Skylab Experiment Operations Handbook: Experiment Descriptions - Volume 1
Volume I of the Skylab Experiment Operations Handbook is system-oriented and provides the description of all Skylab Experiments except ATM.
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Volume I of the Skylab Experiment Operations Handbook is system-oriented and provides the description of all Skylab Experiments except ATM.
The Operator Control Station of the JPL/NASA Telerobot Demonstration System provides an efficient man-machine interface for the performance of telerobot tasks. Its hardware and software have been designed with high flexibility. It provides a feedback-rich interactive environment in which the Operator performs teleoperation tasks, robotic tasks, and telerobotic tasks with ease. The to-date operational experiences of this system, particularly related to the Object Designate Process and the Voice Input/Output Process are discussed.
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The exploitation of the full physics potential of the LHC experiments requires fast and efficient processing of the largest possible dataset with the most refined understanding of the detector conditions. To face this challenge, the CMS collaboration has setup an infrastructure for the continuous unattended computation of the alignment and calibration constants, allowing for a refined knowledge of the most time-critical parameters already a few hours after the data have been saved to disk. This is the prompt calibration framework which, since the beginning of the LHC Run-I, enables the analysis and the High Level Trigger of the experiment to consume the most up-to-date conditions optimizing the performance of the physics objects. In the Run-II this setup has been further expanded to include even more complex calibration algorithms requiring higher statistics to reach the needed precision. This imposed the introduction of a new paradigm in the creation of the calibration datasets for unattended workflows and opened the door to a further step in performance. The paper reviews the design of these automated calibration workflows, the operational experience in the Run-II and the monitoring infrastructure developed to ensure the reliability of the service.
The Magellan Venus radar mapping mission was NASA's first planetary launch in 11 years, heralding a successful return to unmanned planetary exploration. This paper first describes the spacecraft, its mission, and its Mission Operations System, including the remotely located spacecraft team. It then discusses how the flight team achieved mission success, in spite of the obstacles imposed by challenges from the spacecraft and its environment, which had to be resolved with the spacecraft team nearly 1000 miles distant from the rest of the flight team. Benefits of remotely distributed spacecraft operations are summarized and suggestions offered, based on Magellan experience, for future mission operations systems considering the use of distributed elements.
A joint NASA/ESA endeavor was established to conduct an extensive spacelab simulation using the NASA CV-990 airborne laboratory. The scientific payload was selected to perform studies in upper atmospheric physics and infrared astronomy with principal investigators from France, the Netherlands, England, and several groups from the United States. Two experiment operators from Europe and two from the U.S. were selected to live aboard the aircraft along with a mission manager for a six-day period and operate the experiments in behalf of the principal scientists. This appendix discusses the experiment operators and their relationship to the joint mission under the following general headings: selection criteria, training programs, and performance. The performance of the proxy operators was assessed in terms of adequacy of training, amount of scientific data obtained, quality of data obtained, and reactions to problems that arose in experiment operation.
Numerous Stirling machines have been built and operated, but the operating experience of these machines is not well known. It is important to examine this operating experience in detail, because it largely substantiates the claim that Stirling machines are capable of reliable and lengthy lives. The amount of data that exists is impressive, considering that many of the machines that have been built are developmental machines intended to show proof of concept, and were not expected to operate for any lengthy period of time. Some Stirling machines (typically free-piston machines) achieve long life through non-contact bearings, while other Stirling machines (typically kinematic) have achieved long operating lives through regular seal and bearing replacements. In addition to engine and system testing, life testing of critical components is also considered.
Numerous Stirling machines have been built and operated, but the operating experience of these machines is not well known. It is important to examine this operating experience in detail, because it largely substantiates the claim that Stirling machines are capable of reliable and lengthy lives. The amount of data that exists is impressive, considering that many of the machines that have been built are developmental machines intended to show proof of concept, and were not expected to operate for any lengthy period of time. Some Stirling machines (typically free-piston machines) achieve long life through non-contact bearings, while other Stirling machines (typically kinematic) have achieved long operating lives through regular seal and bearing replacements. In addition to engine and system testing, life testing of critical components is also considered.
Lessons learned from Shuttle operations are discussed with emphasis placed on: (1) reusability of flight systems, (2) orbiter ground turnaround, (3) flight design, (4) payload integration, and (5) training. Attention is also given to the impact of the Challenger accident on Shuttle operations. Operations experience in flight design, payload integration, and flight controller and astronaut training reveals that initial projections underestimated the compexity, time, and manpower required. This can be attributed to the demands of customizing each mission to maximize the science return in a shrinking Shuttle flight program, and to frequent changes of the cargo manifest to optimize the mix of science and applications payloads.
Evaluating operational incidents can provide a window into the drivers most critical to establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture, thereby minimizing the potential project risk associated with safety incidents. By examining U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) versus U.S. Army drivers in terms of regulatory and contract requirements, programs implemented to address the requirements, and example case studies of operational events, a view of the elements most critical to making a positive influence on safety culture is presented. Four case studies are used in this evaluation; two from DOE and two from U.S. Army experiences. Although the standards guiding operations at these facilities are different, there are many similarities in the level of hazards, as well as the causes and the potential consequences of the events presented. Two of the incidents examined, one from a DOE operation and the other from a U.S. Army facility, resulted in workers receiving chemical burns. The remaining two incidents are similar in that significant conduct of operations failures occurred resulting in high-level radioactive waste (in the case of the DOE facility) or chemical agent (in the case of the Army facility) being transferred outside of engineering controls. A review of the investigation reports for all four events indicates the primary causes to be failures in work planning leading to ineffective hazard evaluation and control, lack of procedure adherence, and most importantly, lack of management oversight to effectively reinforce expectations for safe work planning and execution. DOE and Army safety programs are similar, and although there are some differences in contractual requirements, the expectations for safe performance are essentially the same. This analysis concludes that instilling a positive safety culture comes down to management leadership and engagement to (1) cultivate an environment that values a questioning attitude and (2) continually reinforce expectations for the appropriate level of rigor in work planning and procedure adherence. A review of the root causes and key contributing causes to the events indicate: - Three of the four root cause analyses cite lack of management engagement (oversight, involvement, ability to recognize issues, etc.) as a root cause to the events. - Two of the four root cause analyses cite work planning failures as a root cause to the events and all cause analyses reflect work planning failures as contributing factors to the events. - All events with the exception of the Tuba City plant shutdown indicate procedure noncompliance as a key contributor; in the case of Tuba City the procedure issues were primarily related to a lack of procedures, or a lack of sufficiently detailed procedures. - All events included discussion or suggestion of a lack of a questioning attitude, either on the part of management/supervision, work planners, or workers. This analysis suggests that the most critical drivers to safety culture are: - Management engagement, - Effective work planning and procedures, and - Procedure adherence with a questioning attitude to ensure procedural problems are identified and fixed. In high-hazard operational environments the importance of robust work planning processes and procedure adherence cannot be overstated. However, having the processes by themselves is not enough. Management must actively engage in expectation setting and ensure work planning that meets expectations for hazard analysis and control, develop a culture that encourages incident reporting and a questioning attitude, and routinely observe work performance to reinforce expectations for adherence to procedures/work control documents. In conclusion, the most critical driver to achieving a workforce culture that supports safe and effective project performance can be summarized as follows: 'Management engagement to continually reinforce expectations for work planning processes and procedure adherence in an environment that cultivates a questioning attitude'. (authors)
During a free-jet investigation of a 28-inch ram-jet engine at a Mach number of 2.35, flow pulsation at the engine inlet were discovered which proved to have an effect on the engine performance and operational characteristics, particularly the engine rich blowout limits. This report discusses the finding of the flow pulsations, their elimination, and effect. Other facility characteristics, such as the establishment of flow simulation and the degree of subcritical operation of the diffuser, are also explained.
This paper describes the new DSN science capability and highlights of the engineering work that lead to its development. It will also discuss experience with operations along with statistics and data quality.
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Industry-wide operating experience is a critical source of raw data for reliability and risk model parameter estimations for nuclear power plants. A large portion of operating experience data are failure events stored as reports that contain unstructured data, such as narratives. In current practice, a failure report is usually reviewed and manually coded by analysts. The coding is based on extracting several event characteristics such as system name, component type, sub-part type, failure mode, and failure cause. Event narratives are mostly used to help understand events and extract their characteristics. In this line of research, we aim to maximize the usage of event narratives by leveraging natural language processing (NLP) methods to automatically convert an event narrative to a causal graph. This research has promise to improve physical understanding of failure initiation and propagation and to facilitate use of non-failure data (e.g., near-misses and degradations) to complement the limited data pool of failures. In our previous work, we developed an NLP tool and applied it to analyze a number of licensee event reports submitted by U.S. nuclear power plants to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In this paper, we will report our recent research progress in aggregating the results of multiple reports, developing network model(s), and drawing statistical insights.
This report presents a summary of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reactor operating experience analyses with data through 2022 as well as the reliability and frequency trends identified in the 2022 update reports for component performance study, loss of offsite power analysis, initiating events analysis, and system study provided on the NRC Reactor Operating Experience Results and Databases website (https://nrcoe.inl.gov/).
Underwater operation evaluation of standard impact wrench, regulator valve for pressure suits, and S-IVB workshop hatches