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Status of HLW disposal in the USA and rational, progressive, paths forward based upon lessons learned in the USA and abroad since 1973 - 15103
The development of the USA's only candidate (since 1987) HLW-repository at the Yucca Mountain (YM) site, Nevada, was halted by the Obama administration in 2009. Four years later, the Obama administration proposed a new strategy for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle that would open a consent-based HLW repository 'by 2048'. At the end of 2014, both the YM HLW repository and the new HLW-disposition (storage and disposal) strategy remain on hold due to lack of enabling legislation. With this as background, and based upon our active involvement in, monitoring of, and reporting on HLW management programs in the USA and abroad since 1973, we submit that: 1. Politics, political will, and legal actions and outcomes will continue to govern progress. 2. Public acceptance and sustained support (PASS) may influence politics and political will. 3. PASS is time-dependent and governed by: a. Ideologies; b. Perceived benefits and risks; c. Level and equity of radiation protection provided by applicable regulations; d. Perceived robustness/safety of the proposed disposition concept; and e. Perceived credibility and competency vested in the involved organizations and their respective leaders (= TRUST). We therefore recommend that the USA concurrently pursues at least two, 'centralized' HLW-storage and -disposal solutions based upon best-available relevant knowledge and majority-PASS at facility-host locations. Furthermore, safe(r) and more secure disposal of defense/government-generated HLW could probably commence at least 15 years earlier than 'by 2048' in/at: 1. The YM repository/site. 2. The WIPP repository/site. 3. 'Local' deep boreholes. (authors)
The Exploration of Mars by Humans: Why Mars? Why Humans?
As we commemorate the 50th anniversary of Yuri Gagarin's historic flight in 1961, the first flight of a human in space, plans are underway for another historic human mission. Plans are being developed for a human mission to Mars. Once we reach Mars, the human species will become the first two-planet species. Both the Bush Administration (in 2004) and the Obama Administration (in 2010) proposed a human mission to Mars as a national goal of the United States.
Resolving potential energy conflicts among allies: The 2015 United States-Republic of Korea nuclear cooperation agreement
After four years of sometimes contentious negotiations (that at one point required a two-year extension from the U.S. Congress), the United States and Republic of Korea signed a new nuclear cooperation agreement in the summer of 2015. These negotiations caused strain in one of the closest bilateral relationships the U.S. has in Asia – a regional priority for the foreign policy of the Obama administration. This paper examines energy conflict within the confines of an otherwise cooperative and productive partnership. It examines the strategic, technical, economic, and political factors that extended the negotiation period and the creative compromises that led to a final agreement. It then considers the potential pit-falls in implementing the agreement and the implications, in terms of process and substance, for future negotiations regarding civilian nuclear cooperation.
How much will it cost to destroy stockpiled US plutonium?
Lawmakers reject the Obama administration’s plan to suspend construction of a South Carolina plant for fabricating mixed-oxide nuclear fuel.
Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes
The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.
Materials design for new superconductors
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The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World
Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.
Preparing Communities for Nuclear Terrorism
Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have designated the potential use of nuclear or radiological weapons by a terrorist organization as the most significant danger facing American society. In order to confront this threat the Obama Administration’s 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism states, “We recognize that no nation, no matter how powerful, can prevent every threat from coming to fruition. That is why we are focused on building a culture of resilience able to prevent, respond to, or recover fully from any potential act of terror directed at the United States.”1 Promoting the necessary transition of a “culture of resilience” from ambitious rhetoric to plausible reality requires American communities to serve as the primary initiators. Rather than begin with a top down strategy at the national level, it is necessary to ingrain a whole of community approach at the local, state, and federal stages. Through utilization of resiliency planning techniques stakeholders can prepare for a wide spectrum of hazards ranging from natural disasters to the threat of nuclear terrorism. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism affirms that, “Supporting community leaders and influential local stakeholders as they develop solutions tailored to their own particular circumstances is a critical part of our whole-of-government approach that contributes to our counterterrorism goals.” A catalyst for increasing community resilience is knowledge of the threat, what preparedness actions to take, how to implement those actions and communal consensus on why these actions are beneficial. It is important for community leaders to understand the risks associated with nuclear/radiological terrorism and the initial steps required to mitigate these dangers through resilience.
U.S. Department of Energy Pacific Region Clean Energy Application Center (PCEAC)
The U.S. Department of Energy Pacific Region Clean Energy Application Center (PCEAC) was formed in 2009 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the California Energy Commission to provide education, outreach, and technical support to promote clean energy -- combined heat and power (CHP), district energy, and waste energy recovery (WHP) -- development in the Pacific Region. The region includes California, Nevada, Hawaii, and the Pacific territories. The PCEAC was operated as one of nine regional clean energy application centers, originally established in 2003/2004 as Regional Application Centers for combined heat and power (CHP). Under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, these centers received an expanded charter to also promote district energy and waste energy recovery, where economically and environmentally advantageous. The centers are working in a coordinated fashion to provide objective information on clean energy system technical and economic performance, direct technical assistance for clean energy projects and additional outreach activities to end users, policy, utility, and industry stakeholders. A key goal of the CEACs is to assist the U.S. in achieving the DOE goal to ramp up the implementation of CHP to account for 20% of U.S. generating capacity by 2030, which is estimated at a requirement for an additional 241 GW of installed clean technologies. Additional goals include meeting the Obama Administration goal of 40 GW of new CHP by 2020, key statewide goals such as renewable portfolio standards (RPS) in each state, California’s greenhouse gas emission reduction goals under AB32, and Governor Brown’s “Clean Energy Jobs Plan” goal of 6.5 GW of additional CHP over the next twenty years. The primary partners in the PCEAC are the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and the Energy and Resources Group (ERG) at UC Berkeley, the Advanced Power and Energy Program (APEP) at UC Irvine, and the Industrial Assessment Centers (IAC) at San Diego State University and San Francisco State University. The center also worked with a wide range of affiliated groups and industry, government, NGO, and academic stakeholders to conduct a series of CHP education and outreach, project technical support, and related activities for the Pacific region. Key PCEAC tasks have included: - Preparing, organizing and conducting educational seminars on various aspects of CHP - Conducting state baseline assessments for CHP - Working with state energy offices to prepare state CHP action plans - Providing technical support services including CHP/district energy project feasibility screenings - Working with state agencies on CHP policy development - Developing additional CHP educational materials The primary specific services that PCEAC has offered include: - A CHP “information clearinghouse “ website: http://www.pacificcleanenergy.org - Site evaluations and potential projects screenings - Assessment of CHP status, potential, and key issues for each state - Information and training workshops - Policy and regulatory guidance documents and other interactions These services were generally offered at no cost to client groups based on the DOE funding and additional activities supported by the California Energy Commission, except for the in-kind staff resources needed to provide input data and support to PCEAC assessments at host sites. Through these efforts, the PCEAC reached thousands of end-users and directly worked with several dozen organizations and potential CHP “host sites” from 2009-2013. The major activities and outcomes of PCEAC project work are described.
Biogas Opportunities Roadmap Progress Report
In support of the Obama Administration's Climate Action Plan, the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and U.S. Department of Agriculture jointly released the Biogas Opportunities Roadmap Progress Report, updating the federal government's progress to reduce methane emissions through biogas systems since the Biogas Opportunities Roadmap was completed by the three agencies in July 2014. The report highlights actions taken, outlines challenges and opportunities, and identifies next steps to the growth of a robust biogas industry.
An Alternative Method for Disposition of U.S. Excess Weapons-Grade Plutonium: Addressing the Challenges of the PMDA
This paper will discuss options for the U.S. government, which include the original MOX approach and the Obama Administration’s proposed dilute and dispose method. This paper will also provide an examination of the thorium fuel cycle as a potential breakthrough in plutonium disposition.
Broad Scope Analysis of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and Disposition of Plutonium
The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), signed into effect in 2000, between the United States and Russia, was made in a post-Cold War effort to dispose of military-useable material, a combined 68 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. The United States has been pursuing a disposition path through conversion to MOX fuel for use in current commercial nuclear reactors. The Savannah River Site’s (SRS) MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF, the MOX facility) began construction in 2007 with intent to uphold the United States’ half of the agreement. In the FY2017 budget, the Obama administration proposed a termination of the MFFF after lack of sufficient funding to the project, which caused paralyzing delays and drastically inflated costs for completion. Prolonged construction, piled costs, and divergent policies between shifting administrations have resulted in turmoil between the United States and Russia, culminating with the proposed abandonment of the MOX disposition path and being used as a justification by Russia to withdraw from the agreement until the United States is able to identify a clear plan, fulfilling the requirements set forth by the PMDA. The leading expedient to replace MOX fuel is the dilute and dispose method, which leaves uncertainty for the SRS MFFF and places reliance on New Mexico’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to legally accommodate the additional and unaccounted waste. If the current capacity of WIPP proves insufficient, construction of a new repository for transuranic waste would only incur additional costs and regulatory burdens, along with extreme schedule delays. Future proposed adaptations of the SRS MFFF include pit production, which would require complex and costly alterations to be operational at the current site. Restrictions from Congress, such as mandating the proposed solution to abandoning MFFF must equal half of the costs required for completing the facility, have fueled severely underestimated quotations of these alternatives. The increasing pressure from both Russia and South Carolina government officials to make a decision could result in the pursuit of another doomed project, leaving the United States with even further sunk costs and strained international relations. This paper will summarize the involved history of the MFFF, explicate the recourses to salvage the facility for pit production, and provide postulation on the dilute and dispose method.
Analytic framework for the United States cyber deterrence strategy. Final draft, 2nd submission (20 May 2015]
If the United States (U.S.) government allows cyberattacks to continue on their current trajectory of increased frequency and effect, the bonds holding our society together will be jeopardized, potentially impacting the survival of our society as we know it. Actions must be taken not only to defend against, but also to deter future cyberattacks. To achieve a credible and actionable U.S. Cyber Deterrence Strategy, the following three lines of effort are recommended for implementation by the White House: 1. Add a sixth priority to the Obama Administration's current cyberspace priorities to state: "Advance our cyber response policies and capabilities to further protect the country's national interests by deterring attacks within cyberspace." 2. Adopt the proposed Cyber Deterrence Analytic Framework as a guide for policy makers to use when determining the appropriate response to a cyberattack. 3. Implement the proposed Presidential Policy Directive outlining the United States' deterrence policy for cyber. These recommendations for establishing a U.S. Cyber Deterrence Strategy address the following key findings: As the U.S. private sector owns and operates over 90% of all of the networks and infrastructure of cyberspace, an effective policy must be communicated clearly across the government, business enterprise, and most importantly, to the people; More so than any time in our nation's history, individuals, companies, and organizations depend on cyberspace for uses ranging from social interactions to sustaining democracy; Threats existing within the cyber domain have grown both in attack vector complexity and societal impact; and, The current Presidential Executive Orders and Policy Directives related to cyber deterrence do not include a strategy for deterring attacks. The concepts presented in this paper were derived from interviews with experts in subjects ranging from deterrence philosophy, nuclear weapons implementation, U.S. cyber operations, and U.S. cyber policy. In addition, theories on deterrence strategies are explored, ranging from the 1960s to present to develop a deterrence strategy unique to cyber. Lastly, recent examples of cyberattacks are examined to provide evidence for the need to establish consequences for those individuals or countries that continue to behave nefariously within cyberspace. To form a strong foundation for a U.S. Cyber Deterrence Strategy, the U.S. must establish and clearly articulate the consequences for nations or individuals if they choose to initiate a cyberattack on the U.S. or its national interests.
Exploration Architecture Options - ECLSS, EVA, TCS Implications
Many options for exploration of the Moon and Mars have been identified and evaluated since the Vision for Space Exploration VSE was announced in 2004. Lunar architectures have been identified and addressed in the Lunar Surface Systems team to establish options for how to get to and then inhabit and explore the moon. The Augustine Commission evaluated human space flight for the Obama administration and identified many options for how to conduct human spaceflight in the future. This paper will evaluate the options for exploration of the moon and Mars and those of the Augustine human spaceflight commission for the implications of each architecture on the Environmental Control and Life Support, ExtraVehicular Activity and Thermal Control systems. The advantages and disadvantages of each architecture and options are presented.
The Use of Remote Sensing Data for Advancing America's Energy Policy
After briefly reviewing America's Energy Policy laid out by the Obama Administration, we outline how a Global Carbon Observing System designed to monitor Carbon from space can provide the necessary data and tools to equip decision makers with the knowledge necessary to formulate effective energy use and practices policy. To stabilize greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere in a manner that it does not interfere with the Earth's climate system (which is one of the goals of United Nations Framework for Convention on Climate Change) requires vastly improved prediction of the atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations. This in torn requires a robust understanding of the carbon exchange mechanisms between atmosphere, land, and oceans and a clear understanding of the sources and sinks (i.e. uptake and storage) of CO2. We discuss how the Carbon Observing System from space aids in better understanding of the connection between the carbon cycle and climate change and provides more accurate predictions of atmospheric CO2 concentration. It also enables implementation of greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation policies such as cap and trade programs, international climate treaties, as well as formulation of effective energy use policies.
Exploration Architecture Options - ECLSS, EVA, TCS Implications
Many options for exploration of space have been identified and evaluated since the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) was announced in 2004. Lunar architectures have been identified and addressed in the Lunar Surface Systems team to establish options for how to get to and then inhabit and explore the moon. The Augustine Commission evaluated human space flight for the Obama administration and identified many options for how to conduct human spaceflight in the future. This paper will evaluate the options for exploration of space for the implications of architectures on the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLSS), ExtraVehicular Activity (EVA) and Thermal Control System (TCS) Systems. The advantages and disadvantages of each architecture and options are presented.
Exploration Architecture Options - ECLSS, TCS, EVA Implications
Many options for exploration of space have been identified and evaluated since the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) was announced in 2004. The Augustine Commission evaluated human space flight for the Obama administration then the Human Exploration Framework Teams (HEFT and HEFT2) evaluated potential exploration missions and the infrastructure and technology needs for those missions. Lunar architectures have been identified and addressed by the Lunar Surface Systems team to establish options for how to get to, and then inhabit and explore, the moon. This paper will evaluate the options for exploration of space for the implications of architectures on the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLSS), Thermal Control (TCS), and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Systems.