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At least 19 records

Material Balance Area Design for the Transuranic Fuel Cycle Employing High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors

A major impetus has been to ensure safety in nuclear power plant systems from the beginning of its development to the current period of nuclear renaissance. As one of the next generation reactors with a high level of nuclear safety, high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR) has attracted large attention because of the possibility to shut down the reactor safely and remove decay heat without the use of active cooling. A deep-burn concept of fuel utilization is proposed and studied for HTGRs to alleviate plutonium proliferation concern. The idea is to utilize the plutonium extracted by reprocessing the light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel and discharge it only at higher fuel burn-ups of up to 90 atom %. In addition HTGRs have been studied to utilize transuranic (TRU) fuel. A large amount of special nuclear material (SNM) will be used in the HTGR advanced fuel cycle. The inherent proliferation resistance and material attractiveness of the fresh fuel and discharged spent fuel have been discussed against the diversion from peaceful to military uses. On the other hand safeguards of SNM is also important to prevent nuclear proliferation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty between the state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Facility operators are responsible to design material balance area (MBA) and provide enough information on material balance of SNMs for the safeguards conclusion. The material unaccounted for (MUF) and measurement uncertainty in MUF (σ{sub MUF}) represent accuracy of material balance. The MBAs have to be designed and established to achieve enough confidence level on MUF and σ{sub MUF}. The MBA design is challenging for nuclear facilities managing large amount of bulk (instead of items) SNM because of potentially large MUF and σ{sub MUF}. A concept and guidance of MBA design for uranium fueled HTGRs has been discussed. In this study, a MBA design is presented for the transuranic fuel cycle employing HTGRs. The MUF and the σ{sub MUF} is calculated and evaluated using international target values (ITVs) provided by the IAEA. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system-centric strategy that utilizes data collected from a system of sensors and that effectively exploits known characterizations of sensors and facility operations in order to significantly improve anomaly detection, reduce false alarm, and enhance assessment robustness under unreliable partial sensor information.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Tritium accountancy in fusion systems

The US Department of Energy (DOE) has clearly defined requirements for nuclear material control and accountability (MCA) of tritium whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not since tritium is not a fissile material. MCA requirements are expected for tritium fusion machines and will be dictated by the host country or regulatory body where the machine is operated. Material Balance Areas (MBA) are defined to aid in the tracking and reporting of nuclear material movements and inventories. Material sub-accounts (MSA) are established along with key measurement points (KMP) to further subdivide a MBA to localize and minimize uncertainties in the inventory difference (ID) calculations for tritium accountancy. Fusion systems try to minimize tritium inventory which may require continuous movement of material through the MSA. The ability of making meaningful measurements of these material transfers is described in terms of establishing the MSA structure to perform and reconcile ID calculations. For fusion machines, changes to the traditional ID equation will be discussed which includes breeding, burn-up, and retention of tritium in the fusion device. The concept of 'net' tritium quantities consumed or lost in fusion devices is described in terms of inventory taking strategies and how it is used to track the accumulation of tritium in components or fusion machines. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Advanced Algorithms for Scrutiny of Mandatory State Reports Declarations to the IAEA (Final Project Report)

In compliance with their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, based on INFCIRC/153 (corrected) (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972), States Party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are obligated to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all changes in their nuclear material inventory as well as movement of the material across boundaries of IAEA recognized material balance areas (MBA), inventories and nuclear material balances. This project addresses capabilities to detect irregularities in State reports, thus ensuring their accuracy and completeness, and in the broader context, States’ compliance with safeguards obligations of the NPT. A recent study (Henzl et al., 2022) (lead by this project’s PI) demonstrated how analysis of dynamic correlations in nuclear material movement within the entire fuel cycle of a State (viewed as a single system) can reveal variances consistent with and indicative of “irregular” activities. Expanding on this concept, novel ways to analyze State declarations themselves—again, for the State as a whole entity—will help the IAEA draw accurate safeguards conclusions and trust the validity and authenticity of Stategenerated declaration reports. Introducing new declaration analyses capabilities explored in this project will help to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State in general.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

MATERIAL CONTROL ACCOUNTING INMM

Since 1996, the Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC - formerly known as K-26), and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) have been cooperating under the cooperative Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program between the Russian Federation and the U.S. Governments. Since MCC continues to operate a reactor for steam and electricity production for the site and city of Zheleznogorsk which results in production of the weapons grade plutonium, one of the goals of the MPC&A program is to support implementation of an expanded comprehensive nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) program. To date MCC has completed upgrades identified in the initial gap analysis and documented in the site MC&A Plan and is implementing additional upgrades identified during an update to the gap analysis. The scope of these upgrades includes implementation of MCC organization structure relating to MC&A, establishing material balance area structure for special nuclear materials (SNM) storage and bulk processing areas, and material control functions including SNM portal monitors at target locations. Material accounting function upgrades include enhancements in the conduct of physical inventories, limit of error inventory difference procedure enhancements, implementation of basic computerized accounting system for four SNM storage areas, implementation of measurement equipment for improved accountability reporting, and both new and revised site-level MC&A procedures. This paper will discuss the implementation of MC&A upgrades at MCC based on the requirements established in the comprehensive MC&A plan developed by the Mining and Chemical Combine as part of the MPC&A Program.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An Enhanced Safeguards Approach for Accelerator Driven Systems utilized to Close the Fuel Cycle

Further to our previous safeguards approach for Accelerator Driven Systems, which focused on estimates of fissile material production using relevant proton accelerator systems and corresponding safeguards needs for fuel storage, the subcritical reactor, and spent fuel storage material balances areas, this report is more expansive and considers utilization of ADS for either burning of transuranics or breeding of fissile materials. We find that the recycled fuels likely intended for ADS will be thermally and radioactively hot to such a degree that it is likely reprocessing and fuel fabrication will have to be co - located with the ADS reactor facility to avoid impractical hot fuel transportation issues. As such, we consider in detail the full ADS system to include material balance areas for spent fuel receiving, reprocessing, storage & cooling, fuel fabrication, subcritical reactor area, and waste storage & handling. Furthermore, aqueous - based separation methods like PUREX cannot tolerate the intense heat of the ADS fuels, so pyroprocessing will likely be required. With these considerations, we developed an Enhanced Safeguards Approach for ADS beyond the work done in our first report, and conclude that significant diagnostic development is needed , a nd provide safeguards recommendations. We have also included an appendix regarding some country programs, in particular the Chinese ADANES burner/breeder program a nd the Indian thorium - based breeder program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Critical and Subcritical Experiment NEA Benchmark Possibilities for Measurements at ORCEF and Other USDOE Facilities

This report documents a wide variety of critical and subcritical measurements that could be Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) or International Criticality Safety Benchmark Program (ICSBEP) benchmarks. The list has omitted some few measurements. The experiments are divided into four classes: critical experiments only, critical and subsequent subcritical experiments, subcritical experiments (all performed in critical experiment facilities, and fourth subcritical measurements performed in Material Balance Areas at the Y-12 National Security Complex (NSC) for Y-12 nuclear criticality safety. This report documents to number of critical facility days utilized used for the measurements. Measurement at critical and subsequently subcritical in critical facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORCEF), Los Alamos National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and Babcock and Wilcox at Lynchburg, Va, utilized ~350 operational days of critical facility time, Measurement only at subcritical at ORCEF utilized ~200 operational days in this critical facility, and subcritical measurements in Material Balance Areas of the Y-12 National Security Complex used 350 operational days, many were unattended measurements. In view of the high cost of critical facility time and the limitation of only one facility available for measurements in the United States, it is very cost-effective to mine the existing data to produce benchmarks such as those already in NEA and ICSBEP. For measurements at ORCEF the material descriptions from Y-12 NSC and the accuracy of the configurations should (bases on experience with existing NEA or ICSBEP of ORCEF measurement benchmarks) result in uncertainties in measured k eff values lower than ±0.001 and may be as low as ±0.0002; thus, allowing more accurate comparisons between measurements and calculations and thus more accurate verification of calculations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A New Modeling Technique to Analyze Safeguards Measurements in Large Systems

SafeGuards Analysis (SGA) is a computational toolbox able to simulate different safeguards scenarios across a number of different fuel cycles and at many different scales within the Matlab Simulink framework. SGA functions by simulating Material Balance Areas (MBAs) under safeguards materials control and accountability and allows the user to define the uncertainty parameters of the associated flow and inventory measurements. The simulated safeguard system uses the uncertain measurement estimates to calculate a mass-balance across the MBA. This mass balance is then evaluated by one of a number of different statistical tests to determine if a significant amount of material has been removed from the MBA. This work describes the design of SGA, the results of testing each element of the toolbox, and a number of single MBA example scenarios. In all of the test cases SGA performed as expected, and produced acceptable results from the single MBA scenario.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Initial Testing of a Small Gamma Detector (GR1+) for Detection of Holdup in HEPA Filters

Measuring and assessing holdup is a key component of proper inventorying of a Material Balance Area (MBA). The Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (NMC&A) group at the Savannah River Site is responsible for ensuring that the methods used to determine holdup in the MBAs are valid for the conditions of that MBA. Holdup can be contained inside processing equipment or inside ventilation systems that that pulls air out of the glovebox through HEPA filters and stainless steel piping.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

American Nuclear Society 2023 Student Conference [Slides]

This presentation is titled American Nuclear Society 2023 Student Conference and is led by with introductions from a few of the students. This presentation touches on how operations serve the mission, and everyone is a part of it. In order for anyone to operate with special nuclear material (SNM) the responsible contractor or licensee must comply with several regulations. The presentation touches on how there are several roles involved in operations. This talk also includes a page of references, regulations, standards and guidance. The presentation concludes with a section on Material Balance Areas (MBA).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

MATERIAL TRACKING USING LANMAS

LANMAS is a transaction-based nuclear material accountability software product developed to replace outdated and legacy accountability systems throughout the DOE. The core underlying purpose of LANMAS is to track nuclear materials inventory and report transactions (movement, mixing, splitting, decay, etc.) to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). While LANMAS performs those functions well, there are many additional functions provided by the software product. As a material is received onto a site or created at a site, its entire lifecycle can be tracked in LANMAS complete to its termination of safeguards. There are separate functions to track material movements between and within material balance areas (MBAs). The level of detail for movements within a MBA is configurable by each site and can be as high as a site designation or as detailed as building/room/rack/row/position. Functionality exists to track the processing of materials, either as individual items or by modeling a bulk process as an individual item to track inputs and outputs from the process. In cases where sites have specialized needs, the system is designed to be flexible so that site specific functionality can be integrated into the product. This paper will demonstrate how the software can be used to input material into an account and track it to its termination of safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

New Capability at ORNL: High Precision Uranium Titration

Destructive analytical measurements establish a nuclear facility’s nuclear material inventory and inventory differences for Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control. A nuclear laboratory’s ability to perform accurate high-precision analytical measurements is key for tracking large inventories within a facility’s material balance areas and during production to track material movement through dynamic processes. For uranium, these measurements are made by using several established high-precision measurement protocols. These include isotope dilution mass spectrometry, gravimetry, and potentiometric titrations. Whatever measurement technique a nuclear lab chooses to use, reference materials (RMs) with certified attributes and accompanying uncertainties are used to calibrate measurement systems, and are the cornerstone for accurate results. In addition to calibration, RMs provide for metrological traceability, are used for method development and validation, and thus provide critical evaluations of the appropriateness and performance of analytical processes used. Evaluations may include validation that a method is fit-for-purpose, quantification of systematic and random biases, and the evaluation of long-term and short-term performance metrics. High-precision measurement techniques require that measured attributes be certified to a high degree of precision in the RMs used—ultimately, to a higher degree than that of the measurement technique itself. The US authority on the production of special nuclear material Certified Reference Materials is the NBL Program Office (NBLPO), formally known as New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL). The NBLPO is responsible for the sales and distribution of existing NBL certified reference materials (CRMs) and for the production of the next generation of nuclear RMs. To accomplish its mission, NBLPO is establishing key base capabilities within the DOE laboratory complex that formerly existed at the NBL laboratory. The Nuclear Analytical Chemistry (NAC) section within the Chemical Sciences Division (CSD) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is currently working with NBLPO to set up laboratory and measurement capabilities to provide measurements and capabilities for production and/or recertification of existing and future CRMs for uranium assay. The NBL-developed high-precision titration (HPT) method is a critically-evaluated, extremely precise and accurate primary method utilized for the determination of uranium content in a variety of uranium materials. The HPT method, combined with detailed balance weighing protocols, provides for an analytical methodology that is unsurpassed in precision and one in which all sources of error have been evaluated, a requirement of CRM certification. HPT capability within the United States was lost with the closure of the labs at NBL. The NAC has been collaborating with NBLPO to stand up and demonstrate the capability to perform uranium assay via HPT at ORNL. HPT can produce results with an expanded uncertainty of approximately 0.01% for pure uranium compounds, with typical precisions of <0.006%. The major tasks required to stand up the method at ORNL were the refurbishment of a dedicated lab and equipment setup, procedure development, analyst training, establishing method-specific quality assurance, and qualification of an analyst to perform the method. This report summarizes these tasks, outlines the documents drafted, and gives the outcome of the qualification titrations.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

MC&A System Effectiveness Tool (MSET) (Presentation 2)

MSET is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's material control and accountability (MC&A) system. MSET analyzes the effectiveness of an MC&A system based on defined performance metrics for MC&A functions defined based on U.S. and international best practices and regulations. MSET analysis is based on performance of the entire MC&A system including defense-in-depth attributes and sensitivity analysis of changes in the system, both positive and negative. MSET analysis considers: accounting; containment; access control; surveillance capabilities of the system; and other interfaces with the physical protection systems that provide detection of an unauthorized action. MSET performs a system effectiveness calculation evaluation against a defined performance metric. MSET uses PRA techniques to analyze the MC&A system. MSET is a tool for evaluating the system effectiveness of MC&A systems during self-assessment or external inspection. MSET has been developed, tested, and benchmarked by the U.S. DOE. In collaboration with the U.S. DOE, Rosatom is developing a Russian version (MSET-R) planned for pilot implementation at select material balance areas in 2011. MSET has been shown to be an effective training and communication tool for MC&A.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Developing standard performance testing procedures for material control and accounting components at a site

The condition of a nuclear material control and accountability system (MC&A) and its individual components, as with any system combining technical elements and documentation, may be characterized through an aggregate of values for the various parameters that determine the system's ability to perform. The MC&A system's status may be functioning effectively, marginally or not functioning based on a summary of the values of the individual parameters. This work included a review of the following subsystems, MC&A and Detecting Material Losses, and their respective elements for the material control and accountability system: (a) Elements of the MC&A Subsystem - Information subsystem (Accountancy/Inventory), Measurement subsystem, Nuclear Material Access subsystem, including tamper-indicating device (TID) program, and Automated Information-gathering subsystem; (b) Elements for Detecting Nuclear Material Loses Subsystem - Inventory Differences, Shipper/receiver Differences, Confirmatory Measurements and differences with accounting data, and TID or Seal Violations. In order to detect the absence or loss of nuclear material there must be appropriate interactions among the elements and their respective subsystems from the list above. Additionally this work includes a review of regulatory requirements for the MC&A system component characteristics and criteria that support the evaluation of the performance of the listed components. The listed components had performance testing algorithms and procedures developed that took into consideration the regulatory criteria. The developed MC&A performance-testing procedures were the basis for a Guide for MC&A Performance Testing at the material balance areas (MBAs) of State Scientific Center of the Russian Federation - Institute for Physics and Power Engineering (SSC RF-IPPE).

78↗

Research on the IAEA State-Level Safeguards Approach in KAERI

The IAEA has verified the declared nuclear material according to the comprehensive safeguards agreement under NPT between the Republic of Korea and the IAEA, as well as the undeclared nuclear material and nuclear activities under the Additional Protocol. In the safeguards Implementation Report for 2007, the Agency drew a broader conclusion for Korea that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in Korea because there was no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the ROK. The IAEA also informed that the implementation of Integrated Safeguards (IS) in Korea started on 1 July, 2008 in accordance with the state level IS approach after a drawing of the broader conclusion. In addition, for now, a State-Level Safeguards Approach (SLA) is adopted for the ROK, including 11 Material Balance Areas (MBAs) in KAERI. This paper describes a comparison analysis between IS and SLA.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NEUTRON MULTIPLICITY AND ACTIVE WELL NEUTRON COINCIDENCE VERIFICATION MEASUREMENTS PERFORMED FOR MARCH 2009 SEMI-ANNUAL DOE INVENTORY

The Analytical Development (AD) Section field nuclear measurement group performed six 'best available technique' verification measurements to satisfy a DOE requirement instituted for the March 2009 semi-annual inventory. The requirement of (1) yielded the need for SRNL Research Operations Department Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) group to measure the Pu content of five items and the highly enrich uranium (HEU) content of two. No 14Q-qualified measurement equipment was available to satisfy the requirement. The AD field nuclear group has routinely performed the required Confirmatory Measurements for the semi-annual inventories for fifteen years using sodium iodide and high purity germanium (HpGe) {gamma}-ray pulse height analysis nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments. With appropriate {gamma}-ray acquisition modeling, the HpGe spectrometers can be used to perform verification-type quantitative assay for Pu-isotopics and HEU content. The AD nuclear NDA group is widely experienced with this type of measurement and reports content for these species in requested process control, MC&A booking, and holdup measurements assays Site-wide. However none of the AD HpGe {gamma}-ray spectrometers have been 14Q-qualified, and the requirement of reference 1 specifically excluded a {gamma}-ray PHA measurement from those it would accept for the required verification measurements. The requirement of reference 1 was a new requirement for which the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Research Operations Department (ROD) MC&A group was unprepared. The criteria for exemption from verification were: (1) isotope content below 50 grams; (2) intrinsically tamper indicating or TID sealed items which contain a Category IV quantity of material; (3) assembled components; and (4) laboratory samples. Therefore all (SRNL) Material Balance Area (MBA) items with greater than 50 grams total Pu or greater than 50 grams HEU were subject to a verification measurement. The pass/fail criteria of reference 7 stated 'The facility will report measured values, book values, and statistical control limits for the selected items to DOE SR...', and 'The site/facility operator must develop, document, and maintain measurement methods for all nuclear material on inventory'. These new requirements exceeded SRNL's experience with prior semi-annual inventory expectations, but allowed the AD nuclear field measurement group to demonstrate its excellent adaptability and superior flexibility to respond to unpredicted expectations from the DOE customer. The requirements yielded five SRNL items subject to Pu verification and two SRNL items subject to HEU verification. These items are listed and described in Table 1.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Nuclear Material Control and Accountability System Effectiveness Tool (MSET)

A nuclear material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) has been developed in the United States for use in evaluating material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) systems in nuclear facilities. The project was commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation. MSET was developed by personnel with experience spanning more than six decades in both the U.S. and international nuclear programs and with experience in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in the nuclear power industry. MSET offers significant potential benefits for improving nuclear safeguards and security in any nation with a nuclear program. MSET provides a design basis for developing an MC&A system at a nuclear facility that functions to protect against insider theft or diversion of nuclear materials. MSET analyzes the system and identifies several risk importance factors that show where sustainability is essential for optimal performance and where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. MSET contains five major components: (1) A functional model that shows how to design, build, implement, and operate a robust nuclear MC&A system (2) A fault tree of the operating MC&A system that adapts PRA methodology to analyze system effectiveness and give a relative risk of failure assessment of the system (3) A questionnaire used to document the facility's current MPC&A system (provides data to evaluate the quality of the system and the level of performance of each basic task performed throughout the material balance area [MBA]) (4) A formal process of applying expert judgment to convert the facility questionnaire data into numeric values representing the performance level of each basic event for use in the fault tree risk assessment calculations (5) PRA software that performs the fault tree risk assessment calculations and produces risk importance factor reports on the facility's MC&A (software widely used in the aerospace, chemical, and nuclear power industries) MSET was peer reviewed in 2007 and validated in 2008 by benchmark testing at the Idaho National Laboratory in the United States. The MSET documents were translated into Russian and provided to Rosatom in July of 2008, and MSET is currently being evaluated for potential application in Russian Nuclear Facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗