Euro-Deterrent: Analysis of Proposals for a European Nuclear Arsenal (CNSIS Paper)
The idea of a “Euro-deterrent”—a nuclear arsenal under European control and mandated to protect multiple European countries—has been proposed many times as a means for European self-defense independent of United States security guarantees under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This paper examines not only the concept’s multiple guises, but the reasons for their failure. It will address the idea of a Franco-British umbrella, a French umbrella, a European “pool”, and the nuclear arsenal of a hypothetical “united Europe”. Reasons for rejection largely fall into three categories: sovereignty concerns, credibility gaps, and a desire to preserve existing norms and structures. This paper concludes that the Euro-deterrent will likely remain only hypothetical unless the US unequivocally signals its intent to withdraw its nuclear umbrella from Europe, thereby forcing European countries to build a new defense arrangement.