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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Measuring 3D Profilometry of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers: Novacam TubeInspect Capabilities Report

The SAVY-4000 container series is a general-purpose interim storage container for nuclear materials, developed and maintained by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It is the first vented, general-use nuclear material container to be demonstrated as meeting the requirements outlined in DOE M 441.1-1, the Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. Due to the challenging radiation, thermal, and corrosive storage conditions that the SAVY containers must endure, continuous surveillance techniques are employed to ensure the containers meet all safety standards and specifications. These inspections are typically performed by human operators, who check for issues such as corrosion, O-ring deterioration, corrosion, filter integrity, and potential manufacturing defects. However, human inspections alone are not sufficient, and automated inspection technologies, such as the ATIS system, as well as other automated systems are also utilized. The MicroCam TubeInspect, developed by Novacam Technologies Inc., is designed to address the challenges of understanding how manufacturing variations in the SAVY-4000 container series may affect performance. It is a 3D profilometry measurement system that enables detailed analysis of surface features, including defects, surface roughness, and manufacturing variations. This advanced tool significantly enhances rapid surveillance techniques for both pristine and used containers. In this study, container properties such as surface roughness, thickness, and geometric attributes like circularity are measured for SAVY-4000 containers. Artificially corroded or dented containers are examined to demonstrate the MicroCam's ability to quantify defects. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted, comparing the MicroCam results to those obtained using more precise instruments such as confocal microscopy. This comparison aims to provide valuable insights into container quality, durability, and potential improvements in manufacturing processes.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Redesign of Nuclear Material Storage Container with Additive Manufacturing

The goal of this project is to reduce worker dose and improve criticality safety by improving nuclear material storage containers. The current method of medium to long term (up to 15 years) storage of small amounts of nuclear material is to store it in a stainless-steel flat tube with a copper crush gasket. These containers use 10 bolts to fasten the lid, and the crush gasket must be replaced after every use. Stainless-steel acts as a gamma shield, but there is not any material to account for neutron dose. A redesign of this container should prioritize reducing radiation doses to handlers of the container by reducing the amount of time handlers are exposed to the container and introducing material with effective neutron and gamma shielding mechanics.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Framework development for a SAVY-4000 nuclear material storage container structural integrity surveillance tool

Here, this work presents the preliminary design of an automated surveillance tool to assess the health of SAVY-4000 nuclear material storage containers. This tool is designed by training several machine learning (ML) regression models to predict maximum residual stress in plain dents on the container sidewall. The model is trained on an experimentally validated Finite Element Analysis (FEA) model built in Abaqus FEA. The accuracy of each ML model is compared. The potential for application as well as model shortcomings are assessed. Necessary FEA model improvements are outlined and the various ML models are proposed.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Full Submersion Water Testing of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers

SAVY-4000 (SAVY) containers are the primary container used at Technical Area (TA) TA-55 plutonium facility for the prevention of water ingress to mitigate against a criticality event. The basis for water resistance of these containers has long been attributed to the Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) membrane that is assembled on the outermost surface of the filter assembly. On August 22nd a test of a container used inside of a glovebox was performed that brought into question this long-standing-basis. This test was performed by inverting a SAVY-lid onto a specialized piece of equipment for evaluating the integrity of the PTFE membrane. During the test water was observed passing through the filter indicating that the filter membrane was no longer preventing the ingress of water through the filter. The assumption after making this observation was that alpha-particles were rapidly degrading the membrane creating a leak path through the underlying aluminosilicate media (Fiberfrax®). The apparatus used was designed to only test the lid rather than the entire SAVY assembly. A test plan, PA-PLAN-01921, was developed to investigate whether a fully assembled container with a fully degraded PTFE membrane would be capable of meeting the criteria defined in PA-RD-1009 of not allowing more than 200 ml of water to enter the container with a water column of 6-inches applied over a 2-hour period. This report provides the results of the testing performed against PA-PLAN-01921.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Reducing the Risk of Airborne Contamination through Intelligent Container Surveillance

DOE Manual 441.1-1 provides a set of performance criteria that nuclear material storage containers must achieve to provide protection to the worker, public, and environment. At Los Alamos National Laboratory, the SAVY-4000 is the container of choice for nuclear material storage, meeting all Manual requirements. At the outset, polymer components of the SAVY 4000 were considered to be life-limiting components due to their performance degradation resulting from radiation exposure. However, recent annual surveillance results revealed another life-limiting phenomenon for the container: a deterioration of the package integrity through corrosion of the stainless steel components, primarily the body. Container surveillance remains the choice method of observing, measuring, and tracking container health in service.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Technical Basis Update for the Design Life Extension of the SAVY-4000® Series of Containers

This technical basis update focuses on the design life of the SAVY-4000® (hereafter “SAVY”) series of nuclear material storage container (e.g., used to store, transport, and handle special nuclear material outside of a glovebox), previously approved under DOE Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY is approved for storing all authorized contents for a period of 15 years. The lifetime extension technical basis is established on the compiled technical data from the on-going SAVY and Hagan surveillance programs, destructive analysis results, accelerated aging studies, and performance testing, in line with the regulatory rigor of DOE M441.1-1.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Technical Basis SAVY-4000® Series, 5.5G Container (Rev. 1)

The 5.5 Gallon (5.5G) SAVY-4000® nuclear material storage container is the latest in the SAVY-4000® series. The 5.5G is similar to that of a 1or 2Qt container in functionality with the exception of a larger volume deep drawn and spun form body achieved through increases in the depth and diameter of the container. Here, a technical basis using engineering equivalency analysis, calculation, and test data is presented to establish that the 5.5G SAVY-4000® Container is a DOE Manual 441.1-1 compliant container at a drop height of 9 feet (rather than the typical 12 ft of the other SAVY-4000® containers) and that a twenty-five year design life (as with the currently approved SAVY-4000® series) is justified.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

SAVY O-ring characterization for lifetime extension

Los Alamos National Laboratory and Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. developed the SAVY-4000 nuclear material storage container, named after the designers Stone, Anderson, Viers, and Yarbro. The SAVY 4000 meets the requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) M 441.1-1,2 Nuclear Material Packaging Manual, to protect workers who handle nuclear materials against radiation exposures resulting from the leakage of stored materials. The SAVY-4000 is an innovative and creative design: it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without using torque wrenches and instead only a tire iron or equivalent prying tool; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates at 200 ACCM rated flow; and prevents the release of stored materials upon a 12- foot drop.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Laser Confocal Microscopy Uncertainty Quantification Study

At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Storage Safety and Engineering (SSE) team completes annual surveillance on a subset of in-use interim nuclear material storage containers in fulfilment of requirements outlined in DOE Manual M 441.1-1. The containers are selected through several methods, such as subject matter expert judgement, random selection, and trending items. Following these selections, the SSE team has the capacity to complete surveillance on 15-20 containers each fiscal year, composed of a combination of SAVY-4000 and Hagan storage containers. Through previous work, the stainless-steel components of the containers have been identified as life limiting components, with an emphasis on the thin-walled bodies. The team is focused on understanding the extent of general and pitting corrosion, due to observations of extensive corrosion from stored contents and bag-out-bag degradation. Quantifying corrosion effects on the thin-walled stainless steel container bodies, and understanding potential impacts to the respective design release rates and design qualification release rates is paramount to the team. To date, destructive examination (DE) has proven to be the most insightful method for developing an understanding on the extent of corrosion on used containers. To standardize this process, the SSE team developed a destructive examination guide for analyzing stainless steel components of the containers. Corroded containers of interest are identified during surveillance activities and set aside for sectioning and characterization. Following sectioning, a major step in the DE workflow is the utilization of laser confocal microscopy for scanning corroded samples of interest and extracting data on pits, such as count, depth, and equivalent diameter. Adhering to the techniques outlined in the DE guide, analysis has been completed on two Hagans and one SAVY-4000 container, with the maximum pit depth recorded as 139.1 ± 22.82 μm on a 17.5 year old Hagan. The findings from the completed destructive examinations will be utilized to support lifetime extension efforts of the SAVY-4000 as the team can better estimate corrosion rates and effects over time based on stored contents and age. Due to the implications of observing extreme pit depths that approach the nominal container body thickness of .0299 inches (0.759 mm) or minimum container thickness of 0.236” (0.6 mm), high confidence in the LCM measurements is desired. Through testing outlined in, it was concluded that the total error ascribed to the 20x objective when conducting large image mapping on the Keyence VK-X3050 laser confocal microscope (LCM) relative to a 50x objective (reference) is 16.4% (± 8.73%). For shallow features on the order of pristine SAVY surface defects (i.e. 5 μm), this uncertainty is appropriate. However, this conservative estimate of total error poses a fundamental concern for pit depths that approach the thickness of the measured samples. That is, with the measurement uncertainty currently employed on all measurements, the LCM would be unable to resolve if a pit with a depth of 515 μm is through wall. Standard step height samples were procured and used in the present study to assess the resolution and repeatability of height measurements. Understanding the resolution and repeatability of height measurements was the first focus of the team as it relates directly to pit depth, which is of primary concern. Calibration gratings were procured to evaluate the resolution and repeatability of measurements in the X and Y axes of the LCM stage. The results of the depth uncertainty study were conducted first and presented in the subsequent sections. The planar uncertainty study is appended to the depth study with conclusions from both summarized at the end of the report.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2026

Utilizing Time Reversal Ultrasonics to Detect the Removal of Nuclear Materials from Geological Repositories (FY26 Mid-Year)

Detecting unauthorized nuclear material removal from storage environments, such as geological repositories, is a critical safeguards task essential to ensuring the integrity and non-diversion of nuclear materials. However, this process is fraught with significant technical challenges. Storage configurations often involve tightly packed nuclear material containers or obstructed environments, making detection of removal events exceedingly difficult. Optical surveillance cameras, which are commonly used for monitoring, suffer from substantial limitations, including restricted coverage, reliance on line-of-sight measurements, and vulnerability to environmental conditions in certain storage scenarios. As the global inventory of monitored nuclear materials increases and storage configurations become more complex— such as deep geological repositories, inaccessible storage vaults, and tightly packed containers—there is an urgent need for innovative detection technologies that can reliably identify unauthorized diversion events in these challenging environments. The challenge of detecting nuclear material removal in complex storage environments is both significant and urgent. Preventing unauthorized access, diversion, or tampering with nuclear materials is a cornerstone of global nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation efforts. Current detection methods are increasingly inadequate as storage configurations become more intricate and inaccessible. The limitations of existing technologies—such as their inability to detect changes behind obstructions, reliance on costly and labor-intensive processes, and vulnerability to environmental conditions—pose risks to the effectiveness of safeguards systems. Addressing this challenge is critical to maintaining international trust in nuclear safeguards frameworks and ensuring compliance with nonproliferation agreements. Our project builds on the proven concept of TRU technology that can address this unmet need. TRU has demonstrated exceptional spatial sensitivity and change detection capabilities in complex non-line-ofsight environments, making it uniquely suited for detecting unauthorized nuclear material removal in challenging storage configurations. Unlike optical methods, TRU is not limited by line-of-sight constraints or environmental conditions, enabling reliable detection of subtle alterations even behind obstructions. By leveraging TRU’s ability to identify removal or tampering events, we aim to develop a robust detection system that enhances safeguards in geological repositories, storage vaults, and other complex environments.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Integrity Monitoring, Prediction and Assessment, Corrosion Control, and Repair of the Hanford Storage Tanks – 25213

The Hanford Nuclear Reservation site contains approximately 211 million liters of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste arising from nuclear weapons production, beginning with World War II, and continuing through the Cold War [1]. The waste is stored in 177 carbon-steel underground storage tanks, of which 149 are single-shell tanks (SSTs) and the remaining are double-shell tanks (DSTs). The mission of an ongoing River Protection Project is to retrieve the waste from the underground storage tanks and then treat and immobilize (i.e., vitrify) it for disposal. Waste from the older SSTs is being progressively retrieved into the newer DSTs for storage pending treatment, immobilization, and disposal. Figure 1 depicts a typical DST design [2]. The tank is approximately 23 m in diameter and 9 m high and has a domed structure and has a capacity of 4000 m3. The tank wall and floor vary in thickness between approximately 10 mm and 25 mm depending on location. The thicker wall sections are near the curved transition between the tank wall and the floor, while the thinner sections are located near the top of the tank wall. The tank floor thickness varies from 25 mm at the tank center to 10 mm near the tank wall. The tanks were constructed of either ASTM A516 Grade 65 or ASTM A537 Class 1 carbon steel and were post-weld heat treated to reduce the risk of SCC.

Shukla, Pavan K. [Savannah River National Laborato↗
DOE OSTI2024

THERMAL MODELING OF HANFORD CESIUM AND STRONTIUM CANISTERS DURING SIMULATED LOADING

A computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model was built to simulate planned testing of heater assemblies within a canister and overpack for the Hanford Lead Canister (HLC) project. The HLC is a canister storage system that will contain heaters to simulate the decay heat of nuclear material and provide the canister storage system with environmental conditions equivalent to the operating conditions on a dry storage pad. The HLC will be equipped with long-term data collection and monitoring systems to provide an early warning of corrosion, pitting, cracking, or other signs of canister degradation that might threaten the integrity of the containment boundary over the potentially long term of dry storage. An important part of the HLC development is to make pretest numerical predictions for the behavior of the heated canister during the simulated radiolytic decay heat testing, which simulates the dry storage system during loading operations. The simulated radiolytic decay heat test is planned for mid-2024 in a configuration that includes the heater assembly, overpack, and canister, but with the lids removed to allow loading cesium and strontium capsules into the canister. One of the goals of the test is to evaluate the thermal behavior of the canister and overpack assembly in the ambient air of the test facility, which will provide data critical to validating the thermal models and understanding how the HLC will perform as a system once deployed. To best approximate real-world conditions, the CFD model includes the full air volume of the mock-up truck bay the heated canister test will be performed in, enabling detailed investigation of how the heated canister affects airflow around it. Rigorous pre-deployment testing of the complete HLC cask and canister system is intended to be completed before the HLC is deployed in the 2028 timeframe. This study presents the pre-test temperature predictions of the simulated radiolytic decay heat test. A description of the heater assembly, canister, and overpack system is presented. The model was developed with the commercial CFD software STAR-CCM+. An uncertainty analysis was run with the CFD model to determine the uncertainty in the temperature predictions and provide a range over which the predicted temperatures are expected to vary. The uncertainty analysis was preformed by coupling STAR-CCM+ with the software Dakota, which provides advanced parametric analyses, including quantification of margins and uncertainty with computational models. This work is expected to provide insight into SNF canister behavior.

Carpenter-Graffy, Dina E.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Improved Fundamental Understanding of Aluminum Chemistry and Interactions of Aluminate Anion with Co-Anions: ORNL Project Progress Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)’s Hanford Site in Washington State houses 177 underground storage tanks containing millions of gallons of nuclear and chemical waste with high aluminum content. Aluminum (Al) salt reactions with strong bases produce aluminum hydroxides, like boehmite (γ-AlOOH), which are main components of insoluble nuclear waste sludge. Understanding the morphology, crystallinity, and dissolution behavior of boehmite under waste tank conditions is necessary for improving waste management and mitigation strategies. The ORNL team uses in situ multimodal analysis strategy to study Al chemistry of simulated tank waste using microfluidic reactors and advanced chemical imaging and mass spectrometry (MS) techniques. Because the SALVI device is vacuum compatible and transferrable among different platforms, we can use it in scanning electron microscopy (SEM), vacuum ultraviolet single photon mass spectrometry (VUV SPI-MS), and time-of-flight secondary ion mass spectrometry (ToF-SIMS) to study the chemical speciation and colloid stability in liquids in this project. Additionally, ex situ transmission electron microscopy (TEM) and x-ray diffraction (XRD) spectroscopy can be used to verify particle phase to further the understanding of the Al-bearing phases. This report gives a summary of the technical progress of the ORNL tasks. A plan for year 2 performance is recommended in the summary.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Development of an ERT‐Based Framework for Bentonite Buffers Monitoring From Laboratory Tests: 2. Quantitative Moisture Dynamics Estimation Model

Abstract The long‐term containment of high‐level radioactive waste in geological disposal repositories relies on Engineered Barrier Systems (EBS), with bentonite clay emerging as a candidate material due to its unique properties. Understanding moisture dynamics within bentonite buffers is crucial for EBS performance, as it directly influences the material's swelling capacity, thermal and hydraulic conductivity, mechanical properties, and long‐term evolution under complex thermal‐hydrological‐mechanical (THM) processes. This study develops an advanced Electrical Resistivity Tomography (ERT)‐based framework to quantitatively monitor moisture dynamics under THM conditions. Our framework extends the Waxman‐Smits model to incorporate the coupled effects of temperature, water content, fluid chemistry, and mechanical changes on bentonite's electrical properties. Utilizing HotBENT‐Lab data from our companion paper, which includes electrical conductivity, CT density, and thermocouple measurements, this study offers a novel methodological framework bridging different scales of the model. Our results show that the extended model can estimate water content from ERT data, capturing spatial and temporal variations in moisture distribution within bentonite columns. However, the model tends to overestimate water content compared to CT density‐derived measurements. We address this discrepancy by incorporating a simplified swelling effect model, which improves agreement between ERT and CT density‐based water content estimates. We also discuss model limitations, including simplified treatment of swelling and micropore effects, and propose a conceptual framework for transitioning from laboratory to field applications, addressing challenges such as parameter scalability, field validation methods, and integration of diverse data sources. This ERT‐based framework can potentially advance real‐world moisture monitoring of bentonite‐based EBS in nuclear waste repositories. Plain Language Summary Safely containing high‐level radioactive waste depends on barriers made from materials like bentonite clay, which is effective because it swells and seals in the waste. To ensure these barriers work well over time, it's important to understand how moisture moves through the clay. Our study developed a new method using ERT to monitor moisture levels in bentonite under conditions that mimic those in actual storage sites, including changes in temperature, water content, and mechanical stress. This study improved an existing model to better account for how these factors affect the clay, allowing us to create more accurate moisture maps. Initially, the proposed model overestimated the amount of water in the clay, but its accuracy was improved by factoring in how the clay swells when wet. This study also identified some limitations of the model and suggested ways to adapt it for use in real‐world waste storage sites. This new approach could lead to better monitoring and safety checks for nuclear waste storage systems, helping to ensure long‐term containment. Key Points This work develops an ERT‐based framework extending the Waxman‐Smits model to monitor bentonite moisture dynamics during coupled THM processes The extended model accurately estimates water content from Electrical Resistivity Tomography data, incorporating swelling effects to improve precision This work proposes a conceptual framework for transitioning from laboratory to field applications, advancing EBS monitoring in nuclear waste repositories

Chen, Hang↗
DOE OSTI2026

Vapor phase deposition of alumina on interior surfaces of tritium storage containers

Efficient tritium management and containment are critical challenges for nuclear fusion. To mitigate issues related to permeation into structural materials and isotopic exchange with protium, permeation barriers must be applied to the nonplanar internal surfaces of tritium handling components. In this study, we developed an atomic layer deposition (ALD) system to deposit films on canisters used to store and transport tritium. Growth conditions for deposition of Al 2 O 3 were mapped spatially along the length of a canister using silicon witness samples characterized by ellipsometry, atomic force microscopy, and x-ray reflectivity (XRR). We identified ALD process windows for growth at temperatures between 100 and 140 °C. Furthermore, we compared films grown on our Si witness samples to those grown on polished stainless steel 316 (SS316). X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy indicates two distinct chemical states for the alumina, while XRR confirms that the overall growth rate is similar to the 1.1 Å/cycle that we observed on the Si witness samples.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

An approach for spent nuclear fuel containment integrity verification using gas tagging

Verification of containment integrity is required for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) managed by the commercial nuclear industry and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), especially after extended storage. Certain SNF storage systems, such as the DOE road-ready dry storage system, hold several packaged containments within a welded over-canister. These packaged containments are called Department of Energy Standard Canisters (DOESCs). DOESC leakage identification is challenging because their containment boundary cannot be accessed for testing and their contents (i.e., SNF and fill gas) are often similar. There are concerns that this could result in costly characterization and repackaging operations of DOE road-ready dry storage systems if compromised DOESCs are suspected. Here, to address these concerns, this paper presents an approach for applying a gas tagging process using xenon to uniquely identify compromised inaccessible containments following extended storage. The containments considered for this application are seven DOESCs, each packaged within a single over-canister. Two different SNF loading configurations from the Advanced Test Reactor and Fort Saint Vrain nuclear power plant are considered. These configurations are used to represent research reactor aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) and TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) SNF types. Results for this application show that for ASNF and TRISO type fuels for which the selected fuels are representative, the volume of taggant required at loading is determined primarily by the lower detection limit and leak rate of taggant from a compromised DOESC, rather than the amount of fission-generated xenon in the loaded fuel. While the application presented is suited for larger leaks, smaller leaks could be detected by modifying certain design parameters. This gas tagging approach can also be applied to other DOE containments and advanced reactor SNF storage systems.

07 - ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Fuel Assembly and Irradiation Parametric Study for Extended-Enrichment and High-Burnup Light-Water Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel in Dry Storage Casks and Transportation Packages

There is an increased interest in operating commercial light-water reactors (LWRs) in the United States with improved economics that would result from longer fuel cycle lengths, fewer and shorter refueling outages, and fewer fuel assemblies requiring storage at the back end of the fuel cycle. To support this, fuel discharge burnups, as well as initial 235 U enrichments, must be higher than those used in current commercial LWRs. The typical upper limit considered for assembly average burnup in this report is 75 gigawatt-days (GWd) per metric ton of uranium (MTU), as opposed to the current typical upper bound of approximately 62 GWd/MTU. The upper limit considered for initial 235 U enrichment is 8 weight percent (8 wt %), as opposed to the current regulatory limit of 5 wt %. The enrichment range from 5 to 8 wt % is referred to in this report as extended enrichment . To investigate the effect of high burnup and extended enrichment conditions on dose rates and burnup credit for dry storage casks and transportation packages, a fuel assembly and irradiation parametric study was performed. The conclusions from this study will assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff in reviewing applications for dry storage casks and transportation packages that contain high-burnup and extended enrichment fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗