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At least 19 records

Surface Disturbances at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Another Indicator of Nuclear Testing?

A review of available very high-resolution commercial satellite imagery (bracketing the time of North Korea’s most recent underground nuclear test on 9 September 2016 at the Punggye-ri Underground Nuclear Test Site) has led to the detection and identification of several minor surface disturbances on the southern flank of Mt. Mantap. These surface disturbances occur in the form of small landslides, either alone or together with small zones of disturbed bare rock that appear to have been vertically lofted (“spalled”) as a result of the most recent underground explosion. Typically, spall can be uniquely attributed to underground nuclear testing and is not a result of natural processes. However, given the time gap of up to three months between images (pre- and post-event), which was coincident with a period of heavy typhoon flooding in the area1, it is not possible to determine whether the small landslides were exclusively explosion induced, the consequence of heavy rainfall erosion, or some combination of the two.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Estimation of Radiation Doses to U.S. Military Test Participants from Nuclear Testing: A Comparison of Historical Film-Badge Measurements, Dose Reconstruction and Retrospective Biodosimetry

Retrospective radiation dose estimations, whether based on physical or biological measurements, or on theoretical dose reconstruction, are limited in their precision and reliability, particularly for exposures that occurred many decades ago. Here, we studied living U.S. military test participants, believed to have received high-dose radiation exposures during nuclear testing-related activities approximately six decades ago, with two primary goals in mind. The first was to compare three different approaches of assessing past radiation exposures: 1. Historical personnel monitoring data alone; 2. Dose reconstruction based on varying levels of completeness of individual information, which can include film badge data; and 3. Retrospective biodosimetry using chromosome aberrations in peripheral blood lymphocytes. The second goal was to use the collected data to make the best possible estimates of bone marrow dose received by a group with the highest military recorded radiation doses of any currently living military test participants. Six nuclear test participants studied had been on Rongerik Atoll during the 1954 CASTLE Bravo nuclear test. Another six were present at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and/or Pacific Proving Ground (PPG) and were believed to have received relatively high-dose exposures at those locations. All were interviewed, and all provided a blood sample for cytogenetic analysis. Military dose records for each test participant, as recorded in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Nuclear Test Review and Information System, were used as the basis for historical film badge records and provided exposure scenario information to estimate dose via dose reconstruction. Dose to bone marrow was also estimated utilizing directional genomic hybridization (dGH) for high-resolution detection of radiation-induced chromosomal translocations and inversions, the latter being demonstrated for the first time for the purpose of retrospective biodosimetry. As the true dose for each test participant is not known these many decades after exposure, this study gauged the congruence of different methods by assessing the degree of correlation and degree of systematic differences. Overall, the best agreement between methods, defined by statistically significant correlations and small systematic differences, was between doses estimated by a dose reconstruction methodology that exploited all the available individual detail and the biodosimetry methodology derived from a weighted average dose determined from chromosomal translocation and inversion rates. Employing such a strategy, we found that the Rongerik veterans who participated in this study appear to have received, on average, bone marrow equivalent doses on the order of 300–400 mSv, while the NTS/ PPG participants appear to have received approximately 250–300 mSv. The results show that even for nuclear events that occurred six decades in the past, biological signatures of exposure are still present, and when taken together, chromosomal translocations and inversions can serve as reliable retrospective biodosimeters, particularly on a group-average basis, when doses received are greater than statistically-determined detection limits for the biological assays used.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Chemical Explosion Experiments to Improve Nuclear Test Monitoring [Developing a New Paradigm for Nuclear Test Monitoring with the Source Physics Experiments (SPE)]

A series of chemical explosions, called the Source Physics Experiments (SPE), is being conducted under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to develop a new more physics-based paradigm for nuclear test monitoring. Currently, monitoring relies on semi-empirical models to discriminate explosions from earthquakes and to estimate key parameters such as yield. While these models have been highly successful monitoring established test sites, there is concern that future tests could occur in media and at scale depths of burial outside of our empirical experience. This is highlighted by North Korean tests, which exhibit poor performance of a reliable discriminant, mb:Ms (Selby et al., 2012), possibly due to source emplacement and differences in seismic responses for nascent and established test sites. The goal of SPE is to replace these semi-empirical relationships with numerical techniques grounded in a physical basis and thus applicable to any geologic setting or depth.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Norbo Underground Nuclear Test in U8c, Nevada Nuclear Security Site, and the Impact on Stability of the Ground Surface

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo underground nuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

International challenge to predict the impact of radioxenon releases from medical isotope production on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty sampling station

Abstract The International Monitoring System (IMS) is part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO). At entry-into-force, half of the 80 radionuclide stations will be able to measure concentrations of several radioactive xenon isotopes produced in nuclear explosions, and then the full network may be populated with xenon monitoring afterward (Bowyer et al., 2013). Fission-based production of 99Mo for medical purposes also releases radioxenon isotopes to the atmosphere (Saey, 2009). One of the ways to mitigate the effect of emissions from medical isotope production is the use of stack monitoring data, if it were available, so that the effect of radioactive xenon emissions could be subtracted from the effect from a presumed nuclear explosion, when detected at an IMS station location. To date, no studies have addressed the impacts the time resolution or data accuracy of stack monitoring data have on predicted concentrations at an IMS station location. Recently, participants from seven nations used atmospheric transport modeling to predict the time-history of 133Xe concentration measurements at an IMS station in Germany using stack monitoring data from a medical isotope production facility in Belgium. Participants received only stack monitoring data and used the atmospheric transport model and meteorological data of their choice. Some of the models predicted the highest measured concentrations quite well (a high composite statistical model comparison rank or a small mean square error with the measured values). The results suggest release data on a 15 min time spacing is best. The model comparison rank and ensemble analysis suggests that combining multiple models may provide more accurate predicted concentrations than any single model. Further research is needed to identify optimal methods for selecting ensemble members and those methods may depend on the specific transport problem. None of the submissions based only on the stack monitoring data predicted the small measured concentrations very well. The one submission that best predicted small concentrations also included releases from nuclear power plants. Modeling of sources by other nuclear facilities with smaller releases than medical isotope production facilities may be important in discriminating those releases from releases from a nuclear explosion.

133Xe↗

The distinct conditions of atmospheric and underground nuclear tests revealed by Zn isotopic compositions of nuclear debris samples

We analyzed the Zn isotopic compositions of nuclear debris samples from atmospheric and underground nuclear tests. Samples from the site of atmospheric tests exhibit a range of Zn isotopic fractionation (δ 66 Zn JMC-Lyon = 0.23–0.86 ‰) while samples from underground tests exhibit Zn isotopic compositions with minimal variation among samples and from terrestrial igneous rock standards (δ 66 ZnJMC-Lyon = 0.28–0.39 ‰). In conclusion, the larger range of δ 66 Zn JMC-Lyon observed in atmospheric test samples relative to underground test samples is likely the result of the open system characteristics of atmospheric nuclear tests and the closed system characteristics of underground nuclear tests.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

The rise, collapse, and compaction of Mt. Mantap from the 3 September 2017 North Korean nuclear test

Surveillance of clandestine nuclear tests relies on a global seismic network, but the potential of spaceborne monitoring has been underexploited. Here we used satellite radar imagery to determine the complete surface displacement field of up to 3.5 meters of divergent horizontal motion with 0.5 meters of subsidence associated with North Korea’s largest underground nuclear test. Combining insight from geodetic and seismological remote sensing, we found that the aftermath of the initial explosive deformation involved subsidence associated with subsurface collapse and aseismic compaction of the damaged rocks of the test site. The explosive yield from the nuclear detonation with best-fitting source parameters for 450-meter depth was 191 kilotonnes of TNT equivalent. Finally, our results demonstrate the capability of spaceborne remote sensing to help characterize large underground nuclear tests.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Test Site Verification Team: Optimal and Nominal Nuclear-Testing Programs [Slides]

Objectives of the Optimal and Nominal Nuclear-Testing Programs: Define optimal and nominal nuclear-testing programs; Discuss underground development for nuclear operations; Discuss underground nuclear operations, safety, and health; Compare drift complexes of optimal and nominal testing programs; Compare drift complexes for nuclear testing and commercial production; Discuss a potential future look of underground development and operations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Report on the recovery of legacy 1997-1998 Depth-of-Burial / Tunnel-and-Hole-Closure explosion data from the Kazakhstan former Soviet nuclear test site, Semipalatinsk.

In 1996, negotiations between the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NNC), the U.S. Defense Special Weapons Administration (DSWA) and the U.S. Department of Energy led to an agreement for a joint series of experiments at the former Soviet nuclear test site Semipalatinsk (STS). These experiments had a dual purpose: to close holes and tunnels originally created for the purpose of testing nuclear weapons, and to characterize explosive sources at a former nuclear test site. This report covers the recovery of legacy data from the experiments conduct in 1997 and 1998. Two teams collected data. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in collaboration with the NNC, collected the near-source (local) data out to approximately 20 km. Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (LDEO), with funding from Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLNL), also in collaboration with NNC, collected regional data, 200 – 1000 km distant, leveraging the KZ regional seismic network that LDEO had recently installed in collaboration with NNC. The two teams also worked together to some extent, regarding instrumentation and planning. This report primarily addresses the near-source data collected by the LANL/NNC team.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Hydrothermal Alteration of Glass from Underground Nuclear Tests: Formation and Transport of Pu-clay Colloids at the Nevada National Security Site

The testing of nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), has led to the deposition of substantial quantities of plutonium into the environment. Approximately 2.8 metric tons (3.1×10 4 TBq) of Pu were deposited in the NNSS subsurface as a result of underground nuclear testing. While 3 H is the most abundant anthropogenic radionuclide deposited in the NNSS subsurface (4.7×10 6 TBq), plutonium is the most abundant from a molar standpoint. The only radioactive elements in greater molar abundance are the naturally occurring K, Th, and U isotopes. 239 Pu and 240 Pu represent the majority of alpha-emitting Pu isotopes. The extreme temperatures associated with underground nuclear tests and the refractory nature of Pu results in most of the Pu (98%) being sequestered in melted rock, referred to as nuclear melt glass (Iaea, 1998). As a result, Pu release to groundwater is controlled, in large part, by the leaching (or dissolution) of nuclear melt glass over time. The factors affecting glass dissolution rates have been studied extensively. The dissolution of Pu-containing borosilicate nuclear waste glasses at 90ºC has been shown to lead to the formation of dioctahedral smectite colloids. Colloid-facilitated transport of Pu at the NNSS has been observed. Recent groundwater samples collected from a number of contaminated wells have yielded a wide range of Pu concentrations from 0.00022 to 2.0 Bq/L. While Pu concentrations tend to fall below the Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for drinking water (0.56 Bq/L), we do not yet understand what factors limit the Pu concentration or its transport behavior. To quantify the upper limit of Pu concentrations produced as a result of melt glass dissolution and determine the nature of colloids and Pu associations, we performed a 3 year nuclear melt glass dissolution experiment across a range of temperatures (25-200 °C) that represent hydrothermal conditions representative of the underground nuclear test cavities (when groundwater has re-saturated the nuclear melt glass and glass dissolution occurs). Colloid loads and Pu concentrations were monitored along with the mineralogy of both the colloids and the secondary mineral phases. The intent was to establish an upper limit for Pu concentrations at the NNSS, provide context regarding the Pu concentrations observed at the NNSS to date and the Pu concentrations that may be observed in the future. The results provide a conceptual model for the risks posed by Pu migration at the NNSS.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Completion of Nuclear Testing after Core Internals Changeout #6 in the Advanced Test Reactor

A series of physics tests were conducted in 2022 for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) after the sixth Core Internals Changeout (CIC) in 2021. These tests verify nuclear characteristics of the new reflector and shim mechanisms and are validation cases for core models. This work describes the results of these tests and compares the physics tests with those performed previously in ATR and updates previous work reporting on planning for nuclear testing and on preliminary results of several low-power tests. This work also identifies unique characteristics of ATR that result in the need for unique tests.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Investigation of CTBT OSI Radionuclide Techniques at the DILUTED WATERS Nuclear Test Site

Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a verification regime that includes the ability to conduct an On-Site Inspection (OSI) will be established. The Treaty allows for an OSI to include many techniques, including the radionuclide techniques of gamma radiation surveying and spectrometry and environmental sampling and analysis. Such radioactivity detection techniques can provide the “smoking gun” evidence that a nuclear test has occurred through the detection and quantification of indicative recent fission products. An OSI faces restrictions in time and manpower, as dictated by the Treaty; not to mention possible logistics difficulties due to the location and climate of the suspected explosion site. It is thus necessary to have a good understanding of the possible source term an OSI will encounter and the proper techniques that will be necessary for an effective OSI regime. One of the challenges during an OSI is to locate radioactive debris that has escaped an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) and settled on the surface near and downwind of ground zero. To support the understanding and selection of sampling and survey techniques for use in an OSI, we are currently designing an experiment, the Particulate Release Experiment (PRex), to simulate a small-scale vent from an underground nuclear explosion. PRex will occur at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The project is conducted under the National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS) funded by the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). Prior to the release experiment, scheduled for Spring of 2013, the project scheduled a number of activities at the NNSS to prepare for the release experiment as well as to utilize the nuclear testing past of the NNSS for the development of OSI techniques for CTBT. One such activity—the focus of this report—was a survey and sampling campaign at the site of an old UNE that vented: DILUTED WATERS. Activities at DILUTED WATERS included vehicle-based survey, in situ measurements with high-purity germanium (HPGe) and hand-held LaBr 3 systems, soil sampling with a variety of tools, and laboratory gamma spectrometric analysis of those samples. A further benefit of the measurement campaign was to gain familiarity with the many logistical aspects of performing radiological field work at NNSS ahead of the PRex. Many practical lessons concerning the proper methodologies and logistics of using the surveying and sampling equipment were noted. These Lessons Learned are compiled together in Appendix A. The vehicle-based survey was successful in that it found a previously unknown hotspot (determined to be 232 Th) while it demonstrated that a better method for keeping a serpentine track without staking was needed. Some of the soil sampling equipment was found to be impractical for the application, though core sampling would not be the correct way to take soil samples for a fresh vent deposit (as opposed to an old site like DILUTED WATERS). Due to the site’s age, 137 Cs was the only fission radioisotope identified, though others were searched for. While not enough samples were taken and analyzed to definitively link the 137 Cs to DILUTED WATERS as opposed to other NNSS activities, results were consistent with the historical DILUTED WATERS plume. MDAs were compared for soil sampling and in situ measurements.

CTBT↗

Underground Nuclear Testing [Slides]

Conducting a nuclear test was a major undertaking. It involves several hundred full time positions that have little to do with the actual test. In the 60’s Mercury was the second largest city in Nevada. On a average day in the 60’s, 70’s AND 80’s there were about 20,000 people on the site. One effects shot would require from 2 to 4 years to plan and execute. These were massive undertakings.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Improving prediction of radioactive gas seepage for nuclear testing treaty verification

The length of time it takes for radioactive gases to seep from an underground nuclear test to the ground surface is crucial for verification of nuclear testing treaties, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The identification of short-lived radioactive gases emanating from the ground surface at a suspected nuclear test location could provide “smoking gun” type evidence of a nuclear test. Accurate predictions of radioactive gas arrival time and detection window (duration of time gas concentration is above its detection threshold) are critical for procuring this type of evidence. LANL researchers are working toward improving such predictions in support of the Global Security mission and Information Science & Technology science pillar.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

YOLO11 to SAM2 pipeline for feature extraction from nuclear test films

The response to the effects of nuclear detonations is supported by models that describe the evolution of the nuclear fireball and cloud and the associated transport of active debris. Validation of those descriptions relies on data from the nuclear test operations. Video records of those events offer a rich source of information that was exploited to a limited extent in historic analyses. Computer vision and machine learning techniques are powerful tools that can be used to increase the number of measurements that can be obtained from those films. In this work, we apply computer vision techniques to automatically track the temporal evolution of the nuclear fireball. In particular, we apply You Only Look Once 11 (YOLO11) and Segment Anything Model 2 (SAM2) in combination with minimal human intervention to digitized versions of the original nuclear test films. As part of the proposed workflow, the YOLO11 model is applied to films to determine bounding boxes for the fireball within each frame. These are then used as inputs to SAM2, which uses image segmentation to determine the fireball boundaries and their temporal evolution. We assess the accuracy of our approach by using it to determine the energy released during the Trinity nuclear test and comparing the results with previous analyses based on manual measurements.

Van Exel, Kimberly [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000877463894)↗