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At least 19 records

Materials and Sensor R&D to Transform the Nuclear Stockpile: Livermore?s Transformational Materials Initiative

As the nation's nuclear weapons age and the demands placed on them change, significant challenges face the nuclear stockpile. Risks include material supply issues, ever-increasing lifecycle costs, and loss of technical expertise across the weapons complex. For example, non-nuclear materials are becoming increasingly difficult to replace because manufacturing methods and formulations have evolved in such a way as to render formerly available materials unprofitable, unsafe, or otherwise obsolete. Subtle formulation changes in available materials that occur without the knowledge of the weapons community for proprietary reasons have frequently affected the long-term performance of materials in the nuclear weapon environment. Significant improvements in performance, lifetime, or production cost can be realized with modern synthesis, modeling, and manufacturing methods. For example, there are currently supply and aging issues associated with the insensitive high explosive formulations LX-17 and PBX 9502 that are based on triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) and Kel-F, neither of which are commercially available today. Assuring the reliability of the stockpile through surveillance and regularly scheduled Life Extension Programs is an increasingly expensive endeavor. Transforming our current stockpile surveillance--a system based on destructive testing of increasingly valuable assets--to a system based on embedded sensors has a number of potential advantages that include long-term cost savings, reduced risk associated with asset transportation, state-of-health assessments in the field, and active management of the stockpile.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Nuclear stockpile stewardship and Bayesian image analysis (DARHT and the BIE)

Since the end of nuclear testing, the reliability of our nation's nuclear weapon stockpile has been performed using sub-critical hydrodynamic testing. These tests involve some pretty 'extreme' radiography. We will be discussing the challenges and solutions to these problems provided by DARHT (the world's premiere hydrodynamic testing facility) and the BIE or Bayesian Inference Engine (a powerful radiography analysis software tool). We will discuss the application of Bayesian image analysis techniques to this important and difficult problem.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Optics of Deterrence: How Science Assures the Nuclear Stockpile's Reliability In Lieu of Testing

When designing a product intended to perform a certain function and satisfy some set of criteria, the standard engineering method to assess its ability to perform is to test it. This nearly universal concept works consistently, assuring proper function and generally avoiding or mitigating the consequence of failure to within acceptable limits. What would happen if the product developers were told that they must continue to certify and validate the performance without testing it, that the landscape in which the product must serve its purpose is constantly evolving, and that the product in question is the United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile? This is the position the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) finds itself in; the reliability of the stockpile must be verified without actually testing it to see if it works as intended.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and nuclear arms control to enable significant stockpile reductions

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Hedge math: Theoretical limits on minimum stockpile size across nuclear hedging strategies

In June 2013, the Department of Defense published a congressionally mandated, unclassified update on the U.S. Nuclear Employment Strategy. Among the many updates in this document are three key ground rules for guiding the sizing of the non-deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile. Furthermore, these ground rules form an important and objective set of criteria against which potential future stockpile hedging strategies can be evaluated.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Approaches to integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and arms control objectives.

Historically, U.S. arms control policy and the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise have been reactive to each other, rather than interdependent and mutually reinforcing. One element of the divergence has been the long timescale necessary to plan and create substantive changes in the infrastructure vs. the inherent unpredictability of arms control outcomes. We explore several examples that illustrate this tension, some of the costs and implications associated with this reactive paradigm, and illustrate that, while the nuclear weapons enterprise has long considered the implications of arms control in sizing capacity of its missions, it has not substantively considered arms control in construction requirement for capabilities and products. Since previous arms control agreements have limited numbers and types of deployed systems, with delivery systems as the object of verification, this disconnect has not been forefront. However, as future agreements unfold, the warhead itself may become the treaty limited item and the object of verification. Such a scenario might offer both the need and the opportunity to integrate nuclear weapons and arms control requirements in unprecedented ways. This paper seeks to inspire new thinking on how such integration could be fostered and the extent to which it can facilitate significant reduction in nuclear stockpiles.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integrated Initiative for Plutonium and Actinide Missions

Recognizing the dynamic environment and challenges facing the plutonium and actinide missions at Los Alamos National Laboratory over the next decade, Laboratory leadership established Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Laboratory Agenda Item 2.6. This agenda item calls for the development and implementation of an integrated initiative for plutonium and actinide missions at Los Alamos. Over the next decade, Los Alamos has been asked to significantly ramp up pit production to help address nuclear stockpile and nuclear deterrence needs, heat source production to support expansion in space exploration, evaluation of stockpile returns, processing operations in support of nonproliferation, and the actinide science to support all of these efforts. All of this must be accomplished while significantly increasing the size of our plutonium and actinide missions workforce and modernizing and updating critical infrastructure. Only through enhanced integration of science, technology, and engineering (ST&E), manufacturing, and mission operations will we enable achievement of these critical missions. An overall summary of the plutonium and actinide missions is included in Figure 1 on Page 3 and Figure 2 on Page 4 summarizes our goals, objectives, FY 2021 recommended actions and internal strategic priorities that are key elements of our integrated initiative.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Theoretical Description of the Fission Process

Advanced theoretical methods and high-performance computers may finally unlock the secrets of nuclear fission, a fundamental nuclear decay that is of great relevance to society. In this work, we studied the phenomenon of spontaneous fission using the symmetry-unrestricted nuclear density functional theory (DFT). Our results show that many observed properties of fissioning nuclei can be explained in terms of pathways in multidimensional collective space corresponding to different geometries of fission products. From the calculated collective potential and collective mass, we estimated spontaneous fission half-lives, and good agreement with experimental data was found. We also predicted a new phenomenon of trimodal spontaneous fission for some transfermium isotopes. Our calculations demonstrate that fission barriers of excited superheavy nuclei vary rapidly with particle number, pointing to the importance of shell effects even at large excitation energies. The results are consistent with recent experiments where superheavy elements were created by bombarding an actinide target with 48-calcium; yet even at high excitation energies, sizable fission barriers remained. Not only does this reveal clues about the conditions for creating new elements, it also provides a wider context for understanding other types of fission. Understanding of the fission process is crucial for many areas of science and technology. Fission governs existence of many transuranium elements, including the predicted long-lived superheavy species. In nuclear astrophysics, fission influences the formation of heavy elements on the final stages of the r-process in a very high neutron density environment. Fission applications are numerous. Improved understanding of the fission process will enable scientists to enhance the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear stockpile and nuclear reactors. The deployment of a fleet of safe and efficient advanced reactors, which will also minimize radiotoxic waste and be proliferation-resistant, is a goal for the advanced nuclear fuel cycles program. While in the past the design, construction, and operation of reactors were supported through empirical trials, this new phase in nuclear energy production is expected to heavily rely on advanced modeling and simulation capabilities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment

Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

HedgeHOGS: A Rapid Nuclear Hedge Sizing and Analysis Tool

The U.S. nuclear stockpile hedge is an inventory of non-deployed nuclear warheads and a force structure capable of deploying those warheads. Current guidance is to retain this hedge to mitigate the risk associated with the technical failure of any single warhead type or adverse geopolitical developments that could require augmentation of the force. The necessary size of the hedge depends on the composition of the nuclear stockpile and assumed constraints. Knowing the theoretical minimum hedge given certain constraints is useful when considering future weapons policy. HedgeHOGS, an Excel-based tool, was developed to enable rapid calculation of the minimum hedge size associated with varying active stockpile composition and hedging strategies.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Science and Technology Review July/August 2010

This issue has the following articles: (1) Deterrence with a Minimum Nuclear Stockpile - Commentary by Bruce T. Goodwin; (2) Enhancing Confidence in the Nation's Nuclear Stockpile - Livermore experts are participating in a national effort aimed at predicting how nuclear weapon materials and systems will likely change over time; (3) Narrowing Uncertainties - For climate modeling and many other fields, understanding uncertainty, or margin of error, is critical; (4) Insight into a Deadly Disease - Laboratory experiments reveal the pathogenesis of tularemia in host cells, bringing scientists closer to developing a vaccine for this debilitating disease. (5) Return to Rongelap - On the Rongelap Atoll, Livermore scientists are working to minimize radiological exposure for natives now living on or wishing to return to the islands.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Without Testing: Stockpile Stewardship in the Second Nuclear Age

Stockpile stewardship is a topic dear to my heart. I’ve been fascinated by it, and I’ve lived it—mostly on the technical side but also on the policy side from 2009 to 2010 at Stanford University as a visiting scholar and the inaugural William J. Perry Fellow. At Stanford I worked with Perry, former secretary of defense, and Sig Hecker, former Los Alamos Lab director (1986–1997), looking at nuclear deterrence, nuclear policy, and stockpile stewardship and at where all this was headed.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

20 Years of Success: Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

On Oct. 22, 2015, NNSA celebrated the proven success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program at a half-day public event featuring remarks by Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator Lt. Gen. (retired) Frank G. Klotz. The event also featured remarks by Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall and NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator Madelyn Creedon.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Engineering Services in a Mission Critical Environment: Engineering Services - Science and Technology Operations’ Infrastructure Support at Los Alamos National Laboratory

As an engineering team within a facilities-driven organization, Engineering Services – Science and Technology Operations (ES-STO), supports Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), playing a pivotal role in the U.S. nuclear stockpile mission. This report outlines ES-STO’s contributions through the installation of crucial systems such as HVAC units, compressors, and scientific specialty equipment, as well as providing expert consultation to optimize laboratory operations. ES-STO’s goal is to ensure that LANL's infrastructure and research facilities are aligned with mission-critical needs, supporting both operational efficiency and safety in the nuclear stockpile management and maintenance. This report discusses the installation processes, ongoing consultations, and the significant impact of our efforts on national security objectives.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗