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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Quantitative Encapsulation and Homogeneity Assessment of Sol–Gel Based Nuclear Explosive Debris Simulants

Nuclear explosive debris simulants are an important material in training and validating aspects of post-detonation nuclear forensic processes. Realistic simulants should replicate several aspects of nuclear explosive debris such as the size, shape, color, density, and chemical and radiological properties. Silica particles produced via sol-gel synthesis have recently been found to successfully reproduce many of these parameters including the controllable incorporation of radionuclide content. However, to be useful as a benchmarking material for validation and verification of laboratory methodologies, radionuclide content from batch-to-batch must be reproducible. Here, in this work, we explore the variance in radionuclide distribution incorporated into sol-gel benchmarking materials with respect to sample subdivision. Results will help inform the sample sizes required to minimize variance between samples.

36 - MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2026

Forensic characterization of surrogate nuclear explosion debris: radiochemical and spectroscopic strategies for method validation

Surrogate nuclear explosion debris (SNED) has emerged as a critical platform for advancing post-detonation nuclear forensic analysis in the absence of readily accessible historic materials. SNED enables controlled investigation and validation of analytical methodologies used to interrogate the chemical, isotopic, radiological, and microstructural signatures preserved in nuclear explosion debris. This review presents an integrated assessment of destructive and non-destructive analytical techniques commonly employed within decision-driven nuclear forensic workflows. Each technique is discussed individually while highlighting how it contributes to different stages of post-detonation analysis. Core methods – including gamma and alpha spectrometry, ICP-MS, TIMS, SIMS, SEM-EDS, XRF, LIBS, vibrational spectroscopy, and X-ray absorption spectroscopy – are critically evaluated with respect to forensic maturity, information content, and matrix limitations. Emphasis is placed on the role of SNED in benchmarking multi-modal workflows and identifying gaps in reproducing heterogeneity, fractionation, and radiation-driven evolution relevant to forensic attribution.

X-ray spectroscopic methods↗
DOE OSTI2026

A comparison of long-term 37 Ar and 39 Ar transport and implications for 39 Ar as a persistent indicator of underground nuclear explosions

Measurements were first made in 2016 of legacy 39 Ar gas from the decades-old Barnwell underground nuclear explosion site within the Nevada National Security Site. This has raised the question of the ubiquity of the radionuclide 39 Ar following underground nuclear explosions in general locations. This article presents a high-level evaluation of the scientific case for using 39 Ar as a long-term indicator of underground nuclear explosions. Assessment is made based on a broad set of assumptions to reasonably estimate the persistence of 39 Ar in the subsurface environment following an explosion to establish potential detectability years to decades after the originating event.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2025

A statistical approach to screening isotopic signatures in monitoring for underground nuclear explosions

The ability to differentiate between atmospheric radionuclide signatures from underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) and signals from other sources, such as medical isotope-production facilities and nuclear reactors, can be critical to the detection and monitoring of unannounced, low-yield nuclear events. Signatures having anomalously high amplitudes, compared to background levels, remain the best indicator in screening for a UNE. However, isotopic composition can further validate a suspected UNE signature, but separation from any atmospheric background composition is first necessary. To date, evaluating the challenges of performing this separation has typically involved comparing an observed background with a highly idealized deterministic model of radioxenon signature production by a UNE that does not consider the influence of post-detonation chemical/physical processes in the detonation cavity or the subsequent gas transport mechanisms that can also affect the isotopic composition of the detected gas signature. In addition, purely deterministic models, as previously employed, overlook the uncertainty inherent in estimating critical parameters characterizing the UNE and its detonation environment. In this paper, we create detailed, multi-parameter models of radionuclide evolution using the widely accepted England and Rider post-detonation radionuclide decay-chain network coupled to detailed models simulating physical production and transport processes affecting the gas signature. Because these models are governed by uncertain parameters including barometric fluctuations, realistic ranges of variation for each of the parameters influencing isotopic composition are then defined. A Latin-Hypercube sampling approach is used to obtain a random distribution of isotopic production and gas transport results associated with a given value of each parameter. We apply these results to background histories of two stations, one providing 4-isotope background measurements and the other providing two-isotope measurements associated with the 2013 DPRK announced UNE.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Designing Yield Grids for Airborne Nuclear Explosions to Maintain Decrements in Rayleigh Waveform Amplitudes

This document details a method for selecting grid points that sample the yields of airborne, low yield nuclear explosions that constrains the relative size of seismic waveforms sourced by explosions that are parameterized by this grid. In detail, we impose this constraint so that the vertical component of ground displacement that is sourced by explosions with a fixed height of burst (HoB) at grid point k change by a fixed factor of a when compared to the waveform amplitudes sourced by explosions at grid point k + 1, as observed at a fixed standoff distance. This gridding thereby preserves amplitude ratios along the grid so that they are agnostic to k. We assert that this method is useful in tests that apply algorithms against synthetic or augmented datasets for which the performance of the algorithm must be measured against source size, and waveform amplitudes must change uniformly (e.g., Berg et al, 2025).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Dynamic Networks Experiments: Virtual Experiments to Quantify Gains in Nuclear Explosion Monitoring

We describe an ongoing series of virtual experiments conducted collaboratively by four United States National Laboratories: Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. These Dynamic Network Experiments (DNEs) provide an experimental framework to evaluate the potential impact of new research tools on nuclear explosion monitoring. The second DNE (DNE2), completed in 2024, exploited waveform data (seismic, infrasound, and electromagnetic) that was recorded by multi-modal sensors within and near the Nevada National Security Site and synthetic radionuclide signatures over multiple time periods. During the execution of DNE2, we processed and analyzed data through a multi-stage event processing pipeline that ingested raw data, performed quality control, detected signals, built events from these signals, located these events, and characterized the events’ source types and sizes. For each stage and over the entire event processing pipeline, we evaluated performance changes by comparing the performance of new data processing methods, models, and algorithms against a baseline. We also performed an additional execution phase to assess event processing pipeline function, speed, and efficiency against that of an expert analyst, including computational and manual efforts. Finally, we assessed the impact and effort of modern computing infrastructure on the monitoring pipeline. This paper describes key elements of the DNEs, from formulation through execution, as demonstrated in DNE2. The DNEs introduce several novel concepts to quantitatively measure the potential impact of new methods on explosion monitoring, including the collaborative design of multi-modal datasets, performance and logistical metrics, and integrated analyses.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Yield Estimates of three Historical Atmospheric Nuclear Explosions at Lop Nor, from Reduced Order Models of Regionally Recorded Rayleigh Waveforms and One Seismic Station: A Brief Communication

We use a reduced order model (ROM) for Rayleigh waveforms sourced by large atmospheric explosions along with data collected from a single seismic station (TLG) to estimate the yields of three atmospheric nuclear tests with order-megaton (MT) yields. These historical tests were conducted by China between 1973 and 1980 (CHIC 15, CHIC 16, and CHIC 26). We use our ROM to estimate yields of 2.34 MT (CHIC 15), 0.51 MT (CHIC 16), and 1.15 (CHIC 26) in the 20.5 s period band that are consistent with publicly accepted values of 3 MT (CHIC 15), 0.50 MT (CHIC 16), and 0.730 MT (CHIC 26).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Nuclear Explosion Monitoring in the Changing Arctic

As the Arctic warms and loses its perennial ice cover, it attracts new attention as a locus for resource extraction, commerce, communication, and defense. The region previously had a relatively low priority in global geopolitics due to operational challenges but is quickly attracting interest for economic growth, competition, and potential conflict. Future years and decades will see a transformation of the Arctic’s place in global geopolitics. In this context, monitoring both human and natural activity in the Arctic is increasingly critical.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Explosive Byproduct Gas Transport Through Sorptive Geomedia

Current underground nuclear explosion (UNE) detection strategies rely heavily on atmospheric noble gas sampling of radioxenon. However, discriminating nuclear weapons testing programs from civilian sources is difficult due to highly variable atmospheric radioxenon backgrounds and processes affecting subsurface transport of parent radionuclides. Here, we aim to study the transport of gases produced by subsurface explosions as novel stable signatures for underground nuclear explosion (UNE) monitoring. These gases may be produced in large quantities with distinct molecular ratios, which will be impacted by subsurface transport processes. To demonstrate how ratios of gases produced by explosions can change during transport in geomaterials, we conducted laboratory benchtop experiments on the transport of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and hydrogen (H 2 ) gases through variably saturated zeolitic tuff, which is abundant at the historic US testing site. We observed that zeolitic tuff sorbs substantial quantities of CO 2 while allowing H 2 to transport more freely, leading to changes in the molecular ratios of the two gases along the transport pathway. Gas uptake in the dry zeolitic tuff core was 72.3% for CO 2 , compared with 53.4% for xenon and 7.6% for H 2 . The presence of 20% water saturation disrupted the CO 2 sorption process, though to a lesser extent than observed for noble gases, with a 36.7% drop in xenon sorption compared with a 21.9% drop for CO 2 . These results represent the first observations of zeolite sorption altering explosive gas ratios during transport through geomedia relevant to nuclear proliferation monitoring.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Measurements of radioxenon activities during periods of gaseous release from an advanced gas-cooled reactor

Activities of radioxenon isotopes are reported from an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) during periods of gaseous release. Xenon isotopes are relevant to the monitoring regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). These releases may affect detections from the International Monitoring System (IMS) by influencing the radioxenon background. Time series activity plots have been produced from both in-core monitoring and direct measurement at the point of release using a stack monitor system. Ratio plots using both data sets have been produced with results compared with a commonly chosen nuclear explosion “discrimination line.” The reported results improve the understanding of radionuclide emissions from civil nuclear power plants. This work is being performed as part of the Xenon Environmental Nuclide Analysis at Hartlepool (XENAH) collaboration between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE, UK), EDF Energy (UK), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL, USA), and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Preferential adsorption of noble gases in zeolitic tuff with variable saturation: A modeling study of counter-intuitive diffusive-adsorptive behavior

Noble gas transport through geologic media has important applications in the prediction and characterization of measured gas signatures related to underground nuclear explosions (UNEs). Retarding processes such as adsorption can cause significant species fractionation of radionuclide gases, which has implications for measured and predicted signatures used to distinguish radioxenon originating from civilian nuclear facilities or from UNEs. Accounting for the effects of variable water saturation in geologic media on tracer transport is one of the most challenging aspects of modeling gas transport because there is no unifying relationship for the associated tortuosity changes between different rock types, and reactive transport processes such as adsorption that are affected by the presence of water likewise behave differently between gas species. In this study, we perform numerical diffusive-adsorptive transport simulations to estimate gas transport parameters associated with bench-scale laboratory diffusion cell experiments measuring breakthrough in zeolitic and non-zeolitic rocks for a gaseous mixture of xenon, krypton, and SF 6 at varying degrees of water saturation (S w ). Counter-intuitive transport behavior was observed in the zeolitic rock experiments whereby breakthrough concentrations were significantly higher when the core was partially saturated (S w = 17 %) than under dry (S w = 0 %) conditions. Breakthrough of xenon was especially retarded in the dry core – likely due to comparatively high affinity of xenon for zeolitic adsorption sites – and estimated effective diffusion coefficients for all gases were approximately an order of magnitude lower than what is predicted by porosity-tortuosity models. We propose the counter-intuitive behavior observed is because water infiltration of zeolite nanopores reduces both the adsorptive capacity of the rock and the tortuosity of connected flow paths. We developed a two-site competitive kinetic Langmuir adsorption reaction for the porous media transport simulator in order to constrain transport parameters within zeolitic tuff, where differential adsorption to zeolite and non-zeolite pores was observed. We determined that liquid saturation-dependent diffusive-adsorptive transport is affected by subtle and at times competing processes that are specific to different gases, which have a significant overall influence on effective transport parameters.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Analysis of 127 Xe tracer measurements using a net counts method

A suite of measurement systems were deployed as part of the Physical Experiment 1 series of experiments, which involved detonating chemical explosives along with radionuclide tracers in an underground cavity, at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in the United States. One of the radionuclide tracers, 127 Xe was released from the containment following the explosion and detected on a SAUNA Q B sampler situated approximately 3.5 km away. The system uses a beta-gamma coincidence detector system to measure fission product radioisotopes of xenon relevant to nuclear explosion monitoring. In this work we use the coincidence measurement data to analyse and interpret the results from the SAUNA Q B system, to calculate the measured 127 Xe activity concentration(s).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Simulating High-Frequency Seismograms in Realistic Earth Models to Better Understand Source Discrimination Based on Differential Magnitudes ( M L− M c)

Discriminating low-yield underground nuclear explosions from small earthquakes is a key task in monitoring nuclear test ban treaties. P/S amplitude ratios have been an effective discriminant for moderate-sized events recorded at regional distances, but it is unclear if they are as effective in discriminating small seismic events recorded at local distances (<150 km). The difference between local magnitude (M L ) and coda duration magnitude (M c ) has been proposed as a new discriminant that may complement P/S amplitude ratios at local distances. Here, in this work, we calculate high-frequency (up to ∼4 Hz) synthetic seismograms at epicentral distances of 0–30 km in realistic models of the Salt Lake basin (Utah, United States) to better understand how variations in source type and depth affect M L −M c values. The Earth models incorporate simplified 1D and deterministic 3D structures, small-wavelength stochastic velocity perturbations, and surface topography. Coda waves are enhanced for the more complicated models compared to the base 1D model, but still underpredict observed durations by about a factor of two, which results in overprediction of amplitude to duration ratios (i.e., M L −M c values) for a near-surface explosion and a 7 km deep earthquake. For both source types, the predicted M L and M c values decrease as source depth increases, and M L −M c shows only minor variation with depth; however, M L −M c is on average ∼0.5 units smaller for explosions than earthquakes. This finding may imply that M L −M c has sensitivity to source type, in addition to being a depth discriminant, but more modeling is needed given the limitations of the current study. Future modeling should incorporate higher-frequency (≳5 Hz) simulations over a larger distance range (0–150 km), where M L and M c are commonly measured, while honoring low shear velocities (<300 m/s) near the surface and sampling a wider range of earthquake and explosion source mechanisms.

Hutchings, Sean J. [Univ. of Utah, Salt Lake City,↗
DOE OSTI2025

Demonstration of active neutron interrogation of special nuclear materials using a high-intensity short-pulse-laser-driven neutron source

Detecting shielded special nuclear material, such as nuclear explosives, is a difficult challenge pursued by non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and nuclear security programs worldwide. Interrogation with intense fast-neutron pulses is a promising method to characterize concealed nuclear material rapidly but is limited by suitable source availability and proven instrumentation. In this study we have pioneered a demonstration of such an interrogation method using a high-intensity, short-pulse, laser-driven neutron source that offers potential benefits compared to conventional neutron sources. The measurement results reported here represent the first experimental demonstration of this interrogation approach on enriched uranium items and demonstrate the feasibility of a precise measurement using realistic nuclear materials, representative of field scenarios, even with just a single laser-driven neutron pulse. Bright pulsed sources can overcome the nuisance background of items with strong internal neutron sources, improving analytical power, while single-shot assay is attractive in high-throughput situations where time is at a premium. The science and technology of this type of neutron production is developing rapidly, and we anticipate that practical mobile interrogation systems will become available based on the detection concepts demonstrated here to meet the growing measurement needs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Permeability scaling relationships of volcanic tuff from core to field scale measurements

A recent chemical explosive test in P-Tunnel at the Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, USA, was conducted to better understand how signals propagate from explosions in the subsurface. A primary signal of interest is the migration of gases that can be used to differentiate chemical from nuclear explosions. Gas migration is highly dependent on the rock permeability which is notoriously difficult to determine experimentally in the field due to a potentially large dependence on the scale over which measurements are made. Here, we present pre-explosion permeability estimates to characterize the geologic units surrounding the recent test. Permeability measurements were made at three scales of increasing size: core samples (≈2 cm), borehole packer system tests (≈1 m), and a pre-shot cavity pressurization test (> 10 m) across ten tuff units. Permeability estimates based on core measurements showed little difference from borehole packer tests. However, permeability in most rock units calibrated from cavity pressurization tests resulted in higher permeability estimates by up to two orders of magnitude. Here, we demonstrate that the scale of the measurement significantly impacts the characterization efforts of hydraulic properties in volcanic tuff, and that local-scale measurements (< 10 m scale) do not incorporate enough heterogeneity to accurately predict field-scale flow and mass transport.

Environmental sciences↗
DOE OSTI2025

An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.

12-201800↗
DOE OSTI2025

Incorporating civilian radioxenon background estimates in anomaly detection

A nuclear explosion screening exercise in 2023 (Maurer et al., 2023) found challenges with discerning anomalous radioxenon activity concentrations relative to elevated background concentrations. Research has continued into methods to detect anomalous radioxenon concentrations by comparing samples to estimates of atmospheric radioxenon background concentrations caused by releases at nuclear reactors or medical isotope production facilities. A new approach estimates the sample concentrations using time-varying radioxenon release rates obtained using optimization techniques that constrain the facility release rates to plausible amounts based on historical data or facility knowledge. The purpose of the optimization is to determine whether any combination of plausible release rates from emitting facilities can explain a series of radioxenon measurements at one or more sampling stations. A case study uses radioxenon data collected at three locations in western Europe for a month in 2021 and considers releases from 77 locations. Fewer samples are identified as being anomalous using a simplistic flagging rule than from an application of the current International Monitoring System (IMS) activity concentration-level rule.

Environmental sciences↗
DOE OSTI2025

127 Xe quantification method development and intercomparison exercise

Monitoring of the atmosphere for fission products ( 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) is performed by various laboratories to detect nuclear explosions. Quantification of 127 Xe is not routinely performed by laboratories measuring atmospheric radioxenon because it is not a fission product. 127 Xe was recently detected by a ground-based beta-gamma air monitoring system. When measured using beta-gamma coincidence detector systems, such as those in use on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 127 Xe can interfere with the quantification of fission product radioxenon due to overlap of the 127 Xe beta-gamma coincidence signatures with those of fission product radioxenon. Here, this work demonstrates quantification of 127 Xe at different laboratories with different measurement techniques. Production and purification of 127 Xe was performed by neutron activation of enriched 126 Xe. The purified 127 Xe was then split between laboratories, and detection and quantification methods were developed. At Idaho National Laboratory, a quantification method involving high purity germanium detectors was devised that included self-attenuation correction. At AWE, a beta-gamma coincidence counting method, as used in support of the IMS, was modified to enable the measurement and analysis of the 127 Xe samples. Corrections were made for self-attenuation, which showed a strong xenon volume dependency, for some coincidence signatures. The gas sample activity concentration was used as the comparison metric and it showed excellent agreement between the methods.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗