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Guidelines for Verification Strategies to Minimize RISK Based on Mission Environment, -Application and -Lifetime (MEAL)

There is a trend of compromising verification testing to address the cost and schedule constraints, which poses a high-risk posture for programs/projects. Current and emerging aerospace scientific and/or human exploration programs continue to pose new technological challenges. These technological challenges combined with finite budgets and truncated schedules are forcing designers, scientists, engineers, and managers to push technologies to their physical limits. In addition, budget and schedule pressures challenge how those technologies/missions are verified. A clear understanding of the different verification processes is needed to ensure the proper verification of the technology within the mission (i.e., capabilities, advantages, and limitations). The goal of verification is to prove through test, analysis, inspection, and/or demonstration that a product provides its required function while meeting the performance requirements. It is important that verification yield understanding of representative performance under worst-case conditions so that margins to failure can be evaluated for proposed applications. The capabilities, advantages, and limitations of the testing and inspection performed at each level are different, and the risk incurred by omitting a verification step depends on the level of integration as well as Mission, Environment, Application and Lifetime (MEAL). This paper focuses on verification processes. The goal of the verification process is to ensure the given avionics technology could be safely implemented on the given MEAL consistent with the program/project risk posture.

Gonzalez, Oscar↗

Recommendations on the Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions - Phase II

This assessment had two Phases. Phase I captured NASA Centers’ current practices for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts 1 used in spaceflight systems and ground support equipment (available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205011579) [ref. 1]. The Phase II report provides guidance for selecting and using COTS parts in NASA missions. The approaches proposed in this report differ from current agency practices. This top-level executive summary touches on these new approaches for using COTS parts but does not provide the detailed information that is critical in understanding the rationale behind these new approaches. Readers will need to read the entire report to gain full understanding and effectively use the recommendations herein. NASA’s historical approach to selecting and applying parts has been to define certain parts, primarily specific classes of military specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, as “standard”, leaving all others, including COTS parts, as nonstandard. Standard parts typically are used without further testing (“use-as-is”). Nonstandard parts are subjected to initial screening and subsequent lot acceptance testing of representative samples from each procured lot per MIL-SPEC or similar requirements. Decades later, top-tier commercial part manufacturers have evolved significant manufacturing, statistical control, and technological improvements that can now provide parts as reliable or more reliable than MIL-SPEC parts, when used within their datasheet limits. Concurrently, the space science and exploration community’s needs demand technological advances unavailable with MIL-SPEC parts. This ongoing change necessitates using COTS parts for space missions. Properly selected COTS parts in appropriate applications can offer performance and supply availability advantages compared to MIL-SPEC parts. Their utility and demonstrated reliability result from large volumes and automated production and testing processes. However, careful review and a thorough understanding of their specifications (i.e., datasheet limitations) is needed, and verifying that manufacturer specifications and reliability meet space hardware application needs are necessary. This report recommends MIL-SPEC screening and non-radiation-related lot acceptance testing be reduced or eliminated in cases where evidence of sufficient quality and reliability exists for COTS parts. The extent of NASA's insight into COTS manufacturers and the amount and nature of the needed evidence will differ by mission and will likely be driven by a mission's resources and associated risk posture. To facilitate this goal, two new terminologies have been defined and described: “Industry Leading Parts Manufacturer (ILPM)” and “Established COTS parts.” An ILPM is a COTS manufacturer that produces high quality and reliable parts. Some parts produced by ILPMs, defined as Established COTS parts, do not need any additional MIL-SPEC or NASA screening and lot acceptance testing to be used in space applications. This report provides guidance for selecting, procuring, and applying COTS parts and for performing part-, board-, and system-level COTS parts verification. The recommendation to select Established COTS parts from ILPMs will assure those COTS parts will have comparable quality to corresponding MIL-SPEC parts. Selecting, applying, and verifying Established COTS parts from ILPMs requires a holistic team approach, engaging parts engineers, circuit designers, quality, reliability, and systems engineers, procurement specialists, radiation specialists, avionics leads, and program/project managers. A mission-specific approach tailored to a project’s Mission, Environment, Applications and Lifetime (MEAL) [ref. 2] requirements should be developed and approved by program/project managers. Any associated risks should be clearly identified, quantified, mitigated, and/or accepted. Different approaches are recommended according to program/project Risk Classes A, B, C, and D [ref. 3] and human-rated missions [ref. 4]: 1. Recommend Classes A and B and human-rated missions consider a “MIL-SPEC parts- based design” approach. ”MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach is one in which most parts are MIL-SPEC parts and Established COTS parts from ILPMs are used only when an equivalent MIL-SPEC part does not meet functional or size, weight, and power (SWaP) or performance requirements, or is not available. 2. Recommend Classes D and Sub-D missions consider a “System of COTS” approach. “System of COTS” approach is one which most parts are Established COTS parts from ILPMs. 3. Recommend Class C missions determine which approach is the best for their projects; that is, use either a “MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach, “System of COTS” approach, or a combined approach utilizing elements of both. This report intends to provide guidance in using COTS parts for NASA missions with risk classifications of A through D and human-rated missions; but it does not address the costs of using COTS parts. Costs of using COTS parts in different NASA mission classes can vary significantly even if the same parts are used in different risk postures, due to differing verification levels needed. The guidance does not distinguish between critical or non-critical systems, and a given project will need to apply the appropriate guidance based on their risk posture. The intended audience of this report are NASA personnel and commercial practitioners who support NASA’s spaceflight missions, including spaceflight program or project managers, parts engineers, parts manufacturers, radiation engineers, avionics engineers, system engineers, circuit design engineers, reliability engineers, safety and mission assurance (SMA) personnel, and parts procurement specialists. The NEPP Program will perform a pathfinder study to explore implementing the guidance in this NESC report. An ILPM verification process is not the same as conventional vendor qualification processes performed according to military standards and specifications. This NESC report intends to provide guidance in utilizing available parts data from ILPM manufacturers for parts assurance assessments needed for NASA missions. The report also captured the current practices from DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Section 10. Note each DoD and FAA report was provided by the corresponding agencies regarding their practices, which are independent from the NESC recommendations in the report.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗

Space System Verification Approach Based on MEAL and Mission Risk Posture

There is no "one size fits all" solution for verifying space avionics systems to ensure safety and mission success. This paper presents a verification approach based on MEAL and risk posture for space systems. MEAL refers to Mission, mission Environment, Application, and Lifetime of the application. In addition to the description of the verification approach, the paper also provides the awareness of the different levels of risks associated with verification tests and inspections when performed at part-, board- and box-level, and discusses the applications of the approach for flight heritage verification, commercial off the shelf (COTS) verification and radiation-effects verification.

Mission Environment Application and Lifetime (MEAL↗

Space System Verification Approach Based on MEAL and Mission Risk Posture

There is no "one size fits all" solution for verifying space avionics systems to ensure safety and mission success. This paper presents a verification approach based on MEAL and risk posture for space systems. MEAL refers to Mission, mission Environment, Application, and Lifetime of the application. In addition to the description of the verification approach, the paper also provides the awareness of the different levels of risks associated with verification tests and inspections when performed at part-, board- and box-level, and discusses the applications of the approach for flight heritage verification, commercial off the shelf (COTS) verification and radiation-effects verification.

Mission Environment Application and Lifetime (MEAL↗

The NASA Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) Process Standard

This paper presents status on the upcoming NASA Agency-level RHA Process Standard. Based on recommendations provided by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program has led development of an agency-level standard for space flight avionics and electronics RHA. The standard introduces a novel RHA taxonomy and prescribes the process required by NASA programs and projects to baseline their RHA programs consistent with the MEAL (Mission, Environment, Application, and Lifetime) criteria including the risk tolerance posture. The standard also provides requirements for the RHA schedule integration in the program or project lifecycle and requirements for data deliverables content. Additional non-prescriptive technical content is provided in the standard appendices to guide development of RHA programs for NASA missions.

Avionics↗