Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for Securing the Internet of Things (IoT).
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Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) or Physical One Way Functions (P-OWFs) are physical systems whose responses to input stimuli (i.e., challenges) are easy to measure (within reasonable error bounds) but hard to clone. The unclonability property comes from the accepted hardness of replicating the multitude of characteristics introduced during the manufacturing process. This makes PUFs useful for solving problems such as device authentication, software protection, licensing, and certified execution. In this paper, we focus on the effectiveness of PUFs for software protection in offline settings. We first argue that traditional (black-box) PUFs are not useful for protecting software in settings where communication with a vendor's server or third party network device is infeasible or impossible. Instead, we argue that Intrinsic PUFs are needed to solve the above mentioned problems because they are intrinsically involved in processing the information that is to be protected. Finally, we describe how sources of randomness in any computing device can be used for creating intrinsic-personal-PUFs (IP-PUF) and present experimental results in using standard off-the-shelf computers as IP-PUFs.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) or Physical One Way Functions (P-OWFs) are physical systems whose responses to input stimuli (i.e., challenges) are easy to measure (within reasonable error bounds) but hard to clone. This property of unclonability is due to the accepted hardness of replicating the multitude of uncontrollable manufacturing characteristics and makes PUFs useful in solving problems such as device authentication, software protection, licensing, and certified execution. In this paper, we focus on the effectiveness of PUFs for software protection and show that traditional non-computational (black-box) PUFs cannot solve the problem against real world adversaries in offline settings. Our contributions are the following: We provide two real world adversary models (weak and strong variants) and present definitions for security against the adversaries. We continue by proposing schemes secure against the weak adversary and show that no scheme is secure against a strong adversary without the use of trusted hardware. Finally, we present a protection scheme secure against strong adversaries based on trusted hardware.
Supply chain security to detect, deter, and prevent the counterfeiting of networked and stand-alone integrated circuits (ICs) is critical to cyber security. Sandia National Laboratory researchers have developed IC ID to leverage Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and strong cryptographic authentication to create a unique fingerprint for each integrated circuit. IC ID assures the authenticity of ICs to prevent tampering or malicious substitution.
The last few decades have seen a large proliferation in the prevalence of cyber-physical systems. This has been especially highlighted by the explosive growth in the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Unfortunately, the increasing prevalence of these devices has begun to draw the attention of malicious entities which exploit them for their own gain. What makes these devices especially attractive is the various resource constraints present in these devices that make it difficult to add standard security features. Therefore, one intriguing research direction is creating security solutions out of already present components such as sensors. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are one potential solution that use intrinsic variations of the device manufacturing process for provisioning security. In this work, we propose a novel weak PUF design using thermistor temperature sensors. Our design uses the differences in resistance variation between thermistors in response to temperature change. To generate a PUF that is reliable across a range of temperatures, we use a response-generation algorithm that helps mitigate the effects of temperature variation on the thermistors. We tested the performance of our proposed design across a range of environmental operating conditions. From this we were able to evaluate the reliability of the proposed PUF with respect to variations in temperature and humidity. We also evaluated the PUF’s uniqueness using Monte Carlo simulations.
A physically unclonable function (PUF) and a method of reading it are provided. The PUF is constituted by a microfabricated array of randomly polarized micromagnets disposed on a substrate. The PUF can be read by creating a magnetization map of the PUF from the signal output of a quantum diamond microscope (QDM) and converting the magnetization map to a numerical sequence.
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) make use of the measurable intrinsic randomness of physical systems to establish signatures for those systems. Thus, PUFs provide a means to generate unique keys that don't need to be stored in nonvolatile memory, and they offer exciting opportunities for new authentication and supply chain security technologies.
This program is a graphical user interface for measuring and performing inter-active analysis of physical unclonable functions (PUFs). It is intended for demonstration and education purposes. See license.txt for license details. The program features a PUF visualization that demonstrates how signatures differ between PUFs and how they exhibit noise over repeated measurements. A similarity scoreboard shows the user how close the current measurement is to the closest chip signatures in the database. Other metrics such as average noise and inter-chip Hamming distances are presented to the user. Randomness tests published in NIST SP 800-22 can be computed and displayed. Noise and inter-chip histograms for the sample of PUFs and repeated PUF measurements can be drawn.
This program is a graphical user interface for measuring and performing inter-active analysis of physical unclonable functions (PUFs). It is intended for demonstration and education purposes. See license.txt for license details. The program features a PUF visualization that demonstrates how signatures differ between PUFs and how they exhibit noise over repeated measurements. A similarity scoreboard shows the user how close the current measurement is to the closest chip signatures in the database. Other metrics such as average noise and inter-chip Hamming distances are presented to the user. Randomness tests published in NIST SP 800-22 can be computed and displayed. Noise and inter-chip histograms for the sample of PUFs and repeated PUF measurements can be drawn.
Cybersecurity of inverters has been significantly important as inverters become smarter in cyber-physical environments. However, firmware security of smart inverters against firmware attacks from various attack vectors has been less studied. Furthermore, this paper proposes a secure firmware update and device authentication method using a blockchain-based public key infrastructure (PKI) management system and a physically unclonable function (PUF)-embedded security module in a smart inverter. The proposed method is validated by experiments.
Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a hardware device for authenticating a binding of the hardware device and a physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes an internal physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generate an internal PUF value. Binding logic is coupled to receive the internal PUF value, as well as an external PUF value associated with the physical structure, and generates a binding PUF value, which represents the binding of the hardware device and the physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit also includes a cryptographic unit that uses the binding PUF value to allow a challenger to authenticate the binding.
We report on the fabrication and characterization of nanocrystalline ZnO films for use as a random laser physical unclonable function (PUF). Correlation between processing conditions and film microstructure will be made to optimize the lasing properties and random response. We will specifically examine the repeatability and security of PUFs demonstrated in this novel system. This demonstration has promise to impact many of Sandia's core missions including counterfeit detection.
The increased use of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) in critical systems brings new challenges in securing the diversely programmable fabric from cyber-attacks. FPGAs are an inexpensive, efficient, and flexible alternative to Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), which are becoming increasingly expensive and impractical for low volume manufacturing as technology nodes continue to shrink. Unfortunately, FPGAs are not designed for high security applications, and their high-flexibility lends itself to low security and vulnerability to malicious attacks. Similar to securing an ASIC’s functionality, FPGA programmers can exploit the inherent randomness introduced into hardware structures during fabrication for security applications. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are one such solution that uses the die specific variability in hardware fabrication for both secret key generation and verification. PUFs strive to be random, unique, and reliable. Throughout recent years many PUF structures have been presented to try and maximize these three design constraints, reliability being the most difficult of the three to achieve. This thesis presents a new PUF structure that combines two elementary PUF concepts (a bi-stable SRAM PUF and a delay-based arbiter PUF) to create a PUF with increased reliability, while maintaining both random and unique qualities. Properties of the new PUF will be discussed as well as the various design modifications that can be made to tweak the desired performance and overhead.
Random variations in microelectronic circuit structures represent the source of entropy for physical unclonable functions (PUFs). In this paper, we investigate delay variations that occur through the routing network and switch matrices of a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). The delay variations are isolated from other components of the programmable logic, e.g., look-up tables (LUTs), flip-flops (FFs), etc., using a feature of Xilinx FPGAs called dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR). A set of partial designs is created to fix the placement of a time-to-digital converter (TDC) and supporting infrastructure to enable the path delays through the target interconnect and switch matrices to be extracted by subtracting out common-mode delay components. Delay variations are analyzed in the different levels of routing resources available within FPGAs, i.e., local routing and across-chip routing. Data are collected from a set of Xilinx Zynq 7010 devices, and a statistical analysis of within-die variations in delay through a set of the randomly-generated and hand-crafted interconnects is presented.
Magnetic microscopy with high spatial resolution helps to solve a variety of technical problems in condensed-matter physics, electrical engineering, biomagnetism, and geomagnetism. In this work we used quantum diamond magnetic microscope (QDMM) setups, which use a dense uniform layer of magnetically-sensitive nitrogen-vacancy (NV) centers in diamond to image an external magnetic field using a fluorescence microscope. We used this technique for imaging few-micron ferromagnetic needles used as a physically unclonable function (PUF) and to passively interrogate electric current paths in a commercial 555 timer integrated circuit (IC). As part of the QDMM development, we also found a way to calculate ion implantation recipes to create diamond samples with dense uniform NV layers at the surface. This work opens the possibility for follow-up experiments with 2D magnetic materials, ion implantation, and electronics characterization and troubleshooting.
GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.
Process variations within Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) provide a rich source of entropy and are therefore well-suited for the implementation of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). However, careful considerations must be given to the design of the PUF architecture as a means of avoiding undesirable localized bias effects that adversely impact randomness, an important statistical quality characteristic of a PUF. Here in this paper, we investigate a ring-oscillator (RO) PUF that leverages localized entropy from individual look-up table (LUT) primitives. A novel RO construction is presented that enables the individual paths through the LUT primitive to be measured and isolated at high precision, and an analysis is presented that demonstrates significant levels of localized design bias. The analysis demonstrates that delay-based PUFs that utilize LUTs as a source of entropy should avoid using FPGA primitives that are localized to specific regions of the FPGA, and instead, a more robust PUF architecture can be constructed by distributing path delay components over a wider region of the FPGA fabric. Compact RO PUF architectures that utilize multiple configurations within a small group of LUTs are particularly susceptible to these types of design-level bias effects. The analysis is carried out on data collected from a set of identically designed, hard macro instantiations of the RO implemented on 30 copies of a Zynq 7010 SoC.