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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Remixing the ‘Appropriate Mix’: Reassessing NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture in the Face of New Threats

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the countries of Europe face a renewed challenge from the east vis-à-vis the Putin regime in Moscow. In the face of these new challenges, NATO must reconsider its deterrence and defense posture in order to deter conflict in Europe. Unfortunately, Russian attempts to rewrite the rules of the post-Cold War international order by force have been coupled with nuclear saber rattling and overt nuclear threats. Russia’s nuclear threats, in addition to provocative changes to Russia’s nuclear posture in its Military Doctrine, are methods to make up for Russia’s conventional military inferiority relative to NATO and the United States. Some have described Moscow’s actions as laying the groundwork for a nuclear coercion strategy. While the decrease in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States has reduced the likelihood of nuclear annihilation to an all-time low since the height of the Cold War, Russia’s nuclear coercion strategy is increasing the probability of nuclear employment in Europe. The probability of nuclear use is compounded by Russia’s tremendous local military advantage around its periphery in spite of U.S. global military primacy. This military advantage increases the incentive to use military force if Russian decision-makers conclude that a quick military victory is possible, or if Russian leaders miscalculate based on an incorrect assessment of military force balance or resolve of their adversary. The integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (referred to as the Baltics in this paper) into the NATO alliance in 2004 makes Russia’s military advantage in its periphery increasingly relevant. Each NATO state is required to assist any NATO state that comes under attack per Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Baltic states’ proximity to Russia, their weak indigenous militaries, their former status as Soviet Republics, large population of ethnic Russians, and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s claim that he will protect Russians wherever they are makes the Baltics the most likely flashpoint for conflict between NATO and Russia. This analysis will tackle the problem of reshaping NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in light of the new Russian threat and its obligation to defend its most vulnerable members. Specifically, it will assess the suitability of NATO’s “appropriate mix” of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities to deterring conventional conflict with Russia and, if conventional deterrence fails, preventing Russian nuclear escalation. It will use a scenario-based approach informed by a deterrence model to explore how changes to NATO’s posture and policy could impact the deterrence of Russian aggression.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Russian Multi-Domain Strategy against NATO: information confrontation and U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe

Western philosophical and moral principles incline strategic thinkers in democratic societies to reject the notion that information can be used as a weapon or a domain of warfare instead of a tool of freedom and truth. International law suggests that the vast majority of societies and governments agree that freedom of information and truth are crucial to healthy societies. In practice, however, there are also governments that perceive them as both a form of strategic deception and as a vulnerability that can be exploited through information operations. An increasingly common dimension of Russian strategy against the United States and its NATO allies and partners is information confrontation [informatsionnoe protivoborstvo], or IPb. Russia actively pursues a strategy of exploiting perceived vulnerabilities of these democratic societies by carrying out informational-technical (e.g., cyber) and informational-psychological operations below the threshold of open military conflict in order to exacerbate pre-existing societal, political, and military divisions, thereby degrading NATO cohesion. The literature on IPb suggests that a key element of this strategy is an effort to create confusion and sow doubt in the existence of truth. Russia has also applied these operations alongside traditional military means of armed conflict in NATO partner states, Georgia and Ukraine, in order to slow down the decision-making processes in those countries as well as throughout the international community. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has employed both aspects of IPb to challenge the Westphalian international order and achieve a fait accompli with a limited use of military force. The body of literature dedicated to understanding the role of IPb in Russian strategy has yet to explore its relationship to U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. This topic merits study for at least three reasons. First, Russian strategic thinkers and official strategic documents identify NATO as threat and assign an increased role for asymmetric, indirect, and non-military (including informational) measures in conflict resolution. Second, Russia has historically used IPb against the Alliance with mixed success. In this regard, Soviet active measures [aktivnie meropriyatiya] operations targeting societal, political, and military divisions about NATO nuclear posture in the late 1970s and early 1980s are illuminating. Finally, current Russian practice reflects an effort to propagate disinformation about U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons. This study seeks to contribute to the body of literature on IPb by analyzing the evolution of Russian strategic thought on and practice of IPb in relation to U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. It explores the following questions: How and under which conditions does Russia employ IPb in an effort to achieve preferred strategic outcomes related to NATO nuclear force structure? What insights about contemporary Russian IPb efforts can be gained from studying Soviet active measures campaigns against NATO nuclear force posture?

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, NATO's Brussels Summit and Beyond

The NATO allies must react to the nuclear policy and posture choices of the Trump administration. In some respects, there are good reasons why the Alliance should move closer to the Trump Administration. In other cases, Allies should seek agreement on slightly different policies. While it is unrealistic to expect that the NATO allies will be able to resolve all the questions posed by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review at the Summit in Brussels, there are several things that they should be able to agree upon. This includes more specific language about the Russia nuclear challenges, general recognition of U.S. efforts to bolster NATO nuclear deterrence posture, a clear language on the value of nuclear sharing arrangements, and reaffirmation of some of NATO’s statements on arms control and disarmament. Yet, a signal in Brussels of NATO’s efforts to build a new nuclear consensus would be stronger if heads of state and government initiated a broader process aimed at developing a comprehensive deterrence and defense strategy that would treat nuclear deterrence as an integral part of a multi-domain approach.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

Turkey’s Independent Defense Developments: Implications for NATO

Turkey is undergoing many political and economic changes, which puts stress on the country’s foreign relationships. In the defense sphere, Turkey is becoming more active in acquiring new technology. These defense sector changes have implications for Turkey’s relationship with NATO and other countries.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2018

DHS S&T First Responders Group and NATO Counter UAS Proposal Interest Response.

The capability, speed, size, and widespread availability of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) makes them a serious security concern. The enabling technologies for sUAS are rapidly evolving and so too are the threats they pose to national security. Potential threat vehicles have a small cross-section, and are difficult to reliably detect using purely ground-based systems (e.g. radar or electro-optical) and challenging to target using conventional anti-aircraft defenses. Ground-based sensors are static and suffer from interference with the earth, vegetation and other man-made structures which obscure objects at low altitudes. Because of these challenges, sUAS pose a unique and rapidly evolving threat to national security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2012

The bound coherent neutron scattering length of the oxygen isotopes

The technique of neutron interferometry was used to measure the bound coherent neutron scattering length bcoh of the oxygen isotopes 17O and 18O. From the measured difference in optical path between two water samples, either H2 17O or H2 18O versus H2 natO, where nat denotes the natural isotopic composition, we obtain bcoh , 17O = 5.867(4) fm and bcoh , 18O = 6.009(5) fm, based on the accurately known value of bcoh , natO = 5.805(4) fm which is equal to bcoh , 16O within the experimental uncertainty. Our results for bcoh , 17O and bcoh , 18O differ appreciably from the standard tabulated values of 5.6(5) fm and 5.84(7) fm, respectively. In particular, our measured scattering length contrast of 0.204(3) fm between 18O and natO is nearly a factor of 6 greater than the tabulated value, which renders feasible neutron diffraction experiments using 18O isotope substitution and thereby offers new possibilites for measuring the partial structure factors of oxygen-containing compounds, such as water.

Fischer, Henry E↗
DOE OSTI2024

Interplay between Catalyst Corrosion and Homogeneous Reactive Oxygen Species in Electrochemical Ozone Production

In this study, electrochemical ozone production (EOP), a six-electron water oxidation reaction, offers promising avenues for creating value-added oxidants and disinfectants. However, progress in this field is slowed by a dearth of understanding of fundamental reaction mechanisms. In this work, we combine experimental electrochemistry, spectroscopic detection of reactive oxygen species (ROS), oxygen-anion chemical ionization mass spectrometry, and computational quantum chemistry calculations to determine a plausible reaction mechanism on nickel- and antimony-doped tin oxide (Ni/Sb–SnO 2 , NATO), one of the most selective EOP catalysts. Antimony doping is shown to increase the conductivity of the catalyst, leading to improved electrochemical performance. Spectroscopic analysis and electrochemical experiments combined with quantum chemistry predictions reveal that hydrogen peroxide (H 2 O 2 ) is a critical reaction intermediate. We propose that leached Ni 4+ cations catalyze hydrogen peroxide into solution phase hydroperoxyl radicals ( • OOH); these radicals are subsequently oxidized to ozone. Isotopic product analysis shows that ozone is generated catalytically from water and corrosively from the catalyst oxide lattice without regeneration of lattice oxygens. Further quantum chemistry calculations and thermodynamic analysis suggest that the electrochemical corrosion of tin oxide itself might generate hydrogen peroxide, which is then catalyzed to ozone. The proposed pathways explain both the roles of dopants in NATO and its lack of stability. Our study interrogates the possibility that instability and electrochemical activity are intrinsically linked through the formation of ROS. In doing so, we provide the first mechanism for EOP that is consistent with computational and experimental results and highlight the central challenge of instability as a target for future research efforts.

77 NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2017

Towards Integrated Strategic Deterrence - 3rd Annual Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar, 2016

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted the 3rd Annual Cross-Domain Deterrence (CDD) Seminar on November 15-17, 2016 in Livermore, CA. The seminar was sponsored by LLNL’s National Security Office (NSO) and Center for Global Security Research (CGSR). The primary purpose of the seminar was to utilize the crossdomain framework to work toward an approach for comprehensive and integrated strategic deterrence. The seminar focused on a tabletop exercise (TTX) to explore the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation in cyber space, outer space, and the nuclear domain. The TTX explored a scenario involving a NATO Article V defense of a Baltic ally. To help inform game “play,” the exercise was preceded by expert panel discussions about the CDD strategies of Russia and NATO. The exercise was followed by two panels on lessons learned and next steps, to help derive lessons from the TTX.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Euro-Deterrent: Analysis of Proposals for a European Nuclear Arsenal (CNSIS Paper)

The idea of a “Euro-deterrent”—a nuclear arsenal under European control and mandated to protect multiple European countries—has been proposed many times as a means for European self-defense independent of United States security guarantees under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This paper examines not only the concept’s multiple guises, but the reasons for their failure. It will address the idea of a Franco-British umbrella, a French umbrella, a European “pool”, and the nuclear arsenal of a hypothetical “united Europe”. Reasons for rejection largely fall into three categories: sovereignty concerns, credibility gaps, and a desire to preserve existing norms and structures. This paper concludes that the Euro-deterrent will likely remain only hypothetical unless the US unequivocally signals its intent to withdraw its nuclear umbrella from Europe, thereby forcing European countries to build a new defense arrangement.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2011

Oxygen as a site specific structural probe in neutron diffraction

Oxygen is a ubiquitous element, playing an essential role in most scientific and technological disciplines, and is often incorporated within a structurally disordered material where examples include molten silicates in planetary science, glasses used for lasers and optical communication, and water in biological processes. Establishing the structure of a liquid or glassy oxide and thereby its relation to the functional properties of a material is not, however, a trivial task owing to the complexity associated with atomic disorder. Here we approach this challenge by measuring the bound coherent neutron scattering lengths of the oxygen isotopes with the sensitive technique of neutron interferometry. We find that there is a small but finite contrast of 0.204(6) fm between the scattering lengths of the isotope 18O and oxygen of natural isotopic abundance natO, contrary to tables of recommended values. This has enabled us to investigate the structure of both light and heavy water by exploiting, for the first time, the method of oxygen isotope substitution in neutron diffraction, thus circumventing many of the significant problems associated with more traditional methods in which hydrogen is substituted by deuterium. We find a difference of ~0.5% between the O-H and O-D intra-molecular bond distances which is much smaller than recent estimates based on diffraction data and is found to be in excellent agreement with path integral molecular dynamics simulations made with a flexible polarisable water model. Our results demonstrate the potential for using oxygen isotope substitution as a powerful and effective site specific probe in a plethora of materials, of pertinence as instrumentation at next generation neutron sources comes online

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2017

Chapter 7: Renewable Energy Options and Considerations for Net Zero Installations

This chapter focuses on renewable energy options for military installations. It discusses typical renewable technologies, project development, and gives examples. Renewable energy can be combined with conventional energy sources to provide part or all of the energy demand at an installation. The appropriate technology mix for an installation will depend on site-specific factors such as renewable resources, energy costs, local energy policies and incentives, available land, mission compatibility, and other factors. The objective of this chapter is to provide basic background information and resources on renewable energy options for NATO leaders and energy personnel.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Chloride Molten Salt Electrolysis Enables Integrated and Energy-Efficient Process for NdFeB Magnet Fabrication

Rare-earth elements (REEs) have been identified by NATO, the USDOE, and USGS as critical materials, i.e., materials which have significant demand yet pose supply-chain risks. Many of the existing processes for separations, metallization, and final parts production used across the REE supply chain involve energy intensive steps. For example, neodymium (Nd or NdPr) is produced using oxyfluoride electrolysis of Nd 2 O 3 , which requires hydrofluoric acid to produce a key electrolyte component (NdF 3 ) and generates undesired perfluorocarbon (PFC) gases. Such challenges make securing a resilient supply chain for NdFeB permanent magnets in countries like the United States prohibitively difficult. Here, we propose a chloride-based MSE process that circumvents these challenges, delivering high-purity NdPr from a (NdPr)Cl 3 feed from upstream REE separations. This eliminates environmentally-damaging steps of oxalate or carbonate precipitation and calcination, and enables superior production rates due to greater solubility of (NdPr)Cl 3 in chloride melts compared to Nd 2 O 3 . We show that CMSE generates high-purity NdPr (99.4 wt.%) while being energy-efficient (~ 6 kWh/kg-Nd). NdPr from CMSE was used to fabricate a NdFeB magnet with an excellent maximum energy product (> 40 MGOe), comparable to commercially available NdFeB magnets. This establishes CMSE as a leading approach for integrated, energy-efficient NdFeB magnet production.

Materials science↗
DOE OSTI2013

Reductions Without Regret: Historical Perspectives

This is the first of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. This paper examines the circumstances and consequences of the elimination of The INF-range Pershing II ballistic missile and Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), deployed by NATO under a dual-track strategy to counter Soviet intermediate-range missiles while pursuing negotiations to limit or eliminate all of these missiles. The Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM), which was actually a family of missiles including SRAM A, SRAM B (never deployed), and SRAM II and SRAM T, these last two cancelled during an over-budget/behind-schedule development phase as part of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992. The nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM/N), first limited to shore-based storage by the PNIs, and finally eliminated in deliberations surrounding the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. The Missile-X (MX), or Peacekeeper, a heavy MIRVed ICBM, deployed in fixed silos, rather than in an originally proposed mobile mode. Peacekeeper was likely intended as a bargaining chip to facilitate elimination of Russian heavy missiles. The plan failed when START II did not enter into force, and the missiles were eliminated at the end of their intended service life. The Small ICBM (SICBM), or Midgetman, a road-mobile, single-warhead missile for which per-unit costs were climbing when it was eliminated under the PNIs. Although there were liabilities associated with each of these systems, there were also unique capabilities; this paper lays out the pros and cons for each. Further, we articulate the capabilities that were eliminated with these systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗