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The present disclosure is related to a cyber-security system that includes a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network monitor configured to receive a data set from a power system network, an event manager, and a mitigation system, where the SCADA network monitor includes an anomaly detector.
Nowadays, data generated by large-scale scientific experiments are on the scale of petabytes per month. These data are transferred through dedicated high-bandwidth networks (40/100G) across distributed sites for processing, storage, and analysis. Like general purpose networks, research networks experience intrusions. However, monitoring anomalies in such high-speed network traffics is challenging given current cyber-infrastructure. Moreover, traditional network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are signature based. However, anomaly patterns are difficult to define and that rulesets are often not updated frequently enough to reflect the changes of attack behaviors. We present ThunderSecure, a high-throughput, unsupervised learning-based intrusions detection system for 100G research networks. ThunderSecure implements an efficient packet processing and detection pipeline using multi-cores and GPUs. It extracts statistical and temporal features from real-time network data streams and feeds them to a one-class anomaly detection network. A baseline of normal distribution will be created based on the training observation. Testing traffic deviated from the learned profile will be marked as anomalies. We trained ThunderSecure on hundreds of billions of science data packets mirrored from two 100G network connections at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. The detection performance was evaluated on traffic captured from the same research network days and weeks after the training with different types of attack flows injected. Results show that ThunderSecure can recognize science data traffic captured long after the training and made nearly certain detection on the segment of the streams where anomalous flows were injected.
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are commonly used to detect malware communications, including command-and-control (C2) traffic from botnets. NIDS performance assessments have been studied for decades, but mathematical modeling has rarely been used to explore NIDS performance. This paper details a mathematical model that describes a NIDS performing packet inspection and its detection of malware's C2 traffic. Here, the paper further describes an emulation testbed and a set of cyber experiments that used the testbed to validate the model. These experiments included a commonly used NIDS (Snort) and traffic with contents from a pervasive malware (Emotet). Results are presented for two scenarios: a nominal scenario and a “stressed” scenario in which the NIDS cannot process all incoming packets. Model and experiment results match well, with model estimates mostly falling within 95 % confidence intervals on the experiment means. Model results were produced 70-3000 times faster than the experimental results. Consequently, the model's predictive capability could potentially be used to support decisions about NIDS configuration and effectiveness that require high confidence results, quantification of uncertainty, and exploration of large parameter spaces. Furthermore, the experiments provide an example for how emulation testbeds can be used to validate cyber models that include stochastic variability.
Cyber-physical system (CPS) security for the smart grid enables secure communication for the SCADA and wide-area measurement system data. Power utilities world-wide use various SCADA protocols, namely DNP3, Modbus, and IEC 61850, for the data exchanges across substation field devices, remote terminal units (RTUs), and control center applications. Adversaries may exploit compromised SCADA protocols for the reconnaissance, data exfiltration, vulnerability assessment, and injection of stealthy cyberattacks to affect power system operation. In this paper, we propose an efficient algorithm to generate robust rule sets. We integrate the rule sets into an intrusion detection system (IDS), which continuously monitors the DNP3 data traffic at a substation network and detects intrusions and anomalies in real-time. To enable CPS-aware wide-area situational awareness, we integrated the methodology into an open-source distributed-IDS (D-IDS) framework. The D-IDS facilitates central monitoring of the detected anomalies from the geographically distributed substations and to the control center. The proposed algorithm provides an optimal solution to detect network intrusions and abnormal behavior. Different types of IDS rules based on packet payload, packet flow, and time threshold are generated. Further, IDS testing and evaluation is performed with a set of rules in different sequences. The detection time is measured for different IDS rules, and the results are plotted. All the experiments are conducted at Power Cyber Lab, Iowa State University, for multiple power grid models. After successful testing and evaluation, knowledge and implementation are transferred to field deployment.
Nowadays, data generated by large-scale scientific experiments are on the scale of petabytes per month. These data are transferred through dedicated high-bandwidth networks across distributed collaboration sites for processing, storage, and analysis. Like general purpose networks, research networks experience attacks. However, monitoring traffic in such high-bandwidth network environments is challenging with conventional deep packet inspection (DPI)- based network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). Recently, machine learning (ML) algorithms have shown potential in detecting anomalous patterns with better generalizability and faster speed. Compared to the general purpose networks, traffic movement in research network is less volatile and more likely to benefit from the ML-based anomaly analysis. We present ThunderSecure, an efficient AI-powered system for detecting anomalies in 100G research networks. ThunderSecure implements a high-throughput packet processing infrastructure using multi-cores and GPUs. It takes time-series statistics from a variety of network measurements and uses 2D Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) to explore both spatial and temporal dependencies in network data stream. Patterns of science data traffic are learned with a one-class neural network, which blends an Adversarial Autoencoder (AAE) with Gaussian mixture density estimation. Testing traffic flows exhibiting significant deviations from the learned baseline of normality are marked as anomalies. We trained ThunderSecure on hundreds of billions of science data packets recorded from a 100G research network at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. The detection performance was evaluated on traffic captured from the same research network days and weeks after the training with different types of attack flows injected. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ML work in the area of network anomaly detection that has been validated on such extreme scale datasets. Results show that ThunderSecure can recognize science data traffic that are captured long after the training and make nearly certain detection on those with anomalous flows injected, even in the case when the anomaly-to-normal mixing ratio is 0.1%.
NREL's Cyber-Energy Emulation Platform (CEEP) provides the capability to realize cyber-energy security and resilience through automation and orchestration of virtualized systems and software defined networks for the electric grid. CEEP enables testing and validation of grid-security and -control methodologies as the grid evolves to include smart technologies/systems, such as virtualization and containerization of grid components, software defined networking, simulation and co-simulation frameworks, and hardware in the loop. CEEP is a modular system that can be distributed and deployed across different hardware infrastructure sizes and network architectures. For example, CEEP can visualize, emulate, and/or coordinate the Smart-Grid Network Visualization, Intrusion Detection, and Network Healing system. Using CEEP, intrusion-detection and network-self-healing solutions can be deployed at grid control centers, within secure private clouds, and in cyber-energy appliances.
NREL's Cyber-Energy Emulation Platform (CEEP) provides the capability to realize cyber-energy security and resilience through automation and orchestration of virtualized systems and software defined networks for the electric grid. CEEP enables testing and validation of grid-security and -control methodologies as the grid evolves to include smart technologies/systems, such as virtualization and containerization of grid components, software defined networking, simulation and co-simulation frameworks, and hardware in the loop. CEEP is a modular system that can be distributed and deployed across different hardware infrastructure sizes and network architectures. For example, CEEP can visualize, emulate, and/or coordinate the Smart-Grid Network Visualization, Intrusion Detection, and Network Healing system. Using CEEP, intrusion-detection and network-self-healing solutions can be deployed at grid control centers, within secure private clouds, and in cyber-energy appliances.
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are commonplace in network security but they frequently employ algorithms that are computational demanding requiring hardware and software with significant power requirements. Two examples of such resource-intensive algorithms used for network security are regular expression matching and broader signature pattern matching which are commonly used in deep packet inspection (DPI). Network security algorithms that have large power requirements may be a challenge for low-power internet-of-things (IoT) environments, which generally lack the power resources to implement complex security measures like computationally expensive DPI at the edge. Furthermore, IoT environments incorporating 5G standalone networks have network latency constraints beyond just power that make DPI at the edge even more difficult. Programmable logic is ideally suited for machine learning inference for DPI because of its deep instruction level parallelism and single-cycle memory access. Machine learning approaches for DPI have been explored before using the programmable logic of field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) as a potential solution for NIDS approaches that would be power-suitable for IoT. However, those previous programmable logic NIDS approaches utilize either a supervised or unsupervised learning model. Sentinel utilizes the ensemble of these two machine learning approaches known as a semi-supervised approach which has shown promise in NIDS implementations. Sentinel provides a programmable logic implementation of a semi-supervised approach for DPI which operates at much lower power and latency than a GPU implementation with negligible loss of accuracy due to quantization through a logistic regressor.
Cybersecurity of photovoltaic (PV) systems entails a much larger scope than just encryption and firewall of communications. For instance, integrity of data in transit between inverters and a cloud server can be compromised by authorized third-party, devices, and internal network within security perimeter (i.e., man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack). To address this challenge, this paper proposes a blockchain-based MITM attack detection method for a PV system. A breakthrough method includes screening network data, network intrusion detection, and hash comparison of in-transit data using distributed ledgers. Furthermore, the proposed method is implemented in Internet-of-Thing (IoT) security modules as clients of a blockchain network and validated by experiments.
To reduce cost and ease maintenance, industrial control systems (ICS) have adopted Ethernetbased interconnections that integrate operational technology (OT) systems with information technology (IT) networks. This integration has made these critical systems vulnerable to attack. Security solutions tailored to ICS environments are an active area of research. Anomalybased network intrusion detection systems are well-suited for these environments. Often these systems must be optimized for their specific environment. In prior work, we introduced a method for assessing the impact of various anomaly-based network IDS settings on security. This paper reviews the experimental outcomes when we applied our method to a full-scale ICS test bed using actual attacks. Our method provides new and valuable data to operators enabling more informed decisions about IDS configurations.
The rapid digitalization of the electric grid - driven by the integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), and advanced grid control platforms - has significantly enhanced grid efficiency, visibility, and flexibility. However, this evolution also introduces new cybersecurity risks, particularly through supply chain dependencies and operational blind spots at the grid edge. To address these challenges, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) Rapid Risk initiative, conducted a series of rapid risk assessment engagements with energy organizations across the United States. Drawing on lessons learned from these engagements, INL developed the following threat hunting guide for asset owners and operators (AOOs) to enhance their cybersecurity visibility within BESS and IBR systems. The guide demonstrates how to use passive network monitoring to baseline device behavior, detect adversarial activity, and investigate anomalies without disrupting operations. By implementing these practices, energy sector stakeholders can improve coordination between cybersecurity and operations teams and strengthen the resilience of distributed energy resources (DERs) within the modern power grid. Prior to implementing any network monitoring, packet capture, or threat hunting activity described in this guide, AOOs are strongly advised to review applicable governance frameworks, legal requirements, and organizational policies. This guide is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not replace compliance with any federal, state, or local cybersecurity mandates or industry standards. Implementation of described configurations, technologies, or analytic workflows is performed at the discretion and responsibility of the asset owner and operator.
Wide-area protection and control (WAPAC) systems are widely applied in the energy management system (EMS) that rely on a wide-area communication network to maintain system stability, security, and reliability. As technology and grid infrastructure evolve to develop more advanced WAPAC applications, however, so do the attack surfaces in the grid infrastructure. This paper presents an attack-resilient system (ARS) for the WAPAC cybersecurity by seamlessly integrating the network intrusion detection system (NIDS) with intrusion mitigation and prevention system (IMPS). In particular, the proposed NIDS utilizes signature and behavior-based rules to detect attack reconnaissance, communication failure, and data integrity attacks. Further, the proposed IMPS applies state transition-based mitigation and prevention strategies to quickly restore the normal grid operation after cyberattacks. As a proof of concept, we validate the proposed generic architecture of ARS by performing experimental case study for wide-area protection scheme (WAPS), one of the critical WAPAC applications, and evaluate the proposed NIDS and IMPS components of ARS in a cyber-physical testbed environment. Our experimental results reveal a promising performance in detecting and mitigating different classes of cyberattacks while supporting an alert visualization dashboard to provide an accurate situational awareness in real-time.
SAND2024-13723O This software translates and maps any .xlsx-based distributed energy resource (DER) device from the SunSpec certification registry (https://sunspec.org/certified-registry/) to a JSON-based DER models map. It is then read by DER monitoring tools for applications such as network intrusion detection and system health monitoring. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.
The last two decades has seen a rapid increase in the application of AIS (Artificial Immune Systems) modeled after the human immune system to a wide range of areas including network intrusion detection, job shop scheduling, classification, pattern recognition, and robot control. JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory) has developed an integrated pattern recognition/classification system called AISLE (Artificial Immune System for Learning and Exploration) based on biologically inspired models of B-cell dynamics in the immune system. When used for unsupervised or supervised classification, the method scales linearly with the number of dimensions, has performance that is relatively independent of the total size of the dataset, and has been shown to perform as well as traditional clustering methods. When used for pattern recognition, the method efficiently isolates the appropriate matches in the data set. The paper presents the underlying structure of AISLE and the results from a number of experimental studies.
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The rapid growth and ubiquitous adoption of the internet and cyber-physical systems (CPS) have fundamentally transformed modern communication, work, and human-system interactions. While networks now form the backbone of critical digital ecosystems, enabling seamless data transmission across diverse, interconnected systems, this increased connectivity also expands the attack surface, making real-time detection of network intrusions and anomalies a pressing challenge. Detecting unusual activities within network infrastructure requires advanced data traffic analysis to differentiate between legitimate and malicious interactions. Traditional approaches to network anomaly detectionâ??such as rule-based and signature-based systemsâ??often depend on predefined patterns to identify known anomalies, limiting their effectiveness against emerging, stealthy, or previously unseen threats. These conventional methods suffer from high false alarm rates and fail to adapt to the ever-evolving nature of network traffic, particularly in large-scale, decentralized environments where data volume, velocity, and variety are constantly increasing. This dissertation presents artificial intelligence (AI)-driven approaches to anomaly detection that leverage graphics processing unit (GPU)-enabled high-performance computing (HPC) platforms for processing massive network traffic data and monitoring the components of cyber-physical systems (CPS) for potentially hazardous conditions. The research advances several key contributions: (1) Designing efficient machine learning techniques for CPS condition monitoring and anomaly detection; (2) enabling federated learning (FL) frameworks that enable distributed detection while preserving data privacy and system resilience; (3) exploring graph-based methodologies combining graph neural networks (GNN) and graph machine learning (ML) approaches for the Internet of Things (IoT) and automotive network security, and (4) performing distributed edge computing optimizations that integrate FL with scalable technologies for reduced communication overhead. Through extensive experiments, these methodologies demonstrate that complex anomaly detection and condition monitoring tasks can be achieved while balancing computational efficiency and detection accuracy through fine-grained network information processing. The frameworks developed in this research establish a robust foundation for network anomaly detection, providing scalable, adaptive, and privacy-preserving solutions for safeguarding CPS and IoT networks in an increasingly interconnected digital landscape. The practical implications of these research findings are significant, as they can inform the development of next-generation network security systems and contribute to the protection of critical infrastructure against sophisticated cyber attacks.
We present a programmable intrusion detection method is presented to identify the malicious attacks to distributed energy resources (DERs) in the cyber-physical networked microgrids. The proposed method injects small programmable signals into the system and uses the response to identify abnormal conditions. Because of the low or even zero inertia induced by integrations of DER power-electronic-interfaces, microgrids have very limited resilience capability; and thus, being sensitive to attacks. One microgrid's malfunction caused by attacks can easily propagate to its neighboring systems when several microgrids are connected, leading to catastrophic electricity supply failures. Through the presented method, malicious intrusions can be effectively detected, located, and defended for securing microgrids. Theoretical derivations are provided to define the programmable detection rules. The detection rule is easy and flexible to update, making it difficult for attack actors to gain the knowledge of the detection rules, in order to avoid being detected. Numerical results on a cyber-physical networked microgrids system show that the proposed method is effective and efficient in precisely locating intrusion attacks to the microgrids system.
Modern vehicles rely on complex cyber-physical systems made up of hundreds of electronic control units (ECUs) connected through controller area network (CAN) buses. However, the CAN bus attack surface is increasing due to advanced features in automobiles, making it prone to injection attacks. The ordinary injection attacks disrupt the typical timing properties of the CAN data stream, and the rule-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) can easily detect them. However, advanced attackers can inject false data to the signal level, maintaining the regular pattern/frequency of the CAN messages. Such attacks can bypass the rule-based IDS or any anomaly-based IDS built on binary payload data. To make the vehicles robust against such intelligent attacks, we propose CANShield, a signal-based intrusion detection framework for the CAN bus that consists of three modules. A data preprocessing module handles the high-dimensional CAN data stream at the signal level and make them suitable for any machine learning model. A data analyzer module consists of multiple deep autoencoder networks, each analyzing the time series data from a different perspective. Finally, an attack detection module uses an ensemble method to make the final decision. Evaluation results on a standard signal-based dataset show the effectiveness of the CANShield in detecting five advanced attacks.