Raytheon Missile Systems
Sandia and the Raytheon Company are collaborating to develop a range of mutually beneficial technologies to enhance weapons system design, effectiveness/lethality, manufacturing, sustainment, and retirement.
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Sandia and the Raytheon Company are collaborating to develop a range of mutually beneficial technologies to enhance weapons system design, effectiveness/lethality, manufacturing, sustainment, and retirement.
President Nixon addresses the nation to announce a significant development between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs). Both nations have promised to make this agreement a top priority in the coming year, working together to limit ABMs. The President notes that intensive negotiations will follow to codify the pledge between the two nations but reports that this commitment is a major breakthrough for both nations.
The detection and tracking of vehicles moving at hypersonic speeds (> Mach 5) at altitudes of ~100 km has been of growing interest due to the ongoing development of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) by the U.S., Russia and China. This challenge is notably different from traditional ballistic missile systems whose re-entry vehicles move at hypersonic velocities but at much higher altitudes on a ballistic course. Hypersonic glide vehicles are also designed to be able to make sudden turns along their flight path making prediction of their trajectories difficult. Their ability to maneuver, combined with their high velocity and altitude make them difficult to track. The combination of these characteristics presents a challenge for anyone attempting to defend against a hypersonic glide vehicle attack by generally shortening the time available to react. That reaction can involve moving potential targets or attempting to detect the hypersonic glide vehicle and intercept it before it reaches the intended target. Figure 1 compares the trajectory of hypersonic vehicles compared to that of a traditional ballistic missile.
This project was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Raytheon Company, Missile Systems Rancho Innovations, to develop High Power Microwave (HPM) source technology. Under this effort, we sought to combine joint expertise to achieve scientific goals, develop new specialized knowledge, and utilize facilities and resources more effectively, in order to research, develop and deploy advanced technologies to improve US National Security. The HPM source technology used in this effort was developed outside of this CRADA under several efforts sponsored by the US government and internal Laboratory funding.
The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) celebrated the completion of the Program of Record for the W76-1 Mk 4A Life Extension Program (LEP) on Jan. 24 at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas. The W76-1 is a modernized W76-0 warhead, which is a submarine-launched ballistic missile system first introduced into the stockpile for the U.S. Navy in 1978. This LEP has strengthened the safety and security of the United States and its allies by extending the warhead’s service life for another 20 years.
The W76-1 is a refurbished W76-0 warhead, which is a submarine-launched ballistic missile system that was first introduced into the stockpile for the Navy in 1978. The W76-1 Life Extension Program extends the originally designed warhead service life of 20 years to 60 years. The W76-1 continues to meet all missions and capabilities of the original W76-0 warhead and does not provide new military capabilities. NNSA completed refurbished warhead production at the Pantex Plant in December 2018.
During lightning strikes buildings and other structures can act as imperfect Faraday Cages, enabling electromagnetic fields to be developed inside the facilities. Some equipment stored inside these facilities may unfortunately act as antenna systems. It is important to have techniques developed to analyze how much voltage, current, or energy dissipation may be developed over valuable components. In this discussion we will demonstrate the modeling techniques used to accurately analyze a generic missile type weapons system as it goes through different stages of assembly. As work is performed on weapons systems detonator cables can become exposed. These cables will form different monopole and loop type antenna systems that must be analyzed to determine the voltages developed over the detonator regions. Due to the low frequencies of lightning pulses, a lumped element circuit model can be developed to help analyze the different antenna configurations. We will show an example of how numerical modeling can be used to develop the lumped element circuit models used to calculate voltage, current, or energy dissipated over the detonator region of a generic missile type weapons system.
A testing system for testing a missile component having a sense axis includes a centrifuge, a support arm, an orientation assembly, and a controller. The centrifuge rotates the orientation assembly about a vertical axis in a substantially horizontal plane. The orientation assembly includes a first motor, a first gimbal, and a gimballed support. The first motor has a first rotatable shaft defining a first gimbal axis. The first gimbal is coupled with the first rotatable shaft to rotate about the first gimbal axis while the centrifuge rotates the orientation assembly about the vertical axis such that missile component is simultaneously rotated about both the vertical axis and the first gimbal axis to simulate a missile launch of the missile component. The gimballed support is coupled with the first gimbal for supporting the missile component such that the sense axis of the missile component is not parallel to the substantially horizontal plane. The orientation assembly may also include a second gimbal that is rotated about a second gimbals axis by a second motor.
A testing system for testing a missile component having a sense axis includes a centrifuge, a support arm, an orientation assembly, and a controller. The centrifuge rotates the orientation assembly about a vertical axis in a substantially horizontal plane. The orientation assembly includes a first motor, a first gimbal, and a gimballed support. The first motor has a first rotatable shaft defining a first gimbal axis. The first gimbal is coupled with the first rotatable shaft to rotate about the first gimbal axis while the centrifuge rotates the orientation assembly about the vertical axis such that missile component is simultaneously rotated about both the vertical axis and the first gimbal axis to simulate a missile launch of the missile component. The gimballed support is coupled with the first gimbal for supporting the missile component such that the sense axis of the missile component is not parallel to the substantially horizontal plane. The orientation assembly may also include a second gimbal that is rotated about a second gimbals axis by a second motor.
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Military missiles are exposed to many sources of mechanical vibration that can affect system reliability, safety, and mission effectiveness. The U. S. Army Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) has been developing missile health monitoring systems to assess and improve reliability, reduce life cycle costs, and increase system readiness. One of the most significant exposures to vibration occurs when the missile is being carried by a helicopter or other aviation platform, which is a condition known as captive carry. Recording the duration of captive carry exposure during the missile’s service life can enable the implementation of predictive maintenance and resource management programs. Since the vibration imparted by each class of helicopter varies in frequency and amplitude, tracking the vibration exposure from each helicopter separately can help quantify the severity and harmonic content of the exposure. Under the direction of AMRDEC staff, engineers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have developed a Captive Carry Health Monitor (CCHM) for the Hellfire II missile. The CCHM is an embedded usage monitoring device installed on the outer skin of the Hellfire II missile to record the cumulative hours the host missile has been in captive carry mode. To classify the vibration by class of helicopter, the CCHM analyzes the amplitude and frequency content of the vibration with the Goertzel algorithm to detect the presence of distinctive rotor harmonics. Cumulative usage data are accessible in theater from an external display; monthly usage histograms are accessible through an internal download connector. This paper provides an overview of the CCHM electrical and package design, describes field testing and data analysis techniques used to monitor captive carry identify and the class of helicopter, and discusses the potential application of missile health and usage data for real-time reliability analysis and fleet management.
The BREN (Bare Reactor Experiment, Nevada) Tower Complex is significant for its role in the history of nuclear testing, radiation dosimetry studies, and early field testing of the Strategic Missile Defense System designs. At the time it was built in 1962, the 1,527 ft (465 m) BREN Tower was the tallest structure west of the Mississippi River and exceeded the height of the Empire State Building by 55 ft (17 m). It remains the tallest ever erected specifically for scientific purposes and was designed and built to facilitate the experimental dosimetry studies necessary for the development of accurate radiation dose rates for the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The tower was a key component of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission’s (ABCC) mission to predict the health effects of radiation exposure. Moved to its current location in 1966, the crucial dosimetry studies continued with Operation HENRE (High Energy Neutron Reactions Experiment). These experiments and the data they generated became the basis for a dosimetry system called the Tentative 1965 Dose or more commonly the T65D model. Used to estimate radiation doses received by individuals, the T65D model was applied until the mid-1980s when it was replaced by a new dosimetry system known as DS86 based on the Monte Carlo method of dose rate calculation. However, the BREN Tower data are still used for verification of the validity of the DS86 model. In addition to its importance in radiation heath effects research, the BREN Tower Complex is also significant for its role in the Brilliant Pebbles research project, a major component of the Strategic Defense Initiative popularly known as the “Star Wars” Initiative. Instigated under the Reagan Administration, the program’s purpose was to develop a system to shield the United States and allies from a ballistic missile attack. The centerpiece of the Strategic Defense System was space-based, kinetic-kill vehicles. In 1991, BREN Tower was used for the tether tests of the Brilliant Pebbles prototype vehicle at the earth’s surface prior to the more costly space testing program. The success of these tests established the Brilliant Pebbles program as an essential component of America’s space-based missile defense system even after the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Data from the Brilliant Pebbles research program continues to inspire current missile defense system research (Independent Working Group 2009).
America's missile defense systems are deployed at home and abroad. This includes the Groundbased Missile Defense (GMD) system in Alaska and California, the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe (EPAA), and regional systems in the Middle East and Asia. Unfortunately these systems lack workable architectures, and many of the required elements either don't work or are missing. Major review and reconsideration is needed of all elements of these systems. GMD performance in tests has gotten worse with time, when it ought to be getting better. A lack of political support is not to blame as the DoD spends about $10 billion per year, and proposes to add about $5 billion over the next five years. Russia objects to the EPAA as a threat to its ICBM forces, and to the extensive deployment of U.S. military forces in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, once part of the Soviet Union. Going forward the U.S. should keep working with Russia whose cooperation will be key to diplomatic gains in the Middle East and elsewhere. Meanwhile, America's missile defenses face an enduring set of issues, especially target discrimination in the face of attacks designed to overwhelm the defenses, stage separation debris, chaff, decoys, and stealth. Dealing with target discrimination while also replacing, upgrading, or adding to the many elements of U.S. missiles defenses presents daunting budget priorities. A new look at the threat is warranted, and whether the U.S. needs to consider every nation that possesses even short-range missiles a threat to America. The proliferation of missiles of all sizes around the world is a growing problem, but expecting U.S. missile defenses to deal with all those missiles everywhere is unrealistic, and U.S. missile defenses, effective or not, are justifying more and more offensive missiles.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.
The W88 nuclear warhead entered the stockpile in late 1988 and is deployed on the Navy’s Trident II D5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system, carried onboard Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. Deployed now for almost three decades, several updates are required to address aging issues and to maintain its current state of readiness. The W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 program replaces the arming, fuzing, and firing subsystem, adds a lightning arrestor connector, and refreshes the conventional high explosives within the weapon to enhance nuclear safety and support future life extension program options. The W88 Alt 370 program is scheduled to be completed concurrent with planned exchanges of limited-life, or routinely replaced, components, including the gas-transfer system
The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.
A new race is emerging among nuclear powers: the hypersonic weapon. Hypersonics are flight vehicles that travel at Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound) or faster. They can cruise in the atmosphere, unlike traditional exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles, allowing stealth and maneuverability during midflight. Faster, lower, and stealthier means the missiles can better evade adversary defense systems. The U.S. has experimented with hypersonics for years, but current investments by Russia and China into their own offensive hypersonic systems may render U.S. missile defense systems ineffective. For the U.S. to avoid obsolescence in this strategically significant technology arena, hypersonics—combined with autonomy—needs to be a force multiplier. Achieving an autonomous hypersonic missile, however, that can intelligently navigate, guide, and control itself and home-in on targets ranging from traditional stationary systems to targets that are themselves hypersonic vehicles—with all the maneuverability that this entails—may sound far-fetched. But to Sandia's Autonomy for Hypersonics (A4H) team, this dream is one step closer to reality.
A new arms race is emerging among global powers: the hypersonic weapon. Hypersonics are flight vehicles that travel at Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound) or faster. They can cruise in the atmosphere, unlike traditional exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles, allowing stealth and maneuverability during midflight. Faster, lower, and stealthier means the missiles can better evade adversary defense systems. The U.S. has experimented with hypersonics for years, but current investments by Russia and China into their own offensive hypersonic systems may render U.S. missile defense systems ineffective. For the U.S. to avoid obsolescence in this strategically significant technology arena, hypersonics—combined with autonomy—needs to be a force multiplier.