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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Predicting Pilot Error in Nextgen: Pilot Performance Modeling and Validation Efforts

We review 25 articles presenting 5 general classes of computational models to predict pilot error. This more targeted review is placed within the context of the broader review of computational models of pilot cognition and performance, including such aspects as models of situation awareness or pilot-automation interaction. Particular emphasis is placed on the degree of validation of such models against empirical pilot data, and the relevance of the modeling and validation efforts to Next Gen technology and procedures.

pilot error↗
NASA NTRS1985

Investigation of technology needs for avoiding helicopter pilot error related accidents

Pilot error which is cited as a cause or related factor in most rotorcraft accidents was examined. Pilot error related accidents in helicopters to identify areas in which new technology could reduce or eliminate the underlying causes of these human errors were investigated. The aircraft accident data base at the U.S. Army Safety Center was studied as the source of data on helicopter accidents. A randomly selected sample of 110 aircraft records were analyzed on a case-by-case basis to assess the nature of problems which need to be resolved and applicable technology implications. Six technology areas in which there appears to be a need for new or increased emphasis are identified.

Chais, R. I.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Pilot errors as a source of workload

A pilot opinion survey was conducted to develop a database for creating simulation scenarios that impose predetermined levels of pilot workload. Twelve pilots estimated the effect of 163 events and activities (which they had encountered during their previous flying experiences) on performance, effort, workload, and stress. The events, described in the context of flight scenario segments, included control, navigation and communications activities, aircraft and system failures, and pilot errors. In general, workload, stress, and effort ratings were significantly correlated with each other but not with performance ratings; however, some different response patterns were found as a function of flight segment (e.g., workload, stress, and performance, but not effort, ratings varied with flight phase) and type of event. Errors were rated as a significant source of change for workload, stress, and performance, suggesting that errors could be conceptualized as a cause of workload rather than as a symptom.

Hart, S. G.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Pressing the Approach: A NASA Study of 19 Recent Accidents Yields a New Perspective on Pilot Error

This article begins with a review of two sample airplane accidents that were caused by pilot error. The analysis of these and 17 other accidents suggested that almost all experienced pilot operating in the same environment in which the accident crews were operating and knowing only what the accident crews knew at each moment of the flight, would be vulnerable to making a similar decision and similar errors. Whether a particular crew in a given situation makes errors depends on somewhat random interaction of factors. Two themes that seem to be prevalent in these cases are: Plan Continuation Bias, and Snowballing Workload.

Berman, Benjamin A.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Activity Tracking for Pilot Error Detection from Flight Data

This report presents an application of activity tracking for pilot error detection from flight data, and describes issues surrounding such an application. It first describes the Crew Activity Tracking System (CATS), in-flight data collected from the NASA Langley Boeing 757 Airborne Research Integrated Experiment System aircraft, and a model of B757 flight crew activities. It then presents an example of CATS detecting actual in-flight crew errors.

Callantine, Todd J.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Classification and reduction of pilot error

Human error is a primary or contributing factor in about two-thirds of commercial aviation accidents worldwide. With the ultimate goal of reducing pilot error accidents, this contract effort is aimed at understanding the factors underlying error events and reducing the probability of certain types of errors by modifying underlying factors such as flight deck design and procedures. A review of the literature relevant to error classification was conducted. Classification includes categorizing types of errors, the information processing mechanisms and factors underlying them, and identifying factor-mechanism-error relationships. The classification scheme developed by Jens Rasmussen was adopted because it provided a comprehensive yet basic error classification shell or structure that could easily accommodate addition of details on domain-specific factors. For these purposes, factors specific to the aviation environment were incorporated. Hypotheses concerning the relationship of a small number of underlying factors, information processing mechanisms, and error types types identified in the classification scheme were formulated. ASRS data were reviewed and a simulation experiment was performed to evaluate and quantify the hypotheses.

Rogers, W. H.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents. CRM/HF Conference, Held in Denver, Colorado on April 16-17, 2006

Reviewed NTSB reports of the 19 U.S. airline accidents between 1991-2000 attributed primarily to crew error. Asked: Why might any airline crew in situation of accident crew--knowing only what they knew--be vulnerable. Can never know with certainty why accident crew made specific errors but can determine why the population of pilots is vulnerable. Considers variability of expert performance as function of interplay of multiple factors.

Aviation accidents↗
NASA NTRS1975

Secondary task for full flight simulation incorporating tasks that commonly cause pilot error: Time estimation

The task of time estimation, an activity occasionally performed by pilots during actual flight, was investigated with the objective of providing human factors investigators with an unobtrusive and minimally loading additional task that is sensitive to differences in flying conditions and flight instrumentation associated with the main task of piloting an aircraft simulator. Previous research indicated that the duration and consistency of time estimates is associated with the cognitive, perceptual, and motor loads imposed by concurrent simple tasks. The relationships between the length and variability of time estimates and concurrent task variables under a more complex situation involving simulated flight were clarified. The wrap-around effect with respect to baseline duration, a consequence of mode switching at intermediate levels of concurrent task distraction, should contribute substantially to estimate variability and have a complex effect on the shape of the resulting distribution of estimates.

Rosch, E.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Pilot Navigation Errors on the Airport Surface: Identifying Contributing Factors and Mitigating Solutions

A taxonomy of navigation errors (pilot deviations) during taxi operations was developed that defines 3 classes of errors: planning, decision, and execution errors. This taxonomy was applied to error data from 2 full-mission simulation studies that included trials that replicated current-day operations and trials with advanced cockpit technologies including datalink, electronic moving maps (EMM), and head-up displays (HUDs). Pilots committed navigation errors on 17% of current-day operations trials (in low-visibility and night), distributed roughly equally across the 3 error classes. Each error class was associated with a unique set of contributing factor s and mitigating solutions. Planning errors were mitigated by technologies that provided an unambiguous record of the clearance (datalink and the EMM, which possessed a text-based clearance). Decision errors were mitigated by technologies that provided both local and global awareness including information about the distance to and direction of the next turn, current township location, and a graphical depiction of the route (as provided by the EMM and HUD together). Execution errors were best mitigated by the HUD, which disambiguated the environment and depicted the clear ed taxi route. Implications for technology design and integration are provided.

Hooey, Becky L.↗
NASA NTRS1974

An analysis of pilot error-related aircraft accidents

A multidisciplinary team approach to pilot error-related U.S. air carrier jet aircraft accident investigation records successfully reclaimed hidden human error information not shown in statistical studies. New analytic techniques were developed and applied to the data to discover and identify multiple elements of commonality and shared characteristics within this group of accidents. Three techniques of analysis were used: Critical element analysis, which demonstrated the importance of a subjective qualitative approach to raw accident data and surfaced information heretofore unavailable. Cluster analysis, which was an exploratory research tool that will lead to increased understanding and improved organization of facts, the discovery of new meaning in large data sets, and the generation of explanatory hypotheses. Pattern recognition, by which accidents can be categorized by pattern conformity after critical element identification by cluster analysis.

Kowalsky, N. B.↗
NASA NTRS1975

The influence of radio altimeter errors on pilot performance during the final approach and landing phase of an RPV mission

Due to the fact that remotely piloted vehicles (RPV's) are currently being flown from fixed base control centers, kinesthetic and real world peripheral vision cues are absent. The absence of these cues complicates the piloting task, particularly during the final approach and landing phase of a mission. The pilot's task is futher complicated by errors in the displayed altitude information. To determine the influence of these errors on pilot performance during the final approach and landing phase of a mission, an experiment was conducted in which pilot subjects were asked to fly a fixed base simulation of a Piper PA-30 aircraft, using degraded altitude information. For this experiment, the chevron component of the display configuration was driven by a radio altimeter. Four altimeters were used, each with a different error characteristic, but within the range specified for the Sperry series of radio altimeters. Results indicate that for range of errors considered, there is no significant difference in landing performance that can be attributed to errors in altitude information.

Howard, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS1983

A computerized, procedural aid for flight crews

A computer program for detecting pilot error is described. The program observes pilot actions through the aircraft controls and state, and the actions are compared to those of a procedural script which can be considered a prescriptive model of the procedural aspects of flight. Pilot error is a discrepancy between the pilot actions and the script. The script has a hierarchical structure consisting of a single script at the highest level, scripts for the major phases of flight at the next level, scripts for procedures to be executed during these phases, and procedure step scripts at the bottom. The program interprets the aircraft data base in terms of the script, detecting errors of commission from a set of allowed and disallowed changes stored with each script element.

Hammer, J. M.↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Effects of Speed Uncertainty on a Separation Assurance Algorithm

Trajectory prediction is central to separation assurance, because it is necessary to accurately predict where an aircraft will be in the future to avoid losses of separation. In any system in the field there will always be uncertainty associated with trajectory prediction. This uncertainty is a product of many different sources including wind prediction errors, pilot intent, surveillance errors, navigation errors and aircraft weight. The purpose of this study is to parametrically analyze the effects of aircraft speed errors on conflict detection and to analyze the performance of a conflict resolution algorithm when these speed errors are present. Results show that a speed error of +/- 10% of the cruise speed can result in about 30% of the conflicts not being detected ten minutes before the loss of separation. It can also result in 50% more resolutions being performed to maintain separation.

Lauderdale, Todd A.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Performance Data Errors in Air Carrier Operations: Causes and Countermeasures

Several airline accidents have occurred in recent years as the result of erroneous weight or performance data used to calculate V-speeds, flap/trim settings, required runway lengths, and/or required climb gradients. In this report we consider 4 recent studies of performance data error, report our own study of ASRS-reported incidents, and provide countermeasures that can reduce vulnerability to accidents caused by performance data errors. Performance data are generated through a lengthy process involving several employee groups and computer and/or paper-based systems. Although much of the airline indUStry 's concern has focused on errors pilots make in entering FMS data, we determined that errors occur at every stage of the process and that errors by ground personnel are probably at least as frequent and certainly as consequential as errors by pilots. Most of the errors we examined could in principle have been trapped by effective use of existing procedures or technology; however, the fact that they were not trapped anywhere indicates the need for better countermeasures. Existing procedures are often inadequately designed to mesh with the ways humans process information. Because procedures often do not take into account the ways in which information flows in actual flight ops and time pressures and interruptions experienced by pilots and ground personnel, vulnerability to error is greater. Some aspects of NextGen operations may exacerbate this vulnerability. We identify measures to reduce the number of errors and to help catch the errors that occur.

countermeasures↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Formal Methods Approach to the Analysis of Mode Confusion

The goal of the new NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) is to reduce the civil aviation fatal accident rate by 80% in ten years and 90% in twenty years. This program is being driven by the accident data with a focus on the most recent history. Pilot error is the most commonly cited cause for fatal accidents (up to 70%) and obviously must be given major consideration in this program. While the greatest source of pilot error is the loss of situation awareness , mode confusion is increasingly becoming a major contributor as well. The January 30, 1995 issue of Aviation Week lists 184 incidents and accidents involving mode awareness including the Bangalore A320 crash 2/14/90, the Strasbourg A320 crash 1/20/92, the Mulhouse-Habsheim A320 crash 6/26/88, and the Toulouse A330 crash 6/30/94. These incidents and accidents reveal that pilots sometimes become confused about what the cockpit automation is doing. Consequently, human factors research is an obvious investment area. However, even a cursory look at the accident data reveals that the mode confusion problem is much deeper than just training deficiencies and a lack of human-oriented design. This is readily acknowledged by human factors experts. It seems that further progress in human factors must come through a deeper scrutiny of the internals of the automation. It is in this arena that formal methods can contribute. Formal methods refers to the use of techniques from logic and discrete mathematics in the specification, design, and verification of computer systems, both hardware and software. The fundamental goal of formal methods is to capture requirements, designs and implementations in a mathematically based model that can be analyzed in a rigorous manner. Research in formal methods is aimed at automating this analysis as much as possible. By capturing the internal behavior of a flight deck in a rigorous and detailed formal model, the dark corners of a design can be analyzed. This paper will explore how formal models and analyses can be used to help eliminate mode confusion from flight deck designs and at the same time increase our confidence in the safety of the implementation. The paper is based upon interim results from a new project involving NASA Langley and Rockwell Collins in applying formal methods to a realistic business jet Flight Guidance System (FGS).

Butler, Ricky W.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lander Lighting to Reduce Pilot Approach Errors: Project Design Assumptions & Model Constraints

The south pole lighting environment will have harsh low inclination sunlight, making overhead judgement of surface features difficult. Autonomous solutions are great, however, the need for visual monitoring and independent go/no-go decisions remain. Our project proposes that lunar landing systems will be better served by including a powerful landing light system that improves visibility of surfaces from overhead by illuminating the ground at critical distances for the crew to make last minute decisions regarding an approach.

Toni A. Clark↗
NASA NTRS1993

Autogenic-feedback training improves pilot performance during emergency flying conditions

Studies have shown that autonomous mode behavior is one cause of aircraft fatalities due to pilot error. In such cases, the pilot is in a high state of psychological and physiological arousal and tends to focus on one problem, while ignoring more critical information. The effect of training in physiological self-recognition and regulation, as a means of improving crew cockpit performance was examined. Seventeen pilots were assigned to the treatment and control groups matched for accumulated flight hours. The treatment group comprised four pilots of HC-130 Hercules aircraft and four HH-65 Dolphin helicopter pilots; the control group comprised three pilots of HC-130's and six Dolphin helicopter pilots. During an initial flight physiological data were recorded for each crewmember and individual crew performance and rated by an instructor pilot. Eight crewmembers were then taught to regulate their own physiological response levels using Autogenic-Feedback Training (AFT). The remaining subjects received no training. During a second flight, treatment subjects showed significant improvement in performance, while controls did not improve. The results indicate that AFT management of high states of physiological arousal may improve pilot performance during emergency flying conditions.

Kellar, Michael A.↗