Results for “MMOD”

NASA NTRS2009

Handbook for Designing MMOD Protection

Spacecraft are subject to micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impact damage which have the potential to degrade performance, shorten the mission, or result in catastrophic loss of the vehicle. Specific MMOD protection requirements are established by NASA for each spacecraft early in the program/project life, to ensure the spacecraft meets desired safety and mission success goals. Both the design and operations influences spacecraft survivability in the MMOD environment, and NASA considers both in meeting MMOD protection requirements. The purpose of this handbook is to provide spacecraft designers and operations personnel with knowledge gained by NASA in implementing effective MMOD protection for the International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and various science spacecraft. It has been drawn from a number of previous publications [10-14], as well as new work. This handbook documents design and operational methods to reduce MMOD risk. In addition, this handbook describes tools and equations needed to design proper MMOD protection. It is a living report, in that it will be updated and re-released periodically in future with additional information. Providing effective and efficient MMOD protection is essential for ensuring safe and successful operations of spacecraft and satellites. A variety of shields protect crew modules, external pressurized vessels and critical equipment from MMOD on the International Space Station (ISS). Certain Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle systems are hardened from MMOD impact, and operational rules are established to reduce the risk from MMOD (i.e., flight attitudes are selected and late inspection of sensitive thermal protection surfaces are conducted to reduce MMOD impacts). Science spacecraft include specific provisions to meet MMOD protection requirements in their design (for example, Stardust & GLAST). Commercial satellites such as Iridium and Bigelow Aerospace Genesis spacecraft incorporate MMOD protection. The development of low-weight, effective MMOD protection has enabled these spacecraft missions to be performed successfully. This handbook describes these shielding techniques. For future exploration activities to the Moon and Mars, implementing high-performance MMOD shielding will be necessary to meet protection requirements with minimum mass penalty. A current area of technology development in MMOD shielding is the incorporation of sensors to detect and locate MMOD impact damage. Depending on the type of sensor the signals from the sensor can be processed to infer the location of the impact and the extent of damage. The objective of the sensors is to locate critical damage that would endanger the spacecraft or crew immediately or during reentry (such as an air leak from crew module or critical damage to thermal protection system of reentry vehicles). The information from the sensors can then be used with repair kits, patch kits, hatch closure or other appropriate remedial techniques to reduce MMOD risk.

Arnold, Jim↗

NASA NTRS2019

Observations of MMOD Impact Damage to the ISS

This paper describes meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage observations on the International Space Station (ISS). Several hundred MMOD damage sites on ISS have been documented using imagery taken from ISS windows. MMOD damage sites visible from ISS windows are typically larger – approximately 5mm diameter and greater – due to the larger viewer-to-surface distance. Closer inspection of these surfaces by astronauts during spacewalks reveals many smaller features that are typically less distinct. Characterization of these features as MMOD or non- MMOD is difficult, but can be partially accomplished by matching physical characteristics of the damage against typical MMOD impact damage observed on ground-based impact tests. Numerous pieces of space-exposed ISS hardware were returned during space shuttle missions. Subsequent ground inspection of this hardware has also contributed to the database of ISS MMOD impact damage. A handful of orbital replacement units (ORUs) from the ISS active thermal control and electrical power subsystems were swapped out and returned during the Space Shuttle program. In addition, a reusable logistics module was deployed on ISS for a total 59.4 days on 11 shuttle missions between 2001 and 2011 and then brought back in the shuttle payload bay. All of this returned hardware was subjected to detailed post-flight inspections for MMOD damage, and a database with over 1,400 impact records has been collected. A description of the largest observed damage features is provided in the paper. In addition, a discussion of significant MMOD impact sites with operational or design aspects is presented. MMOD impact damage to the following ISS modules/subsystems is described: (1) Solar Arrays, (2) US and Russian windows, (3) Extravehicular Activity (EVA) handrails, (4) Radiators, and (5) Russian Functional Cargo Block (FGB) module.

Hyde, James L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Advanced Multifunctional MMOD Shield: Radiation Shielding Assessment

As NASA is looking to explore further into deep space, multifunctional materials are a necessity for decreasing complexity and mass. One area where multifunctional materials could be extremely beneficial is in the micrometeoroid orbital debris (MMOD) shield. A typical MMOD shield on the International Space Station (ISS) is a stuffed whipple shield consisting of multiple layers. One of those layers is the thermal blanket, or multi-layer insulation (MLI). By increasing the MMOD effectiveness of MLI blankets, while still preserving their thermal capabilities, could allow for a less massive MMOD shield. Thus, a study was conducted to evaluate concept MLI blankets for MMOD shields. In conjunction, these MLI blankets and the subsequent MMOD shields were also evaluated for their radiation shielding effectiveness towards protecting crew. These concepts were evaluated against the ISS MLI blankets and the ISS MMOD shield, which acted as the baseline. These radiation shielding assessments were performed using the high charge and energy transport software (HZETRN). This software is based on a one-dimensional formula of the Boltzmann transport equation with a straight-ahead approximation. Each configuration was evaluated against the following environments to provide a diverse view of radiation shielding effectiveness in most space environments within the heliosphere: August 1972 solar particle event, October 1989 solar particle event, 1982 galactic cosmic ray environment (during solar maximum), 1987 galactic cosmic ray environment (during solar minimum), and a low earth orbit environment in 1970 that corresponded to an altitude of 400 km and inclination of 51.6 . Both the absorbed dose and the dose equivalent were analyzed, but the focus of the discussion was on the dose equivalent since the data is most concerned with radiation shielding of the crew. The following paper outlines the evaluations performed and discusses the results and conclusions of this evaluation for radiation shielding effectiveness. Future work will focus on optimizing the radiation shielding properties for the MMOD shield. Submission

Rojdev, Kristina↗

NASA NTRS2013

Advanced Multifunctional MMOD Shield: Radiation Shielding Assessment

As NASA is looking to explore further into deep space, multifunctional materials are a necessity for decreasing complexity and mass. One area where multifunctional materials could be extremely beneficial is in the micrometeoroid orbital debris (MMOD) shield. A typical MMOD shield on the International Space Station (ISS) is a stuffed whipple shield consisting of multiple layers. One of those layers is the thermal blanket, or multi-layer insulation (MLI). Increasing the MMOD effectiveness of MLI blankets, while still preserving their thermal capabilities, could allow for a less massive MMOD shield. Thus, a study was conducted to evaluate a concept MLI blanket for an MMOD shield. In conjunction, this MLI blanket and the subsequent MMOD shield was also evaluated for its radiation shielding effectiveness towards protecting crew. The overall MMOD shielding system using the concept MLI blanket proved to only have a marginal increase in the radiation mitigating properties. Therefore, subsequent analysis was performed on various conceptual MMOD shields to determine the combination of materials that may prove superior for radiation mitigating purposes. The following paper outlines the evaluations performed and discusses the results and conclusions of this evaluation for radiation shielding effectiveness.

Rojdev, Kristina↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations (BLEs) used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the coefficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for spacecraft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar surface assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Equation Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. This paper will expand on the hypervelocity impact (HVI) testing and ballistic limit equation (BLE) definition work that was partially presented at the 2nd International Orbital De-bris (IOC-II) Conference held in Sugar Land, TX in December 2023. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the co-efficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for space-craft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar sur-face assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environ-ment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Mar-shall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗

NASA NTRS2014

MMOD Impact Damage to ISS

Paper will describe micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage that has been observed on the International Space Station (ISS). Several hundred documented MMOD damage sites on ISS have been identified through imagery from the windows of ISS modules or docked vehicles. Sites that are observable from ISS or shuttle windows exhibiting distinct features of hypervelocity impact damage are usually greater than 5mm in diameter. Many smaller features are revealed in on-orbit imagery are typically less distinct and difficult to characterize but could be MMOD damage. Additional images of on-orbit damage features have been collected by astronauts during extra vehicular activities. Ground inspection of returned ISS hardware has also contributed to the database of ISS MMOD impact damage. A handful of orbital replacement units (ORU) from the ISS active thermal control and electrical power subsystems were swapped out and returned during the Space Shuttle program. In addition, a reusable logistics module was deployed on ISS for a total 59.4 days on 11 shuttle missions between 2001 and 2011 and then brought back in the shuttle payload bay. All of this returned hardware was subjected to detailed post-flight inspections for MMOD damage, and a database with nearly 1000 impact records has been collected. A description of the largest observed damages will be provided in the paper. In addition, a discussion of significant MMOD impact sites with operational or design aspects will be presented. Some of the ISS modules/subsystems damaged by MMOD to be included in the discussion are (1) Solar Arrays, (2) US and Russian windows, (3) EVA handrails, (4) Radiators, and (5) Russian FGB module.

Hyde, James L.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Mitigation of EMU Glove Cut Hazard by MMOD Impact Craters on Exposed ISS Handrails

Recent cut damages to crewmember extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) gloves during extravehicular activity (EVA) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) has been found to result from contact with sharp edges or pinch points rather than general wear or abrasion. One possible source of cut-hazards are protruding sharp edged crater lips from impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles on external metallic handrails along EVA translation paths. During impact of MMOD particles at hypervelocity an evacuation flow develops behind the shock wave, resulting in the formation of crater lips that can protrude above the target surface. In this study, two methods were evaluated to limit EMU glove cut-hazards due to MMOD impact craters. In the first phase, four flexible overwrap configurations are evaluated: a felt-reusable surface insulation (FRSI), polyurethane polyether foam with beta-cloth cover, double-layer polyurethane polyether foam with beta-cloth cover, and multi-layer beta-cloth with intermediate Dacron netting spacers. These overwraps are suitable for retrofitting ground equipment that has yet to be flown, and are not intended to protect the handrail from impact of MMOD particles, rather to act as a spacer between hazardous impact profiles and crewmember gloves. At the impact conditions considered, all four overwrap configurations evaluated were effective in limiting contact between EMU gloves and impact crater profiles. The multi-layer beta-cloth configuration was the most effective in reducing the height of potentially hazardous profiles in handrail-representative targets. In the second phase of the study, four material alternatives to current aluminum and stainless steel alloys were evaluated: a metal matrix composite, carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP), fiberglass, and a fiber metal laminate. Alternative material handrails are intended to prevent the formation of hazardous damage profiles during MMOD impact and are suitable for flight hardware yet to be constructed. Of the four materials evaluated, only the fiberglass formed a less hazardous damage profile than the baseline metallic target. Although the CFRP laminate did not form any noticeable crater lip, brittle protruding fibers are considered a puncture risk. In parallel with EMU glove redesign efforts, modifications to metallic ISS handrails such as those evaluated in this study provide the means to significantly reduce cut-hazards from MMOD impact craters.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

NASA NTRS2012

As-Flown Shuttle Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) Assessment History

The final flight of the Space Shuttle program was completed on July 21st of 2011. The reusable nature of the Orbiter vehicles has provided NASA with a unique opportunity to inspect and sample spacecraft surfaces exposed to the MMOD environment in low Earth orbit. This paper will provide details of MMOD damages found on Orbiter surfaces after recent flights, as well as putting these damages in context by providing historical comparisons of recent damage to previous flights. The Bumper threat assessment computer code is used by NASA to determine spacecraft MMOD penetration risk. The tool was used before each mission to estimate pre-flight MMOD risk for the Shuttle Program Office using planned vehicles attitudes and exposure times. This paper summarizes the efforts of the authors to assess the expected number MMOD impacts of selected particles sizes of 52 shuttle missions ranging from STS-50 (1992) through STS-133 (2011) using as-flown attitude data. The missions encompass the Shuttle/Mir precursors to the International Space Station (ISS) as well as the ISS assembly flights. The paper includes a comparison of observed MMOD impact damage to the predicted number of impacts from Bumper code assessments. This data can be used to validate engineering models of the orbital debris and micrometeoroid environment, such NASA s ORDEM debris model and MEM meteoroid model.

Hyde, James L.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Alternative MMOD Shielding Concepts

The main types of meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shields are single-layer “monolithic” shields, dual-wall “Whipple” shields, and multi-wall shields (“Stuffed Whipple” and “multi-shock” are common types). Aluminum alloys are typically used for the outer bumper layer and for the rear wall of the dual- and multi-wall shields, although carbon-composites are increasingly employed in MMOD shields given their low-mass and high-strength. Ceramic (NextelTM) and KevlarTM fabrics are commonly used for the intermediate layers of Stuffed Whipple shields. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group is continuously working to improve NASA spacecraft MMOD shielding by evaluating new materials and shielding concepts by test and analysis. HVIT has performed many hypervelocity impact tests over several years to evaluate alternative MMOD shield materials and concepts. This paper will provide results of this work in the following areas: (1) Material substitutions to improve radiation and MMOD protection within Stuffed Whipple shields, (2) Metallic and ceramic foam bumper and intermediate layer materials, (3) Self-sealing materials. In the first two areas listed above, the candidate shield materials were tested under similar test conditions and with fixed shield standoff and mass. Damage to the rear wall was quantified and compared to determine the best performing shield materials. In the self-sealing material evaluations, the test objective was to gauge the ability of different materials and techniques to stop leaks in a rear wall with a 1-atmosphere (air) delta-pressure across the wall. This paper provides results of the investigations and describes forward work to continue the development of the most promising MMOD shield alternatives. KevlarTM is a trademark of DuPont de Nemours, Inc. NextelTM is a trademark of 3M Corporation Note, Trade names and trademarks are used in this report for identification only. Their usage does not constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or implied, by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Hypervelocity↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Equation Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (XEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs). An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an MMOD risk assessment of the internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds.

Micrometeoroid↗

NASA NTRS2014

MMOD Protection and Degradation Effects for Thermal Control Systems

Micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment overview Hypervelocity impact effects & MMOD shielding MMOD risk assessment process Requirements & protection techniques - ISS - Shuttle - Orion/Commercial Crew Vehicles MMOD effects on spacecraft systems & improving MMOD protection - Radiators Coatings - Thermal protection system (TPS) for atmospheric entry vehicles Coatings - Windows - Solar arrays - Solar array masts - EVA Handrails - Thermal Blankets Orbital Debris provided by JSC & is the predominate threat in low Earth orbit - ORDEM 3.0 is latest model (released December 2013) - http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/ - Man-made objects in orbit about Earth impacting up to 16 km/s average 9-10 km/s for ISS orbit - High-density debris (steel) is major issue Meteoroid model provided by MSFC - MEM-R2 is latest release - http://www.nasa.gov/offices/meo/home/index.html - Natural particles in orbit about sun Mg-silicates, Ni-Fe, others - Meteoroid environment (MEM): 11-72 km/s Average 22-23 km/s.

Christiansen, Eric↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SpaceX Dragon 1 Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign

Introduction The SpaceX Dragon 1 spacecraft performed 20 resupply missions to the International Space Station (ISS) between 2012 and 2020. After each mission, a team from the NASA John-son Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology Group inspected each Dragon 1 capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. Data from these inspections are collected into a database that includes impact feature dimensions as well as the location on the vehicle. Additional details on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site are provided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Observation data can be compared with impact estimates from risk assessment codes as a check on the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment predictions. Scope A general description of the areas of the vehicle that were inspected are provided as well as mission details such as exposure duration and launch dates. The paper documents the general inspection procedure for collection of data and the post inspection data analysis process. It also provides details of the observation data collected as well as the results of analysis of intact samples collected for spectroscopic analysis to discern the source of the impacting particle. A comparison between observed impacts and the expected number of damage features calculated by Bumper 3 with the latest MMOD environments are also presented. Findings Statistics on the >300 impact features documented in the database will provide insight into the depth to diameter ratios and other relationships. The quality of the comparison between the observations and code predictions are dependent on several factors. The paper provides de-tails of each of these variables. (1) Damage equations (2) Impact condition assumptions a. Projectile density b. Impact speed c. Impact angle (3) Analysis results a. pre-flight vs. on-orbit damage b. MMOD vs. non-MMOD Conclusions and Recommendations The ISS visiting vehicle impact database is an ongoing project. SpaceX provides crew rotations as well as resupply and cargo return with the Dragon 2 spacecraft. Sierra Space is manifested for resupply and cargo return services starting in 2023. Boeing is expected to provide crew rotations as well. All of these spacecraft will provide additional opportunities for post flight MMOD inspections of space exposed hardware. Acknowledgements Over the course of the inspection campaign various personnel at the SpaceX Texas Test Site in McGregor and at the SpaceX headquarters in Hawthorne CA provided valuable support to this activity.

James L Hyde↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Alternative MMOD Shielding Concepts

A core objective of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group is to improve spacecraft meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shielding by evaluating new materials and shielding concepts by test and analysis. This paper describes hypervelocity impact tests that were performed over several years to evaluate alternative MMOD shielding concepts. Specific objectives of the work were to incorporate improved MMOD and radiation protection within Stuffed Whipple shields, and to evaluate various self-sealing MMOD shielding concepts. The tests were performed under similar impact conditions and with fixed shield standoff and comparable overall shield mass. Damage to the rear wall was quantified and compared to determine the best performing shield concepts. Generally, the best shielding for both MMOD and radiation protection included polymer materials rich in hydrogen introduced into the intermediate and final layers of the shielding. In the self-sealing material evaluations, the test objective was to gauge the ability of different materials and techniques to stop leaks in a rear wall with a delta-pressure across the wall typical of spacecraft crew cabins (i.e., up to 1 atmosphere pressure). Shielding containing ionomer films and elastomer materials satisfied this objective for pressure shell holes up to 6mm diameter. This paper provides results of the investigations.

Orbital Debris↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Orion Artemis I As Flown MMOD Analysis

Introduction The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, an engineer from the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris MMOD analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, a team from the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. Scope of Work The spacecraft geometry model was created by Lockheed Martin during construction of the Artemis I Orion vehicle based on Computer Aided Design (CAD) models of the vehicle. New hypervelocity impact testing was performed to verify Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) used in the analysis to link impactor size and damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS). The exact trajectory flown was recorded during the flight, including vehicle attitude. This data was used in conjunction with the ORDEM 3.2 and MEM 3 environment modeling tools to create models of particle flux impacting the spacecraft throughout the mission. Meteoroid shower forecast information was also included to account for additional particle flux associated with meteoroid showers. Inspection of the Orion capsule included the Backshell thermal tiles and the tape covering it, windows, fabric thermal materials, and small areas of other materials. Potential MMOD damage found was characterized using various techniques, including optical microscopy, computed tomography scanning, and X-ray spectroscopy. Findings The number of craters found in the Backshell tile, and their size distribution, matches well with the Bumper analysis prediction. Tape, window, and other material impacts recorded similarly align to Bumper analysis predictions. Conclusions and Recommendations This comparison of analysis with inspection of the hardware provides valuable insight into the MMOD environment and how accurately analysis tools assess the impact risk to spacecraft. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this analysis extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Orion Artemis I As Flown MMOD Analysis

Introduction The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, an engineer from the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris MMOD analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, a team from the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. Scope of Work The spacecraft geometry model was created by Lockheed Martin during construction of the Artemis I Orion vehicle based on Computer Aided Design (CAD) models of the vehicle. New hypervelocity impact testing was performed to verify Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) used in the analysis to link impactor size and damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS). The exact trajectory flown was recorded during the flight, including vehicle attitude. This data was used in conjunction with the ORDEM 3.2 and MEM 3 environment modeling tools to create models of particle flux impacting the spacecraft throughout the mission. Meteoroid shower forecast information was also included to account for additional particle flux associated with meteoroid showers. Inspection of the Orion capsule included the Backshell thermal tiles and the tape covering it, windows, fabric thermal materials, and small areas of other materials. Potential MMOD damage found was characterized using various techniques, including optical microscopy, computed tomography scanning, and X-ray spectroscopy. Findings The number of craters found in the Backshell tile, and their size distribution, matches well with the Bumper analysis prediction. Tape, window, and other material impacts recorded similarly align to Bumper analysis predictions. Conclusions and Recommendations This comparison of analysis with inspection of the hardware provides valuable insight into the MMOD environment and how accurately analysis tools assess the impact risk to spacecraft. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this analysis extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗

NASA NTRS2006

Space Station MMOD Shielding

This paper describes International Space Station (ISS) shielding for micrometeoroid orbital debris (MMOD) protection, requirements for protection, and the technical approach to meeting requirements. Current activities in MMOD protection for ISS will be described, including efforts to augment MMOD protection by adding shields on-orbit. Observed MMOD impacts on ISS elements such as radiators, modules and returned hardware will be described. Comparisons of the observed damage with predicted damage using risk assessment software will be made.

Christiansen, Eric↗

NASA NTRS2008

Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. An overview of significant MMOD impacts on the Payload Bay Door radiators, wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panels and crew module windows will be presented, along with a discussion of the techniques NASA has implemented to reduce the risk from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the RCC regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it s role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, J. L.↗