workspace is called “Events and Condition Assessment (ECA);” (2) the NRC’s Significance Determination Process (SDP); and (3) the General Analysis (GA) workspace. Workspaces are independent of each other and modifications or calculations made within one workspace will not affect another. In addition, each workspace has a user interface and reports tailored for their intended uses. This report provides an overview of the functions and features available in SAPHIRE 8 and presents general instructions for using the software. Since SAPHIRE 8 expands upon Version 7, new and improved features will be discussed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

SAPHIRE 8 Volume 3 - Users' Guide

The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer. SAPHIRE is funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The INL's primary role in this project is that of software developer. However, the INL also plays an important role in technology transfer by interfacing and supporting SAPHIRE users comprised of a wide range of PRA practitioners from the NRC, national laboratories, the private sector, and foreign countries. SAPHIRE can be used to model a complex system’s response to initiating events, quantify associated damage outcome frequencies, and identify important contributors to this damage (Level 1 PRA) and to analyze containment performance during a severe accident and quantify radioactive releases (Level 2 PRA). It can be used for a PRA evaluating a variety of operating conditions, for example, for a nuclear reactor at full power, low power, or at shutdown conditions. Furthermore, SAPHIRE can be used to analyze both internal and external initiating events and has special features for transforming models built for internal event analysis to models for external event analysis. It can also be used in a limited manner to quantify risk in terms of release consequences to both the public and the environment (Level 3 PRA). This reference guide will introduce the SAPHIRE Version 8.0 software. A brief discussion of the purpose and history of the software is included along with general information such as installation instructions, starting and stopping the program, and some pointers on how to get around inside the program. Next, database concepts and structure are discussed. Following that discussion are nine sections, one for each of the menu options on the SAPHIRE main menu, wherein the purpose and general capabilities for each option are furnished. Next, the capabilities and limitations of the software are provided.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Ground Test Validations for Uncrewed Dormancy Preparation and Recovery

In future long duration space flight and habitation missions, periods of uncrewed dormancy where life support systems are shutdown or in low power-modes will occur. To examine the impacts of these dormant periods, along with potential pre- and post-dormancy procedures, Marshall Space Flight Center has been building an uncrewed dormancy test stand. The uncrewed dormancy test stand will include a urine separator from the Universal Waste Management System, a condensate separator, urine filter, brine filter and distillate filter. In conjunction to the test stand, the Center for Biofilm Engineering (CBE) has ongoing long-term dormancy experiments to assess microbial survival in a variety of simulated shutdown procedures including shut-in, flushing with and without biocide, and dry-out conditions. This publication will serve as a discussion of dormancy considerations, criteria for success, and experimental designs for testing dormancy conditions and shutdown procedures. It will include an update of ongoing test stand construction, including a description of the current lower-fidelity versions of the urine and condensate separators being produced. It will also examine dormancy work being conducted by the CBE and discuss how this may factor into procedures tested on the uncrewed dormancy test stand.

Eric Beitle↗

Determining the Appropriate Emergency Planning Attributes for Microreactors

Micro-reactor designs incorporate design features that provide very low reactor decay heat power at 24 hours after shutdown that is manageable in comparison with larger reactors. This attribute translates into a low probability of core damage negligible offsite dose. This paper provides the conceptual framework for appropriately structuring emergency planning requirements for micro-reactors while ensuring the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) commitment to safety is met. Due to the diversity in reactor designs comprising the micro-reactor community, this paper identifies the necessary concepts that should be considered to ensure emergency plans for micro-reactors are appropriate for the risk. This paper does not mandate specific design features for micro-reactors but provides reactor designers a conceptual framework for a scalable, graded approach to Emergency Planning Standards that should be considered in their individual designs in order to support simplified emergency plans. Given that accident source terms associated with micro-reactors are essentially negligible when compared with those for large light water reactors, revisions to emergency planning standards are justified. A graded approach to implementing emergency planning guidance can be used to appropriately structure micro-reactor emergency plans and reduce the size of the emergency planning zone and plume exposure pathway. Appropriately structuring emergency planning requirements will better optimize licensee and offsite agencies emergency planning resources and reduce the resources associated with emergency planning.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Immediate Dismantling of a Large Fleet of LWR NPPs: Consequences for Spent Fuel and Waste Management - 16027

The experience feedback shows that the complete dismantling of one Light Water Reactor (LWR) unit is an activity now globally well under control (reactor pressure vessel and its internals removal and cutting included). However some specific industrial difficulties may arise in view of the dismantling of numerous LWR units simultaneously. Indeed more than 300 LWR units are currently operated worldwide, which have been commissioned these last 50 years. So in some countries, many units may be permanently shut down over a period of few years in the next decades. Such a situation addresses the issue of the overall management of large quantities of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and decommissioning waste for the concerned units. For example, in France, the legislative and regulatory framework for the nuclear facilities favors their dismantling 'as soon as possible' after their permanent shutdown which implies as well to limit the duration of the transition period from operation to decommissioning. Furthermore 58 LWR units have been commissioned between 1977 and 1999 in France - on average more than 2 units per year. In this context, the operator (Electricite de France - EDF) plans to remove quickly the SNF then to perform dismantling actions immediately after the permanent shutdown of the LWR units. One issue is to remove the SNF from all the relevant units, even if this removal is simultaneous in many units (permanently shut down or still under operation). Similar issue has to be taken into account regarding the management of the radioactive waste (RW) produced by the dismantling and clean-up actions, notably the RW that cannot be disposed of in a near surface repository. One method followed by the French technical support organization (Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire - IRSN) to analyze these issues is the use of estimates of flows of SNF and RW. These estimates are based notably on a phasing-scenario and a planning template defined for the decommissioning of the units of one nuclear power plant (NPP) and coupled to an overall schedule for phase out all the units of the fleet. The estimates relative to the next decades can be compared to the current experience feedback of flows of SNF and RW for units under operation, in order to identify risks when facing decommissioning. The risks highlighted are driven by key parameters (as duration of the main dismantling actions) of the estimates which can be adapted to minimize their impact. On this basis, it is possible to identify the key-factors to dismantle each unit of NPPs and phase out the fleet regarding SNF and RW management. It is noteworthy that this work needs to be done in any case upstream the studies and the implementation of dismantling actions. Finally it can be underlined that another issue is the human resources (staff, skills and knowledge) necessary to perform all the decommissioning actions, but this aspect is not addressed in the present paper. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites - 2016 Update - 17086

An updated evaluation of removing used or spent nuclear fuel (SNF)2 from 13 shutdown nuclear power reactor sites was conducted during 2016. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites included in the evaluation were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience, including identification of gaps in information, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. Updates to the evaluation since 2015 include incorporating spent nuclear fuel data from the GC-859 database; updating of Google Earth imagery; incorporating revisions to transportation certificates of compliance; adding information obtained from site visits to the Pacific Sun Railroad and Camp Pendleton, California; adding rail assessments for Kewaunee, Crystal River, and San Onofre to the evaluation; and adding information obtained from the site visit to Vermont Yankee. As additional sites such as Fort Calhoun, Palisades, Clinton, Quad Cities, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Low dose failures of hardened DC-DC power converters

Box-level total dose testing of the FOG (Fiber Optic Gyro) by IXSEA at ESA's GammabeamFacility were abruptly terminated at 8krad (Si) due to catastrophic failure (complete shutdown). This was unexpected because all components within the gyro were supposedly radiation tolerant. Further testing showed that the components responsible for the failure were two DC-DC converters, manufactured by Interpoint, that stopped regulating shortly before shutdown. This paper summarizes diagnostic test results for the converters to determine the underlying cause of the unexpected failure at low levels of radiation.

Interpoint Rad-hard DC-DC power converter TC4426 M↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Nuclear Power Plant Sites - 2018 - 19101

This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management (DOE-IWM) continues to conduct evaluations of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from shutdown nuclear power plant sites. The 14 shutdown sites included in the evaluation to date have nuclear power reactors that have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The 14 shutdown sites are Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ceased operations in September 2018 and will be included in future evaluations. The evaluations of the shutdown sites contain four components: - A characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory; - A description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites; - An evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience at the shutdown sites - An evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF were the DOE GC-859 and RW-859 spent nuclear fuel inventory databases. This inventory has been augmented with data obtained from the shutdown sites for SNF discharges that occurred after June 2013. The primary sources for information on the conditions of site and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included field observations and information collected during visits to the 14 shutdown sites, information provided by managers and staff at the shutdown sites, and Google Earth imagery. Extensive photographs taken during the shutdown site visits have proven to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at and near the shutdown sites. Tribal and state representatives, State and Regional Group representatives, and Federal Railroad Administration representatives have participated in 11 of the shutdown site visits. In addition to visiting the shutdown site, site visits often include activities such as meeting with local railroads to discuss the near-site railroad infrastructure and meeting with community engagement panels. Oyster Creek permanently ceased power operations on September 17, 2018 and fuel was removed from the reactor vessel on September 25, 2018. Planning for the Oyster Creek site visit has begun and is conducted in three stages. In the first stage, data and documents that are applicable to Oyster Creek are collected. In the second stage, questions are developed based on the data and documents collected during the first stage. These questions are submitted to the Oyster Creek site approximately one month before the site visit. The third stage involves establishing specific schedules and participants. Participants will likely include tribal and state representatives, the Council of State Governments - Eastern Regional Conference, and the Federal Railroad Administration. State participation will likely include a representative of the State Rail Safety Participation Program, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, and the New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering. The site visit is tentatively expected to occur in April or May of 2019. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites - An Update - 16057

An updated preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 13 shutdown nuclear power reactor sites was conducted. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure and conditions relevant to transportation of SNF and GTCC waste, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience relevant to shipping transportation casks containing SNF and GTCC waste, including identification of gaps in information, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. Every site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. It is expected that additional site visits will be conducted to add to the information presented in the evaluation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Initial Site-Specific Studies for Removing SNF from Six Shutdown Sites - 18042

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is exploring options for developing a large-scale transportation system for the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste to future storage or disposal facilities. This complex, large-scale transportation system will involve coordinated, integrated activities. Interfaces with various transportation and non-transportation activities must be defined, and systems must be developed to ensure successful integration when the system becomes operational. To provide an understanding of the tasks and interfaces required for the complete de-inventory of particular sites where SNF is stored, DOE solicited bids from integrating contractors to develop initial site-specific de-inventory reports. The reports were developed for several nuclear power plant sites selected to represent a range of geographic locations, existing on-site SNF storage systems, and expected transportation modal options. Each report is presented in a self-contained narrative describing a potential campaign for removing all SNF and greater-than-class-C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) from each specified site. Each study narrative includes site information; an analysis of the near-site transportation infrastructure; a concept of operations for the de-inventory; an estimated budget and schedule for the duration of operations; and a safety and security plan with site-specific considerations, emergency response considerations, and recommendations for the next steps DOE could take to de-inventory the site. The reports provide cost estimates for analytical purposes only; they do not attempt to specify the party or parties responsible for the costs. These reports present a first look at how an integrating contractor might recommend removing SNF from particular sites. They are written from the perspective of the contractor and do not represent DOE's plans. At this writing, six sites have been studied: - Connecticut Yankee, - Big Rock Point, - Humboldt Bay, - Maine Yankee, - Trojan, - Kewaunee. DOE may develop de-inventory reports for all reactor sites, with an initial focus on shutdown reactor sites. The order in which sites have been selected for study should not be considered an indicator of the order used by DOE to remove SNF from the sites. Since the SNF's destination is not important for the purpose of this work, DOE tasked the contractor with planning transportation of the SNF from the site to a generic railroad location in the approximate geographical center of the United States. These reports represent an initial study of the specific sites. Per the terms of the contract, the contractor was not permitted to engage in dialogue with power plant site personnel; near-site railroad personnel; or any local, state, or regional stakeholders about the studies. DOE provided site-specific data. The contractor was tasked to rely on past corporate experience, data available from DOE, and publicly available data when making site-specific recommendations for removing all SNF from each site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Accident Analysis for the NIST Research Reactor Before and After Fuel Conversion

Postulated accidents have been analyzed for the 20 MW D2O-moderated research reactor (NBSR) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The analysis has been carried out for the present core, which contains high enriched uranium (HEU) fuel and for a proposed equilibrium core with low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses employ state-of-the-art calculational methods. Three-dimensional Monte Carlo neutron transport calculations were performed with the MCNPX code to determine homogenized fuel compositions in the lower and upper halves of each fuel element and to determine the resulting neutronic properties of the core. The accident analysis employed a model of the primary loop with the RELAP5 code. The model includes the primary pumps, shutdown pumps outlet valves, heat exchanger, fuel elements, and flow channels for both the six inner and twenty-four outer fuel elements. Evaluations were performed for the following accidents: (1) control rod withdrawal startup accident, (2) maximum reactivity insertion accident, (3) loss-of-flow accident resulting from loss of electrical power with an assumption of failure of shutdown cooling pumps, (4) loss-of-flow accident resulting from a primary pump seizure, and (5) loss-of-flow accident resulting from inadvertent throttling of a flow control valve. In addition, natural circulation cooling at low power operation was analyzed. The analysis shows that the conversion will not lead to significant changes in the safety analysis and the calculated minimum critical heat flux ratio and maximum clad temperature assure that there is adequate margin to fuel failure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Preliminary evaluation of removing used nuclear fuel from shutdown sites - 15568

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 12 shutdown nuclear power reactor sites was conducted. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, and San Onofre. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure and conditions relevant to transportation of SNF and GTCC waste, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience relevant to shipping transportation casks containing SNF and GTCC waste, including identification of gaps in information, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. Every site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. It is expected that additional site visits will be conducted to add to the information presented in the evaluation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nested Pebble Bed Blanket (NesPeB)

Recent advances in magnetic confinement fusion technology have attracted billions of dollars of investments in startups from venture capitals and corporations, resulting in the development of devices aiming to demonstrate net energy gain in a self-heated burning plasma, such as SPARC (under construction) and others. However, future fusion power plants must operate in regimes that will require technologies far beyond current experience. According to a National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine report, to have nuclear fusion power plants contributing in a timely manner to the planned reduction of atmospheric carbon dioxide, a pilot plant should be built by 2035, and it should demonstrate fusion power production and the performance of the tritium fuel system (requiring a high enough tritium breeding) by 2040. A recognized key technology gap by [26] is the fusion first wall and blanket since no current blanket concept is considered satisfactory or has been built and proven. The first wall and blanket in magnetic fusion reactors form a vital and complex system, as it must satisfy different functions such as power extraction, tritium breeding, plasma containment, radiation shielding, and safety. The list of design requirements is even longer: high enough tritium production for fusion self-sufficiency, low material activation, decay heat and shutdown dose rates, high thermal efficiency, high-capacity factor, high magnets-divertor-vacuum vessel-first wall life, low corrosion, low cost, and intrinsically safe (requiring minimal licensing). Despite fifty-plus years of research, the first wall and blanket concepts proposed suffer from fundamental technical problems and immaturity (TRL=2-3) that jeopardize the timely delivery of a commercial fusion power plant. A fusion first-wall blanket has never been built nor tested, and a "winning", practical functioning design requires enough engineering margins (high enough tritium breeding considering the uncertainty, etc.), manufacturing simplicity, ease of continuous operation, maintenance, and low cost. A new, groundbreaking blanket concept called "Nested Pebble Bed Blanket" (NesPeB) was developed at ORNL under the successful ARPA-E GAMOW FERMI project (patent application allowed by the USPTO). The NesPeB blanket concept addresses current blanket concepts' shortcomings and technical immaturity, paving the way for accelerated delivery of fusion power plants. NesPeB is based on nested pebbles, which are binary-sized lithium-ceramic pebbles enclosed in "Beryllide" perforated and coated spherical shells, which are also binary-sized, stacked on top of each other, forming a "bed" and cooled by Nitrogen gas also "sweeping" the Helium and Tritium generated by the neutron irradiation of Lithium; the vacuum vessel plasma facing material is Molybdenum-96 and -97 with the first wall cooled by Helium while the divertor armor is made of Tungsten. The simulations of the NesPeB blanket using Fusion Reactors Models Integrator (FERMI) are encouraging as they estimate a tritium breeding ratio (TBR) greater than 1.2 using natural Lithium, acceptable pressure drop, and excellent heat transfer properties. Furthermore, the NesPeB blanket is not limited by magneto-hydro-dynamics (MHD) effects, is designed for online refueling, relies on existing tritium extraction technologies, has a simple construction, and limits the corrosion and chemical reactivity problems. NesPeB has the potential to be transformational and disruptive since it can solve all the main, challenging technical problems of fusion device blankets and accelerate a pilot plant delivery for 10 or more years.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗