Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “MATERIALS, RADIOACTIVE”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

NSUF Rad-AFM: Nanoscale Material Property Measurements of Radioactive Materials

Many advances in our understanding of radiation induced damage mechanisms are due to imaging techniques including transmission electron microscopy and scanning electron microscopy. However, the effect of these radiation induced defects characterized on the atomic to micrometer scale are often interpreted by changes in bulk material properties measured in the hundreds of microns to cm scale. In order to bridge this gap, additional tools need to be developed for use with radioactive materials. To this end a new Asylum Infinity multimodal atomic force microscope (AFM) has been added to the library of Nuclear Science User Facility (NSUF) instruments for use on radioactive materials. This instrument is housed in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL) which is a Department of Energy Hazard Category II Non-Reactor Nuclear Facility operated by Battelle at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This allows for the handling, sample preparation, and characterization of highly radioactive materials providing a unique capability to understand fundamental properties of nuclear materials and the effects of radiation induced damage.

Riechers, Shawn L.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Development of a Helical Closure for Radioactive Material Shipping Packages

Radioactive Material (RAM) Packagings Used to transport radioactive material • Weapons components • Medical isotopes • Spent nuclear fuel • Etc. • Packages must adhere to 10 CFR 71 which drive to NUREGs, ASME codes, etc. • Transport Index (A2 values) determine if a package is Type A, Type AF, Type B, Type B(U)F

Housley, William M. [Savannah River National Labor↗
DOE OSTI2019

Perspectives on Regulatory Design and Development for Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with the State but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes that a cornerstone in the development of a nuclear security regime is the development of regulations that address security of nuclear material and other radioactive material in transport. While the IAEA provides recommendations and guidance for security of materials in transport through Nuclear Security Series (NSS) documents, the challenge of integrating those recommendations into a Member State’s national legal framework is significant. Specifically, the development of transport security regulations requires coordination between both legal and technical experts within the country’s competent authority and multiple governmental agencies, as well as input from transport operators and other stakeholders. In addition to these interactions, the regulations must reflect the legal traditions of the Member State to fit within its overall national legal framework. Recognizing the challenge, the IAEA has requested input from international legal and technical experts to develop a methodology for drafting regulations on transport security of nuclear material and other radioactive material. This paper discusses the progress made so far in developing the methodology and provides a perspective on the need for transport security regulations and the challenges associated with their development. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to introduce the IAEA-proposed methodology and to facilitate the discussion of this methodology with Member States that need support in developing their transport security regulations.

Ladsous, David↗
DOE OSTI2023

RCT Module 2.12: Shipment and Receipt of Radioactive Material [Slides]

The basis of regulations governing the packaging and shipping of radioactive material is to keep radioactive material from affecting the environment during transportation and to keep the environment from affecting the integrity of the radioactive material. The package itself is to be designed and constructed to be the effective barrier between the environment and the radioactive material; thus, most of the regulatory restrictions apply to the package and the method of shipment used to transport the package. To reduce any potential hazard, the regulatory requirements become more restrictive as the quantity, concentration, and potential hazard of the radioactive material increase.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2019

IAEA Guidance on Managing the Interface between Safety and Security for Normal Commercial Shipments of Radioactive Material

Regulations governing the safe transport of radioactive material have been developed and maintained at the international and national levels for more than six decades. Following the events of 9/11, a similar effort was initiated for security during the transport of radioactive material; however, safety and security provisions have generally been developed independent of each other. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State but as part of an international effort to address the provisions that complement or conflict with each other in the interface between safety and security during transport, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a series of consultancy meetings beginning in October 2016, to (a) identify the needs and develop a plan to address those needs for the transport of low-activity radioactive material (defined for the purposes of this effort as “Normal Commercial Shipments”) with respect to the interface between transport safety and transport security, (b) develop guidance on the interface between transport safety and transport security, and (c) development of a model workshop that will inform IAEA Member States of the interface between transport safety and security. Specifically, the materials addressed in the IAEA Technical Report Series, TRS No. 1001 (in preparation), are those that are limited to low activity radioactive material (including nuclear materials) with activities below 3000 A2 – as defined in the IAEA transport safety regulations – or activities below 10 D – as defined in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources – depending on the radionuclide(s) involved. Emphasis was placed in the Technical Report on these materials since, worldwide, little effort has focused on security for their transport and such guidance could prove beneficial to regulators and operators in many developing countries. An IAEA Technical Report has been drafted and is currently undergoing final steps for publication. The Technical Report will address the issues identified during the consultancy meetings, with a focus on the needs and methods for clarifying safety–security interfaces. This paper will introduce the structure and contents of the Technical Report and provide an update on its progress toward publication. A separate PATRAM 2019 paper will outline the workshop materials developed to date.

Ladsous, David↗
DOE OSTI2020

Geographic Information System Based Emergency Response Training Assessments for DOE Radioactive Materials Transport - 20027

Safety and security are priorities of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) radioactive materials shipping campaigns. In the more than 70-year history of domestic transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), there has never been a transportation-related radiological injury. To support transportation planning, among the tools that DOE uses is the Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START). START contains geospatial data and transportation route analyses capabilities designed to support a range of DOE transportation planning initiatives. One of those functions is the capability to support emergency response planning and training for State and Tribal jurisdictions located on routes used for DOE shipments of radioactive materials. As part of the Department's commitment to public safety, DOE provides federally-funded radiological response training to emergency responders along DOE radioactive materials transportation corridors through its Transportation Emergency Preparedness Program (TEPP). START contains spatial data representing the locations and emergency-response capabilities of fire departments, police, hospitals, State emergency response centers, and where TEPP-trained personnel are based. The START tool supports State and Tribal users' ability to evaluate emergency-response coverage on active and potential DOE radioactive materials transport routes through their jurisdictions, provide expected response times to reach the scene of an incident, identify equipment available to support a response, and identify the number of response personnel and their respective training levels. In addition, START can be used to identify gaps in coverage along a transportation corridor where additional radiological emergency response training may be needed. This paper describes the data, features, and functionality DOE uses to provide a resource for emergency response training needs assessments for States and Tribes along active and potential routes for transporting radioactive materials, and illustrates its use. It also discusses future plans to integrate TEPP and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) radiological training data to provide a more comprehensive source of geospatial information on personnel who have received equivalent radiological response training. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗
NASA NTRS2023

Technical Basis Related to the Posture of NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance for the Launch of Radioactive Material Other than Space Nuclear Systems: Volume 1–Overview of Analysis and Results

NASA has launched and reentered payloads containing radioactive material for over 50 years. The isotopes, their quantity, and their form have varied significantly. The handling of this material prior to its integration into the spacecraft at the launch Center (and after its return to Earth after flight, if applicable) falls under the purview of the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer, while after the radioactive material is integrated into the spacecraft at the launch Center, it falls under the purview of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance’s (OSMA) Nuclear Flight Safety Program. Historically, OSMA concurrence was required for any launch or reentry involving radioactive material. However, OSMA recently revisited this posture due to changes in the Federal policy in this area, and the significant accrued experience. The current report represents the more quantitative study envisioned in the recent change in posture. More specifically, this document addresses the potential risks and other considerations associated with launching small quantities of radioactive material (below the level requiring the Federally-mandated process in National Security Presidential Memorandum- (NSPM-) 20, “Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems” (USG, 2019) to provide the technical basis for when such activities require OSMA concurrence versus notification, as it relates to nuclear flight safety.

Don Helton↗
DOE OSTI2019

MULTI-MODAL CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (THE ONLY INTERESTING PARTS OF A SYSTEM ARE THE INTERFACES.)

Transportation of nuclear and radioactive material exposes these materials to the most risk for malicious acts. Unlike physical facilities, securing radioactive and nuclear materials during transport requires that many different organizations including operators, regulatory agencies, and security agencies work together to ensure the security of the cargo. A major security challenge for international movement of nuclear and radioactive material is the need to use multiple transport modes. Ensuring security of these cargos as they move through intermodal facilities, some of which may take multiple hours, or days, depending on operational constraints at the yards, ports, or other facilities, is a major operational and regulatory challenge. Especially in the international context, ensuring the security of material in transport through in-transit countries and coordinating transport activities across jurisdictions can lead to challenges as to whose security plan controls, whose transport regulations are to be followed, and how might plans need to be adjusted to adapt to in-transit conditions and ultimately how to ensure cargo security. This paper introduces and highlights selected challenges in the multi-modal movement of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. While the paper will address selected challenges in coordination of stakeholders and resources, activities at intermodal facilities, and other selected issues, this does not address all the challenges, rather it brings issues forward and suggests solutions and strategies for enhancing the security of nuclear and radioactive material transported internationally.

Singley, Paul↗
DOE OSTI2020

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗
DOE OSTI2023

Recent Radioactive Material Package Testing Experiences at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was a pioneer in the testing of radioactive material shipping packages and has been performing such tests for over 50 years. Currently, except for Type B thermal tests, testing is performed at the purpose-built Packaging Research Facility that is located at the National Transportation Research Center - a U.S. Department of Energy User Facility. Packages used for the transportation of Type B quantities of radioactive materials must be capable of meeting normal conditions of transportation (NCT) requirements and hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) requirements as defined in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71. Evaluation of package designs to these criteria typically involves a combination of analysis and physical testing. Required physical tests include free drop, crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Packaging Evaluation Facility (PEF) at the National Transportation Research Center (NTRC) provides an inclusive testing capability for a wide variety of packages needed for shipment of radioactive materials. Since PATRAM 2019, ORNL has performed several sets of tests including testing of two designs of the Defense Program Package (DPP-3 and DPP-1) and several Special Form Capsules. This paper provides an overview of the testing performed as well as a summary of advancements made to the ORNL package testing program during that time.

Martinez, Oscar↗
DOE OSTI2025

Development of a Helical Closure for Radioactive Material Shipping Packages

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Packaging Technology group proposed a closure design for the outer packaging of a prototype Type B shipping package being developed for the Department of Energy (DOE). The closure design provides an efficient means of securing the containment vessel (CV) within the radioactive material packaging. This design has a simplified operation, requires less components, and less maintenance when compared to current radioactive material package closure methods. This paper will review and discuss the materials, designs, processes, and testing activities that were considered and pursued in the development of the novel closure for the outer packaging of new radioactive material shipping packages.

Housley, William M. [Savannah River National Labor↗
DOE OSTI2022

Remote Detection of Radioactive Materials Using Long Wavelength Infrared Laser Driven Avalanche Breakdown [Slides]

The yearly goals of the "Remote Detection of Radioactive Materials Using Long Wavelength Infrared Laser Driven Avalanche Breakdown" experiment are broken into two parts. Year 1: Perform proof-of-concept scaling experiments for detection of radioactive materials at 10m standoff distance, characterizing avalanche breakdowns with the 9.2μm long pulse beam line and optimizing diagnostics. Years 2-3: Extend technique to 30m detection distance, characterizing the effect of long propagation paths on sensitivity, improving diagnostic sensitivity and resolution, and characterizing the effects of turbulence and aerosols.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2019

Remote detection of radioactive material using mid-IR laser–driven electron avalanche

Remote detection of a distant, shielded sample of radioactive material is an important goal, but it is made difficult by the finite spatial range of the decay products. Here, we present a proof-of-principle demonstration of a remote detection scheme using mid-infrared (mid-IR) (λ = 3.9 μm) laser–induced avalanche breakdown of air. In the scheme’s most basic version, we observe on-off breakdown sensitivity to the presence of an external radioactive source. In another realization of the technique, we correlate the shift of the temporal onset of avalanche to the degree of seed ionization from the source. We present scaling of the interaction with laser intensity, verify observed trends with numerical simulations, and discuss the use of mid-IR laser–driven electron avalanche breakdown to detect radioactive material at range.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Security Interface Considerations for Regaining Control of Discovered Nuclear and Radioactive Materials

Recognizing that regaining control of orphan radioactive and nuclear material is challenging, the international community has developed requirements and guidance to support countries in addressing the problem. However, limited guidance is available on the practical nuclear security related issues that arise when nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control (MORC) is encountered and efforts are undertaken to regain control. For example, the IAEA Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-19, “National Strategy for Regaining Control over Orphan Sources and Improving Control over Vulnerable Sources”, provides recommendations on a methodology for establishing a national strategy for regaining control of orphan sources. However, except for Pu239 in radioactive sources, nuclear material is outside the scope of this safety guide, and practical safety and security measures below the level of national strategy are not discussed adequately.This paper discusses the interfaces between the stakeholder groups and the responsibilities of each when encountering common scenarios that deal with MORC transitioning to regulatory control. The stakeholders include but are not limited to individuals who encounter MORC, and providers of formal and informal transport systems, and traditional and ad hoc storage solutions. This paper explores practical legal, financial, and institutional issues that hinder implementation of required safety and security practices. This paper also offers strategies that can be implemented on the individual, organizational, national, and international level to regain control of MORC.

Shannon, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2025

THE DESIGN OF RADIAL HONEYCOMB LATTICES FOR IMPACT ENERGY ABSORPTION IN RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS PACKAGES

In this research we present a variation on the corrugation technique of honeycomb lattices, for cylindrical honeycombs, making them much easier to design for impact energy absorption in radioactive materials packages. This variation, termed radial honeycomb lattices, eliminates the residual strain and saddle effect. The use of honeycomb lattices provides advantages over the typically used foams. While foams are effective at absorbing impact energy, they can burn, their material properties are difficult to control, they can degrade over time, and procurement of raw materials can be dependent on timing of manufacturer batch runs. While the weaknesses of foam are strengths for honeycomb lattices, lattices have a different set of problems. Typically, when cylindrical honeycomb lattices are manufactured, they are manufactured flat, wrapped around a mandrel of the desired radius, and then brazed. This approach introduces residual strains, resulting in the saddle effect, which limits both the radial thickness and cylinder length. The radial honeycomb lattice approach presented here makes the design of thicker and longer cylinder honeycombs possible. To address these issues, we propose a honeycomb lattice which changes in cross-section from the inner to the outer radius of the cylinder. This causes the lattice to automatically wrap into a cylinder as it exits the corrugating gears. The theoretically bounding case, of a square cross-section at the inner radius, transitioning through a hexagon, to a diamond cross-section at the outer radius, results in a maximum thickness of approximately 41% of the inner radius. Full mathematical derivations, implemented in computer code, allow for the design of an entire radial honeycomb lattice, including the corrugating gears. To accomplish this only the radial thickness, inner cross-section shape, cell size, and nominal gear radius need to be specified, making the design of these lattices very efficient. Radial honeycomb lattice prototypes have demonstrated that the honeycomb does indeed wrap into a cylinder as intended, without the saddle effect, and can therefore be used to create thick-walled cylinders of any length. These design improvements make cylindrical honeycomb lattices much more accessible as a design element for radioactive materials packages

Johnson, William R. [Savannah River National Labor↗
DOE OSTI2022

Capability Needs for Irradiated and Radioactive Materials Research (Ad hoc Committee Summary Report)

It is essential for the U.S. nuclear energy community to have access to world-leading equipment suitable for conducting research on both nuclear fuels and structural materials, including neutron irradiated–and therefore activated–materials. To address future research infrastructure requirements to support the DOE-NE mission, the Office of Reactor Fleet and Advanced Reactor Deployment established an ad hoc committee to gather information on potential capability gaps for radioactive materials and radiation effects research. This document summarizes the discussions of the committee addressing the high-level challenges in irradiated and radioactive materials research and the capabilities needed to address these challenges. After considering the various needs, the committee agreed on the four top-level targets and priority capability gaps.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Peer Review Comments on the Authorized Limits Technical Document (OREM-19-2573) for Disposal of Waste Containing Residual Radioactive Material at the U.S. Department of Energy Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Argonne National Laboratory is assigned responsibility by DOE/EM-4 to conduct a peer review of the proposed Authorized Limits (ALs) for disposal of waste containing residual radioactive material at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The ALs document package (Document Number OREM-19-2573, dated May 2020) was sent to Argonne by DOE on June 1, 2020 (Oak Ridge 2020a). Argonne started the review immediately and held several BlueJeans meetings with Oak Ridge and DOE to discuss review comments. The first BlueJeans meeting was June 17, 2020. Oak Ridge presented a briefing of the AL package, followed by discussion of the assumptions, methodology, and parameters used in the analysis. A follow-up BlueJeans meeting was held on June 24, 2020, at which Argonne presented both general and specific review comments in PowerPoint slides. This set of slides - Review Comments on the “Authorized Limits for Disposal of Waste Containing Residual Radioactive Material at DOE Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee” - was then emailed to Oak Ridge and DOE after the BlueJeans meeting on June 24, 2020. A PDF version of this slide set is included as Appendix A.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗