Active neutron coincidence counting to determine fissile mass of uranium oxide containing 233U and 235U
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46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
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Feasibility of neutron coincidence counting for spent TRISO fuel
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Nuclear Science & Technology↗
An Evaluation of a Neutron Time Correlated Interrogation Method for Measurement of Fissile Content in Research Reactor Spent Fuel Assemblies
There are many research reactors worldwide that have been, or are being converted from the use of high enrichment uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU, < 20% enriched). The verification of fissile content and initial enrichment of the spent fuel is needed for the effective safeguards of the fuel. The advanced experimental fuel counter (AEFC) was developed for the measurement of spent fuel rods and assemblies from research reactors for safeguards verification. This measurement system contains components for active neutron interrogation, passive neutron totals counting, neutron coincidence counting, and gross gamma-ray counting. This report presents the first application of the time correlated interrogation technique for the measurement of the 235 U content in research reactor spent fuel assemblies. The technique, called time correlated induced fission (TCIF), uses a 252 Cf neutron source to irradiate the fuel assembly, and the subsequent induced fission events in the fissile material are measured by coincidence counting. The doubles rates are enhanced by having the neutron trigger events from both the 252 Cf source and the induced fission neutrons in the same time gate in the coincidence analysis. The average neutrons per fission of the 252 Cf source is 3.76 and the induced fission neutrons for 235 U is 2.44, so the number of neutrons that are produced is higher than for random neutron interrogation. This high effective neutron number increases the multiplicity counting rates and reduces the statistical error. The background coincidence counts from the 252 Cf are reduced by the water in the sample cavity and the polyethylene surrounding the 3 He detector tubes. This method of active neutron interrogation has been applied to the measurement of spent research reactor (IRT) fuel assemblies. The advanced experimental fuel counter (AEFC) was used to compare the TCIF method with the typically used AmLi neutron interrogation source that emits neutrons that are random in time. The statistical uncertainty for the use of the random neutron source (AmLi) and the time correlated source ( 252 Cf) for spent fuel interrogations was evaluated.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Development and evaluation of a list mode neutron coincidence collar for spatial response measurements of fresh fuel assemblies
A traditional safeguards neutron coincidence counting system, the Neutron Coincidence Collar, has been modified to incorporate individual preamplifiers on each of its 18 3He tubes in active interrogation mode. When used with list mode data acquisition (LMDA) and analysis, a signal from each 3He tube can be recorded and analyzed to allow a spatial response measurement to be performed on an item based on count rate and 3He tube location within the system. The ultimate goal of this project is to demonstrate the capabilities of a list mode response matrix for the nondestructive assay of fresh nuclear fuel assemblies. To enable partial defect detection of fuel pin locations and absences within an assembly, the project aims to extend well-established correlated neutron analysis techniques on a preexisting Neutron Coincidence Collar by extracting a greater number of useful signatures from the system than are currently generated. LMDA, combined with the addition of multiple preamplifiers, facilitates this capability by increasing the number of simultaneous signals that can be measured; this allows an in-depth analysis of neutron coincidence events to determine a fissioning item’s location based on the measured doubles count rate in various channel logic coincidence combinations. All of this can be done from a single measurement pulse train in offline analysis, which is the major benefit provided by LMDA. Through various stages of development and testing, a Mirion Technologies model JCC-71 Neutron Coincidence Collar has been successfully retrofit with modern electronics designed in-house at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, matching preexisting JAB-01 electronics performance, while maintaining the original system footprint. This paper presents these various stages of development and experimental evaluation of the proof of concept system.
Moore, Angela S.↗
Improving Effective Mass Estimations in Pu-Metal Annuli
Determining the effective mass of 240 Pu in a plutonium metal item can be achieved through a number of destructive and non-destructive assay techniques. However, these techniques have one or more shortcomings. These include the need for large quantities of plutonium, long measurement time, or lack of sufficient accuracy. While efforts have been made to mitigate these issues by estimating 240 Pu quantities through neutron coincidence counting techniques, these estimates are subject to systematic bias, and their estimates are not well characterized when other factors of the annulus’ physical form and composition are accounted for. In this work, we expand upon these non-destructive assay techniques via the implementation of random forest machine learning models, which produce correction functions that augment and improve the effective mass estimates derived from classical leakage multiplication, singles, doubles, and triples multiplicity counting equations.
73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
The Impact of Increased Requirements for Verification Measurements of Category III and IV Receipts
As part of the regular nuclear material accounting and control process, sites that have accountable nuclear material regularly perform measurements of the material in their possession. The expectation for the type of measurements and their frequency is set out in Department of Energy (DOE) Order 474.2, and further detailed in each site’s respective material control and accountability (MC&A) plan and associated controlling documents. The measurements of interest in this report are those performed on external (between DOE sites) transfer receipts of Category III or IV accountable materials. In 2020, a revision of DOE Order 474.2 was proposed that would significantly increase the requirement that measurements be performed upon receipt of material, and further, that those measurements be quantitative verification (rather than qualitative confirmatory) measurements. A survey was performed of DOE sites to discuss the impact on their MC&A measurements program if more rigorous verification measurements requirements for Category III and IV receipts were implemented. An assessment of nondestructive assay (NDA) measurement instruments to meet those needs was also performed. Across the board, sites indicated that personnel and budget would cause the largest impact. Sites which are qualified as Category I/II indicated a reduced impact as these sites already have the measurement capabilities and some personnel but would require the acquisition of additional measurement systems. Category III/IV sites indicated a much larger impact as these sites generally have smaller MC&A programs. A few smaller sites stated a measurement program would need to be created to handle the demand. Calorimetry, quantitative gamma spectroscopy and neutron coincidence counting systems were identified as common systems that could meet the verification measurement requirements. The other, and perhaps larger issue is the need for calibration standards for the calorimetry and neutron coincidence counting systems. It is proposed that a comparative study be performed for ISOCS and ISOTOPICS, qualification of a COTS calorimetry system be performed, and development of an AWCC system that uses a neutron generator.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Incorporating the latest Neutron NDA analysis techniques into INCC6
International Neutron Coincidence Counting (INCC6) is the IAEA’s neutron NDA software. With FY25 SGTech support we implemented self-diagnostic features into INCC6. For FY26 we propose to implement advanced analysis methods that have been splintered into custom software for one-off instruments. Incorporating these capabilities in INCC6 will make them available for any new or existing application on the ubiquitous INCC6 platform, increasing safeguards efficiency and effectiveness.
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Demonstration of INCC6 for advanced list-mode data acquisition and analysis using ALMM
The International Neutron Coincidence Counting (INCC) software plays an important role in nuclear safeguards and nuclear material control and accounting (NMC&A) measurements. While the current version, INCC5, represents the traditional standard utilized by inspectorates as well as facilities and practitioners alongside shift register hardware, LANL has recently developed an upgraded version of the software, INCC6. INCC6 offers the same analysis tools as INCC5 while adding new capabilities including acquisition and analysis of list-mode data, recording and storage of list-mode data files, and an expanded set of advanced analysis tools that make use of the additional information available from list-mode data. Here, this paper presents the first demonstration of data acquisition and analysis using INCC6 and the Advanced List Mode Multiplicity Module (ALMM). The capability of INCC6 to perform live list-mode data acquisition and analysis is demonstrated for a variety of neutron sources with a range of neutron emission rates relevant for practical applications and validated against the results obtained with INCC5 and traditional shift register hardware. Advanced list-mode analysis tools introduced by INCC6, such as time-interval and coincidence matrix analysis, are also demonstrated. Finally, the capability of INCC6 to analyze list-mode data files is tested and validated against traditional shift register results using INCC5.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Boron coated straw-based neutron multiplicity counter for neutron interrogation of TRISO fueled pebbles
Pebble bed reactors (PBRs) can improve the safety and economics of the nuclear energy production. PBRs rely on TRIstructural-ISOtropic (TRISO) fuel pebbles for enhanced fission product retention. Accurate characterization of individual fuel pebbles would enable the validation of computational models, efficient use of TRISO fuel, and improve fuel accountability. Here, we have developed and tested a new neutron multiplicity counter (NMC) based on 192 boron coated straw (BCS) detectors optimized for 235 U assay in TRISO fuel. The new design yielded a singles and doubles neutron detection efficiency of 4.71% and 0.174%, respectively, and a die-away time of 16.7 μs. The NMC has a low intrinsic gamma-ray detection efficiency of 8.71 x 10 –8 at an exposure rate of 80.3 mR/h. In simulation, a high-efficiency version of the NMC encompassing 396 straws was able to estimate the 235 U in a pebble with a relative uncertainty and error both below 2% in 100 s.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Safeguards Hour [Sides]
This presentation provides an overview of nonproliferation and safeguards, introduces neutron coincidence counting, reviews spent fuel characterization for power reactors and research reactors, and outlines safeguards at Los Alamos.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Trade Study of Nondestructive Assay Technologies
The purpose of this report is to summarize the capabilities of currently existing NDA technologies that can be applied to holdup measurements. Cataloguing the strengths and weaknesses of the existing state of the art is a necessary step towards setting goals for new technology development. The NDA technologies evaluated in this report include gamma imaging, non-imaging gamma detectors, and neutron coincidence counting. These technologies were chosen based on their potential for technological improvement or to be applied in different settings. Each technology will be analyzed on a set of evaluation criteria chosen to represent the most salient features of a detector system for holdup measurements. These criteria include sensitivity, energy resolution, angular resolution (for imaging technologies only), ease of use, and cost.
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Plutonium Basket Counter Measurement Control Q3-Q4 2023
The Plutonium Basket Counter (PBC) is a spent fuel nuclear safeguards instrument that was developed to measure spent-fuel elements from MAGNOX-type research reactors and determine their plutonium content. The instrument is designed to measure fuel elements in spent fuel cooling pools through underwater operation, but it is also able to measure radiation sources in air. The PBC determines fuel plutonium content by detecting neutrons with an array of Helium-3 detectors. The electronics make use of a JSR-15 shift register for data collection and IAEA Neutron Coincidence Counting (INCC) software for data analysis. The PBC is used to determine the 240 Pu content in spent MAGNOX fuel elements grouped into basket-like bundles, thus the instrument’s name. Reactor burnup calculations can be used in conjunction with the data from the PBC to estimate the total plutonium content in the fuel.
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Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) for a Commercial Fuel Debundling Facility in the United States
The concept of fuel debundling proposes that all non-fuel components of a fuel assembly be removed prior to beginning the recycling process. It was introduced to reduce the quantity of and cost of disposing high level radioactive waste during recycling in the United States. However, nuclear material accountancy and control programs could also benefit from fuel debundling due to a reduction in self-shielding material for individual fuel rods compared to a fuel assembly. Current NRC regulations and guidance point to an independent fuel debundling facility with a material-possession-only license as the best option for implementing this concept into a used fuel recycling scheme in the United States. This allows the facility to comply only with simple NMAC requirements under Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 74 without the need to submit an NMAC plan to the NRC, exempting it from more tedious and complex NMAC requirements. However, a recycling facility may desire a Pu mass estimate from measurements of each individual fuel rod to improve accountancy into the dissolver. Many technologies and methodologies were considered for performing NMAC in an independent fuel debundling facility in the United States. Few were able to meet anticipated throughput demands of up to 3,300 rods/day and achieve measurement uncertainties suitable for input accountancy for a recycling facility. The best option was a combination of passive gamma-ray spectroscopy and neutron coincidence counting to meet all requirements for the proposed Fuel Debundling Detector (FUDD). Follow-on work will include a full uncertainty analysis to inform what assumptions can be made to meet input accountancy objectives before beginning experimental activities.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Verification of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) using Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Detector
SNM verification can be accomplished via two methods i.e. destructive analysis (DA) or nondestructive analysis (NDA). The DA modes are much more accurate compared to NDA modes; nevertheless, the sample's physical integrity is destroyed in the process. Techniques such as ICP-MS, ID-ICP-MS, TI-MS are few examples of DA, where a bulk material is ground and mixed with a solution (some form of acid) to acquire a homogenous sample. In contrast, NDA modes utilize signals emitted by the sample such as gamma, neutrons, light, or heat to analyze samples under investigation. HPGe detectors are some of the most frequently used gamma detectors to assay SNM. However, in a high activity scenario it provides a large uncertainty and sometimes becomes unfeasible to measure low energy gamma rays. Meanwhile, neutron detectors are not affected by the gamma background, therefore they can be used in addition to the gamma detectors to verify total fissile mass ({sup 235}U + {sup 239}Pu) of SNM. The AWCC is one of the thermal neutron NDA systems developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It consists of 42 {sup 3}He detectors to measure gross neutrons (singles), coincidence neutrons (doubles), higher order multiplicity counting (triples, quadruples, etc.). It can effectively operate in both active and passive neutron interrogation modes. It can utilize AmLi, AmBe, or {sup 252}Cf active interrogation neutron sources. It is used to verify declared fissile mass ({sup 235}U or {sup 239}Pu) present in SNM. Objectives: Calibrate HPGe and AWCC for lightly irradiated (with enough {sup 137}Cs gamma background) ∼93% enriched HEU fuels; Verify fissile mass ({sup 235}U +{sup 239}Pu) content using AWCC and HPGe; Model and benchmark AWCC in MCNP6. Neutron coincidence and multiplicity counting: Two or more neutrons are coincident if they are detected by the system within the specified gate window; In AWCC: Gate window is 128 μsec; Induced fission in fissile material such as {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu - emission of time correlated neutrons - Singles, Doubles, Triples, or Quadruples; No induced fission in non-fissile materials- no correlated neutrons - only singles. SNM can be verified with high accuracy and precision using gamma and neutron NDA instruments such as HPGe and AWCC. Interaction with thermal neutrons. Non-fissile atoms - do not emit correlated neutrons. Fissile atoms - emit correlated neutrons during induced fission events. The time correlated neutrons can be detected by using coincidence or multiplicity counters such as AWCC. Likewise, {sup 235}U produces 186 keV gamma peak that can be measured by a HPGe gamma detector. Counts under 186 keV gamma peak provide information about {sup 235}U content. Combining AWCC and HPGe results can provide better understanding of special nuclear material under investigation.
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Manganese-56 coincidence-counting facility precisely measures neutron-source strength
Precise measurement of neutron-source strength is provided by a manganese 56 coincidence-counting facility using the manganese-bath technique. This facility combines nuclear instrumentation with coincidence-counting techniques to handle a wide variety of radioisotope-counting requirements.
De Volpi, A.↗
Validation and demonstration of the AEFC as a practical safeguards tool for inventory verification
The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) instrument designed to determine the residual fissile mass in irradiated fuel assemblies for safeguards verification purposes. This is done by actively interrogating an assembly with a neutron source and measuring the total (Singles) and correlated (Doubles) neutron count rates resulting from induced fissions in the irradiated nuclear fuel and relating those rates to the residual fissile mass using calibration curves. Comprehensive NDA measurements of the irradiated fuel inventory at Israeli Research Reactor 1 (IRR-1) were taken with the AEFC to validate a set of previously developed calibration curves. During the campaign, measurements were acquired of 32 standard fuel assemblies and three control assemblies in just nine days. This is a significant majority of the research reactor's irradiated fuel inventory and the largest data set gathered by the AEFC to date. Many of the fuel assemblies measured during the campaign had much shorter cooling times than those assemblies previously measured with the instrument. Calibration curves developed from previous AEFC deployments were used to determine the residual 235 U mass in the measured standard fuel assemblies. The results of the campaign demonstrated that the AEFC can be used to estimate the 235 U mass remaining in a large number of irradiated fuel assemblies with 1%–5% uncertainty in a reasonable amount of time despite operating in a high dose environment.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Polyethylene density uncertainty in the simulation of neutron detectors
Simulations with the Monte Carlo N-Particle® (MCNP®) code are frequently used to study neutron coincidence counters for international safeguards. Reducing sources of uncertainty enables more accurate simulations, which reduces the need for expensive or impossible measurements. Accurately specifying the density of polyethylene is crucial for accurate simulations. The density of polyethylene ranges from 0.88 to 0.97 g/cm 3 and high-density polyethylene (HDPE) ranges from about 0.944 to 0.965 g/cm 3 . The density of a specific detector should be measured exactly for the best simulations. Here, the density of the blue/white Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) bulk polyethylene was measured to be 0.9594 +- 0.0013 g/cm 3 at 1-sigma confidence. The density was calculated from repeated measurements of the various polyethylene dimensions for volume, and weighing the polyethylene for the mass. The AWCC neutron detection efficiency was simulated for each polyethylene density. The relative range of efficiencies (3σ) was 3.4% for unspecified polyethylene, 0.9% for HDPE, and 0.3% for the measured density. The impact of modeling small features such as screws was also studied and was found to be a negligible 0.2%. Measuring polyethylene density can reduce its role in uncertainty from one of the largest to one of the smallest contributors.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Characterization of Impure Plutonium Oxide Neutron Calibration Standards through Evaluation by Neutron Multiplicity Equations
Plutonium oxide calibration standards STD4C, STD6C and STD8C have been historically used, and are currently the only MT52 standards in use, for calibration and measurement control program of Passive/Active Neutron Coincidence Counter known as PAN1 at PF-4. In this paper, previously measured high-statistics data are used in conjunction with neutron multiplicity equations to determine multiplication M and α parameter of these standards as the explicit knowledge of these parameters may allow quantification of precision and bias of accountability measurements of different material types and matrices of items.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗