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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

System and method for testing missile components

A testing system for testing a missile component having a sense axis includes a centrifuge, a support arm, an orientation assembly, and a controller. The centrifuge rotates the orientation assembly about a vertical axis in a substantially horizontal plane. The orientation assembly includes a first motor, a first gimbal, and a gimballed support. The first motor has a first rotatable shaft defining a first gimbal axis. The first gimbal is coupled with the first rotatable shaft to rotate about the first gimbal axis while the centrifuge rotates the orientation assembly about the vertical axis such that missile component is simultaneously rotated about both the vertical axis and the first gimbal axis to simulate a missile launch of the missile component. The gimballed support is coupled with the first gimbal for supporting the missile component such that the sense axis of the missile component is not parallel to the substantially horizontal plane. The orientation assembly may also include a second gimbal that is rotated about a second gimbals axis by a second motor.

Prewitt, Steven Forrest↗
DOE OSTI2023

System and method for testing missile components

A testing system for testing a missile component having a sense axis includes a centrifuge, a support arm, an orientation assembly, and a controller. The centrifuge rotates the orientation assembly about a vertical axis in a substantially horizontal plane. The orientation assembly includes a first motor, a first gimbal, and a gimballed support. The first motor has a first rotatable shaft defining a first gimbal axis. The first gimbal is coupled with the first rotatable shaft to rotate about the first gimbal axis while the centrifuge rotates the orientation assembly about the vertical axis such that missile component is simultaneously rotated about both the vertical axis and the first gimbal axis to simulate a missile launch of the missile component. The gimballed support is coupled with the first gimbal for supporting the missile component such that the sense axis of the missile component is not parallel to the substantially horizontal plane. The orientation assembly may also include a second gimbal that is rotated about a second gimbals axis by a second motor.

Prewitt, Steven Forrest↗
DOE OSTI2018

Report of a Workshop on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC November 30, 2017

At a time which some view as the end of the post-Cold War era, geopolitics is increasingly fluid, complex and dangerous, including Russian and Chinese modernization of their nuclear and conventional forces nuclear and their increasingly aggressive foreign policies; North Korean nuclear and missile tests and provocations; Iran’s missile tests, regional ambitions and support for terrorism; Syria’s civil war and use of chemical weapons; and the growing global threat of Islamic terrorism. In this new security environment, potential adversaries are emboldened. Allies are reacting to more concrete and tangible threats. They are demanding greater assurances and, in some cases, questioning the credibility of the guarantees we offer and debating the pursuit of nuclear arms in ways we have not seen since the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was created.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

New Los Alamos space instrument goes for a spin

Scientists and engineers at Los Alamos National Laboratory are using a unique centrifuge facility to evaluate a flight-ready telemetry system for evaluating a nuclear weapons test missile launch. "The telemetry unit was designed and manufactured by Los Alamos' Intelligence and Space Research Division," said Telemetry Program Manager Myles Fitzgerald. "Telemetry is a data stream of information on temperature, acceleration, vibration, strain, all the conditions a system encounters during a test flight." Because a test missile flight ultimately ends with the test system completely destroyed, telemetry data from the flight must be collected by receiving stations along the flight path. "The purpose of the centrifuge test is to subject the electronics to a high gravitational load (G-load) that's representative of what the system will experience when re-entering the Earth's atmosphere," said weapons test engineer Alex Cusick.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2018

New Los Alamos space instrument goes for a spin

Scientists and engineers at Los Alamos National Laboratory are using a unique centrifuge facility to evaluate a flight-ready telemetry system for evaluating a nuclear weapons test missile launch. "The telemetry unit was designed and manufactured by Los Alamos' Intelligence and Space Research Division," said Telemetry Program Manager Myles Fitzgerald. "Telemetry is a data stream of information on temperature, acceleration, vibration, strain, all the conditions a system encounters during a test flight." Because a test missile flight ultimately ends with the test system completely destroyed, telemetry data from the flight must be collected by receiving stations along the flight path. "The purpose of the centrifuge test is to subject the electronics to a high gravitational load (G-load) that's representative of what the system will experience when re-entering the Earth's atmosphere," said weapons test engineer Alex Cusick.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2018

How to make Progress with North Korea Now

In early 2017 the United States should have taken up the Chinese and Russian-backed proposal to suspend United States – South Korean joint military exercises in exchange for suspension of North Korean nuclear and missile tests. South Korea was signaling that it would support this proposal. That was before North Korea tested inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), capable of reaching anywhere in the U.S., and an advanced nuclear explosive, some ten times more powerful than those the U.S. used against Japan in WWII. The Trump administration brushed aside that original international proposal. The Singapore Summit, however, has put just such a suspension-for-suspension agreement in place. A little late, but much better than never.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Force Reconstruction Using the Inverse of the Mode-Shape Matrix [Book Chapter]

A new technique for force reconstruction is developed. To estimate the externally applied force, this technique sums the weight-scaled acceleration signals, and is referred to as the Sum of Weighted Accelerations Technique (SWAT). To obtain the scalar weights the inverse of the mode shape matrix is used. Application of this technique is illustrated with both numerical calculations using a mass-spring model and experimental data from a structure impacting a rigid barrier.

055001 -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards, Inspection, ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Operation Plumbbob

On June 24, 1957, a thirty-seven kiloton nuclear device, codenamed Priscilla, exploded 700 feet over the Nevada Test Site’s Frenchman dry lake. Below, on the lakebed, was a bank vault designed by the Mosler Safe Company for one of several Federal Civil Defense Administration experiments. The vault was constructed “to evaluate the effectiveness of a reinforced-concrete vault and steel vault door in providing protection against the effects of a nuclear detonation.” Blast damage to the exterior was largely confined to the side walls, whose concrete was stripped off; its steel reinforcing rods bent and twisted. The vault door was essentially undamaged and was opened with minimal difficulty. The vault contents - sandbags, movie camera, and thermometers - were only slightly disturbed. The camera operated as planned, running 40 ft of film. The film, however, was completely fogged. Two clinical type thermometers registered 88°F, and a 24-hr stylus American temperature recorder registered a constant 88°F. Priscilla was the fifth of twenty-nine tests conducted in 1957 as part of Operation Plumbbob, whose stated purpose was to conduct tests “aimed to attain new knowledge important to the defense of the United States and the Free World.” Individual events included “proof tests of air defense and antisubmarine warheads to be stockpiled, development tests of bomb components and mockups, and design tests of smaller and lighter warheads.” One test, John, was that of an air-to-air missile detonated 18,500 feet over the test site.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2019

Expert Q&A: Why a Hypersonic Vehicle Flight Test Ban Is Not a Good Idea

Hypersonic Vehicle (HV) development has been pursued since the late 1950s. These vehicles could significantly cut the cost of accessing space, lessen flight time anywhere on the planet to two to three hours, and be used as weapons that would be extremely difficult to intercept. Although considerable progress has been made, hypersonic flight remains in the development and testing phase.

HGV↗
DOE OSTI2019

Signal Processsing for Sounding Rocket Flights: Campaign No. 2 Results

Sounding rockets provide both a viable and convenient alternative to more costly missile flights with one of the major objectives being to test various types of sensors for monitoring components of high interest as well as developing real-time signal processing techniques. Signal processing, especially in real-time, presents an extreme challenge in this noisy flight environment. The estimation and tracking of modal frequencies from vibrating structures is the an important set of features that can provide information about the components under test; therefore, high resolution multichannel spectral processing is required. In this report we discuss the application of both single/multichannel techniques that can be applied to solve this challenging problem in the case of noisy, uncertain accelerometer measurements. The approach involves the selection of methods capable of producing reliable spectral estimates corresponding to the modal frequencies of a vibrating structure.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Method for Calculating Delayed Gamma-Ray Response in the ACRR Central Cavity and FREC-II Cavity Using MCNP

This document presents the process for a new method developed for the characterization of the delayed gamma-ray radiation fields in pulse reactors like the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) and the Fueled Ring External Cavity (FREC-II). The environments used to test this method in the ACRR were FF, LB44, PLG and CdPoly, and the environments used in the FREC-II were FF with rods-down, FF with rods-up, CdPoly with rods-down and CdPoly with rods-up. All environment configurations used the same fission product gamma-ray source energy spectrum. This method required the fission sites located in the MCNP KCODE source tapes. A FORTRAN script was written to translate and extract the coordinates for the fission sites. The 10K fission sites were then input it into an MCNP SOURCE mode script. Using a MATLAB script, a parametric analysis was done, and it helped determine that 10K fission sites are an appropriate number of coordinates to converge to the correct answer. The method gave excellent results and was tested in the ACRR, FREC-II and White Sands Missile Range (WSMR). This method can be applied to other pulse research reactors as well.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Mercury Model of the Molly-G Fast Burst Reactor (FBR)

In order to design neutron irradiation experiments at a given nuclear reactor, one requires a representative neutron spectrum for the configuration of the reactor that will exist during the experiment. This usually implies modeling the operation of the reactor using a neutron transport code. Since the modeling of pulsed neutron reactors is quite complex, requiring coupled modeling of neutronics and thermo-structural response, the typical methodology employs analysis of the neutron spectrum which is obtained from a static keff calculation. While this time-independent Eigenfunction is not truly representative of that during a reactor pulse, we postulate that it is a reasonable representation for our purposes. The Nuclear Survivability (NS) Program at LLNL is considering fielding such experiments at the Molly-G (‘Molybdenum Godiva-II’) Fast Burst Reactor (FBR) at the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR). The goal of these experiments is to (a) test / proof / calibrate diagnostics, and (b) test the efficacy of neutron shield configurations, before fielding at other nuclear reactors, such as the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) at SNL/NM. After attempting to secure either drawings or a copy of an existing MCNP model of the Molly-G FBR from various institutions, it was decided to develop a new model for use with the Mercury Monte Carlo transport code. The model described herein will be used to design these experiments.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Technical and Programmatic Consequences of a Hypersonic Vehicle Flight Test Ban

The hypersonic vehicle (HV) is defined as any vehicle capable of traveling at or above five times the local speed of sound (Mach 5). Development of hypersonic flight has been pursued since the late 1950s, especially for reentry of missile warheads and returning orbiting spacecraft. Although considerable progress has been made since then, air- breathing and gliding hypersonic flight remains in the development and testing phase. Concerns have been raised, however, about continued HV flight tests because of HV's potential military use, which has the potential to encourage hair-trigger tactics that would increase crisis instability. In recent years, non-governmental organizations have called for a ban on HV flight testing for the primary purpose of halting continued development of the HV as a weapon. The emphasis on banning flight tests is due to its vital role in aerospace programs. Without it, significant technical uncertainties remain, creating safety and reliability issues that would discourage commercial development. Although the cost and time involved in flight tests have already spurred the use of other test methods, none can completely reproduce the flight test environment. Flight tests are important for reasons such as generating data unique to flight test environments to use in validating models and verifying ground test data, identifying unanticipated problems, and reducing risk. Commercial HV technology development today depends on advancements in four areas: propulsion; aerodynamics; critical guidance, navigation and control; and thermal management. This report summarizes the ramifications on HV technology development if flight tests were banned.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI1995

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗
DOE OSTI1995

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Commonly Overlooked Material Attractiveness Issues [Slides]

SG-Pu, WG-Pu, FG-Pu, RG-Pu, HEU, and Np should not be ignored in safeguards or security discussions: Nation states prefer SG-Pu and WG-Pu for missile delivery. Terrorists and some nation states will prefer FG-Pu and RG-Pu to minimize the mass that must be stolen/diverted and to minimize the risk of detection. Terrorists and some nation states will prefer HEU to eliminate the need for testing. A nation state with reprocessing capabilities might prefer 237 Np because the IAEA doesn’t require it to be safeguarded. Terrorists might prefer 237 Np if the nation state does not provide adequate safeguards and security for it.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗