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NASNF Processing and Packaging Technical Study

The ABD program will require development of a strategy for the dispositioning the Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF), some of which will be very challenging to handle and dissolve as described in this report. Not all the NASNF is suitable for processing through the electrolytic dissolver. The strategy may involve dissolution of the majority of the NASNF inventory in the electrolytic dissolver combined with some other disposition alternative(s) for the fraction that is not suitable for electrolytic dissolution. This report highlights the risks and challenges associated with the baseline approach of using the electrolytic dissolver to process all of the NASNF. In addition, the characteristics of the NASNF and how those characteristics relate to the risks associated with electrolytically dissolving the specific fuel types.

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Dissolution Flowsheet for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Campaign 1

As part of the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program, H Canyon plans to dissolve non-aluminum spent nuclear fuel (NASNF) in the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver. NASNF Campaign 1 plans to electrolytically dissolve 68 bundles of fuel assemblies from the Carolinas-Virginia Tube Reactor (CVTR), Heavy Water Components Test Reactor (HWCTR), and Experimental Boiling Water Reactor (EBWR). The fuel assemblies are intact Zircaloy or stainless steel (SS) clad UO 2 rods, tubes, and plates. The H Canyon electrolytic dissolver previously dissolved a variety of UO 2 core fuel types in SS, Zircaloy, Nichrome, or Incoloy cladding from 1969 to 1980. The objective of this study was to identify flowsheet conditions through literature review and laboratory experimentation to safely dissolve NASNF Campaign 1 bundles in the H Canyon electrolytic dissolver. Bench-scale electrolytic dissolution tests were performed to demonstrate a flowsheet for NASNF Campaign 1 bundles. The outer bundles are composed of SS or Al alloy, Al 6061-T6, and contain intact Zircaloy or SS clad UO 2 fuel assemblies. The key objectives of these tests were to determine bounding dissolver chemistries and the sparge requirement to ensure H 2 concentration remain less than 60 vol % of the lower flammability limit (LFL) during dissolution. The impact of HNO 3 concentration and the addition of fluoride on the dissolution efficiency of Zircaloy, 304L SS, Al 6061-T6, and Inconel 625 were examined. While SS, Al, and Inconel 625 readily dissolve utilizing electrolytic dissolution, Zircaloy disintegrated anodically; the surface of Zircaloy oxidized and the oxide layer spalled off and settled at the bottom of the dissolver as an insoluble material. The black flakes were identified as ZrO 2 and 85% of the Zr processed was converted to black ZrO 2 flakes when Zr was anodically disintegrated in 9.5 M HNO 3 .

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Evaluation of the Potential for Precipitation of Solids during Storage of Non-Aluminum SNF Solutions

Non-aluminum clad spent nuclear fuels (NASNF) stored in the L-Area basin will be dissolved in H-Canyon using the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver. The solutions will be stored in either the hot or warm canyon until the preparation of a sludge batch for the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Spent nuclear fuel solutions could be stored for 1-2 years before transfer to the H-Area Tank Farm depending on the interval between sludge batches. The solution level in the storage tanks will be maintained; therefore, precipitation of solids due to evaporation is not an issue. However, the precipitation of solids from completely dissolved SNF due to solution instabilities has been observed during intermediate storage of solutions generating hydrated oxides.The presence of fissile material in these solids is generally associated with zirconium molybdate, which is known to act as a host lattice for Pu and can carry the actinides upon precipitation. The formation of zirconium molybdate solids which carry fissile material is a potential concern for the storage of NASNF solutions. To address this concern, the Savannah River National Laboratory performed a literature review to identify knowledge gaps which may require experimental work to determine if the formation of solids is a concern during storage of these solutions. Based on the literature review, the precipitation of zirconium molybdate solids from the Campaign 1 NASNF solutions during intermediatestorage is expected. This conclusion is supported by the identification of zirconium molybdate solids found on the H-Canyon 6.1D Dissolver MK-12 insert spacer. The formation of the zirconium molybdate solids is attributed to hydrolysis and radiolytic processes in the nitric acid solution. As the molybdate solids form, U and Pu can substitute for Zr in the crystal lattice resulting in co-precipitation. Generally, the Pu substitutes directly into the crystal lattice during precipitation while the U associated with the molybdate solids more likely absorbs from the solution. The U in the NASNF solutions is present as uranyl nitrate, a 2+ cation which will not substitute as easily into the molybdate crystal lattice for the Zr 4+ ion.

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Visual Examination of Aluminum Containers for Extended Wet Storage of Non-Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel (FY 2021)

The goal of the Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) program is to provide a condition assessment of the storage containers for non-aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (NASNF) in L Basin and demonstrate continued safe storage of all NASNF pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The storage configuration of NASNF is vulnerable to inside-out corrosion attack. The approach being used in AMCAP is to develop and deploy examination methods for remote, in-situ inspection of the bundle storage in VTS and for OSC storage in the OSC racks. A method for Visual Examination (VE) using video-recording cameras was readied as part of the full-scale mockup development, and was deployed in L Basin for the initial condition assessment work. This report describes the development and the deployment of the VE for inspection of selected bundles in L Basin. The first deployment of the VE system was for visually examining five spent fuel bundles. Bundles were chosen based on their vulnerability in terms of inner fuel contents, history, storage duration, storage configuration, and possibility of inside out corrosion due to galvanic coupling of fuel cladding with the aluminum bundle wall.

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Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) - Proof-of-Principle (POP) Mockup for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Container In-Situ Examinations

A disciplined engineering approach is being followed to develop an engineered system of tooling and sensors, characterization techniques, and deployment subsystems for in-situ inspection of the several container types used for the storage of non-aluminum spent nuclear fuel (NASNF) in L Basin under the Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP). Inspecting the containers to provide information on their structural condition helps ensure the safe handling and storage of the NASNF containers pending final disposition. This report describes the work performed in the initial two phases of this developmental work, namely the bench scale and proof-of-principle (POP) scale, which focus on sensor selection and the tooling design and fabrication for two remote non-destructive examination (NDE) methods. These methods include visual testing (VT) for a visual examination of the container surfaces and ultrasonic testing (UT) for a n examination to characterize container wall material thickness and flaws.

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DISSOLUTION OF SURROGATE U-Zr FUEL USING ALNIFLEX CONDITIONS

Non-aluminum clad spent nuclear fuel (NASNF) stored in L Basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is widely varied in fuel composition, design, packaging, and physical condition. The complexity of the NASNF inventory presents significant challenges, and technology development is necessary for successful disposition. One such fuel in the inventory is metallic uranium-zirconium (U-Zr) alloy fuel, the focus of this study. Electrolytic or nitric acid only dissolution of metallic U-Zr alloy can form insoluble zirconium oxide, which results in up to 52% loss of U to insoluble solids, and can be subject to potentially uncontrolled oxidation reactions [1, 2]. The AlNiflex process was determined to be a viable dissolution flowsheet for the U-Zr alloy fuel. Under a narrow set of solution concentrations, a combination of hydrofluoric acid (HF), nitric acid (HNO3), aluminum nitrate (Al(NO3)3), and hexavalent chromium can safely dissolve U-Zr intermetallic alloys, keep Zr soluble, and not significantly corrode stainless steel (SS) vessels [3, 4.

Gogolski, Jarrod M. [Savannah River National Labor↗

Reference Fuel Development for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

The Savannah River Site (SRS) L Area Facility provides for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and has received more than 47,000 SNF assemblies since 1964. In order to consolidate receipt and storage analysis, L Area criticality safety has historically used several aluminum-clad “reference fuels” to establish bounding storage, handling, and cask loading limits and then applied a reactivity comparison approach to demonstrate that candidate fuels may be processed under the reference fuel limits. Currently, only aluminum-clad SNF from off-site research reactors are transferred on-site. The Accelerated Basin De-Inventory (ABD) program will begin the removal of bundled Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF) from the L Area disassembly basin for dissolution and disposition, which has driven the need for a non-aluminum reference fuel. This paper discusses the process and results of creating a new fictional homogenous NASNF highly enriched uranium reference fuel, “MITZ,” to be used in nuclear criticality safety evaluations for upcoming SNF disposition operations. Data demonstrating the relationship between neutron multiplication behavior and fuel spacing is generated for the new reference fuel MITZ as well as existing reference fuels representing several types of SNF assemblies.

Reference Fuel↗

Reference Fuel Development for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

The Savannah River Site (SRS) L Area Facility provides for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and has received more than 47,000 SNF assemblies since 1964. In order to consolidate receipt and storage analysis, L Area criticality safety has historically used several aluminum-clad “reference fuels” to establish bounding storage, handling, and cask loading limits and then applied a reactivity comparison approach to demonstrate that candidate fuels may be processed under the reference fuel limits. Currently, only aluminum-clad SNF from off-site research reactors are transferred on-site. The Accelerated Basin De-Inventory (ABD) program will begin the removal of bundled Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF) from the L Area disassembly basin for dissolution and disposition, which has driven the need for a non-aluminum reference fuel. This paper discusses the process and results of creating a new fictional homogenous NASNF highly enriched uranium reference fuel, “MITZ,” to be used in nuclear criticality safety evaluations for upcoming SNF disposition operations. Data demonstrating the relationship between neutron multiplication behavior and fuel spacing is generated for the new reference fuel MITZ as well as existing reference fuels representing several types of SNF assemblies.

Reference Fuel↗

Thermal Calculations to Determine Maximum Zircaloy Temperatures During Reactor Operations for Campaign 1 Fuel Assemblies

The H-Canyon Facility plans on processing bundles from Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF) Risk Group 1 (UO 2 core fuels). Uranium-zirconium (UZr) alloys and zirconium clad UO 2 fuel containing UZr intermetallic compound have the potential to cause explosions during dissolution. UZr intermetallic typically only forms when uranium and zirconium (or zirconium alloy) cladding are in contact at high temperatures. Thermal modeling was performed to determine the maximum cladding temperature for Campaign 1 Zircoloy cladded fuel assembles during reactor operation to help determine if the UZr intermetallic compound could have formed during reactor operations. The temperature of 350°C was chosen as a conservative minimum value for the possible formation of intermetallic UZr compound. The modeling approach, inputs, and results are outlined in this document.

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Plutonium Solubility and Supernate Concentration for Neutralized Fast Critical Assembly Discards to Savannah River Site Tank Waste

The Savannah River Site (SRS) plans to dissolve non-irradiated stainless steel (SS)-clad bundles of Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) materials in eighteen batches.1 FCA dissolution is currently underway in the 6.3D dissolver by simultaneous chemical and electrolytic dissolution, which is required to generate the harsh conditions necessary for dissolution of metal-oxide (MOX) and non-aluminum spent nuclear fuels (NASNFs).2 Nitric acid and potassium fluoride are used to promote chemical dissolution.2 Gadolinium will be added during processing as a thermal neutron poison for criticality control. There are no plans for recovering plutonium from this waste stream. After FCA dissolution, the acidic (HNO3/KF) “discards” containing the dissolved metals will be neutralized by addition of 50 wt% sodium hydroxide to a final free hydroxide concentration of 1.2 M.1 Neutralization will precipitate a slurry of insoluble solids, predominantly metal oxides/hydroxides of plutonium, uranium, and SS components. Small fractions of the SS components, Pu, U, and Gd will remain dissolved in the supernate. The neutralized slurry will be composited to existing radioactive waste storage tanks within the SRS Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) containing other similar sludge batch (SB) materials.1 The fate of soluble plutonium and freshly-precipitated, colloidal plutonium from this process are of concern since the total Pu can challenge the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) at the downstream SRS Liquid Waste (LW) facility. Supernate decants including the neutralized FCA discards (nFCAd) within the CSTF will be composited with salt batch (StB) materials and transferred to the SRS Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), where total plutonium is also of concern.

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Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program for SNF Wet Storage Life Extension - 20489

Approximately 27 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management is stored in the L Basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This 'DOE SNF' is comprised of approximately 12,000 aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel assemblies (∼7 MTHM), and approximately 2000 non-aluminum fuel assemblies (∼20 MTHM). A program is in progress to perform Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) of the fuel and their storage containers to characterize the materials' condition, and to evaluate the effects of service to enable continued safe wet storage of the SNF. The Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP), a two-part program to develop and implement remote underwater Non-Destructive Examination of the aluminum SNF, and of the containers of the non-aluminum SNF, respectively, is aimed at the characterization and evaluation of corrosion degradation of aluminum fuel and container materials. The predominant design of the aluminum SNF (ASNF) stored in L Basin is the Materials Test Reactor (MTR) equivalent design, a plate fuel design. These SNF are stored in 5'' diameter tubes or 5'' x 5'' squares (called bundles) that are nominally 12' or up to 14' long. The SNF is de-bundled and inspected using a custom-designed MTR Fuel Inspection Table. The inspection table provides for indexed fuel positioning for a video camera examination with controlled lighting. A total of 10 of the SNF originating from foreign research and test reactors were selected for examination based on burnup, enrichment, and prior damage caused by service/storage history. A special inspection campaign of these 10 assemblies is in progress. The observed corrosion damage included minor to moderate attack from general corrosion, pitting, crevice, end grain and galvanic corrosion. Example results from the completed inspections are shown and discussed. The focus is a comparison of the as-received condition versus the as-found current storage condition that will serve to validate Water Chemistry and Corrosion Monitoring Programs. The non-aluminum SNF (NASNF) stored in L Basin are of diverse design that includes various geometries with claddings of stainless steel, Zircaloy, and Hastelloy. The fuel core materials include uranium alloys, oxides/mixed oxides, and carbides. These SNF materials, originating from early experimental and test reactors, are in various physical forms including single fuel elements and cut pieces. The fuel is stored in L Basin in various configurations including in direct bundled storage in aluminum tubes and in isolation cans that are in the bundles or in a larger over-size storage container (OSC). Concern with inside-out corrosion and the potential loss of configuration control and ability to handle the storage containers prompted the development of remote NDE methods that include visual and UT technologies to assess the condition of the containers. Candidate stored materials were selected for a special inspection campaign; the development of the NDE methods for the inspection for galvanic, crevice and sediment-induced corrosion (inside-out) are discussed. A summary of the SNF storage in L Basin at the SRS, and an overview of the AMCAP to enable continued safe storage of DOE SNF are described. (authors)

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