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A Frank Discussion on Lessons Learned From Adopting and Applying NASA-STD-6030 for Spaceflight Systems

With the advancement and adoption of Additive Manufacturing (AM) for spaceflight systems, numerous lessons have been learned during the qualification and certification of AM components. The lessons learned covered in this presentation will provide an overview of the challenges faced by NASA centers and commercial partners working to design AM hardware that complies with NASA-STD-6030 Additive Manufacturing Requirements (AMR). Topics of interest include tailoring of requirements for specific projects, documentation requirements, and addressing conservative approaches towards mechanical property development and analysis. In addition to that, this presentation aims to impress that these lessons learned will influence the future revisions of the NASA technical standard to facilitate and advance AM technology adoption on NASA projects.

Additive Manufacturing↗

Process Qualification Concepts in NASA-STD-6030

- Terminology - Definition and role of QMP in the NASA-STD-6030 framework - Qualification checklist for evaluating a candidate AM material process - Types of data needed to evaluate the metrics for a QMP - Advocacy for a singular, contained data entity that enables QMP evaluation and other aspects of the AM ecosystem - Material Engineering Equivalence Baseline - Discussion of Material Engineering Equivalence concepts - Summary

Doug Wells↗

NASA’s Plans for the Release of Standards for Additive Manufactured Components

NASA has a critical need for the development of Agency standards for the certification of additively manufactured (AM) components. This is necessary since the current version of NASA standards for manned and noncrewed spaceflight hardware do not contain sufficient detail and the development of documents by the international standards organizations are not mature enough for implementation. AM parts are currently flying or in development for nearly all NASA flight programs. To bridge the gap prior to the release of Agency standards MSFC released two documents, MSFC-STD-3716 and MSFC-SPEC-3717. These documents were written specifically for laser power fusion of metallic powder, but the principles defined were used for tailoring requirements for current NASA manned missions. In 2018 a team of Agency AM experts was assembled and development of standards for the certification of additively manufactured components. These standards are design for use by all NASA programs and a broader spectrum of mature materials and processes. Four documents are being planned; NASA-STD-6030 (add title), NASA-STD-6032 (add title), NASA-STD-6033 (add title) and NASA-HNBK-6034 (add title). Two of these documents, NASA-STD-6030 and NASA-STD-6033, are being finalized for release in late 2020. These standards contain requirements that address part classification, metallurgical process control, material property development, part process control, part inspection and acceptance, equipment process control and vendor process control. This paper will present a summary of the status of each document and provide an overview of the content of NASA-STD-6030.

Richard Russell↗

Off‑World Additive Manufacturing - Augmenting NASA‑STD‑6030

This slide presents a summary for a soon to be released white paper on augmenting NASA-STD-6030 for off-world manufacturing. It examines the driving need for in-space manufacturing and its corresponding risks, challenges, potential solutions, and technology development needed to qualify a process.

NASA-STD-6030↗

Role of NDE and In-Situ Process Monitoring in Managing Risk of AM Space Hardware

The recently published NASA-STD-6030 defines the Additive Manufacturing (AM) Requirements for Spaceflight Systems. Key aspects of the certification approach include the development of a qualified material process (QMP) and material characterization determined by part classification. Nondestructive evaluation (NDE) of the full surface and volume is required for all part classifications except those with negligible risk. NASA is exploring the use of in-process monitoring data to improve risk posture and supplement post-build inspection for complex parts. Currently, the most challenging obstacle to overcome is linking the indications in the monitoring data to the physics of the process and the final material state of the finished part. NASA is undertaking studies to understand and quantify this relationship for various monitoring methods. The desired goal is to develop a protocol to establish this correlation for any monitoring method. Once this correlation is known, the critical defect size can be linked to a representative indication in the monitoring data, and the capability of the monitoring system can be tested using the 90/95 probability of detection requirement for NDE methods. This would enable the use of in-process monitoring as a defect screening activity for AM part certification. Many high-criticality components built with AM have high complexity and therefore limited inspectability, so using in-process monitoring can help address this certification gap. The use of adaptive, closed-loop monitoring systems that alter the locked process will require a new approach to the QMP.

additive manufacturing↗

Role of NDE and In-Situ Process Monitoring in Managing Risk of AM Space Hardware

The recently published NASA-STD-6030 defines the Additive Manufacturing (AM) Requirements for Spaceflight Systems. Key aspects of the certification approach include the development of a qualified material process (QMP) and material characterization determined by part classification. Nondestructive evaluation (NDE) of the full surface and volume is required for all part classifications except those with negligible risk. NASA is exploring the use of in-process monitoring data to improve risk posture and supplement post-build inspection for complex parts. Currently, the most challenging obstacle to overcome is linking the indications in the monitoring data to the physics of the process and the final material state of the finished part. NASA is undertaking studies to understand and quantify this relationship for various monitoring methods. The desired goal is to develop a protocol to establish this correlation for any monitoring method. Once this correlation is known, the critical defect size can be linked to a representative indication in the monitoring data, and the capability of the monitoring system can be tested using the 90/95 probability of detection requirement for NDE methods. This would enable the use of in-process monitoring as a defect screening activity for AM part certification. Many high-criticality components built with AM have high complexity and therefore limited inspectability, so using in-process monitoring can help address this certification gap. The use of adaptive, closed-loop monitoring systems that alter the locked process will require a new approach to the QMP.

advanced manufacturing↗

Having a Come-Apart: Lessons Learned from Additively Manufactured Hardware Failures

NASA has been engaged with additively manufactured (AM) process and component development since the 2000’s. AM offers various technical advantages, such as enhanced hardware design complexity, part consolidation, and processing of novel alloys in addition to programmatic advantages for reduction in processing time and cost. The focus of much of the AM development at NASA has been to mature the various processes, characterize material properties, develop standards, produce demonstrator parts, and integrate AM hardware in liquid rocket engines. These aspects have been demonstrated through process and design iterations using a methodical characterization, test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned. In addition to these fundamental demonstrations of the AM process and hardware development, alloys that provide performance advantages in the high temperature and high-pressure environments have been matured for use in rocket engines. These environments are challenging for any alloy and any design, and the AM process is required to fully meet the intended design requirements. The importance of proper AM process was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality resulted from an AM process issue. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. In part, such concerns motivate the AM certification approach that NASA has recently adopted in NASA-STD-6030 “Additive Manufacturing Requirements for Spaceflight Systems”. This presentation provides an overview of the previously mentioned failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. The objective of this presentation is to provide awareness to the community working critical and non-critical AM components and the lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

Additive Manufacturing↗

NASA's Certification and Qualification Challenges for Additively Manufactured Hardware: What Is Next?

In 2021, NASA released NASA-STD-6030 “Additive Manufacturing Requirements for Spaceflight Systems” to create qualification and certification strategies for mature metallic and non-metallic AM materials and technologies. While these standards have had an immediate impact on the additive manufacturing (AM) industry, there remain many challenges that have yet to be overcome. NASA and its partners in academia and industry are working together to proactively address these issues. One of the most critical needs is a Probabilistic Damage Tolerance Assessment (PDTA) approach, which includes the development of computational modeling, understanding the “effect of defects”, and the implementation of in-situ process monitoring and inspection techniques.

Will Tilson↗