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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records

The effect of the NERC CIP standards on the reliability of the North American Bulk Electric System

Considerable money and effort has been expended by generation, transmission, and distribution entities in North America to implement the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards for the bulk electric system. Assumptions have been made that as a result of the implementation of the standards, the grid is more cyber secure than it was pre-NERC CIP, but are there data supporting these claims, or only speculation? Has the implementation of the standards had an effect on the grid? Furthermore, developing a research study to address these and other questions provided surprising results.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Blockchain: Next Generation Supply Chain Security for Energy Infrastructure and NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Compliance

The U.S. power grid is a complex system of systems that requires a secure, reliable and trustworthy global supply chain. This is especially true for the grid’s increasing number of networked energy delivery system (EDS) and industrial control systems (ICS) and associated vendors, distributers, integrators and end users. Grid modernization has increased the use of “smart” energy devices that network, digitize, automate and increasingly converge the cyber-physical energy supply chain. In this Energy Internet of Things (EIoT) environment there is an increasing number of both critical cyber assets as well as data speed and size requirements, creating new cyber supply chain security and North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) CIP compliance challenges for utilities, regulators and vendors. In realization of these goals, improvements are needed in the process and technology to better monitor, audit and realize cyber security and compliance goals in complex EIoT environments. This paper explores how blockchain technology may present a disruptive solution to facilitate NERC CIP compliance and increase the security of the electricity infrastructure supply chain through a cryptographically signed distributed ledger that provides increased data provenance, attribution and auditability.

Blockchain, Cyber security, grid cyber, NERC CIP, ↗

Load Composition Analysis in Support of the NERC Load Modeling Task Force. 2019-2020 Field Test of the Composite Load Model

In 2015, NERC’s reliability standards were revised to require the use of dynamic load models in transmission planning studies. To comply with the standards, planners must use load models that explicitly represent the dynamic behavior of the different constituents of load at each load bus within their transmission planning models. The most important of these constituents are motor-driven and power electronics-based loads. Collectively, these representations are known as composite load models. In anticipation of the compliance date for the new standards, NERC’s Load Modeling Task Force (LMTF), in 2019, initiated a field test of composite load models involving the regional reliability planning entities. In support of the field test, DOE and BPA researchers developed region-specific composite load models that could be assigned to each non-industrial load bus in the planning models for each of the North American interconnections. Separate models were developed for each hour of a summer peak day, a winter peak day, and a spring light-load day. This report is the technical documentation for the load composition analysis that was conducted to develop these non-industrial composite load models.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NERC MISOPS

This investigation was commissioned by the Office of Electricity of the Department of Energy in response to reviewing the NERC State of Reliability report. The study is an attempt to proactively address electric utility industry needs. “Monitoring, analyzing, and tracking trends in Protection System Misoperations are critical to improve BES reliability. Historically, Protection System Misoperations have exacerbated the severity of most cascading power outages.” The NERC misoperations data shows that unnecessary trips are by far the leading category of reported misoperations and that a majority of misoperations are those of line protection packages. A significant number of misoperations are tied to microprocessor relays. Approximately one quarter of reported misoperations are due to incorrect settings and another one quarter of misoperations are due to relay failures/malfunctions and communication failures.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Securing Grid Communications Infrastructure: Addressing Gaps Beyond NERC CIP Facility Perimeters

The North American electric grid relies on a complex communications infrastructure that extends beyond facility perimeters traditionally covered by NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards. While CIP requirements have significantly strengthened cybersecurity within Electronic Security Perimeters, many operational communications—such as those between control centers, substations, and third-party networks—fall outside current regulatory scope. As grid modernization introduces new technologies and connectivity models, these external pathways present evolving security challenges. This brief explores the nature of these challenges, including emerging attack vectors and supply chain considerations, and highlights how ongoing grid transformation increases exposure to sophisticated threats. It outlines practical strategies and policy options to complement existing standards, such as expanding secure communications practices, enhancing supply chain transparency, and fostering collaboration among federal, state, and industry stakeholders. Near-term actions like encryption, authentication, and contractual safeguards can help reduce risk while longer-term frameworks are developed to ensure resilient and secure grid operations.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Reactive power interconnection requirements for PV and wind plants : recommendations to NERC

Voltage on the North American bulk system is normally regulated by synchronous generators, which typically are provided with voltage schedules by transmission system operators. In the past, variable generation plants were considered very small relative to conventional generating units, and were characteristically either induction generator (wind) or line-commutated inverters (photovoltaic) that have no inherent voltage regulation capability. However, the growing level of penetration of non-traditional renewable generation - especially wind and solar - has led to the need for renewable generation to contribute more significantly to power system voltage control and reactive power capacity. Modern wind-turbine generators, and increasingly PV inverters as well, have considerable dynamic reactive power capability, which can be further enhanced with other reactive support equipment at the plant level to meet interconnection requirements. This report contains a set of recommendations to the North-America Electricity Reliability Corporation (NERC) as part of Task 1-3 (interconnection requirements) of the Integration of Variable Generation Task Force (IVGTF) work plan. The report discusses reactive capability of different generator technologies, reviews existing reactive power standards, and provides specific recommendations to improve existing interconnection standards.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Applicability of the “Gallet equation” to the vegetation clearances of NERC Reliability Standard FAC-003-2

NERC has proposed a standard to use to specify clearances between vegetation and power lines. The purpose of the rule is to reduce the probability of flashover to a calculably low level. This report was commissioned by FERC’s Office of Electrical Reliability. The scope of the study was analysis of the mathematics and documentation of the technical justification behind the application of the Gallet equation and the assumptions used in the technical reference paper.

clearances↗

Follow-on to a report on the Applicability of the “Gallet equation” to the vegetation clearances of NERC Reliability Standard FAC-003-2

In earlier work, a study done at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory examined a NERC proposed standard specifying clearances between vegetation and power lines. The method proposed for calculating the clearances was based on the results of testing for high-voltage line designs. An equation developed to relate the results of testing with rod-plane gaps to proposed tower window sizes was incorporated into the calculations. The equation in question, sometimes called the “Gallet equation,” describes the insulation performance of the atmosphere for air gaps of a few meters. The equation was described in the PNNL study as a good and simple-to-use way to solve a problem made difficult by the nonlinear interactions of the variables. For calculations based on this equation, a certain set of assumptions must be made. In particular, a value for a quantity called the “gap factor” is needed. This is the amount by which the gap to be modeled by the equation is stronger than the reference gap that was used in developing the Gallet equation. That reference gap is the gap between a rod and a plane. This follow-on report examines the effect on flashover probabilities of assuming an incorrect value for the gap factor. In particular, the flashover probability is found that would result from using a value of 1.3 when a gap factor of 1.0 should be applied. It is shown that with these assumptions the probability of a flashover changes from being extremely unlikely (about 1 in 1000 chance) to a virtual certainty (about 97% chance).

high voltage: flashover: Gallet equation↗

Recommended Guidelines for NERC CIP Compliance for Synchrophasor Systems

Compliance with the NERC requirements for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) for synchrophasor systems in the Version 5 paradigm seems to be a matter of some uncertainty for those in the synchrophasor user community. This report aims to provide clarification and guidance in the form of case studies based on methods seen in the industry

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

CIE Update for NERC RSTC (March 2024)

This brief presentation provides a brief overview of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE), explains public resources available for CIE application, and reviews current efforts to expand CIE knowledge and use. To be presented to the NERC Reliability and Security Technical Committee at their annual in-person meetings in San Diego, CA.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Relevant Studies for NERC’s Analysis of EPA's Clean Power Plan 111 (d) Compliance

The purpose of this paper is to describe multiple studies of wind and solar integration that have found CO 2 reductions of approximately 30%. These studies can be viewed in several ways, including as viable paths to compliance with the EPA rule, alternative ''bookend cases'' to compare to compliance based largely on natural gas, or something in between. The studies in this paper represent a body of work that can help inform the public discussion surrounding the cost and reliability impacts of complying with the proposed EPA CPP.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Risk Assessment at the Edge: Applying NERC CIP to Aggregated Grid-Edge Resources

Distributed energy resources (DERs) promise to deliver benefits for both utilities and consumers by dynamically interoperating utility systems with customer-owned grid-edge technologies. These small energy-consuming devices are increasingly being aggregated for participation in grid markets, planning and operations. A cyber attack penetrating the control system of aggregated DERs could negatively impact the operation of the grid. In the worst case, the power grid could be severely damaged and physical safety compromised. In this paper we analyze cybersecurity risks associated with the aggregation of DERs and develop an approach to mitigating that risk. The approaches to both cyber risk analysis and mitigation were developed during a recent research project that serves as an example of how the approaches could be applied. However, both the risk analysis and mitigation are applicable to the broader domain of all DERs. An important conclusion is that the successful cyber compromise of aggregated DERs could have a significant impact on the bulk power system. This is the case even if each individual DER falls below the threshold of compliance with bulk-grid cybersecurity standards. For this reason, we specifically investigate how National Electricity Reliability Corporation's Critical Infrastructure Protection requirements could flow down to interactions between DER aggregators and the DERs themselves in order to protect the grid from these bulk-scale cyber attack impacts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

The impact of planning reserve margins in long-term planning models of the electricity sector

The planning reserve margin is the predominant metric used in long-term planning models to ensure the resource adequacy of projected power systems. Considerable work has been done to estimate the contribution of variable renewable energy resources, such as wind and solar, to the planning reserve margin, but little work has been done to assess what planning reserve margin should be used in planning models. Typically, U.S.-based models use the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)-recommended reserve margin levels. However, historical reserve margins have often exceeded the NERC-recommended levels, suggesting that the use of NERC-recommended levels in planning models may negatively bias projected future capacity investments relative to real-world trends. Using the Regional Energy Deployment System capacity expansion model, we show that setting the planning reserve margin to observed levels in lieu of the NERC-recommended levels leads to substantial differences in near-term capacity additions. Scenarios using alternative specifications for the reserve margin resulted in increased national solar builds of 20-100 GW. Given that the magnitude on results from altering the reserve margin level is similar to or greater than many policies frequently analyzed with planning models, careful consideration of the reserve margin level is crucial for developing accurate power sector projections.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Momentary Cessation: Improving Dynamic Performance and Modeling of Utility-Scale Inverter Based Resources During Grid Disturbances

Sandia National Laboratories worked with NERC staff to provide stakeholder guidance in responding to a May 2018 NERC alert regarding dynamic performance and modeling issues for utility-scale inverter-based resources. The NERC alert resulted from event analyses for grid disturbances that occurred in southern California in August 2016 and October 2017. Those disturbances revealed the use of momentary cessation of transmission connected inverter-based generation- a short time period when they ceased to inject current into the grid, counter to desired transmission operation. The event analyses concluded that, in many cases, the Western Interconnection system models used to determine planning and operating criteria do not reflect the actual behavior of solar plants, resulting in overly optimistic planning assessments and substandard operational responses. This technical report summarizes the gaps between the models and actual performance that were observed at those times, and the guidance that Sandia and NERC provided to owners of solar PV power plants, transmission planners, transmission operators and planning/reliability coordinators to modify existing models to reflect that actual performance

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Evaluating the Value of High Spatial Resolution in National Capacity Expansion Models using ReEDS

Power sector capacity expansion models (CEMs) have a broad range of spatial resolutions. This paper uses the Regional Energy Deployment System (ReEDS) model, a long-term national scale electric sector CEM, to evaluate the value of high spatial resolution for CEMs. ReEDS models the United States with 134 load balancing areas (BAs) and captures the variability in existing generation parameters, future technology costs, performance, and resource availability using very high spatial resolution data, especially for wind and solar modeled at 356 resource regions. In this paper we perform planning studies at three different spatial resolutions--native resolution (134 BAs), state-level, and NERC region level--and evaluate how results change under different levels of spatial aggregation in terms of renewable capacity deployment and location, associated transmission builds, and system costs. The results are used to ascertain the value of high geographically resolved models in terms of their impact on relative competitiveness among renewable energy resources.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Frequency Response Analysis Tool

Frequency response has received a lot of attention in recent years at the national level, which culminated in the development and approval of North American Electricity Reliability Corporation (NERC) BAL-003-1 Frequency Response and Frequency Bias Setting Reliability Standard. This report is prepared to describe the details of the work conducted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in collaboration with the Bonneville Power Administration and Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) Joint Synchronized Information Subcommittee (JSIS) to develop a frequency response analysis tool (FRAT). The document provides the details on the methodology and main features of the FRAT. The tool manages the database of under-frequency events and calculates the frequency response baseline. Frequency response calculations are consistent with frequency response measure (FRM) in NERC BAL-003-1 for an interconnection and balancing authority. The FRAT can use both phasor measurement unit (PMU) data, where available, and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) data. The tool is also capable of automatically generating NERC Frequency Response Survey (FRS) forms required by BAL-003-1 Standard.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗