Progress Update: P-Reactor Grout
A progress update, the Recovery Act at work at the Savannah River Site. The new phase of work on the permanent closure of two cold war nuclear reactors.
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
A progress update, the Recovery Act at work at the Savannah River Site. The new phase of work on the permanent closure of two cold war nuclear reactors.
The objective of this report is to document laboratory testing of magnesium mono potassium phosphate grouts for P-Reactor vessel in-situ decommissioning. Magnesium mono potassium phosphate cement-based grout was identified as candidate material for filling (physically stabilizing) the 105-P Reactor vessel (RV) because it is less alkaline than portland cement-based grout (pH of about 12.4). A less alkaline material ({<=} 10.5) was desired to address a potential materials compatibility issue caused by corrosion of aluminum metal in highly alkaline environments such as that encountered in portland cement grouts. Information concerning access points into the P-Reactor vessel and amount of aluminum metal in the vessel is provided elsewhere. Fresh and cured properties were measured for: (1) commercially blended magnesium mono potassium phosphate packaged grouts, (2) commercially available binders blended with inert fillers at SRNL, (3) grouts prepared from technical grade MgO and KH{sub 2}PO{sub 4} and inert fillers (quartz sands, Class F fly ash), and (4) Ceramicrete{reg_sign} magnesium mono potassium phosphate-based grouts prepared at Argonne National Laboratory. Boric acid was evaluated as a set retarder in the magnesium mono potassium phosphate mixes.
The objective of this report is to document laboratory testing of blended calcium aluminate - calcium hemihydrate grouts for P-Reactor vessel in-situ decommissioning. Blended calcium aluminate - calcium hemihydrate cement-based grout was identified as candidate material for filling (physically stabilizing) the 105-P Reactor vessel (RV) because it is less alkaline than portland cement-based grout which has a pH greater than 12.4. In addition, blended calcium aluminate - calcium hemihydrate cement compositions can be formulated such that the primary cementitious phase is a stable crystalline material. A less alkaline material (pH {<=} 10.5) was desired to address a potential materials compatibility issue caused by corrosion of aluminum metal in highly alkaline environments such as that encountered in portland cement grouts [Wiersma, 2009a and b, Wiersma, 2010, and Serrato and Langton, 2010]. Information concerning access points into the P-Reactor vessel and amount of aluminum metal in the vessel is provided elsewhere [Griffin, 2010, Stefanko, 2009 and Wiersma, 2009 and 2010, Bobbitt, 2010, respectively]. Radiolysis calculations are also provided in a separate document [Reyes-Jimenez, 2010].
The R- and P-reactor buildings were retired from service and are now being prepared for deactivation and decommissioning (D and D). D and D activities consist primarily of immobilizing contaminated components and structures in a grout-like formulation. Aluminum corrodes very rapidly when it comes in contact with the alkaline grout materials and as a result produces hydrogen gas. To address this potential deflagration/explosion hazard, the Materials Science and Technology Directorate (MS and T) of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been requested to review and evaluate existing experimental and analytical studies of this issue to determine if any process constraints on the chemistry of the fill material and the fill operation are necessary. Various options exist for the type of grout material that may be used for D and D of the reactor vessels. The grout formulation options include ceramicrete (pH 6-8), low pH portland cement + silica fume grout (pH 10.4), or Portland cement groupt (pH 12.5). The assessment concluded that either ceramicrete or the silica fume grout may be used to safely grout the P-reactor vessel. The risk of accumulation of a flammable mixture of hydrogen between the grout-air interface and the top of the reactor is very low. Portland cement grout, on the other hand, for the same range of process parameters does not provide a margin of safety against the accumulation of flammable gas in the reactor vessel during grouting operations in the P-reactor vessel. It is recommended that this grout not be utilized for this task. The R-reactor vessel cotnains significantly less aluminum based on current facility process knowledge, surface observations, and drawings. Therefore, a Portland cement grout may be considered for grouting operations as well as the other grout formulations. For example, if the grout fill rate is less than 1 inch/min and the grout temperature is maintained at 70 C or less, the risk of hydrogen accumulation during fill operations in the R-reactor vessel is low for the Portland cement. Alternatively, if the grout fill rate is less than 0.5 inch/min and the grout is maintained at a temperature of 80 C, the risk is again low. Although these calculations are conservative, there are some measures that may be taken to further minimize the potential for hydrogen evolution. (1) Minimize the temperature of the grout as much as practical. Lower temperatures will mean lower hydrogen generation rates. For P-reactor, grout temperatures less than 100 C should provide an adequate safety margin for the pH 8 and pH 10.4 grout formulations. For R-reactor, grout temperatures less than 70 C or 80 C will provide an adequate safety margin for the Portland cement. The other grout formulations are also viable options for R-reactor. (2) Minimize the grout fill rate as much as practical. Lowering the fill rate takes advantage of passivation of the aluminum components and hence lower hydrogen generation rates. For P-reactor, fill rates that are less than 2 inches/min for the ceramicrete and the silica fume grouts will reduce the chance of significant hydrogen accumulation. For R-reactor, fill rates less than 1 inch/min will again minimize the risk of hydrogen accumulation. (3) Ventilate the building as much as practical (e.g., leave doors open) to further disperse hydrogen. The volumetric hydrogen generation rates in the P-reactor vessel, however, are low for the pH 8 and pH 10.4 grout, (i.e., less than 0.97 ft{sup 3}/min). If further walk-down inspections of the reactor vessels suggest an increase in the actual areal density of aluminum, the calculations should be re-visited.
The R- and P-reactor vessels at the Savannah River Site (SRS) are being prepared for deactivation and decommissioning (D&D). D&D activities will consist primarily of physically isolating and stabilizing the reactor vessel by filling it with a grout material. The reactor vessels contain aluminum alloy materials, which pose a concern in that aluminum corrodes rapidly when it comes in contact with the alkaline grout. A product of the corrosion reaction is hydrogen gas and therefore potential flammability issues were assessed. A model was developed to calculate the hydrogen generation rate as the reactor is being filled with the grout material. Three options existed for the type of grout material for D&D of the reactor vessels. The grout formulation options included ceramicrete (pH 6-8), a calcium aluminate sulfate (CAS) based cement (pH 10), or Portland cement grout (pH 12.4). Corrosion data for aluminum in concrete were utilized as input for the model. The calculations considered such factors as the surface area of the aluminum components, the open cross-sectional area of the reactor vessel, the rate at which the grout is added to the reactor vessel, and temperature. Given the hydrogen generation rate, the hydrogen concentration in the vapor space of the reactor vessel above the grout was calculated. This concentration was compared to the lower flammability limit for hydrogen. The assessment concluded that either ceramicrete or the CAS grout may be used to safely grout the P-reactor vessel. The risk of accumulation of a flammable mixture of hydrogen between the grout-air interface and the top of the reactor is very low. Portland cement grout, on the other hand, for the same range of process parameters did not provide a margin of safety against the accumulation of flammable gas in the reactor vessel during grouting operations in the P-reactor vessel. Therefore, it was recommended that this grout not be utilized for this task. On the other hand, the R-reactor vessel contained significantly less aluminum surface area that the P-reactor vessel based on current facility process knowledge, surface observations, and drawings. Therefore, a Portland cement grout may be considered for grouting operations as well as the other grout formulations.
The United States Department of Energy (US DOE) concept for facility in-situ decommissioning (ISD) is to physically stabilize and isolate in tact, structurally sound facilities that are no longer needed for their original purpose of, i.e., producing (reactor facilities), processing (isotope separation facilities) or storing radioactive materials. The Savannah River Site 105-P and 105-R Reactor Facility ISD requires about 250,000 cubic yards of grout to fill the below grade structure. The fills are designed to prevent subsidence, reduce water infiltration, and isolate contaminated materials. This work is being performed as a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensations and Liability Act (CERCLA) action and is part of the overall soil and groundwater completion projects for P- and R-Areas. Cementitious materials were designed for the following applications: (1) Below grade massive voids/rooms: Portland cement-based structural flowable fills for - Bulk filling, Restricted placement and Underwater placement. (2) Special below grade applications for reduced load bearing capacity needs: Cellular portland cement lightweight fill (3) Reactor vessel fills that are compatible with reactive metal (aluminum metal) components in the reactor vessels: Calcium sulfoaluminate flowable fill, and Magnesium potassium phosphate flowable fill. (4) Caps to prevent water infiltration and intrusion into areas with the highest levels of radionuclides: Portland cement based shrinkage compensating concrete. A system engineering approach was used to identify functions and requirements of the fill and capping materials. Laboratory testing was performed to identify candidate formulations and develop final design mixes. Scale-up testing was performed to verify material production and placement as well as fresh and cured properties. The 105-P and 105-R ISD projects are currently in progress and are expected to be complete in 2012. The focus of this paper is to describe the (1) grout mixes for filling the reactor vessels, and (2) a specialty grout mix to fill a selected portion of the P-Reactor Disassembly Basin. Details of the grout mixes designed for ISD of he SRS Reactor Disassembly Basins and below grade portions of the 105-Buildings was described elsewhere. Material property test results, placement strategies, full-scale production and delivery systems will also be described.
For the 2010 ANS Embedded Topical Meeting on Decommissioning, Decontamination and Reutilization and Technology, Savannah River National Laboratory's Mike Serrato reported initial information on the newly developed specialty grout materials necessary to satisfy all requirements associated with in-situ decommissioning of P-Reactor and R-Reactor at the U.S. Department of Energy's Savannah River Site. Since that report, both projects have been successfully completed and extensive test data on both fresh properties and cured properties has been gathered and analyzed for a total of almost 191,150 m{sup 3} (250,000 yd{sup 3}) of new materials placed. The focus of this paper is to describe the (1) special grout mix for filling the P-Reactor vessel (RV) and (2) the new flowable structural fill materials used to fill the below grade portions of the facilities. With a wealth of data now in hand, this paper also captures the test results and reports on the performance of these new materials. Both reactors were constructed and entered service in the early 1950s, producing weapons grade materials for the nation's defense nuclear program. R-Reactor was shut down in 1964 and the P-Reactor in 1991. In-situ decommissioning (ISD) was selected for both facilities and performed as Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensations and Liability Act actions (an early action for P-Reactor and a removal action for R-Reactor), beginning in October 2009. The U.S. Department of Energy concept for ISD is to physically stabilize and isolate intact, structurally robust facilities that are no longer needed for their original purpose of producing (reactor facilities), processing (isotope separation facilities), or storing radioactive materials. Funding for accelerated decommissioning was provided under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Decommissioning of both facilities was completed in September 2011. ISD objectives for these CERCLA actions included: (1) Prevent industrial worker exposure to radioactive or hazardous contamination exceeding Principal Threat Source Material levels; (2) Minimize human and ecological exposure to unacceptable risk associated with radiological and hazardous constituents that are or may be present; (3) Prevent to the extent practicable the migration of radioactive or hazardous contaminants from the closed facility to the groundwater so that concentrations in groundwater do not exceed regulatory standards; (4) Eliminate or control all routes of human exposure to radiological and chemical contamination; and (5) Prevent animal intruder exposure to radioactive and hazardous contamination.
The decommissioning of hardened nuclear facilities provides a unique challenge in balancing current worker dose with exposure to future receptors and media. In situ decommissioning (ISD) is a cost-effective and safe option for the closure of such facilities but requires a detailed understanding of the threat that radioactive and hazardous constituents remaining in the facilities pose to groundwater and surrounding surface water. The Savannah River Site (SRS) extensively employs contaminant migration models within the decommissioning process to develop site-specific removal, grouting, and monitoring strategies in support of safe and effective final end states of nuclear facilities. This work discusses the use of contaminant migration modeling in the ISD process at SRS, including specific examples from the closure of P-Reactor and R-Reactor, Building 235-F, F-Canyon and F/H Laboratory Complex. Migration models developed during the closure of P-Reactor and R-Reactor were divided into four source areas: the reactor vessel, the process area, the disassembly basin, and the purification wing. Each source area was assigned a specific inventory and migration pathway and was then subject to varying hypothetical removal, capping, and grouting schemes. Modeling indicated that groundwater Maximum Concentration Limits (MCLs) might be exceeded if no action was taken for eleven and ten constituents of concern (COCs) at P-Reactor and R-Reactor, respectively. These exceedances could occur in as few as 200 to 500 years. Alternatively, the migration modeling demonstrated that the selected ISD actions reduced contaminant mobility which allowed for significant radioactive decay and resulted in fewer predicted exceedances of groundwater MCLs (five COCs for P-Reactor; eight COCs for R-Reactor). In response to the modeling results for P-Reactor and R-Reactor, effectiveness monitoring programs were developed to target contaminants, specific to each reactor, that may migrate to groundwater. Contaminant migration modeling also revealed that roof collapse was a large factor in the release of COCs to the environment, giving rise to roof improvements, and an inspection and vegetation control program to ensure roof stability over time. Contaminant migration modeling is also aiding in the closure planning for hardened facilities in F Area. Building 235-F housed the Actinide Billet Line, which produced Np-237 billets for irradiation in SRS reactors, and the Plutonium Fuel Form (PuFF) facility that produced Pu-238 heat sources for the space program. As a result of these missions, areas within Building 235-F contain considerable residual amounts of both Pu-238 and Np-237. Contaminant migration modeling of Building 235-F was originally performed in 2012 to identify the feasibility of ISD and the amount of radioactive material removal required to prevent the exceedance of groundwater MCLs. The original model indicated that a 60% reduction in the PuFF facility Pu-238 inventory could keep groundwater concentrations below standards, while Np-237 did not pose a threat to groundwater. However, updates to the model with an emphasis on source impact pathways revealed that, due to the orientation of the source areas relative to groundwater flow, no amount of reasonable removal of Pu-238 would keep groundwater concentrations below MCLs and that Np-237 could be a large contributor to localized MCL exceedances. With this insight, the refined 2019 model is being used to assist in the development of grouting plans specific to each facility source area, where bentonite may be utilized to slow the migration of Pu-238 and its daughter products from the PuFF facility and a reducing grout may decrease Np-237 transport by ensuring the nuclide remains in the less mobile +IV oxidation state. The beginning phases of contaminant migration modeling are underway for F-Canyon and associated facilities using lessons learned from the Reactors and Building 235-F. A contaminant migration pathway, similar to the pathway used for the reactor vessels, is being developed for the hot and warm canyons. The F-Canyon inventories are being spatially refined to identify specific and localized source zones, comparable to Building 235-F, that may impact groundwater. Contaminant migration modeling provides vital input within the ISD process, from facility investigation to post closure effectiveness monitoring, making it a valuable tool in the development of safe and effective end states for hardened nuclear facilities at SRS. (authors)
The Department of Energy (DOE) intends to close 100-150 facilities in the DOE complex using an in situ decommissioning (ISD) strategy that calls for grouting the below-grade interior volume of the structure and leaving the above-grade interior open or demolishing it and disposing of it in the slit trenches in E Area. These closures are expected to persist and remain stable for centuries, but there are neither facility-specific monitoring approaches nor studies on the rate of deterioration of the materials used in the original construction or on the ISD components added during closure (caps, sloped roofs, etc). This report will focus on the evaluation of the actual aging/degradation of the materials of construction used in the ISD structures at Savannah River Site (SRS) above grade, specifically P & R reactor buildings. Concrete blocks (six 2 to 5 ton blocks) removed from the outer wall of the P Reactor Building were turned over to SRNL as the first source for concrete cores. Larger cores were received as a result of grouting activities in P and R reactor facilities. The cores were sectioned and evaluated using microscopy, x-ray diffraction (XRD), ion chromatography (IC) and thermal analysis. Scanning electron microscopy shows that the aggregate and cement phases present in the concrete are consistent with the mix design and no degradation mechanisms are evident at the aggregate-cement interfaces. Samples of the cores were digested and analyzed for chloride ingress as well as sulfate attack. The concentrations of chloride and sulfate ions did not exceed the limits of the mix design and there is no indication of any degradation due to these mechanisms. Thermal analysis on samples taken along the longitudinal axis of the cores show that there is a 1 inch carbonation layer (i.e., no portlandite) present in the interior wall of the reactor building and a negligible carbonation layer in the exterior wall. A mixed layer of carbonate and portlandite extends deeper into the interior (2-3 inches) and exterior (1-2 inches) walls. This is more extensive than measured in previous SRS structures. Once the completely carbonated layer reaches the rebar that is approximately 2-3 inches into the concrete wall, the steel is susceptible to corrosion. The growth rate of the carbonated layer was estimated from current observations and previous studies. Based on the estimated carbonation rate, the steel rebar should be protected from carbonation induced corrosion for at least another 100 years. If degradation of these structures is dominated by the carbonation mechanism, the length of time before water intrusion is expected into the process room of P-reactor is estimated to be between 425-675 years.