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DOE OSTI2026

Surface and Buried Thermal, and RGB Unexploded Ordnance Data Collection

This document provides a description of a data collection campaign of unexploded ordnance (UXOI) set. The dataset captures a controlled UAV imaging campaign designed to support detection of UXO across varied environmental conditions. Data were collected during three campaigns in Norris and Northeast Knoxville, Tennessee, using RGB, and thermal sensors mounted on Parrot UKR. In total, the dataset contains 9925 images, 26 full-motion video, and approximately 81.99 GB of data, collected across late spring/summer conditions, every hour during sunlight, and multiple surface contexts, including tall grass, short grass, gravel, as well as buried in sand, and other gravel mixtures. The collection was designed to capture thermal and visual variability relevant to UXO detection in agricultural land, bare earth, and subsurface. Review of the imagery showed that ordnance was most detectable during periods of changing solar input, especially approximately 10-60 minutes after sunrise, approximately 20-60 minutes after sunset, and 2-3 min after cloud cover interrupted prolonged solar heating. These conditions increased thermal contrast because many ordnance items retained or released heat differently than the surrounding vegetation and ground surface. This dataset provides a useful resource for developing and evaluating airborne UXO detection methods under realistic field conditions. All ordnance used in the study was inert, and thermal behavior may differ from that of live ordnance. In addition, variation in ordnance type, composition, and placement introduced differences in thermal response that should be considered when interpreting results.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2015

RCRA PART B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU)

This volume of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application by the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) seeks continued operation of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Explosives, explosive materials, and unexploded ordnance are declared waste explosives if they are damaged, are defective, have exceeded their shelf life, are the result of environmental restoration (legacy), or are discarded explosive material from research or testing projects. This document provides a description of the regulated waste codes accepted for treatment (controlled detonations), the general design of the unit, and the processes used to safely detonate onsite-generated waste explosives and unexploded ordnance, which are defined as hazardous waste under specific regulations. The Area 11 EODU consists of a firing point (controlled access area where firing of explosives is conducted), firing pad (prepares site where explosives hazardous waste is fired), and ancillary equipment that includes an explosives magazine and firing point area. Additionally, live explosives training is conducted to ensure proficiency of the EODU operations personnel, explosives handlers, and the firing system components. Training detonations do not include waste explosives and are limited in respect to explosives volume and frequency personnel, explosives handlers, and the firing system components. Training detonations do not include waste explosives and are limited in respect to explosives volume and frequency. For safety and security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This public version of the application contains most, but not all, of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Underwater unexploded ordnance discrimination based on intrinsic target polarizabilities – A case study

Seabed unexploded ordnance that resulted partly from the high failure rate among munitions from more than 80 years ago and from decades of military training and testing of weapons systems poses an increasing concern all around the world. Although existing magnetic systems can detect clusters of debris, they are not able to tell whether a munition is still intact requiring special removal (e.g. in situ detonation) or is harmless scrap metal. The marine environment poses unique challenges, and transferring knowledge and approaches from land to a marine environment has not been easy and straightforward. On land, the background soil conductivity is much lower than the conductivity of the unexploded ordnance and the electromagnetic response of a target is essentially the same as that in free space. For those frequencies required for target characterization in the marine environment, the seawater response must be accounted for and removed from the measurements. The system developed for this study uses fields from three orthogonal transmitters to illuminate the target and four three-component receivers to measure the signal arranged in a configuration that inherently cancels the system's response due to the enclosing seawater, the sea–bottom interface and the air–sea interface for shallow deployments. The system was tested as a cued system on land and underwater in San Francisco Bay – it was mounted on a simple platform on top of a support structure that extended 1 m below and allowed the diver to place metal objects to a specific location even in low-visibility conditions. The measurements were stable and repeatable. Furthermore, target responses estimated from marine measurements matched those from land acquisition, confirming that the seawater and air–sea interface responses were removed successfully. Thirty-six channels of normalized induction responses were used for the classification, which was done by estimating the target principal dipole polarizabilities. Our results demonstrated that the system can resolve the intrinsic polarizabilities of the target, with clear distinctions between those of symmetric intact unexploded ordnance and irregular scrap metal. The prototype system was able to classify an object based on its size, shape and metal content and correctly estimate its location and orientation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2015

RCRA Part A Permit Application for Waste Management Activities at the Nevada National Security Site Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU), Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU), and Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU)

This document is the first volume in a Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Application to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for continued operation of certain facilities on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), owned by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). This RCRA permit application pertains to the Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU), the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU), the Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU), and the Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU). This volume lists the relevant permits for each of these facilities and provides maps and drawings of many aspects of them. The companion volumes, which provide descriptive text and discussion and additional graphics, are jointly considered Part B of the permit application. Those volumes are identified by the following document numbers: DOE/NV/25946--2442, DOE/NV/25946--2448, DOE/NV/25946--2425, and DOE/NV/25946--2429.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Applications of the associated-particle neutron-time-of-flight interrogation technique - From sheep to unexploded ordnance

The associated-particle technique (APT) will be presented for some diverse applications that include on the one hand, analyzing the body composition of live sheep and on the other, identifying the fillers of unexploded ordnance (UXO). What began with proof-of-concept studies using a large laboratory based 14 MeV neutron generator of the 'associated-particle' type, soon became possible for the first time to measure total body protein, fat and water simultaneously in live sheep using a compact field deployable associated-particle sealed-tube neutron generator (APSTNG). This non-invasive technique offered the animal physiologist a tool to monitor the growth of an animal in response to new genetic, nutritional and pharmacologic methods for livestock improvement. While measurement of carbon (C), nitrogen (N) and oxygen (O) determined protein, fat and water because of the fixed stoichiometric proportions of these elements in these body components, the unique C/N and C/O ratios of high explosives revealed their identity in UXO. The algorithm that was developed and implemented to extract C, N and O counts from an APT generated gamma-ray spectrum will be presented together with the UXO investigations that involved preliminary proofof-concept studies and modeling with Monte Carlo produced synthetic spectra of 57-155 mm projectiles.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2017

Ordnance News

Since July of 2016 I have been assigned as a Guest Scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory under the Training With Industries (TWI) Program. Los Alamos National Laboratory has proven to be a challenging and rewarding assignment in which I have found myself at the cutting edge of technologies pertinent to the Explosive Ordnance Disposal career field. In the last 7 months I have had the pleasure of working in an applications group that conducts research at the DOE “Q” and SCI levels. The group “uses a broad range of engineering and scientific expertise to support nuclear counter proliferation (NCP), nuclear counter terrorism (NCT), and nuclear emergency response (ER) missions. The Group contributes to national programs intended to protect, deter, and respond to weapons of mass destruction through tailored training and by using specialized applied electromagnetic solutions, rapid prototyping, designing/building/testing/delivering tools and trainers along with novel safing technologies, RF solutions, and cyberphysical applications”. While the specifics of the work performed are classified, the groups “core expertise includes pulsed power; EMP effects; nuclear weapons engineering; weapons effects and materials; predictive/hydrodynamic modeling and testing; firing and penalty systems; x-ray and non-destructive evaluation of threat devices; applied physics; advanced RF systems; powerline communications; novel electronics; 3-D printing of specialized components and cyber assessment/response technologies”. (int.lanl.gov/org/padgs/threat-identification-response/analytics-intelligencetechnology/ a-3/index.shtml)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Thermal, RGB, and Multispectral Unexploded Ordnance Data Collection

As of May 1, 2026 Landmine contamination affects 58 countries and many hundreds of thousands of km² of land. For example, the National Mine Action Program Demining Ukraine reporting that up to 144,000 km² of territory are potentially contaminated and require survey and clearance (National Mine Action Program “Demining Ukraine,” n.d.) alone. This contamination includes mines and other explosive remnants of war and continues to constrain civilian access, agricultural use, infrastructure recovery, and broader socioeconomic activity (International Campaign to Ban Landmines–Cluster Munition Coalition [ICBL-CMC], 2024; Mine Action Review, 2024). Current response activities rely on established mine-action approaches including non-technical survey, technical survey, clearance, and explosive ordnance disposal, consistent with international mine-action terminology and operational practice (United Nations Mine Action Service [UNMAS], 2024; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining [GICHD], 2023). In this context, UAV-based sensing, including UAV-mounted thermal imaging, may provide a useful supplementary capability by supporting faster, safer detection and mapping of suspect hazards prior to ground intervention (Smiljanic, 2022).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2011

Development of an instrument for non-destructive identification of Unexploded Ordnance using tagged neutrons - a proof of concept study

Range clearance operations at munitions testing grounds must discriminate Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) from clutter items and distinguish UXO filled with High Explosives (HE) from those with inert fillers. Non-destructive technologies are thus necessary for the cost-effective disposal of UXO during remediation of such sites. The only technique showing promise so far for the non-destructive elemental characterization of UXO fillers utilizes neutron interactions with the material to detect carbon (C), nitrogen (N) and oxygen (O) which have unique ratios in HE. However, several unresolved issues hinder the wide application of this potentially very suitable technique. The most important one is that neutrons interact with all surrounding matter in addition to the interrogated material, leading to a very high gamma-ray background in the detector. Systems requiring bulky shielding and having poor signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) for measuring elements are unsuitable for field deployment. The inadequacies of conventional neutron interrogation methods are overcome by using the tagged-neutron approach, and the availability of compact sealed neutron generators exploiting this technique offers field deployment of non-intrusive measurement systems for detecting threat materials, like explosives and drugs. By accelerating deuterium ions into a tritium target, the subsequent fusion reaction generates nearly back-to-back emissions of neutrons and alpha particles of energy 14.1 and 3.5 MeV respectively. A position-sensitive detector recognizes the associated alpha particle, thus furnishing the direction of the neutron. The tagged neutrons interact with the nuclei of the interrogated object, producing element-specific prompt gamma-rays that the gamma detectors recognize. Measuring the delay between the detections of the alpha particle and the gamma-ray determines where the reaction occurred along the axis of the neutron beam (14.1 MeV neutrons travel at 5 cm/nanosecond, while gamma rays cover 30 cm/nanosecond). The main advantage of the technique is its ability to simultaneously provide 2D and 3D imaging of objects and their elemental composition. This work reports on the efficacy of using 14 MeV neutrons tagged by the associated particle neutron time-of-flight technique (APnTOF) to extract neutron induced characteristic gamma-rays from an object-of-interest with high SNR and without interference from nearby clutter.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2015

2012 Update to the Site Discharge Pollution Prevention Plan (Rev. 1): Los Alamos/Pueblo Watershed (Vol. 1)

One historical industrial activity area is associated with R001, R-SMA-0.5: Site C-00-020. Area of Concern (AOC) C-00-020 is a suspected mortar impact area located along the north valley wall of Rendija Canyon on General Services Administration (GSA) and U.S. Forest Service (USFS) land. The 30-acre site also includes a tributary of Rendija Canyon. Most of the site lies within the Santa Fe National Forest, except for a small area on the southeastern edge that is private property. AOC C-00-020 was suspected to be a former mortar-impact area because of a “U.S. Property—No Trespassing” sign and a nearly illegible bilingual sign posted in the area. The signs no longer remain. Extensive archival searches have revealed no documentation regarding the use of this site as a munitions impact area. In addition, no field evidence of operations (e.g., munitions debris [MD], munitions and explosives of concern [MEC], unexploded ordnance [UXO], or impact scars) has ever been found at AOC C-00-020. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) facility investigation (RFI) activities conducted in 1993 included conducting an ordnance sweep followed by a geophysical sweep. No ordnance, MD, MEC, or UXO was located. In addition, no ordnance was found during the 2007 investigation or during the 2009 ordnance survey. The site is located within an area burned by the 2000 Cerro Grande fire. The stream channel that runs through the center of the site has been widened by flooding. Currently, there are burned and live trees on the steep slopes next to the stream. Ordnance surveys at the site resulted in no findings except for scrap metal such as bailing wire. The complete absence of ordnance and explosives waste (OEW) confirmed that the site was never used as an ordnance-impact area. In accordance with the approved investigation work plan, no further investigation was conducted at AOC C-00-020. The New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) concurred with the conclusion that no additional ordnance surveys need to be conducted at this site and issued a corrective action complete without controls for AOC C-00-020 on May 16, 2012. No industrial materials were historically managed at this Site; therefore, no potential contaminants are associated with the Site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

Weldon Spring, Missouri, Site Annual Report for Calendar Year 2015 June 2016

1.1 Purpose and Scope. This report summarizes the activities, compliance status, annual inspection, and environmental monitoring results from calendar year 2015 for the Weldon Spring, Missouri, Site. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepares this annual report as part of the site’s long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS&M) activities, in accordance with the requirements of the Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance Plan for the Weldon Spring, Missouri, Site (LTS&M Plan) (DOE 2008a) and the Federal Facility Agreement for the Weldon Spring Site (DOE 2006). The Weldon Spring site is a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) site. 1.2 Site Description. The Weldon Spring site is located in St. Charles County, Missouri, about 30 miles west of St. Louis, Missouri (Figure 1). The site comprises two geographically distinct, DOE-owned properties: the former Weldon Spring Chemical Plant and Raffinate Pit sites (Chemical Plant) and the former Weldon Spring Quarry (Quarry). The former Chemical Plant is located about 2 miles southwest of the junction of Missouri State Route 94 and Interstate 64. The Quarry is about 4 miles southwest of the former Chemical Plant. Both sites are accessible from Missouri State Route 94. During the early 1940s, the Department of the Army acquired 17,232 acres of private land in St. Charles County for the construction of the Weldon Spring Ordnance Works facility. The former Ordnance Works site has since been divided into several contiguous areas under different ownership, as depicted in Figure 2. Current land use of the former Ordnance Works site includes the former Chemical Plant and Quarry, the U.S. Army Reserve Weldon Spring Training Area, the Missouri Department of Conservation (MDC), the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) Division of State Parks (MDNR-Parks), Francis Howell High School, a St. Charles County highway maintenance (formerly Missouri Department of Transportation [MoDOT]) facility, the Public Water Supply District No. 2 water supply facility, the St. Charles County law enforcement training center, the village of Weldon Spring Heights, and a University of Missouri research park. The former Chemical Plant and Quarry areas total 228.16 acres. The Former Chemical Plant property occupies 219.50 acres, and the Quarry occupies 8.66 acres.

2015 Annual Report Weldon Spring↗
DOE OSTI2025

Mil-Std-464C and Mil-Std-464D Electromagnetic Radiation Environment Evaluation

Many systems derive their electromagnetic radiation (EMR) environments from Mil-Std-464C or Mil-Std-464D, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems. This standard defines several EMR environments based on the type of system and expected application. Many nuclear weapon (NW) systems reference the ordnance environments as the starting point for their functional EMR requirements, since any item intended to go into Department of Defense (DOD) custody is expected to be certified hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO) safe when exposed to the environments listed in Mil-Std-464 Table 9. This environment is defined as the envelope of all sources any system in DOD custody may ever encounter, however, and may include sources that are not relevant for a particular system. This document is intended to provide additional clarity on the Mil-Std-464C and Mil-Std-464D EMR environments, specifically the driving sources for the maximum ordnance levels. This supplementary information may be used to guide tailoring of relevant environments or application to different systems with the additional consideration of any shielding that may reduce the external environments defined in the military standard.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2017

The Tragic Bazooka Accident at Los Alamos on July 14, 1962

In recent years the Laboratory has made information (documents, photographs, and perspectives) regarding the occupational explosives accidents that killed seven men in the late 1950s more accessible to the public. While pursuing this effort, we were reminded of similar tragedies that occurred to children of the community. The purpose of this paper is to make information that has come into our hands more available to the public regarding these accidents. Following this introduction, a brief synopsis is provided for each accident. The appendices contain source documents for the 1962 accident that are not generally available. The community of Los Alamos, New Mexico was born out of a military post created to support the secret Manhattan Project during World War II. Security was provided by military police and some training exercises were conducted using live ordnance. In two instances unexploded ordnance (UXO) from this era was found “in the field” by residents hiking in the local area and brought into town. Tragically, handling these “bazooka” rounds as “dud” munitions resulted in death for one child and injury to several others. The first accident occurred on Saturday, September 6, 1947, which resulted in injuries to two boys, ages 5 and 12. The second accident occurred on Saturday, July 14, 1962 and resulted in the death of one five-year-old boy, and injuries to four other children, ages 6 to 10 years-old. The latter accident is the primary focus of the paper.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada for Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 0)

This report provides the results of the annual post-closure use restriction (UR) inspections at corrective action sites (CASs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). This report covers post-closure UR inspections for calendar year 2020, and includes visual inspections and repair activities completed at the following corrective action units (CAUs): • CAU 407, Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) • CAU 424, Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) • CAU 453, Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) • CAU 487, Thunderwell Site (TTR). Note: CAU 400, Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) (CASs TA-19-001-05PT, Ordnance Disposal Pit; and TA-55-00-TAB2, Ordnance Disposal Pit) no longer requires inspection and reporting, as described in the Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada for Calendar Year 2019. Site figures are included in Appendix A. The Post-Closure Inspection Plans and Record of Technical Change modifying the requirements for each UR are included in Appendix B. The Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are included in Appendix C. Field Notes are included in Appendix D. Appendix E, Inspection Photographs, does not include photographs because none were taken during the 2020 post-closure inspections. Appendix F, Post-Closure Vegetation Monitoring Report, does not include any data because vegetation monitoring was not conducted or required at any CAU in 2020. Visual inspections were conducted according to the post-closure requirements outlined in specific CAU and CAS URs, and approved by NDEP. The annual post-closure inspections for CASs associated with CAUs 407, 424, 453, and 487 were conducted on May 20, 2020. No maintenance or repair issues were noted at CAUs 487, or at CASs associated with CAU 424 (except CASs 03-08-002-A304 and 03-08-002-A308). Maintenance items and subsequent repairs include the following: • CAU 407, CAS TA-23-001-TARC (Roller Coaster RadSafe Area): A UR sign was loose and was rehung during the inspection. • CAU 424, CAS 03-08-002-A304 (Landfill Cell A3-4): The northeast monument needed a UR sign. The UR sign was attached to the monument on August 11, 2020. • CAU 424, CAS 03-08-002-A308 (Landfill Cell A3-8): The southeast monument needed additional lava rock. The lava rock was added during the inspection. • CAU 453, CAS 09-55-001-0952 (Area 9 Landfill): Two animal burrows were noted in the western portion of the northern and southern trenches (one burrow per trench). The animal burrows were repaired on August 11, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2015

Historic American Landscapes Survey: Arco Naval Proving Ground (Idaho National Laboratory)

Based on historical evaluations in 1993 and 1997, historians determined that the then-remaining Arco NPG structures were significant to the nation’s history through their association with World War II . Through ensuing discussions with the SHPO, it was further determined that the infrastructure and associated landscape were also significant. According to provisions of INL’s Cultural Resource Management Plan (CRMP) as legitimized through a 2004 Programmatic Agreement between DOE-ID, the Idaho State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO), and Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) historians identified the World War II structures as DOE “Signature Properties”. As defined by DOE-HQ, Signature Properties “denote its [DOE’s] most historically important properties across the complex…and/or those properties that are viewed as having tourism potential.” The INL is a secure site and the INL land and structures are not accessible to the public and, therefore have no “tourism potential”. Although DOE-ID actively sought other uses for the vacant, unused buildings, none were identified and the buildings present safety and health concerns. A condition assessment found lead based paint, asbestos, rodent infestation/droppings, small animal carcasses, mold, and, in CF-633, areas of radiological contamination. In early 2013, DOE-ID notified the Idaho SHPO, ACHP, and, as required by the INL CRMP and PA, DOE-Headquarters Federal Preservation Officer, of their intent to demolish the vacant buildings (CF-606, CF-607, CF-613, CF-632, and CF-633). The proposed “end-state” of the buildings will be either grass and/or gravel pads. Through the NHPA Section 106 consultation process, measures to mitigate the adverse impacts of demolition were determined and agreed to through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DOE-ID, SHPO, and ACHP. The measures include the development and installation of interpretive signs to be placed at a publicly accessible location, retention of original components of CF-633, and completion of this HALS standard format report. Buildings, infrastructure, and features that are not scheduled for removal are documented here as well as properties that are scheduled for removal and the overall Arco NPG landscape. The Arco NPG, located in the remote high-desert of eastern Idaho aided in the defense and eventual ally victory in the Pacific Theater of World War II, in addition to revising national standards for the safe storage and transport of conventional ordnance.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2011

Modeling the tagged-neutron UXO identification technique using the Geant4 toolkit

It is proposed to use 14 MeV neutrons tagged by the associated particle neutron time-of-flight technique (APnTOF) to identify the fillers of unexploded ordnances (UXO) by characterizing their carbon, nitrogen and oxygen contents. To facilitate the design and construction of a prototype system, a preliminary simulation model was developed, using the Geant4 toolkit. This work established the toolkit environment for (a) generating tagged neutrons, (b) their transport and interactions within a sample to induce emission and detection of characteristic gamma-rays, and (c) 2D and 3D-image reconstruction of the interrogated object using the neutron and gamma-ray time-of-flight information. Using the modeling, this article demonstrates the novelty of the tagged-neutron approach for extracting useful signals with high signal-to-background discrimination of an object-of-interest from that of its environment. Simulations indicated that an UXO filled with the RDX explosive, hexogen (C{sub 3}H{sub 6}O{sub 6}N{sub 6}), can be identified to a depth of 20 cm when buried in soil.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗