Results for “Objectives-driven Risk Management”

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 2

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0 (January 2020). NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Risk Leadership↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 1

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0. NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Uncertainty↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗

DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Application of Objectives-Driven Assurance Cases to System Development in an Evolving Acquisition Model

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

Objectives-driven↗

NASA NTRS2021

Modernizing NASA’s Space Flight Safety and Mission Success (S&MS) Assurance Framework In Line With Evolving Acquisition Strategies and Systems Engineering Practices

This paper presents the objectives-driven, case-based safety and mission success (S&MS) assurance framework being developed by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), including its motivations and its implementation via a S&MS Assurance Standard that is under development, supplemented by supporting standards including an S&MS Analysis Management Standard that is also under development. A need to evolve NASA’s S&MS assurance framework has emerged in recent years, resulting from the need to accommodate new acquisition models; the need to accommodate evolving systems engineering (SE) practices; the need to stipulate acceptable levels of S&MS risk; the need for improved integration of S&MS into SE; and the need for clearer risk acceptance accountability. The objectives-driven, case-based S&MS assurance framework proposed here is responsive to that need. Its key features include: • The establishment, by NASA Acquirers, of fundamental S&MS performance objectives that define limits of acceptability for the likelihoods that mission technical objectives will be accomplished and that people, assets, and environments put at risk by the mission will not be adversely affected; • The development and approval of Providers’ S&MS plans for meeting Acquirers’ S&MS performance objectives, including commitments to support Acquirer audit, investigation, and reporting needs; • The development, by Providers, of S&MS assurance cases that argue, supported by evidence, that the Provider has met, or is on track to meeting, the fundamental S&MS objectives; • The evaluation, throughout the program/project life cycle, of Provider S&MS assurance cases as the primary S&MS-related technical basis for Acquirer risk acceptance and the granting to the Provider of authority to proceed through the program/project life cycle. This proposed S&MS assurance framework is notable for its lack of prescription of traditional S&MS requirements and strategies such as defined failure tolerances, margins, or analysis requirements. Instead, Providers are given latitude to propose their own strategies for meeting the fundamental S&MS performance objectives, subject to independent review and Acquirer approval. The result is a framework for S&MS assurance that is at once both rigorous and flexible.

Assurance Case↗

DOE OSTI2022

APPLICATION OF OBJECTIVES-DRIVEN ASSURANCE CASES TO SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IN AN EVOLVING ACQUISITION MODEL

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Application of Objectives-Driven Assurance Cases to System Development in an Evolving Acquisition Model

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗