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Miscalculation, Misperception and Risk Reduction

In the current security environment, the most likely wars for which the US and its allies must be prepared are wars against nuclear-armed states. Such wars bring unique risks of both vertical and horizontal escalation. Some are “accepted risks;” for example, the US may choose to escalate a conflict to clarify its commitment to an issue and defend its interest. Other are “unacceptable risks;” especially, the risk of miscalculation by the U.S. or an adversary. The focus here is on this latter category. Miscalculation is an error of judgment—the failure to accurately assess a situation. Miscalculation can result from hidden, incomplete, or ambiguous information, or from inaccurate processing of available information because of bias, overconfidence, denial, delusion, etc. Miscalculation is related to misperception. For some, they are synonymous. This paper characterizes the risks of miscalculation and introduces a discussion of a risk mitigation strategy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Thinking the Other Unthinkable: Disarmament in North Korea and Beyond

The P5 have defined nuclear disarmament as both a process and an end state. Differences of view about the latter are sharp, bitter, and abiding. This has stripped the discussion about the former of much of its potential content and value. Where might we get, practically and conceptually, if we were to set aside for now questions about the ultimate feasibility and desirability of the long-term goal and focus instead on the process? Further, what if we were also to posit that there will be no “fundamental transformation” of the international political system of a kind that would make the nuclear-armed states, and their unarmed neighbors, unconcerned about the effectiveness of mechanisms for peace and security in a disarmed and disarming world? In this context, might it be possible to give states the confidence they would require to take more ambitious incremental steps on the disarmament pathway? How could such steps contribute to the relaxation of international tensions that the NPT itself describes as a critical enabler of disarmament? These questions motivate this timely and innovative new work by Toby Dalton and George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Their core objective is to “infuse needed realism into disarmament discussions.” Using North Korean disarmament as a test case, they explore a series of practical challenges and associated conceptual issues to frame a discussion of the possible disarming nucleararmed states. They begin by rightly noting that neither the advocates of the Ban treaty nor the advocates of North Korean disarmament have set our practical agendas for achieving their aims. They conclude that without an infusion of realism the “two polarized blocks” will continue to “stonewall and repel each other” and thus that “the risks of global nuclear disorder will grow.” This is the latest in the series of Livermore Papers begun in 2017 to stimulate the development of new strategic thought on emerging nuclear challenges. Conceptually, it is a follow-on to the inaugural Livermore Paper by Lewis Dunn on disarmament pathways. The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or any of its sponsors.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

The Decision to End U.S. Nuclear Testing

Today, for the first time since the beginning of the nuclear age, none of the world’s nuclear-armed states is conducting nuclear test explosions. After more than 2,000 detonations, the world’s nuclear test sites are dormant. The journey that brought us to this point has been long, and there have been some key turning points and some particularly important decision-makers who have steered us away from nuclear testing and the arms racing and environmental contamination it produces.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Scanning of vehicles for nuclear materials

Might a nuclear-armed terrorist group or state use ordinary commerce to deliver a nuclear weapon by smuggling it in a cargo container or vehicle? This delivery method would be the only one available to a sub-state actor, and it might enable a state to make an unattributed attack. Detection of a weapon or fissile material smuggled in this manner is difficult because of the large volume and mass available for shielding. Here I review methods for screening cargo containers to detect the possible presence of nuclear threats. Because of the large volume of innocent international commerce, and the cost and disruption of secondary screening by opening and inspection, it is essential that the method be rapid and have a low false-positive rate. Shielding can prevent the detection of neutrons emitted spontaneously or by induced fission. The two promising methods are muon tomography and high energy X-radiography. If they do not detect a shielded threat object they can detect the shield itself.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Mitigating the Threat of Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation via Nuclear-Submarine Programs

Brazil is building a nuclear-powered attack submarine, South Korea has in the past asserted its need for nuclear-powered attack submarines to deal with the threat of North Korean nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and Iran has asserted more vaguely its need for naval nuclear propulsion. All three countries are non-weapon-state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Their interest in naval reactors brings with it two challenges to the NPT: 1) The safeguards “loophole” under which a country can withdraw nuclear materials from IAEA safeguards indefinitely for allowed “non-peaceful activities;” and 2) A justification for the acquisition of national uranium-enrichment facilities because the international suppliers of enrichment services have peaceful-use requirements. In fact, Brazil’s acquisition of enrichment was driven by its navy. It is argued, however, that nuclear-powered attack submarines have advantages over modern conventional attack submarines primarily in their ability to transit great distances at high speed whereas only a few countries have foreign military commitments requiring such capabilities. For defense of nearby waters against foreign navies, attack submarines are merely one component of a complex system of anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels and underwater sensor networks. Conventional attack submarines are no less effective and much less costly than nuclear-powered attack submarines in this role.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗