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DOE OSTI2017

Study of Control Rod Device Mechanism Missile Impact on Protection Plate

The flying of missile will severely jeopardize the structural integrity in control rod ejection accident. In order to analyze the strength of a new type of shield plate under control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) impact, this article develops the simulation model and conducts the nonlinear response analysis of the missile under 4 cases. In addition, the stress analysis and evaluation of protection shield plate at the most dangerous case are performed. The computed results are validated via empirical formula. The motion analysis of CRDM missile indicates that the fracture at trapezoid thread place is more dangerous than the fracture occurs at cold fitting place. Moreover, the impact at the rim of the shield by the CRDM rod travelling housing is more dangerous than at the center. Therefore, the fracture at trapezoid thread place as well as the shield plate rim under impact should be examined when performing the stress evaluation of the shield plate. Under this circumstance, the maximum stress intensity of the shield plate will exceed the yielding stress and thereby local plasticity will occur. Strain analysis shows that compared with the extension ratio at structural failure, the computed strain still has quite amount of margin to ensure the shield plate will not be penetrated. Hence, this new type of the protection shield plate is capable to prevent the damage of other components by the flying of CRDM missile.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Report on use of Inoculants in Missile Application Alloys

This report documents the status of current inoculant research relevant to missile application alloys and MTCR control language. The information is intended to provide data on current inoculants for us determining the current state of development and identifying potential research directions. Although there has been significant scientific research into the development and synthesis of inoculants, their current availability is limited is traditional powder inoculants employed during casting processes. However, research continues the development of complex oxides, ribbon materials, high entropy alloys, and other inoculant product forms, including the use of inoculants in the melt pools produced during additive manufacturing. Research to date has focused primarily on aluminum and steel alloys with emphasis on refining grain structures and evolving equiaxed morphologies while increasing strength and castability. The primary inoculants in steel and cast irons include TiN, SiC, FeSi75, and Ce which have increased strength properties. Chief inoculants for Al alloys often include TiC, SiC, Al3Sc(x) and TiB2 to aid in precipitation and refinement. Ti and Ni alloys have fewer research activities involving inoculants, although TiN, TiB, ZrN and LaB6 (for Ti alloys) and WC, Co3FeNb2, and CrFeNb (for Ni alloys) have been used. Sic, Al2O3, Mg and Ti are key inoculants for Mg alloys. Multiple cast alloys from each of the material classes demonstrated increased strength and performance properties using inoculants, with several approaching requirements applicable to missile service environments. The continued evolution of advanced manufacturing capabilities is making it easier to produce high temperature near net shape structural materials using inoculant powders. These shapes may include the geometric shapes addressed within the MTCR (tubes and limited wall thicknesses). The use of inoculants may enable further development of high temperature alloys into near net shapes traditionally produced via casting processes due to limited ductility. This may decrease material and manufacturing costs. In addition, inoculation provides controlled kinetics and achievable chemical segregation that enables potential for far-from equilibrium thermodynamic microstructures and chemistries that could provide new metastable alloy states and subsequent properties to address co-design engineering constraints, including needs for increased strength and ductility. It is recommended that specific material combinations within these alloy classes be carefully watched as the materials evolve, with controls aimed at those having material properties above current MTCR levels. This specifically includes the use of refractory inoculants in alloys, and the application of inoculants in high strength and high temperature alloys via additive manufacturing processes, with care to link capabilities to product forms similar to the current requirements on tube geometries and material feed stocks. The continued development of nanoparticle inoculants will increase strength and ductility of high strength castings and additive manufactured metallic components. For example, adding inoculants into the casting of maraging steels and other precipitation strengthened alloys may drastically elevate mechanical properties above the control limit of current regulations.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2024

History and State of the Art in Advanced Thermal Protection Systems

This report documents the current state of the art of thermal protection systems (TPS) relevant to missile application materials and MTCR control language. The information is intended to provide data on current TPS for determining the current state of development and identifying potential research directions. Various vehicle configurations and types of TPS are described, including the evolution of materials and systems. Vehicle configurations such as high drag rocket and capsule systems and low-drag air-breathers are discussed. TPS are complex, transitioning from often very low temperatures to temperatures exceeding 3000°C and heat fluxes of up to 30,000 W/cm 2 . They can take the form of blankets, sheets, tiles and fabricated rigid structures, and can be made from high temperature capable alloys, refractory metals, ceramics, ceramic matrix composites, ultra-high temperature ceramics, carbon-carbon composites or ablative carbonaceous materials. Current state of the art in TPS is based on materials any systems developed for the initial space program. TPS was upgraded to the point of the Space Shuttle development and has stagnated since them.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2018

Autonomous Hypersonics

A new race is emerging among nuclear powers: the hypersonic weapon. Hypersonics are flight vehicles that travel at Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound) or faster. They can cruise in the atmosphere, unlike traditional exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles, allowing stealth and maneuverability during midflight. Faster, lower, and stealthier means the missiles can better evade adversary defense systems. The U.S. has experimented with hypersonics for years, but current investments by Russia and China into their own offensive hypersonic systems may render U.S. missile defense systems ineffective. For the U.S. to avoid obsolescence in this strategically significant technology arena, hypersonics—combined with autonomy—needs to be a force multiplier. Achieving an autonomous hypersonic missile, however, that can intelligently navigate, guide, and control itself and home-in on targets ranging from traditional stationary systems to targets that are themselves hypersonic vehicles—with all the maneuverability that this entails—may sound far-fetched. But to Sandia's Autonomy for Hypersonics (A4H) team, this dream is one step closer to reality.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2019

Hypersonic Weapons: Tactical Uses and Strategic Goals

Hypersonic flight is not new. The V-2 rocket and the vast majority of the ballistic missiles that it inspired achieved hypersonic speeds (i.e., speeds faster than the speed of sound or Mach 5+) as they fell from the sky, as did crewed aircraft like the rocket-powered X-15. Rather than speed, today’s renewed attention to hypersonic weapons owes to developments that enable controlled flight. These new systems have two sub-varieties: hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. Glide vehicles are the cousins of ballistic warheads: they are lofted on high velocity boosters, separate, then use momentum and control surfaces to skip and glide through the upper atmosphere before crashing onto their targets. The cruise missiles use an advanced propulsion system (a SCRAMJET) for powered flight. While the descriptions are straightforward, the engineering needed to accomplish the guidance and maneuvering (not to mention survivability) of these weapons is far from clear.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

System and method for testing missile components

A testing system for testing a missile component having a sense axis includes a centrifuge, a support arm, an orientation assembly, and a controller. The centrifuge rotates the orientation assembly about a vertical axis in a substantially horizontal plane. The orientation assembly includes a first motor, a first gimbal, and a gimballed support. The first motor has a first rotatable shaft defining a first gimbal axis. The first gimbal is coupled with the first rotatable shaft to rotate about the first gimbal axis while the centrifuge rotates the orientation assembly about the vertical axis such that missile component is simultaneously rotated about both the vertical axis and the first gimbal axis to simulate a missile launch of the missile component. The gimballed support is coupled with the first gimbal for supporting the missile component such that the sense axis of the missile component is not parallel to the substantially horizontal plane. The orientation assembly may also include a second gimbal that is rotated about a second gimbals axis by a second motor.

Prewitt, Steven Forrest↗

DOE OSTI2023

System and method for testing missile components

Prewitt, Steven Forrest↗

DOE OSTI2020

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2024

Strategic Analyses and Assessments Office Annual Report 2023

The past year has seen a significant increase in focus on strategic issues with the continued aggression by Russia, the rapid expansion of China’s military—particularly their nuclear capabilities, North Korea’s rapid improvements in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology, and the increase in Iranian fuel enrichment. The U.S. continues to modernize Nuclear Command Control and Communication and all three legs of its nuclear Triad—Columbia-class submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, and B-21 bombers—for the Department of Defense (DOD). At the same time, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is updating its stockpile, producing the B61-12, the new B61-13, the W88 Alteration, the W87-1—with new pits, and the W80-4. This rework of the nuclear enterprise represents the most aggressive expansion of our capabilities and infrastructure in the modern era. At the same time, the Strategic Posture Commission completed its report to Congress and reported that the current modernization program, although clearly necessary, is insufficient to meet the threats that are emerging.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2018

Standoff Over the LRSO: Assessing the long-range stand-off missile's impact on strategic stability.

Mutual vulnerability to strategic forces seems to remain the de facto foundation for strategic stability across the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China dyadic relationships; This work has suggested the bomber force tasked with delivering the LRSO is characterized by relatively long flight times and rich signature sets which make its use inconsistent with the requirements for a disarming first-strike. Therefore, the LRSO would not be expected to disrupt mutual vulnerability by making a disarming strike more possible or attractive; Even if a stealthy air-launched cruise missile is paired with a stealth bomber aircraft, the signatures associated with bomber generation and aerial refueling from non-stealth tanker aircraft make it unlikely the LRSO could be launched against a peer or near-peer nation-state without advance warning; To the extent a nuclear armed air-launched cruise missile deters would-be U.S. adversaries from nuclear use, maintaining a survivable weapon system is crucial for maintaining that stable deterrent effect. A modern stand-off weapon and stealth delivery platform increase the probability this capability will be maintained in the future against other nations' increasingly capable A2/AD systems; The LRSO has been touted as a flexible option to deter, or conduct should deterrence fail, limited nuclear strikes pursuant to Russia's reported "escalate-to-deescalate" doctrine. The concept of limited nuclear use is still intensely debated, and there is no guarantee that escalation could be controlled even with tailored LRSO employment; The challenge of warhead discrimination has not historically led to a nuclear response to a cruise missile launch, but there is no guarantee that cannot change. Having accurate military intelligence coupled with discerning analysis of the context in which cruise missiles are employed (e.g., how escalated is the conflict, how many missiles have been launched, have there been signatures of strategic force mobilization, or has the nuclear threshold been crossed?) will likely be essential for reducing the danger of misperception. Developing norms and/or communication channels in the aforementioned dyadic relationships may also further these ends. In sum, this work has identified and analyzed many of the major arguments in the debate regarding the LRSO's impact on strategic stability. During this study and survey of other nation's conceptions of strategic stability, it became clear that the LRSO is neither inherently stabilizing or destabilizing; rather, it is one instrument in addition to unambiguous U.S. policy, clear messaging, and signaling of intent that may promote stability by reducing the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2020

Verifying Deep Reductions in the Nuclear Arsenals: Development and Demonstration of a Motion-detection Subsystem for a “Buddy Tag” Using Non-export Controlled Accelerometers

Future nuclear arms-control agreements may place numerical limits on items that are difficult to monitor with national technical means, even when complemented with onsite inspections. Such items could include small objects and mobile assets, such as non-deployed nuclear warheads and mobile missile launchers. Typically, this verification task can be addressed with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. First proposed in the late 1980s and partially developed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s, the “Proximity Tag” or “Buddy Tag” concept seeks to overcome these concerns by separating the tag from the treaty accountable item itself. A buddy tag has two key elements: a tamper-indicating enclosure and a motion-detection system designed to detect illicit movements in a stand-down period. As part of this project, we have built a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper reviews the design choices and functionalities of the tag’s motion-detection subsystem.We pursue a modular approach for the tag’s hardware, built around an Arduino-class microcontroller and a non-export-controlled low-noise accelerometer, and use open-source algorithms for the motion-detection software. Finally, we discuss the results of an extensive experimental campaign involving both indoor and outdoor measurements assessing the performance of the tag under real-world environmental conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2026

Nonlocal Metasurface with Resonance-Selective Nonlinear Wavefront Shaping

We demonstrate a nonlinear nonlocal metasurface supporting quasi-trapped modes that enable helicity-dependent wavefront shaping at third-harmonic wavelengths. The geometric phase is selectively modified near resonance, revealing a mechanism for polarization-dependent nonlinear phase control.

Sedeh, Hooman [Duke University]↗

DOE OSTI2019

Technical and Programmatic Consequences of a Hypersonic Vehicle Flight Test Ban

The hypersonic vehicle (HV) is defined as any vehicle capable of traveling at or above five times the local speed of sound (Mach 5). Development of hypersonic flight has been pursued since the late 1950s, especially for reentry of missile warheads and returning orbiting spacecraft. Although considerable progress has been made since then, air- breathing and gliding hypersonic flight remains in the development and testing phase. Concerns have been raised, however, about continued HV flight tests because of HV's potential military use, which has the potential to encourage hair-trigger tactics that would increase crisis instability. In recent years, non-governmental organizations have called for a ban on HV flight testing for the primary purpose of halting continued development of the HV as a weapon. The emphasis on banning flight tests is due to its vital role in aerospace programs. Without it, significant technical uncertainties remain, creating safety and reliability issues that would discourage commercial development. Although the cost and time involved in flight tests have already spurred the use of other test methods, none can completely reproduce the flight test environment. Flight tests are important for reasons such as generating data unique to flight test environments to use in validating models and verifying ground test data, identifying unanticipated problems, and reducing risk. Commercial HV technology development today depends on advancements in four areas: propulsion; aerodynamics; critical guidance, navigation and control; and thermal management. This report summarizes the ramifications on HV technology development if flight tests were banned.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Topology-imprinting in nonlinear metasurfaces

Flat optical components, or metasurfaces, have transformed optical imaging, data storage, information processing, and biomedical applications by providing unprecedented control over light-matter interactions. These nano-engineered structures enable compact, multidimensional manipulation of light’s amplitude, phase, polarization, and wavefront, producing scalar and vector beams with unique properties such as orbital angular momentum and knotted topologies. This flexibility has potential applications in optical communication and imaging, particularly in complex environments such as atmospheric turbulence and undersea scattering. However, designing metasurfaces for shorter wavelengths, such as visible and ultraviolet light, remains challenging due to fabrication limitations and material absorption. Here, we introduce an innovative concept called topology imprinting using judiciously designed all-dielectric nonlinear optical metasurfaces to replicate desired waveforms at fundamental and harmonic frequencies, opening promising avenues for advanced photonic applications.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

GeoThermalCloud: Cloud Fusion of Big Data and Multi-Physics Models using Machine Learning for Discovery, Exploration, and Development of Hidden Geothermal Resources

The primary goals of this project are exploring hidden geothermal resources in the U.S.A. and designing profitable enhanced geothermal systems (EGS). Many processes and parameters control geothermal exploration and energy production from geothermal fields. Diverse datasets (e.g., geology, geochemistry, geophysics, satellite, airborne geophysics) are available to help characterize subsurface geothermal conditions. Sparse and multi-scale characteristics of these datasets prohibit properly leveraging these datasets for geothermal exploration and profitable EGS design. Recent advancements in machine learning (ML) promise to resolve these issues. The tremendous challenges and risks of geothermal exploration and production bring the demand for novel ML methods and tools that can (1) analyze large field datasets, (2) assimilate model simulations (large inputs and outputs), (3) process sparse datasets, (4) perform transfer learning (between sites with different exploratory levels), (5) extract hidden geothermal signatures in the field and simulation data, (6) label geothermal resources and processes, (7) identify high-value data acquisition targets, and (8) guide geothermal exploration and production by selecting optimal exploration, production, and drilling strategies. To address these necessities, ML-based geothermal resources exploration and enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) design tools have been developed. The exploration tool is called GeoThermalCloud and EGS design tool is called GeoDT-ML. GeoThermalCloud (https://github.com/SmartTensors/GeoThermalCloud.jl) utilizes a LANL unsupervised ML platform called SmartTensors (https://tensors.lanl.gov/) to automate data analyses and interpretations by extracting hidden signatures to identify geothermal prospects. Also, it enables the identification of critical measurements needed to identify geothermal resource signatures. Alternatively, GeoDT-ML (https://github.com/SmartTensors/GeoThermalCloud.jl/tree/master/EGS) is an ML-based alternative to GeoDT (https://github.com/GeoDesignTool/GeoDT.git), a fast, simplified multi-physics solver to evaluate EGS project designs in uncertain geologic systems. GeoDT-ML leverages recent advances in deep learning and high-performance computing. It is a faster and simpler version of GeoDT. To make this project a success, we used capabilities of LANL, PNNL, Google, Stanford, and Julia Computing. We analyzed eight datasets of the U.S.A. using GeothermalCloud and demonstrated potential highly prospective geothermal resources and identified key factors defining highly prospective sites. The first data set includes 44 locations in southwest New Mexico and 18 geological, hydrogeological, geophysical, geothermal, geochemical attributes. We defined low- and medium-temperature hydrothermal systems and discovered a new highly prospective site. The second data set analyzed 18 shallow water chemistry attributes at 14,342 locations in the Great Basin. It demarcated modestly, moderately, and highly prospective sites including key attributes for each type of prospectivity. The third data set analyzed Utah FORGE data including satellite (InSAR), geophysical (gravity, seismic), geochemical, and geothermal attributes. Here, we performed prospectivity analysis to identify future drilling locations using geological, geochemical, and geophysical attributes. Maps of temperature at depth and heat flow are constructed based on the available data. Prospectivity maps were generated, and drilling locations were proposed for future geothermal field exploration. The fourth data set analyzed 21 attributes at 120 locations in Tularosa Basin, New Mexico; data comes from past play fairway analyses in this region. ML analyses identified geothermal signatures associated with modestly, moderately, and highly hydrothermal systems. We also defined dominant attributes and spatial distribution of the geothermal signatures. The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth datasets include Tohatchi Springs, New Mexico, Hawaii, Brady site, Nevada, and EGS Collab, respectively. Moreover, we coupled GeothermalCloud and magnetotellurics data to pinpoint drilling locations for developing geothermal projects in the Tularosa Basin, New Mexico. GeothermalCloud found potential prospective locations for geothermal resources near White Sands Missile Range and McGregor Range at Fort Bliss. Magnetotellurics data determined the potential depth (~1800m) of geothermal prospects at McGregor Range based on apparent resistivity structures/layers in the subsurface. The McGregor Range consists of three resistivity layers and two resistivity structures. Magnetotellurics data also helps identify that the western portion of the McGregor Range has thick and low-resistivity earth materials. The low resistivity to the west is most likely for a fault system. Assuming temperature is consistent with a geothermal reservoir, the west-central part of the McGregor Range has the highest geothermal potential because of the increase in porosity and associated permeability attributed to the interpreted fault system. Also, we devised a coupling strategy between a process model and GeothermalCloud to characterize hydrogeological conditions and geothermal conditions, respectively. The process model characterizes hydrogeological and geothermal conditions on highly prospective geothermal sites provided by GeothermalCloud. We developed a physics-informed neural network (PINN) version of the Burns equation that can be easily coupled with GeothermalCloud. Furthermore, we performed an optimal design decision maximizing the economic value of an EGS power plant. This study optimized the range of well spacing between injection and production wells maximizing net present value in dollars (NPV). For this task, we used the GeoDT to simulate the Utah FORGE EGS development cycle from the initial well design to the end of production. Next, we accomplished another crucial task, which is predicting permeability of geothermal reservoirs. Predicting permeability of geothermal reservoirs is a non-trivial task because of huge computational runtime of simulation and lack of measurements. To avoid these limitations, we used easy-to-measure chemical concentrations in the subsurface as measurement data and convolutional neural network based ML model of a high-fidelity model. Next, we predicted permeability using Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation. We found that Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation predicts permeability with a high certainty if the prediction zone in the simulation area has chemical concentration data. Finally, we analyzed the DOE funded INGENIOUS and GeoDAWN projects data. For discovering hidden geothermal systems in the Great Basin, the INGENIOUS project accumulated old data, collected new data, and released them in 2022. The dataset includes a total of 24 geological, geophysical, and geochemical attributes. Data resolution and scale significantly vary prohibiting an appropriate usage. To avoid such limitations, we brought all data in the same resolution and scale by applying the inverse distance weighting interpolation technique for predicting data in unsampled locations. Subsequently, we analyzed LiDAR data of the GeoDAWN project. We received data in tiles format. The DOE’s overarching goal is to use ML on LiDAR data for finding favorable geological structures (e.g., step up faults in Brady, Nevada). To serve the purpose, we need to label favorable geologic structures that correspond to LiDAR data. We wrote an algorithm to label the LiDAR data with the favorable geologic structures.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗